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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The main contention of this thesis is that traditional IR approaches, ethics of 
migration literature and a part of the poststructural scholarship, either implicitly but 
also often explicitly, are based on an exclusionary, hierarchical understanding of the 
Other and an Us versus Them ordering of society even when they purport to contradict 
it. As such, they engender a collective ethos, which, despite these approaches’ initial 
intentions or pronounced humanitarian commitments, does not take into account the 
stranger Other beyond a lordship/bondage view on one hand and allow for 
exacerbating the violence towards the Other/ stranger on the other. This exacerbation 
can be noted when looking at current hospitality practices (detention camps; “closed 
hospitality centres”; state sanctioned illegal push-backs of refugees; “fortress Europe” 
kind of policies, etc.). Whilst accepting this is not a new problem (movement of 
individuals, post-conflict waves of refugees, liminal figures in societies and 
communities have always been present and have constituted parts of on-going 
theoretical discussions in IR, bringing out theoretical tensions and difficulties), the 
thesis argues that there are certain novelties to be found: namely, a strengthened 
overarching security narrative and the resulting militarisation of the treatment of 
strangers. Against this background, my thesis notes the relative absence of any 
ethically engaged discussion around hospitality and finds it problematic. It proposes 
the reconsideration in IR of an umbrella term naming the liminal abject Other. It then 
argues for the need to reconsider the Levinasian understanding of the ethical 
responsibility towards the singular and multiple Others through the concept of 
fraternity. Finally, it revisits the Derridean theorisation of hospitality, i.e., hospitality 
as an opening up of theory to the “missing” or the Other in Western thought beyond 
an “Us/ Them” understanding, through an affirmative reading of autoimmunity, 
arguing that the autoimmunitary ethics of hospitality can enact the ethical 
responsibility by crossing the threshold of undecidability towards an opening to the 
Other. 
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INTRODUCTION1 
 
 
“Who loves the stranger. Who loves the stranger? Whom else is there to love?”  
J. Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas 
 
“Let us consider this negative sentence: ‘death has no border’” 
J. Derrida, Aporias 
 
 
Mos maiorum,2 Mare Nostrum, Xenios Zeus,3 Aphrodite, Perkunas,4 Balder,5 Triton: Latin, 
                                                        1	The	thesis	was	initially	submitted	in	January	2015	and,	as	such,	descriptions	of	events	and	policies	in	some	cases	may	reflect	the	initial	time	of	writing.			2	Mos,	 “a	 vague	 and	 emotional	 concept”	 (Syme,	 1939:153)	 is	 the	 Latin	 word	 referring	 to	 social	custom	or	tradition	in	contrast	to	ius	(human	law	in	a	broad	sense,	the	law)	and	lex	(legislated	law,	
a	law).	Mos	maiorum	was	thus	understood	as	ancestral	custom	or	the	custom	of	the	elders,	which	in	the	 context	 of	 the	 “unending	 real-constitutional	 political	 struggle,	 could	 be	 invoked	 by	 the	reactionary,	reformist	and	revolutionary	alike”	(Allot,	2002:360).		Implemented	from	13	to	26	October	2014,	the	Mos	Maiorum	was	a	joint	operation	set	in	motion	by	the	Italian	Presidency	of	the	Council	of	the	European	Union,	“aiming	at	weakening	the	capacity	of	organized	crime	groups	to	facilitate	illegal	immigration	to	the	EU	and	(...)	focusing	on	illegal	border	crossing.	Another	goal	of	this	operation	is	to	collect	information,	for	intelligence	and	investigation	purposes,	 regarding	 the	main	 routes	 followed	 by	migrants	 to	 enter	 in	 the	 common	 area	 and	 the	modus	operandi	used	by	crime	networks	to	smuggle	people	towards	the	EU	territory,	focusing	also	on	 the	 secondary	 movements.”	 Council	 of	 the	 European	 Union,	 Note	 of	 the	 Presidency	 to	 the	Delegates	 11671/14,	 Brussels	 10.7.2014	 available	 at	http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/sep/eu-council-2014-07-10-11671-mos-maioum-jpo.pdf,	last	 visited	 on	 7th	 October	 2014.	 The	 operation	 was	 seen	 by	 local	 and	 international	 NGOs	 and	immigrants	 support	 groups	 as	 another	 attempt	 at	 immigration	 clampdown	 and	 strengthening	 of	Fortress	 Europe,	 of	 the	 type	 undertaken	 every	 semester	 by	 each	 rotating	 presidency	 (see	operations	Barkunas,	Balder	below).	In	more	extreme	cases,	it	was	criticized	as	a	“pogrom”	against	undocumented	 migrants,	 with	 protests	 organised	 in	 Brussels	 on	 the	 days	 during	 which	 the	operation	was	active.			3	Perhaps	the	most	ironically	named	of	all	the	operations,	Operation	Xenios	Zeus	was	a	large-scale	sweep	operation	intended	to	crack	down	on	irregular	immigration	and	crime	in	Athens,	Greece	and	led	 by	 the	 Greek	 police.	 Issues	 of	 abusive	 stop-and-searches,	 wrongful	 arrests,	 hours-long	detentions	 and	 mistreatment	 at	 police	 stations	 have	 resulted	 in	 various	 condemnatory	 ECHR	decisions	 and	 reports	 by	 humanitarian	 organizations	 (Human	 Rights	 Watch,	 2013),	 and	 many	damning	newspaper	articles	in	the	national	and	foreign	press.	4	In	Lithuanian	and	Baltic	mythology,	Perkunas	is	the	god	of	thunder	and	an	important	god	in	the	Baltic	pantheon.	Following	the	examples	above,	or	as	stated	in	its	final	report,	“the	tradition	well-established	(sic)	by	previous	EU	Presidency	Member	States,”	Operation	Perkunas	was	initiated	and	organized	 by	 the	 State	 Border	 Guard	 Service	 at	 the	 Ministry	 of	 the	 Interior	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	Lithuania	“with	the	main	goal	of	 identifying	the	 link	between	illegal	EU	external	border	crossings	and	 secondary	 movements	 of	 irregular	 immigrants	 within	 the	 EU	 and	 Schengen	 Area.	 Frontex	contributed	 to	 the	 operation	 by	 supporting	 the	 Lithuanian	 Authority	 in	 collecting	 data	 and	 by	making	 its	Risk	Analysis	Unit	 available	 to	prepare	 the	 chapter	of	 the	 report	 concerning	 irregular	migration	at	 the	EU	external	borders.”	Council	of	 the	European	Union,	Final	Report	on	Operation	Perkunas	16045/13,	Brussels	11.12.2013	available	at		http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/mar/eu-council-operation-perkunas-16045-13.pdf,	 last	visited	on	7th	October	2014.				5	Similarly,	Balder	 is	 the	god	of	 light,	one	of	 the	most	 important	gods	 in	Norse	mythology,	whose	name	was	used	by	the	Danish	Presidency	of	the	EU	Council	for	a	High	Impact	Operation	collecting	information	on	migratory	flows	within	the	Member	States	along	the	lines	already	outlined	above.		
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ancient Greek or other antiquated names and phrases referring to mythological gods, 
ancient colonial policies, traditions and customs of a glorious Western past are in 
vogue when it comes to describing European and national operations and policies 
aimed at curbing, restraining and even eliminating immigration towards the European 
Union.6 While in their clinical language these operations purport generally to gather 
information on migratory flows and identify illegal crossings, in practice they 
contribute to a progressive sealing of European borders, hindering the asylum-
claiming procedure.7 In treating migration and migratory flows as processes that can 
be treated independently of the crises that cause them and of human suffering more 
generally, and in disconnecting them from the problematic legal context and the vast 
divergences of its application in each country (such as the Dublin Regulation and the 
pivotal importance of the country of entry), these operations essentially constitute 
quantitative exercises; and so they miss the impact of the context under which they 
operate, both in terms of their findings and in terms of the cost in human lives. This 
context is one of a militarised border regime. This misdefinition of scope and intent is 
mirrored in the choice of the operations’ names. They constitute political mal-
appropriations, which either contradict the actual workings of the operations they 
describe – there was nothing hospitable in the Xenios Zeus Operation, where arrests of 
undocumented immigrants and detention practices has led Four UN Special 
Procedures to express concerns (SRHRM 2013; SRT 2011; SRSC 2006; WGAD 2013), 
and the European Court of Human Rights to identify degrading treatment – or 
ironically underline colonial connotations (Mare Nostrum was and indeed still is used 
to define our, i.e., European, albeit Mediterranean, Sea).8  
 
In a direct parallel, the terminology of the ethics of migration, and also that of 
mainstream International Relations, functions in a euphemistic way: discussions of 
                                                        6	The	 list	 is	much	 longer	 than	 implied	here.	For	example,	 the	2011	Hermes	operation	(starting	 in	Lampedusa	and	focusing	on	sea	migration	–	the	operation	had	to	extend	its	duration)	and	the	2011	Demeter	 operation	 organised	 by	 the	 Polish	 presidency	 are	 two	 of	 the	 operations	 preceding	 the	cases	 seen	 briefly	 above;	 there	 are	 others	 to	 follow	 (such	 as	 Mitras,	 Aerodromos	 etc)	 in	 “the	tradition	well-established”	mentioned	in	fn	4.					7	Following	 the	 Perkunas	 Operation	 discussed	 briefly	 in	 fn	 5,	 the	 final	 report	 argues	 that	 the	practice	of	migrants	submitting	asylum	claims	after	being	apprehended	during	similar	operations	constitutes	in	essence	“a	definite	quantitative	indication	of	abuse	of	the	asylum	procedure”.	While	this	may	be	legally	correct,	 it	 is	based	on	a	flawed	premise,	since	it	takes	into	account	neither	the	inability	of	many	of	 the	 intercepted	 to	 submit	 claims	upon	 initial	entry	 into	 the	EU	prior	 to	 their	capture,	nor	the	restrictions	of	the	Dublin	system.			8	See	 also	 Hugo	 Brady’s	Mare	 Europaeum?	 Tackling	 Immigration	 in	 the	Mediterranean,	 European	Institute	of	Security	Studies	Brief	Issue	25,	September	2014.		
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quotas, right to enter and to leave, freedom of movement, brain-drain, etc. Although 
common as variables for policy orientation, such terminology often obscures the 
human dimension of – and suffering entailed by – the issues it addresses. Ethics of 
migration very often does not even talk about migration per se: like in the recent book 
by Joseph Carens, one of the most eminent representatives of the literature of 
migration ethics, the focus is on naturalisation, citizenship, labour migration and 
refugees (2013). Border crossings and related plights, exclusion and death, and also the 
migrants’ own voices, are seldom referred to.  
 
Such tragedies are often seen as sad but logical results: strife in the periphery will 
always create a centripetal force towards the core; people will flee, move and travel; 
and this will make them unwelcome, put them in peril, even kill them. We are not only 
informed but also partially conditioned and formed through the acceptance of this 
violence inflicted on the Other – often we are even involved in it in one way or 
another. Given that laws of hospitality partly entail this violence and we are members 
of communities guided by them, this is deemed only natural: our cities cannot be 
inundated by foreigners, we have to guarantee our survival before helping Others, life 
is unfair, people die. Ethically speaking though this is a very problematic admission. 
Being formed within a matrix of power “does not mean we need loyally or 
automatically reconstitute that matrix throughout the course of our lives” (Butler, 
2009:167). Similarly, the fact that hospitality laws have violence at their origins, and 
traditional ethics seem to make allowances for tragic eventualities of this sort, 
producing in this way the “norm” of hospitality, does not mean that this should 
remain unchallenged.  
  
Do we need to respond to these tragedies? This thesis argues that we do. Why? 
Because it is only in responding that we can account for our existence, the existence of 
ethics (and also of politics) and because taking such tragedies for granted is in essence 
a failure of humanity. Responding can of course take many guises: pondering on the 
ethics of our response is one of them, the one that this thesis is making; and it does so 
by considering and arguing in favour of a certain understanding of the ethics of 
hospitality. Accepting that the hospitality norm briefly described above needs to be 
contested, my thesis identifies the need to consider receptivity to the claims of the 
Other. 
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The capacity to respond to the claim [of non-violence] has everything to do 
with how the claim is formed and framed, but also with the disposition of the 
senses, or the conditions of receptivity itself, 
 
argues Judith Butler in the chapter entitled “The Claim of Non-Violence” in her 2009 
Frames of War (2009:165). My argument is similar: if we are to become able to respond 
to the tragedy of violence and death inflicted on the Other stranger, the stranger 
Other, the missing, we first need to be receptive of the claim of the Other, of her 
address to us, of her unarticulated need. This is to be attained by considering 
hospitality ethics in the Levinasian and Derridean vein.   
 
The claim of the Other upon me has to be met not only because we are all Others in 
some respect and potentially in need of a response, nor because we are interconnected 
on various levels and in multiple ways. The call of the Other, and I understand that 
this is controversial, before recognition and calculation, constitutes me as a Subject. 
Responding to this call and to the Other may entail a struggle and a polemical need to 
overcome the current presumptions of hospitality. However, most importantly it needs 
to be accompanied by “a critical intervention apropos the norms that differentiate 
between those lives that count as livable and grievable and those that do not” (Butler, 
2009:180), between those Others that are allowed to go missing and be unaccounted 
for and those who are not. Performing such an intervention, though, entails 
fundamentally challenging our understanding of these lives and of the Other, as I will 
be arguing in this thesis. The need to move away from the traditional metaphysical 
tendency to rely on irreducible pairs, such as the hierarchical relation of Self and 
Other, host and guest, friend and enemy, master and slave is crucial for hospitality. 
The Levinasian ethical encounter and the affirmative understanding of hospitality as 
autoimmunity in the Derridean conceptualisation, which I explore in chapter four and 
five respectively, are indispensable tools in this regard.  
 
Doing away with the need for decisionality and to base decisions on certainty and 
calculation is the crucial step: hospitality, as the aporia par excellence, allows us to 
embrace the madness inherent in the decision and the uncertain nature of being. 
Hospitality as threshold, which is both disorienting and paradoxical, and where we are 
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called to linger before the transgressive step; and autoimmunitary hospitality as the 
opening up to the unforeseen, the affirmation of what comes each time in a unique 
and novel way, carrying its threat but also its opportunity.  
 
Hospitality as the interruption of the Self 
The first main contention of my thesis is that when it comes to the issue of hospitality 
and border crossing, traditional International Relations’ (from now on IR) approaches, 
ethics of migration literature, human rights discourse and parts of poststructural 
scholarship, are all, either implicitly but also often explicitly, based on an 
exclusionary, power-contingent hierarchical understanding of the Other and an Us 
versus Them ordering of society, even when they purport to contradict such an 
understanding. As such, on the one hand, they engender a collective ethos, which, 
despite these approaches’ initial intentions or pronounced humanitarian 
commitments, does not take the account of the Self/Other (where the Other is the 
stranger, foreigner and guest, the irregular and undocumented migrant; more on this 
later) relationship beyond a lordship/bondage view. On the other hand, they legitimise 
the exacerbation of the violence towards the stranger Other. I argue that mainstream 
IR approaches tend to avoid the intricacies of the Self/Other relationship and the 
responsibility this carries by submitting to a generally accepted framework of 
humanitarian assistance and a loosely understood, abiding concern for Others, 
masking in this way what is in essence the reproduction of domination and a 
propensity for aggression. This submission leads to poor treatment of the Other and 
an exacerbation of violence, as can be observed in current practices of hospitality 
(detention camps; “closed hospitality centres”; state sanctioned but illegal push-backs 
of refugees; “Fortress Europe” types of policies resulting in perilous border crossings, 
etc.). While accepting this is not a new problem (movement of individuals, post-
conflict waves of refugees and liminal figures in societies and communities have 
always been present and have constituted parts of on-going theoretical discussions in 
IR, bringing out theoretical tensions and difficulties), the present thesis argues that 
there are certain novelties to be found: namely, a strengthened overarching security 
narrative and a resulting militarisation of the treatment of strangers. Against this 
background, my thesis notes the absence, with a few exceptions, of any extensive 
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engagement with the ethics of hospitality in IR and finds this absence problematic.9  
 
Secondly, I argue that the categorisations of Otherness in hospitality (refugee, asylum 
seeker, migrant, along with other liminal abject subcategories) are often misemployed 
and exacerbate violence and that a new theoretical category addressing the liminal and 
non-categorisable in International Political Theory (from now on IPT) and IR, which is 
already slowly emerging, needs to be built upon. This is necessary, the thesis argues, 
because Hegelian, Kojèvian, existentialist and liberal accounts of the relation with the 
Other cannot but provide us with descriptive readings of her and of the militarisation 
observed in hospitality practices. The same goes for the Buberian egalitarian view of 
the Other, which elides difference, for the exclusionary framework provided by 
Agamben’s homo sacer and other post-structural approaches of the biopolitical vein. 
Similarly, the importance attributed to recognition by postcolonialism and to 
resistance by the autonomy of migration scholarship does not allow us to escape from 
a Self/Object relation.  
 
Thirdly, in the main body of the thesis, building on already existing relevant work on 
the issue, I argue for the need to reconsider hospitality in poststructuralist terms – 
inspired by Levinas and Derrida – in order to envisage hospitality as an opening up of 
theory to the “missing” or the Other in Western thought beyond an Us / Them 
understanding. In the case of Levinas, this entails a theoretical reconfiguration of the 
Levinasian ethical encounter, freed this time of the issues of religiosity, the impasse 
presented by the third and the insurmountability of the absolute responsibility towards 
the Other, which have traditionally condemned the Levinasian approach to an 
important but also at the same time marginal place within poststructuralist ethics and 
IR in general. That is to say that while Levinasian work has been long considered an 
important influence in poststructuralist renderings of subjectivity and responsibility, 
it has at the same time been left aside and treated as an approach without egress, 
mainly for the problems mentioned above. I am challenging this through the concept 
of fraternity.  
 
In the case of Derrida, I build on his own and existing IR scholarship’s work on 
                                                        9	See	the	introductory	note	to	Gideon	Baker’s	Politicising	Ethics	in	International	Relations,	where	the	same	“striking	omission”	is	noted	(2011a:i).	
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hospitality to argue that hospitality in this vein should not be considered as mainly 
caught between the impossibility of its unconditionality and the possibility of its often 
failing laws, and in an open-ended, loosely understood, always perfectible future-to-
come. I argue that when Derrida talks of the impossible, he actively sees it as possible 
and invites us to do the same. To this effect, I explore the autoimmunitary aspect of 
hospitality, which, along with the concept of the threshold, I argue can help us utilise 
the aporetic nature of hospitality in an ethically affirmative way. Departing from 
Derrida, I propose an autoimmunitary ethics of hospitality, which crosses the 
threshold of undecidability towards an opening to the Other.   
 
These last two arguments take place in chapters three and four, where my thesis goes 
on to argue that Levinas offers us a viable theoretical alternative through his infinite 
ethical demand imposed on the Self at the encounter with the Other. His 
understanding of said encounter brings into play the use of the Self’s sentience and 
emotion, making it an intersubjective experience, which allows one to discover one’s 
own particularity beyond entrenched beliefs and knowledge. While the possibility of 
conflict and violence is not banished, such understanding of hospitality (through the 
encounter with the Other) acts as proof that the normative demands of the Other on 
me are truly recognised and welcomed. The Other is no longer a number to be 
managed, an individual to be kept outside or at the border, but a subject for whom the 
Self bears an infinite responsibility to respond. This responsibility does not derive 
from my actions (as neo-Kantian approaches, prevalent in IR, would have it); but by 
virtue of my relation to the Other established before any action is undertaken. 
Hospitality is an interruption of the Self (Derrida, 1999a:51). I am addressing the well-
known Levinasian conceptualisation of ethical responsibility, but this time rid of the 
common IR anxieties about Levinas: the ethical encounter’s relation with the 
ethicopolitical, namely the presence of the third, the religious character of his writings 
and the general theoretical impasse IR faces when engaging with Levinas. I show that 
there are ways to overcome these anxieties in a manner that allows us to focus on the 
essential Levinasian contribution, despite its complexities. Therefore, Levinas sets the 
ethical: the encounter with the Other and the Self’s ethical responsibility to her, which 
I present as inescapable. The conceptualisation of fraternity is the bridge for the 
passage to the political, a passage considered until now problematic. 
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I argue that, instead of basing an understanding of ethicopolitical relations on a 
particular human essence – as not only Kant but contemporary cosmopolitan 
discourses within international relations tend to do – Levinas and Derrida opt for a 
more relational view of subjectivity as a viable alternative to the neo-Hegelian and 
communitarian approaches.10 Suffice it here to say that, like Derrida, I feel that the 
relational subjectivity I am proposing and which is needed to address in earnest the 
migratory plights of those caught up in conflict, famine, or other disastrous 
circumstances, is a bond in excess of notions of common citizenship, as if we were all 
cosmopolitan citizens of the world (Derrida, 1994:240). This bond “cannot be 
contained within the traditional concepts of community, obligation, or responsibility”, 
since these are often wound up with the very forces behind those circumstances that 
produce disaster in the first place (ibid.), i.e., state violence, discrimination and 
militarised hospitality practices. This bond relates to the “incalculable singularity of 
everyone, before any ‘subject’ beyond all citizenship, beyond every ‘state’, every 
‘people’”(Derrida, 2003:120). 
 
If Levinas sets the ethical responsibility, one could say then that Derrida sets the 
political: the acceptance of the autoimmune aspect of the encounter with the Other/s. 
The Other/s may symbolise a danger to the Self or even self-destruction, but this is a 
risk worth taking if one is to honour their ethical responsibility towards the Other and 
if their aim is (as it should be) to avoid the worst (le pire), i.e., totalising violence. As 
autoimmune diseases, apart from endangering the body, also allow it to adapt, 
similarly the arrival of the Other/s does not need to be perilous by definition. The 
Derridean opening up to an incalculable future, or future-to-come, is not neutral in its 
configuration, nor does it point to either a negative or a positive state of affairs in its 
unpredictability. I argue that it should be considered as an eventually successful and 
peaceful opening to the Other. As such it is part and parcel of hospitality, since 
predictability more often than not coincides with absolute knowledge and state 
violence, as seen in the militarisation of hospitality practices and the violence lying at 
the core of intersubjectivity as the latter is traditionally understood in the Self/Other 
schemas (both of which I will later explore in more detail). For Derrida, hospitality, 
which is deemed of the name, is open to any possible futures. The possible future 
                                                        10	These	are	approaches	that	I	will	not	be	addressing	in	detail	in	this	thesis,	for	reasons	I	explain	in	the	second	chapter.	
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proposed here is not the overarching form of a Kantian transcendental ethical 
structure or an eternal renewal of the exclusion-resistance-survival biopolitical 
framework, but a radically open-to-the-Other future.  
 
Understanding hospitality in these terms leads to a distinctive ethics of hospitality, 
which functions as a way of thinking about the relationship between representation 
and humanisation, of being alert to what is precarious in another life and of 
responding to the “missing” Other or the “unmissed” Other, i.e., an Other who may be 
present in the Western imaginary, but who, nonetheless, does not possess any clear 
status; who is either “illegal” in her presence, existing in a legal vacuum, or figure of 
destitution / liminality; the Other defined by various theorists as the ungrievable and 
unmourned life (Butler, 2006), “supernumerary” (Davis, 2006), “human refuse” 
(Bauman, 2003), “bare life” (Agamben, 1998) or “pariah” (Varikas and Wacquant, 
2007); the Other in sum as an ethically non-recognised subject. For the needs of the 
current research project, the focus of the “unmissed” Other will fall upon the irregular, 
undocumented migrant, clarifying first, however, the need for a new and broader 
category addressing the liminal and non-categorisable in IR.  
 
Finally, I am testing these two, final aspects of my argument, the Levinasian ethical 
encounter and the autoimmunitary character of hospitality in what I call the camp for 
strangers. Seeing this camp as a result of a new security context and a reaction to the 
ethical vacuum created by this securitisation, defined by the revolution in surveillance 
techniques and technologies, their fusion with military and police practices and the 
emergence of a discourse that connects flows of population with global threats like 
terrorism or pandemics of contagious viruses, I explore how the reconsidered 
theorisation of hospitality as autoimmunity can still be found in the life inside the 
camp, through assumptions of ethical responsibility at the individual level and acts of 
solidarity akin to the existence of open borders.  
 
I present below the main themes of my study. 
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The who of hospitality 
- Xenos / Stranger / Foreigner/ Abject Other 
“What does ‘foreigner’ mean? Who is foreign? Who is the foreign man, who is the foreign 
woman? What is meant by ‘going abroad’, ‘coming from abroad’?”  
Derrida, Of Hospitality 
 
“To approach the stranger is to invite the unexpected, release a new force, let the genie out of 
the bottle. It is to start a new train of events that is beyond your control...” 
T. S. Eliot, The Cocktail Party 
 
The stranger has always seemed to be an unsettling figure for the established order. 
Arriving with questions, posing questions, prompting the other to pose questions, her 
mere presence, in all possible disguises, suffices to challenge the existing order (Dikeç, 
2002). From Plato’s xenos to L’ Étranger of Camus, from Ruth the Moabite to the 
French sans-papier, the stranger seems to endanger the existing order, posing a threat 
to citizens and kings and presenting them all with important duties from the moment 
she arrives at a state’s borders. The duty of hospitality towards the stranger, a duty but 
also a right, therefore became from very early on a custom for societies to reckon with. 
In the context of this thesis, I am only interested in the modern understandings of the 
stranger, which focus on the uncategorisable trait of Otherness; I will thus skip the 
examination of its etymological background and historical evolution to which a 
separate section is dedicated in chapter one. I will only note here that the concept of 
xenos corresponds best with the synonymous French term étranger and the German der 
Fremde, which in English needs to be translated by two distinct terms: stranger and 
foreigner. To avoid any misunderstandings further on, it is very important to state at 
this point that the terms foreigner and stranger are used interchangeably in the body 
of this thesis following the semiology of the xenos and étranger. The stranger will act 
as the umbrella term for the legally and ethically unidentified Other, beyond 
attributions of citizenship, group, religion and community belonging, while it should 
be considered as corresponding with the undocumented migrant for issues of clarity. 
In the terms of this thesis, persecution, marginalisation, exclusion and violence as well 
as her treatment as a problem by IPT plague the stranger by definition, for reasons 
briefly explored below.  
 
The 20th century starts with Simmel’s sociological study of the stranger (McLemore, 
1970), in which it is defined as a distinct category, which counter-intuitively does not 
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outline the entirely unknown Other but instead the non-integrated or non-assimilated 
in a society or community. Thus issues of belonging, which are always to be 
adjudicated by the sovereign power of the host and other decision-makers, are 
attached to the figure of the stranger from the start. Integration and non-assimilation 
are understood both in spatial and relational terms, i.e., both from where the stranger 
stands on the inside/ outside divide but also by the relation (of proximity or distance, 
familiarity or alienation) to the Self. “The stranger is a relational figure constituted in 
a spatial ambivalence between proximity and distance” (Koefed and Simonsen, 
2011:346). Therefore, the question of belonging is closely linked not so much to 
questions of identity or other affiliations but to relationality with the Self. The 
question of proximity and distance, along with a certain spatial and relational 
ambivalence, is what constitutes the stranger (see 1.3.1 for more on proximity, 
distance and ambivalence as these derive from the work of Simmel and Bauman). As a 
result, it is the encounter of the stranger with the Self that according to Simmel, 
Bauman and others assigns to her a meaning: without it, the stranger would be empty 
of meaning or at best “undecidable”. Neither friend nor enemy, the stranger unsettles 
categories and is more dangerous for that:  
 
The threat [she] carries is more horrifying than that which one can fear from 
the enemy. The stranger threatens the sociation itself – the very possibility of 
the sociation (Bauman, 1991b:55).  
 
This unsettling of categories carries risks. Causing intensive attempts to recognise and 
to assign identity and appropriate space to the stranger, it often conceals exclusion, 
since it is a one-way movement: it is only the Other that is recognised and potentially 
legitimised (or not) by the Self, and not the other way around. Current uses of the 
term, which interest me in this study, extrapolate from this assignation of identity and 
space, and see strangers in absolute terms of safety and danger: strangers are figures 
“who pose danger by their very presence in the streets”, constituting what Ahmed calls 
the “stranger danger” (2000:21). Since they are empty signifiers, neither heard nor 
seen, in need of recognition, they only acquire meaning upon their encounter with 
“us”, the Self. It is through this encounter that the space is defined and boundaries are 
established: “through defining strangers as dangerous and exercising hate” (Ahmed, 
2000). But why hatred? 
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[Strangers] allow the demarcation of spaces of belonging; by coming too close 
to home, they establish the very necessity of policing the borders of knowable 
and sustainable terrains (…) it allows us to share a fantasy that, in the co-
presence of strange and alien bodies, we will prevail (2000:3). 
 
Policing, borders and prevailing on the stranger automatically establish a relationship 
of violence. The stranger is mainly understood and embodied through being expelled. 
Expulsion allows both for the stranger to be embodied and recognised and for the 
community to retain its purity (Ahmed, 2000), fulfilling in a way the simultaneous 
construction of spatial identities and spatial formations observed by Henri Lefebvre 
(1991:170), while also proving R.B.J. Walker right for showing how this inside/outside 
opposition both serves as the limit of the political imagination and the source of its 
coherence (Bigo, 2006:13).  
 
It is this context that engendered a vast range of subgroupings of the figure of the 
stranger: the abject Other, the missing missing (see Edkins, 2011), the useless mouths 
(also in chapter two), the non-insured surplus life (Duffield, 2007:19), the bare life (cf. 
chapter two and partly in chapter three), the liminal figure (Mälksoo, 2012), the 
undecidable (Bauman, 1991a) – to mention only a few of many. All subgroupings 
symbolise essentially the abject Other and stranger, which has  
 
only one quality of the object – that of being opposed to I. If the object, 
however, through its opposition, settles me within the fragile texture of a 
desire for meaning, which, as a matter of fact, makes me ceaselessly and 
infinitely homologous to it, what is abject, on the contrary, the jettisoned 
object, is radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning 
collapses (Kristeva, 2012:84). 
 
Taking the undocumented and not the “illegal” migrant11 as the personification of the 
stranger as described above, I agree with Simmel, Ahmed and others that the stranger 
cannot be understood only in ontological terms but is produced instead through 
                                                        11	See	Scheel	and	Squire	(2014)	for	the	use	of	the	term	illegal	and	the	association	of	migration	with	criminality	and	my	relevant	discussion	in	chapter	two.	
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embodied encounters. I also believe, as they do, that it is through the encounter that 
meaning is assigned. However, with this thesis and the ethical encounter as 
understood by Levinas, discussed in chapter three and holding centre stage in the 
ethics of hospitality, I would like to challenge the perception of meaning-assignment 
as a one-way movement. On the contrary, the process of giving meaning through 
relationality, I argue, can and should be multi-layered and, by extension, the 
Self/Other relation should not be mainly seen as one of danger, enmity and abjection. 
By reconsidering issues of subjectification and favouring the constant negotiation of 
the decision and responsibility affecting the Other, the ethics of hospitality advocated 
in this thesis is to my understanding the approach best positioned to address the 
troubled relation with abject Others.  
 
- Self/Other  
I do not pretend I can exhaust this vast topic in this introduction (or this thesis for 
that matter), but for the needs of my discussion later I will briefly refer to some tenets 
of the Self/Other relationship. Focusing on what is important for the ethics of 
hospitality debate, in chapter three I discuss in greater detail the aspects of Self/Other 
relationality as these are informed by Hegelian and Kojèvian scholarship; by the 
existential account of the subject in Sartre; and by the I/Thou relationality of Buber, in 
order to reach its counterpart in Levinas. My main thesis is that Hegel’s, and by 
extension Kojève’s, lordship/bondsman schema, with its emphasis on recognition and 
survival, still informs in one way or another most of the current discussions around 
subjectivity and relationality both in analytical and Anglo-Saxon philosophy as this is 
explored in chapter two. The influence of this binary understanding is omnipresent: 
from Sartre’s understanding of self-awareness established through the gaze of the 
Other to postcolonialism’s emphasis on recognition and resistance, a conflictual 
understanding of Otherness is inspired by a master/slave dialectic. I mention Sartre 
and postcolonialism here not accidentally, but because they are relevant to the 
discussions of subjectivity and dualism explored in chapters two and three – 
respectively, the biopolitical understandings of hospitality and Levinas’ 
conceptualisation of Otherness. No matter how essential this binary may be in 
postcolonialism’s critique of imperial domination, the relation between colonisers and 
the colonised, the importance of the recognition of the colonised Other and the 
biopolitical understanding of the abject other, I argue that this master/slave dialectic 
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not only fails to empower self-becoming or even essentially challenge established 
categories in the context of hospitality ethics, but also engenders violence and very 
strictly defined hierarchies.  
 
The what of hospitality 
- Injustice 
In his ten-word telegram addressing the ten plagues of the “new world order”, Derrida 
identifies them to be: unemployment because of a deregulated worldwide market; 
massive exclusion of homeless citizens from any participation in democratic life; the 
ruthless economic war mainly in the developed world; the inability to master 
contradictions in the concept, norms and reality of the free market; aggravation of 
foreign debt and other connected mechanisms; the arms industry and trade; the 
dissemination of nuclear weapons; inter-ethnic wars; growing worldwide power of 
super-efficient and properly capitalist phantom-States; and the present state of 
international law and its institutions (1994:100–1). From the homeless to the citizens 
that suffer under deregulated markets, to victims of war, Derrida positions the woes of 
the world on the basis of the effect they have on the Other. This Other is the 
disenfranchised, the citizen who has fallen through the societal net, the 
uncategorisable stranger. In addition, Derrida is not only interested in the impact of 
these plagues on democracies and democratic politics, but also (and perhaps mostly) 
in what kind of justice is demanded by these plagues and how they can be faced. For 
him, this is not a traditional understanding of justice, with its legal context and 
apparatus. Instead he talks of a justice to-come, which challenges the violent authority 
and foundations of the law and which can answer to the call of the Other opening up 
to all possible outcomes. Despite the dangers such an open-endedness entail (the 
worst may arrive; see le pire in section 4.2), Derrida still stacks his hopes on it in 
defiance of traditional and dogmatic understandings of right and legality that have 
already allowed the plagues to take place. For this thesis, the “plague” is the usually 
violent or repressive treatment of the stranger, more specifically as this has come to be 
symbolised in the current refugee “crisis”.12  
 
                                                        12	Crisis	 is	presented	 in	quotation	marks	because	 the	 term	will	be	debated	 in	 the	 last	chapters.	 It	will	be	asked	whether	it	is	really	a	product	of	critical	times	or	is	only	treated	as	such	by	the	media	and	the	political	infrastructure	(See	Postel,	Rathisanamy,	&	Clemens,	2015).	
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As with the master/slave dialectic, Derrida finds the law to be caught in a metaphysics 
of presence, where the struggle for the just is clear-cut, the procedure reduced to 
“sanctioning, restituting and doing right” on a course of continuous betterment till 
the end of historic time. Justice pertinent to hospitality, immigration and border 
crossings are perceived in the same way: a linear progress of the law ensures (or is 
supposed to ensure) the procedural accommodation of hospitality needs. Following 
the Second World War and the great wave of refugees that it caused, treaties are 
signed, categories of strangers are more clearly defined and the relevant law is fine-
tuned. Leaving aside for a moment the question of the effective application of such 
law, what does the lawmaking of procedural hospitality do other than establish a 
framework that more often than not fails its objects? Extensive bureaucracy, 
misemploying of categories with an aim to exclude, depersonalisation of procedures, 
militarisation of practices – these are only some of the failings of the law of 
hospitality. The admission that justice and its procedures will always have failures, will 
always generate violence, but is nevertheless on a course of constant improvement – 
this admission may ring true, but is it enough? I argue that such failures are intimately 
related to the skewed relation with the Other and have little to do with a loosely 
understood betterment of law through trial and error. 
 
“Can one not yearn for a justice that one day would finally be removed from the 
fatality of vengeance?” asks Derrida in the Specters of Marx (1994:15). This precarious 
and unjustifiable notion of justice (Kellog, 2010:92), the accomplishment of which 
remains impossible, mirrors the conceptualisation of hospitality. Hospitality and 
justice, intertwined and simultaneously the two sides of the same deconstructive coin, 
are “impatient, uncompromising, and unconditional” (1994:31). Always in contrast 
with the law in the case of the first, and with the laws of hospitality in the case of the 
second, they are interested in addressing the violence inherent in the law and its 
practices. The inherent injustice in the laws of hospitality, i.e., the injustice to be 
found in the practical implementations of the law (singular) of hospitality, is the what 
of this section in which the ultimate aim is to revise and suggest a distinctive ethics of 
hospitality. Whether these laws are construed as historical institutions or products of 
need (for example, the need to curb migration for economic reasons), their processes 
can “be subjected to deconstruction, which either discovers the violence of origins in 
daily operations or unravels the ordered bi-polarities (fact-values, public-private, 
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objective-subjective) and shows that they cannot stabilize the legal system” 
(Douzinas, 2005:178). The ethics of hospitality I argue for here is an answer to the 
injustice of the current refugee crisis.  
 
- Violence and Biopoliticisation of Hospitality 
In examining the death of a “failed” asylum seeker during his deportation, law scholar 
Peter Langford talks of the violent hospitality practices upon application of the law, 
seeking to locate where force of law becomes law of force and where the divergence of 
legal norm from the application of a sanction takes place. He finds that  
 
in relation to the determination of this point of divergence and, with it, the 
designation of those who have applied force as having done so beyond that 
envisaged by the force of law, the recent history of the instances in which the 
legal system has been called upon to engage in this determination have failed 
to clearly and transparently define this boundary (2012).  
 
Not only that though: responsibility, in similar cases of “failed” asylum seekers, 
undocumented immigrants and general strangers under no protective framework 
(national or otherwise), is rarely located.13 Measures taken do not match the severity of 
similar events and remain inconclusive.14 More often than not, especially in issues of 
security, private security firms are assigned to the same tasks, rendering procedures 
even more opaque. The same happens for the boundary mentioned above by Langford: 
in what he calls “a double movement”, both boundaries between norm and application 
of law, on one hand, and between state and private responsibility, on the other, are 
blurred. This is related to the fact that current hospitality practices have taken a turn 
for the worse. Although, as argued earlier, the theoretical challenges that the 
movement of individuals present for IPT are nothing new, what is novel is the 
                                                        13	See	 the	 cases	 of	 Joy	 Gardner	 and	 Jimmy	Mubenga,	 but	 also	 Lampedusa	 and	 Farmakonisi	 (the	latter	to	be	discussed	in	chapter	four).		14	In	the	case	of	Gardner’s	death,	no	public	official	was	found	guilty	and	the	only	effective	measure	taken	involved	the	disbanding	of	the	Metropolitan	Police	Special	Immigration	Unit	and	the	transfer	of	responsibility	for	these	services	to	a	private	security	firm	(Mills,	1999).	Similarly,	in	the	case	of	Jimmy	 Mubenga,	 where	 an	 Angolan	 deportee	 died	 after	 being	 restrained	 by	 privates	 security	guards	on	board	a	British	Airways	flight,	all	parties	involved	were	cleared	of	manslaughter	(Taylor	and	Booth,	2014).	While	anecdotal,	these	developments	mirror	a	pattern	of	action	taken	in	similar	cases.		
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increasingly militarised hospitality framework that has emerged.15 The constellation of 
new or older but now fortified techniques and dispositifs, often related to the private 
sector, confirms the materialisation of a strengthened overarching security narrative 
and a subsequent militarisation of the treatment of strangers, which is often 
intertwined with a postcolonial state of affairs.  
 
With “recent trends of pushing asylum seekers into lower protection statuses in times 
of economic crises or when destination countries perceive themselves as being 
overburdened” (Neumayer, 2005:44) and in a world where states are conditioned “by 
an unequal capacity to provide the same socio-legal and economic framework for their 
populations” (Langford, 2012), and where the recognition and protection of “failed” 
asylum seekers, undocumented migrants and others remain, as with all international 
legal instruments, in the form of treaties and their implementation at the discretion of 
the state, it is unclear to me how traditional IR approaches and current ethics of 
migration can effectively argue for the upholding of the current theoretical framework. 
An approach which acquires its authority by maintaining the importance of the legal 
hospitality framework (the treaties and their implementation just mentioned) is itself 
part of the problem.   
 
An affirmative, autoimmunitary ethics of hospitality 
Why is a deconstructive hospitality approach important?  
 
While it is well established that seemingly neutral and inclusive legal and 
political categories and representations are always, in fact, partial and 
exclusive, among Derrida’s most potent arguments was that the exclusions at 
work in every representation are not accidental but constitutive (Kellog, 
2010:2).  
 
Using the term “fabulous retroactivity” Derrida suggests that concepts like hospitality 
(but also democracy, justice and so on) are presented by modern philosophy as 
foundational. As such, they cannot be challenged since they are part and parcel of 
                                                        15	A	militarised	hospitality	framework,	which	in	this	thesis	is	symbolised	in	the	figure	of	the	camp,	(detention	 camps,	 “closed	 hospitality	 centres”,	 state	 sanctioned	 illegal	 push-backs	 of	 refugees,	relegation	 of	 hospitality	 practices	 to	 private	 companies,	 policies	 inspired	 by	 the	 concept	 of	“Fortress	Europe”,	etc).	
 26 
human development and society. In the case of hospitality, things are slightly worse, 
since issues of communities and borders, economic considerations and costs make this 
“foundationalism” even more complicated. A deconstructive revision of hospitality as 
a foundational philosophical concept as advocated in this thesis is thus absolutely 
necessary. Re-addressing the who of hospitality, namely the stranger, symbolised in 
the figure of the undocumented migrant, and the what of hospitality, i.e., exploring 
anew the relation of the Self with the Other and the injustice and violence this relation 
entails, is, I argue, an intellectual imperative both for IR and IPT.  
 
This can be done by an autoimmunitary ethics of hospitality, which challenges 
immunisation and its purpose of creating an absolute and safe boundary and border 
around the Self. Such a boundary is indeed illusory. Autoimmunity is in itself a proof 
of this illusion, constituting the threshold where inside and outside meet, where an 
attack on the Self, the body (politic) but also on the immune defences themselves is 
possible. The relationship between Self and Other in the context of hospitality is not 
anymore one of exteriority or contradiction. Instead, such a relationship becomes 
ethical in the Levinasian sense and, supported by the discussion of fraternity in the 
way the ethical responsibility addresses more than one Other, reconfigures 
autoimmunity in an affirmative way and overcomes its dangers. Autoimmunitary 
hospitality, as I will I argue in chapter four, helps us, thus, overcome the undecidable 
and undermine the possibility for the worst violence.   
 
 
Outline of Chapters 
As I have already roughly outlined, the first chapter follows the conceptual evolution 
of hospitality up to Kant. From the 20th century, I have chosen to focus only on two 
instantiations of biopolitical theoretical approaches in an attempt to better examine 
the practices of excluding the Other. The shorter second part of the chapter explores 
the figure of the Other, through the notions of proximity and belonging and through 
her possible incarnations, i.e., the categories of legal, illegal and undocumented Other. 
I then turn to the abject and liminal Other of hospitality.  
 
The second chapter explores the normative turn in IR literature with a focus on the 
relation between IR and ethics. I then focus on specific debates relating to hospitality: 
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namely the rights of free movement and exit on the one hand and the contribution of 
distributive justice and justice as equality and membership on the other. In this 
chapter I argue in favour of poststructuralist ethics as the IR strand that can best 
address the failures in hospitality. I explore this through the lens of subjectivity and 
responsibility and I then focus on the specific contribution to hospitality.  
 
The third chapter follows up on my discussion about poststructuralist renderings of 
subjectivity by focusing on the work of Emmanuel Levinas. I explore his 
conceptualisation of the ethical encounter with the Other and I address the possibility 
to overcome the stumbling block of the arrival of the third through Levinas’ 
understanding of fraternity.  
 
The following chapter, chapter four, starts with Derrida’s own understanding of how to 
bridge the ethical and the political: namely by lingering on the threshold of 
undecidability. Trying to infuse this undecidability with the fraternity explored before, 
the chapter outlines the contours of an autoimmunitary ethics of hospitality, which 
departs from Derrida’s own conception of autoimmunity aiming to overcome the 
undecidable and choosing the opening up to the Other. 
 
My fifth and final chapter looks into applying this reading of autoimmunitary 
hospitality on the camps for strangers, i.e., the makeshift, self-managed encampments 
sustained by the enactment of the ethical responsibility of the host-Self. Contrasting it 
to detention camps, I am inquiring into the forms autoimmunitary hospitality can 
take.  
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 A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF HOSPITALITY 1 /
 
 
 
“[A]ll concepts in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated elude definition; only that which 
has no history is definable” 
F. Nietzsche, On Genealogy of Morals 
 
 
“If we are going to understand any of the concepts we use to organise our social, moral, and political 
world, we shall have to study them historically. If only because, as Nietzsche says in a wonderful phrase, 
the concepts we have inherited – and the interpretations we place upon those concepts – are just frozen 
conflicts, the outcomes of ideological debate. We just get the views of the winners, so that historians 
always have to engage in an act of retrieval, trying to recover wider and missing structures of debate.”  
Quentin Skinner, “Concepts only have histories” 
 
 
Introduction  
What is hospitality? Is it possible to historically define it? And why is it important to 
do so? This thesis assumes that not only is it important to establish a conceptual 
history of hospitality, but that, given the current political environment – laden with 
hospitality crises – such a history becomes urgently necessary: that it is vital to 
develop an eye for recurring patterns, sets of power relations and the treatment of the 
Other. As I am arguing elsewhere in this thesis (chapter two), I believe that if there is 
one question the debate around ethics needs urgently to answer, then it should be the 
question of hospitality – and the conceptual history of the term is an important 
constitutive element of this question. However, the exact opposite could also be 
argued: that it is precisely because of the challenges posed on the practical level that 
the examination of hospitality as a general concept can be overlooked, and that focus 
should be placed instead on empirical reality and policy considerations, addressing the 
needs deriving from legal and illegal bordercrossings, the flight of people, their 
acceptance and integration in host societies, etc. These needs are imperative and 
happening in actual time; therefore a conceptual history of hospitality has nothing to 
teach us.    
 
It is the idea underlying both assumptions described above, namely that the history of 
a concept can (or cannot) be used to vindicate the present, which needs to be further 
explored. Even more so in the case of hospitality where, contrary to conventional 
conceptual histories, which usually read as triumphalist accounts, advancing 
progressively upwards across time, from the dark ages of superstition to 
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Enlightenment and scientific mastery (Donnelly, 1982:364), in the history of 
hospitality there is a great temptation to follow a reverse direction. Such an analysis 
would follow a supposed – and often lamented – regressive process, according to 
which hospitality embarked from pure beginnings (e.g. god-protected, all-
encompassing hospitality obligations towards the strangers in ancient societies) to 
become increasingly restricted through time due to economical (e.g. first colonies), 
national (advent of the nation-state) and other interests. Below I briefly address these 
problems affecting the histories of concepts before moving on to look at the 
conceptual history of hospitality, believing that the consciousness of the history of a 
concept, to paraphrase Gadamer, “becomes a duty of critical thinking” (2007:21) and 
can constitute “an alternative approach to some of the seminal questions within the 
field of IR, capable of informing and historicising our present debates” (Jordheim and 
Neumann, 2011:155–6). To do so I choose to focus on the approach of German 
conceptual history, with Reinhart Koselleck’s history of concepts (Begriffsgeschichte)16 
as its central node, inquiring into the ambiguity of the concept of hospitality, the role 
of the central authority governing it and into the exclusion of Otherness.  
 
I find that hospitality has traditionally been defined by a hierarchical set up and that, 
despite its religious provenance, hospitality has been often seen as charity. In 
addition, I show that it has waxed and waned depending on the territorial politics of 
the time. The who of hospitality as in the “object” of hospitality is also very important 
and crucial to my discussion. For this reason the third and last part of this chapter is 
dedicated to the Other of hospitality: I first examine her along the axis of proximity 
and belonging before looking into the standard conceptual categories informing our 
contemporary debate. Finally, I suggest that there is the abject Other, who is always 
                                                        
16 Koselleck’s	history	of	concepts	(Begriffsgeschichte)	has	developed	as	an	indication	of	limitations	and	problems	in	traditional	social	history,	as	“a	critique	of	a	careless	transfer	of	modern,	context-determined	 expressions	 of	 constitutional	 argument	 to	 the	 past”	 (Koselleck,	 1982:415	 quoting	Böckenförde),	 highlighting	 at	 the	 same	 time	 the	 danger	 of	 treating	 ideas	 as	 transcendental	constants	despite	 their	different	historical	occurrences.	Begriffsgeschichte	 should	not	be	confused	with	 linguistic	history	(or	as	Koselleck	himself	calls	 it,	 “the	historical-philological	method”)	as	the	former	is	more	rigorously	bounded,	breaking	the	circular	movement	from	word	to	thing	and	back	(Koselleck,	2002:84).	The	history	of	concepts	breaks	this	circular	movement	by	taking	into	account	the	tension	between	a	concept	and	its	materiality,	the	alternation,	as	Koselleck	characterises	it,	of	the	 semasiological	 approach	 with	 the	 onomasiological.	 “Without	 the	 invocation	 of	 parallel	 or	opposed	concepts	(…),	without	registering	the	overlap	of	two	expressions	it	is	impossible	to	deduce	the	structural	value	of	a	word	as	a	“concept”	either	for	the	social	framework	or	for	the	disposition	of	political	fronts”.		
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there but simultaneously conspicuously absent in IR and IPT discussions. I contend 
that this figure is very crucial, and more central to the debate about ethics of 
immigration, bordercrossing and hospitality than traditional IPT and IR schools treat 
it as being; something I will be addressing in chapter two. This chapter is therefore 
structured in the following manner: a brief rendering of the conceptual history 
approach, followed by the history of the concept of hospitality up to Kant. I then turn 
to the biopolitical face that hospitality has acquired in the 20th century. This is 
important because it introduces the theoretical contours of the issues an 
autoimmunitary ethics of hospitality seeks to re-address. Then, and as mentioned 
above, I conclude with a detailed account of the Other as an object of hospitality and 
liminal figure.  
 
 
1.1 From a history of ideas to a history of concepts  
There are many possible ways to approach the history of a concept, and especially the 
concept of hospitality, with a view to address these problems. Michel Foucault’s 
genealogical approach offers us an insight into how different discursive formations are 
shaped and transformed by power, whereas Reinhart Koselleck’s configuration of the 
history of concepts focuses on the centrality of concepts in the constitution of society. 
Skinner’s approach, on the other hand, establishes that all normative vocabularies are 
ideological in the sense of implying a moral perspective while arguing that the 
contested and historical character of all normative concepts implies that provocative 
turns against commonplace evaluations are always possible.  
 
While the differences of these main approaches are great, and are located not only in 
their definition of what a concept is but also in their account of the way in which such 
definition should be attempted, they share some basic characteristics: both involve 
second-order observation and are anti-essentialist. Both argue that reality does not 
contain any essence requiring observation of the first order, and both reject an 
ontology of action; while neither see action as an objective point of reference, being 
instead a discursive attribute for Foucault and a semantic one for Koselleck. 
Furthermore, they reject what Andersen calls philosophy of consciousness (Andersen, 
2003: xvi), i.e., the unity of a subject and its influence on a concept’s continuity. 
Foucault does so by decentring the subject into numerous discursive subject positions, 
 31 
while Koselleck does so by making the formation of ideas into a presupposition of the 
formation of subjects. Similarly, Skinner is against the studying of concepts with the 
aim of better understanding our current predicament; he argues instead that to 
demand from the history of thought a solution to our own immediate problems is to 
commit not merely a methodological fallacy, but something like a moral error 
(1969:53). However, such study can provide us with a key to self-awareness. Finally, 
neither author considers his approach to be critical of mainstream thinking or to 
pursue an inherent truth. “[They do not believe] that there is a place, an 
argumentative platform, from which one can be critical in any universal sense” 
(Andersen, 2003:xvi.). For Foucault, every truth is related to power and founded on an 
injustice, while Koselleck considers criticism as only another concept to be historically 
and conceptually analysed (Andersen, 2003:xvi-xvii).  
     
A central concept is not discourse, discursive construction, statement or sentence. 
While a word in use can become unambiguous, a concept must remain ambiguous in 
order to be considered as a concept, and so while the concept is bound to be a word it 
will also always be more than that: “a word becomes a concept when the plenitude of a 
politico-social context of meaning and experience in and for which a word is used can 
be condensed into one word”, signifier and signified coinciding insofar as the diversity 
of historical reality and experience is packed into a single term (Koselleck, 1982:419). 
Such coincidence is for Koselleck almost always defined by a binary, counter-
conceptual configuration, and this is the last element I would like to address: the us-
them, Self/Object configuration as it appears in the exploration of a concept’s history. 
Discussing counter-concepts in his book Futures Past (2004:155–191), Koselleck 
subjects to historical-semantic analysis the distinction between us and them. Though 
not itself temporal, this bipolar concept is basic to social reality and is always mapped 
onto some kind of temporal conceptual grid. Koselleck points to the general 
importance of this concept for any notion of group identity, noting that it is always 
manifested concretely in relation to some term such as “nation”, “class”, or “church”, 
and must be studied accordingly. Then he examines three important and striking 
exemplifications of the us-them distinction: between Hellene and Barbarian, between 
Christian and Heathen, and between the human and the sub- or nonhuman (Mensch 
und Unmensch, Übermensch und Untermensch). These classifications have many 
similarities: each is universal, in other words it applies to all people; in each case it is 
 32 
disparaging and asymmetrical or non-recipocal – those classed as “them” by “us” 
would not accept being classed as they are. Each of these pairs has undergone internal 
changes throughout its own history; each has had violent historical consequences; 
each involves groups in close social and political contact with each other over wide 
geographical areas. The three divisions have also overlapped and interpenetrated in 
interesting ways and it is the totality symbolised by the last one, humanity 
(Menschheit), taken up early by the Stoics as genum humanum (ibid.), which will be 
useful in discussing hospitality as a mirror to the exclusion of the Other. 
 
How unambiguous is the concept of hospitality? As will be seen below, hospitality has 
over time interchangeably broadened and narrowed its remit, changed and 
reconfigured its distinguishing criteria (from race, religion and community belonging 
to nationality to citizenship to economic status, etc.), risen and declined in 
importance (from religious individual obligation to a responsibility relegated to 
central authority, etc.). However, there is a constant in the politico-social context of 
its existence, which brings the signifier and signified into a shared position: its 
dispensing agent. A central authority, mostly the state, is the one deciding not only 
the form that hospitality may take but also the criteria of acceptance of the Other, 
criteria whose number, characteristics and form have constantly varied depending on 
synchronic variables that are mostly irrelevant to considerations of Otherness and 
ethics. This constant is the “coincidence” Koselleck speaks of and it is based, in the 
case of hospitality effectively by definition, on the exclusionary binary of “us” versus 
“them”. It is this counter-conceptual configuration of hospitality’s concept that I 
would like to first explore and in later chapters challenge. For the time being, anti-
essentialism, configuration of relations of power with an eye to the exclusion of the 
Other and conceptual history as an instrument for self-awareness are the main three 
axes according to which the following study of the history of hospitality will play out. 
 
 
1.2 A conceptual history of hospitality to date 
Hospitality is often defined along the lines of offering or affording welcome, 
protection, or entertainment to strangers, visitors or guests. It becomes international 
when it is extended to members of ‘out-groups’ of different cultures and communities. 
Looking at the concept’s history, we encounter a variety of attitudes towards 
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strangers, from open hostility and mistreatment to enthusiastic reception into one’s 
household or community, veneration of the stranger as deity, utilitarian reciprocity, 
and protection of the helpless and the persecuted, which amounts to a form of asylum. 
Hospitality granted or denied to unknown visitors is a stock component of many 
legends and stories in various cultures (Cavallar, 2002:71), often related to the 
foundation of states through the figure of the foreign-founder (Honig, 2001). 
Hospitality has been an object of wide study, connected with the stoic-cosmopolitan 
belief in a universal commonwealth, categorised under ethics (Kant) or seen 
straightforwardly as its synonym (Levinas). It has been linguistically deconstructed 
with the aim of emphasising its inherent contradictions (Derrida) while it is in practice 
connected with the advocacy of free trade (by natural law lawyers), with rights of 
sanctuary (by theologians), and with asylum and immigration (by modern legal 
theorists). In most of these analyses, there is an inherent tension in the effort at 
bringing together the unconditional theoretical claim of hospitality and the practical 
societal, state and political needs. 
 
This chapter sketches the conceptual evolution of the term in western political 
thought, choosing to address defining moments in time. It will start by describing the 
forms of hospitality in Ancient Greece and Rome and then its form according to the 
biblical teachings and in the context of Christianity. It will then briefly look at the 
right of sanctuary – the right of the persecuted and fugitives to ask for protection – 
focusing on its role during the Middle Ages, before moving on to modernity and 
hospitality’s legal treatment with the advent of the first indices of what is to become 
international law. Then the discourse of hospitality under the French Revolution will 
be examined, a moment chosen as representative of what Koselleck calls in his 
temporal categorisation of concepts Sattelzeit, i.e., the time between 1750–1850 when 
political and social vocabularies seem to have transformed at an accelerated speed and 
in certain specified directions, with resulting changes in language paralleling rapid 
transformations in the structure of government, society and true economy (Lechmann 
and Richter, 1996:11).  
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1.2.1 Hospitality in the ancient world 
1.2.1.1 Greece and Rome 
In the extant studies on hospitality there is often reference to L. J. Bolchazy’s 
comparative research (1977) on the laws regulating hospitality in the ancient world 
(see Baker, 2011a; Hefferman, 2014). According to him, the main characteristic of 
ancient societies that instigated the custom hospitality has been indeed xenophobia 
(Bolchazy, 1977: i). This xenophobia stemmed from the fear of the new and from the 
belief that strangers possess potentially harmful magico-religious powers. Hospitality 
and subsequently its laws was a way to tackle this belief, and in the case of Rome, the 
ius hospitii showed a humanistic evolution that is supposed to have predisposed the 
Roman world to accept the ethical concepts of late Stoicism and nascent Christianity. 
In what seems clearly to be a rather precarious analysis, Bolchazy provides us with an 
evolutionary schema of the concept, which involves seven stages: (1) avoidance or 
mistreatment of strangers; (2) apotropaic hospitality (ritual disenchantment of 
strangers' magical powers or “ceremonial purification”, as Baker describes it 
(2010b:39); (3) Medea’s category of hospitality (kindness to ensure the friendly use of 
strangers' magical powers); (4) theoxenic hospitality (kindness to strangers who could 
be gods in disguise), prefiguring the later Stoic and Christian teachings of the 
“brotherhood of man” and the following stage; (5) kindness in accordance with divine 
law; (6) contractual hospitality, which involves “arrangements of guest-friendship, 
motivated by elite self-interest to protection and representation in foreign lands” 
(Baker 2010b:39); (7) altruistic hospitality to anyone in need (as a distinguishing 
feature of civilisation in contrast to barbarism). 
 
Despite some interesting elements, however, one should be wary of the evolutionist 
assumption made by Bolchazy and his unilinear development of hospitality through 
parallel stages. While his use of comparative material (he maintains he is drawing on 
comparative evidence from Greece and modern “primitive societies”) to talk about a 
social institution such as hospitality is common, the fact that he lacks any sufficiently 
sophisticated methodology seems to undermine his project (Saller, 1979: 467). The 
definition of the hospitality is barely discussed since the concept is implied to be 
timeless, with no or little variation over its different stages. Its evolution is by 
definition linear, with no ruptures or shortcomings, and triumphalist, moving away 
 35 
from times of barbarism towards a more complete and purer future state. A certain 
essentialism is not avoided, while the issue of power in relation to the configuration of 
hospitality is never addressed. Nevertheless, his analysis makes for interesting 
reading, especially with regards to his argument that fear towards the stranger is the 
driving force behind hospitality and its practices (also argued in Baker 2010b: 40). 
 
Sustaining the implication of Bolchazy’s argument about hospitality’s ennobling 
character, it has been observed that hospitality was considered as “a barometer of 
civilisation” playing “an important humanising role in ancient Roman culture” 
(Newlands and Smith, 2010: 30). It is often noted that in classical times, hospitality 
was a sign of civility (Richard, 2000:5);17 a particular duty of the well off, with lavish 
hospitality functioning as a status symbol. “Hospitality is a characteristic of the person 
who is eleutheriotes, a person of liberality” (Newlands and Smith, op.cit.). Because of 
this and hospitality’s close relation with religious duties, hospitality seems to have 
maintained a similar virtuous status across the time and space of western antiquity. 
 
According to the terms of hospitality, the foreigner/stranger is to be respected by the 
community receiving her, the members of which have certain obligations of 
welcoming her. As early as the Homeric period, the host as well as the suppliant are 
protected by Zeus Xenios18 and Athena Xenia and, as proclaimed in the Iliad, it is a 
religious offence to mistreat a host. Hospitality is Xenia, the code of guest-friendship 
defining the inter-city, -state and -household relationships.19 In the Odyssey the 
hospitality and its rituals constitute the type-scene par excellence, around which the 
epic poem is organised: there are at least twelve elaborate hospitality scenes (Reece, 
                                                        
17 Interestingly	enough,	William	Smith’s	A	dictionary	of	Greek	and	Roman	antiquities,	first	published	in	1842,	makes	the	opposite,	rather	oxymoronic,	argument:	“Hospitality	is	one	of	the	characteristic	features	of	almost	all	nations	previous	to	their	attaining	a	certain	degree	of	civilisation.	In	civilised	countries	 the	 necessity	 of	 general	 hospitality	 is	 not	 so	 much	 felt”	 (1875:619-621).	 Here	 Smith	seems	implicitly	to	equate	civilisation	with	security.	He	must	have	found	that	ancient	nations	failed	to	provide	 the	 latter	consistently,	and	 that	 it	 is	 from	this	 that	 there	 follows	 their	need	 to	provide	hospitality	 instead	 –	 at	 least	 if	 one	 is	 to	 judge	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 without	 explaining	 this	 point	 he	embarks	immediately	upon	an	exposition	of	hospitality	practices	in	Ancient	Greece	and	Rome.		
18	Xenios/	Xénia	 is	 the	adjective	of	 the	noun	Xenía	 (Greek:	 ξενία,	 translated	as	 “guest-friendship”,	accents	only	used	here	to	emphasise	the	difference	in	pronunciation),	the	ancient	Greek	concept	of	hospitality,	 the	 generosity	 and	 courtesy	 shown	 to	 those	 who	 are	 Xenoi	 (plural	 form	 of	 Xenos),	strangers	 and/or	 foreigners.	 Gods	 with	 this	 epithet	 were	 considered	 as	 patrons/protectors	 of	hospitality.	19	The	practice	of	hospitality	involved	both	material	and	non-material	rituals,	such	as,	respectively,	the	 exchange	 of	 gifts	 and	 provision	 of	 shelter	 and	 certain	 rights,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 engendering	 a	reciprocal,	two-way	relationship	between	guest	and	host.	
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1993). The rituals involve many details and slight variations; however, Xenia placed 
under the protection of Zeus Xenios consists mainly of the exchange of gifts between 
the contrasting parties, who declare their intention of binding their descendants by 
this pact (Benveniste, 1973:77). These gifts could often be tessera hospitalis, a pledge 
of hospitality and friendship, a token of which half was kept by each of two parties. 
Findings suggest that similar objects were not only used in the Greek region but also in 
the Roman Empire (Nybakken, 1946:251) and Celtic European regions.  
 
Theoxenia (meaning giving hospitality to the gods), i.e., the appearance of gods to 
mortals in the guise of foreigners and/or beggars, is a common plot pattern, even a 
folktale motif, in ancient literature, and in the case of Homeric epics it is met more 
than once. In every case that a host proves to fall short of his hospitable obligations, 
he is punished by the gods accordingly, the inhospitable thus becoming synonymous 
with the impious (Reece, 1992). Proxeny, on the other hand, a custom that was 
institutionalised during classic times, involved the office of a person chosen by a 
foreign community to represent it in her own country, guard the interests of the said 
community and protect its members when they travelled in her country – a kind of a 
modern ambassador called Proxenus (Mack, 2015).  
 
However, the welcome to the stranger did not render her equal to a citizen. Fustel de 
Coulanges notes in The Ancient City that strangers could not worship in public and 
people who did not worship were not citizens (1955: 193). Therefore, religion would 
provide strangers with protection but it would also contribute in keeping them at the 
periphery of the community. “The slave in certain respects was better treated than [the 
foreigner] was, because the slave, being a member of the family whose worship [s]he 
shared, was connected with the city through [her] master; the gods protected [her]. 
The Roman religion taught, therefore, that the tomb of the slave was sacred, but that 
the foreigner's was not.” The distinction between citizen and foreigner was stronger 
than the natural tie between father and son (Coulanges, 1955: 197). If a father became 
citizen after his son was born, the son remained a stranger to the community, in a way 
a foreigner to his family, and was not able to inherit. By not partaking publicly in the 
religion, the stranger did not partake in law: if he had committed a crime, he was 
treated as a slave, and punished without process of law, the city owing him no legal 
protection. If there was a need for special laws applying to a stranger, an exceptional 
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tribunal had to be set up. “At Rome, in order to judge the alien, the pretor had to 
become an alien himself – proctor peregrinus. At Athens the judge of foreigners was the 
polemarch – that is to say, the magistrate who was charged with the cares of war, and 
of all transactions with the enemy” (Coulanges, 1955: 196). From mid-5th century and 
according to Pericles’ law, conditions of citizenship became even stricter than before, 
asserting now that no one could be a citizen unless both of his parents were of 
Athenian descent (Kristeva, 1991: 41-50), establishing isogony, i.e., the equality in / 
because of birth. 
 
The strangers who decided to stay and become residents, whose craft or business was 
deemed useful to the polis, belonged to the category of metics. They had to pay a 
residency tax but enjoyed no property ownership (unless they were granted special 
exemption) or voting rights; legal protection was provided by a citizen, usually a 
politician, who became their patron (prostates). By choosing a citizen as a patron, the 
foreigner became connected with the city (Coulanges, op.cit.) and without one she was 
vulnerable to persecution. She could then participate in some of the benefits of the 
civil law, and her protection was secured. The French historian Marie-Françoise Baslez 
calls the metics the “homo economicus” of the Greek city-state (1984) because of their 
contractual dealings with the polis: they would be artisans, farmers, bankers, shippers 
but also intellectuals such as Lysias and Aristotle. The distinctive legal status of the 
metics was modified once they were able to act in court without their patron in the 4th 
century BC and it disappeared when the use of purchasing citizenship became 
common in the Hellenistic period (approx. 320–31 BC).  
 
In opposition to classical Athens, there are the Doric city-states such as Sparta, which 
excluded all strangers lest they taint the native character and way of life by their mere 
presence. With the exception of specific friends and allies, all other strangers were to 
be shunned through a body of laws known as xenelasia (expulsion of strangers) 
(Figueira, 2003). Xenelasia was also followed in Crete. This focus on homogeneity is 
admired by Machiavelli and is seen as among the main reasons of the longevity of the 
Spartan “republic” (Machiavelli, 2008:47).  
  
In Rome, hospitality occupies an equally important place. For Cicero and Livy, 
hospitality and the lack thereof is an important signal of relationality. Betrayal of 
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hospitality brings dishonour (Tacitus, Ann. 15.52.1). In Rome there are laws about the 
conduct of disputes with foreigners, while accommodation might be offered privately 
(hospitia privata) or publicly (publica foedera). Hospitality sometimes involves 
patronage and control by the rich (hospitium publicum). However, more interesting is 
the hospitium privatum, which with the Romans seems to have been more accurately 
and legally defined than in Greece. The character of a hospes, i.e., a person connected 
with a Roman by ties of hospitality, was deemed even more sacred, and to have greater 
claims upon the host, than that of a person connected by blood or affinity (Peachin, 
2011). The relation of a hospes to his Roman friend was next in importance to that of a 
cliens, a dependent person (even a Roman citizen) having a patron. According to 
Massurius Sabinus, a hospes had even higher claims than a cliens. The obligations of 
hospitality that a Roman possessed in relation to a foreigner were as follows: to 
receive in his house his hospes when travelling, to protect her and, in case of need, to 
represent her as his patron in the courts of justice. Private hospitality thus gave to the 
hospes the same claims upon his host which the cliens had on his patron, but without 
any degree of the dependence implied in the relation between cliens and patron, called 
clientela (Smith, 1875:621). Private hospitality was established between individuals by 
mutual presents, or by the mediation of a third person, and was hallowed by religion; 
for Jupiter hospitalis was thought to watch over the jus hospitii, as Xenios Zeus did with 
the Greeks, and the violation of it was as great a crime and impiety at Rome as in 
Greece (Jipp, 2013: 112–115). When hospitality was formed, the two friends used to 
divide between themselves the tessera hospitalis mentioned above, by which, 
afterwards, they themselves or their descendants – the connection was hereditary as in 
Greece – might recognise one another. From an expression in Plautus (deum 
hospitalem ac tesseram mecum fero) it has been concluded that this tessera bore the 
image of Jupiter hospitalis (Phillipson, 1911:218). Hospitality, when thus once 
established, could not be dissolved except by a formal declaration (renuntiatio), and in 
this case the tessera hospitalis was broken to pieces. Hospitality was at Rome never 
exercised in that indiscriminate manner characteristic of classical Greece, but the 
custom of observing the laws of hospitality was probably common to all the nations of 
Italy (Jipp, op.cit). In many cases it was exercised without any formal agreement 
between the parties, and it was deemed an honourable duty to receive distinguished 
guests into the house. There also seems to have existed a custom similar to Proxeny, 
involving the granting of the honour of hospes publicus to a distinguished foreigner by 
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a decree of the senate. Whether such a public hospes undertook the same duties 
towards Roman citizens as the Greek proxenus is uncertain (Mack, 2015). Public 
hospitality was, like the hospitium privatum, hereditary in the family of the person to 
whom it had been granted. The honour of public hospes was sometimes also conferred 
upon a distinguished Roman by a foreign state (Smith, 1875:621).  
 
Contrary to this narrative of well-established and commonly accepted hospitality 
rituals, Gideon Baker argues that even from ancient Greek times, hospitable practices 
are not as universal as they are usually presented as being: what we have come to 
consider as universal rituals of hospitality were in reality practiced mainly by the 
elites, “in an aristocratic independence of communal obligation which was itself 
suppressed by the rise of the Greek Polis” (Baker, 2010:40). Aristocratic elites, Homeric 
warrior-kings etc., offered hospitality to their social class fellows because they could 
afford to do so without putting their status in peril. For the lower classes, on the other 
hand, things were different: respecting hospitality rituals usually meant putting a lot 
at stake, so they did not. Their history was, however, neglected.  
 
[I]n part because it is the fearful history of the little people who have always 
risked more in offering a welcome to the stranger but whose stories are 
marginal; in part because it has been overwritten by an elite hospitality which 
itself reflected a shift away from communal fear of strangers [in early times 
before the establishment of hospitable practices] to elite fear of the mob 
(Baker, 2010b:42).  
 
Hospitality practices become, therefore, more cosmopolitan but at the same time less 
popular, argues Baker, pointing to “a radical disjuncture, beginning with xenophobia 
and ending with elite xenophilia” (ibid. 40). 
 
This could appear to be a plausible conjecture, since in attempting a conceptual 
history of the term there should not be such a thing as a linear development in the 
evolution of concepts like hospitality, nor inviolable identities or lofty origins. It 
would therefore not be unreasonable to assume that the lower classes felt and acted 
differently towards hospitality due to their lack of abilities or the danger it posed for 
them. However, this hypothesis, borrowing heavily from Foucault’s genealogical 
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approach, as admitted by Baker himself, and not based on any concrete scholarly 
references, seems also not to take into account the important role that religion played 
in these societies’ everyday life. Public life, the agora, customs, farming, 
entertainment, family life, etc., were unbreakably linked to the religious life of the 
individual, citizen or not, wealthy or worse off. Even if the lower classes had to risk 
more by offering hospitality, to the point of jeopardising even their own survival, 
opting out of what was seen as an obligation to god was not really an option. In 
addition, stories of what Baker calls “the little people” abound both in the Iliad and the 
Odyssey and Livy and Cicero, as well as other oeuvres of the ancient Greek and Roman 
period such as theatrical plays and poems, and all point towards the respect that was 
commonly held for hospitable practices and obligations. Finally, the lack of sources 
directly emanating from the “little people” render this assumption not only difficult to 
support but suspect of projecting current predicaments onto old practices (i.e., 
xenophobia deriving from the “little people’s” inability to conform to hospitality 
demands), using in essence just that historico-methodological fallacy that Skinner 
warns us against. 
 
1.2.1.2 Biblical teachings, Stoicism, Christianity 
In the traditional juxtaposition between Athens and Jerusalem,20 the early myth of 
autochthony21 associates Athens with rootedness and opposes the wandering and 
rootlessness of the Jerusalem “model”. This opposition juxtaposes also the myth of 
autochthony that sees the people of Athens as the indigenous children of the earth 
against the Hebrew biblical master narrative, where under God’s command Abraham 
was obliged to leave the promised land and with it “his country, his kindred, his 
father’s house unto the land of Canaan”. Abraham laments: “I am a stranger and a 
sojourner” (Genesis 23.4). However, what the conflict between autochthony and 
promised land reveals is, first, the centrality of one particular land to both worldviews 
and, second, the shared purpose of the two myths in securing a relationship between 
people and land. But whereas autochthony derives its legitimacy from a natural or 
                                                        20	See,	 for	 instance,	 Leo	 Strauss’	 essay	 “Jerusalem	 and	Athens”	 (1997:377–405)	where	 he	 argues	that	 the	 western	 man	 is	 constituted	 both	 by	 Greek	 thought	 and	 biblical	 Jewish	 faith.	 See	 also	Emmanuel	Levinas’	Difficult	Freedom	(1990),	for	the	relationship	between	Greek	and	Hebrew.	21	Autochthony,	initially	used	by	Homer	and	defining	the	quality	of	being	an	original	inhabitant	of	a	place	(auto	–	self,	kthon	–	soil,	earth,	as	in	sprung	from	the	earth)	was	for	Athenias	the	proud	myth	of	being	locals	and	not	settlers,	a	quality	that	explained	in	the	5th	and	4th	century	their	superiority	both	politically	(rise	of	democracy)	but	also	in	terms	of	might	(the	Athenian	empire).		
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historical relationship between land and people, the myth of a promised land gets its 
force from positing a contractual relationship between land and people, a relationship 
governed by Providence. In religious terms, autochthony is polytheistic while the 
promised land is monotheistic; both define the value of land for the people, 
polytheism from below and monotheism from above. How does this difference, 
however, affect hospitality?  
 
In the Bible there are incidents, used also by Levinas in his discussion of the face of the 
Other and by Derrida, which appear as exemplary instances of selfless, unconditional 
hospitality. Abraham in Genesis 18.2 runs from the entrance of his tent and “bows 
down to the ground” in a primal gesture of hospitality as subservience to the other, to 
the strangers in recognition of their alterity and of the elsewhere from which they 
come. Derrida sees this event as an excellent example of hospitality in Abrahamic 
religions (2008), an account that would support Levinas' contention that “the relation 
with the other is accomplished as service and hospitality” (1969:300). The biblical 
narrative continues with Abraham's intervention on behalf of the righteous in the 
sinful city of Sodom (Genesis 18.16–23). This plea is followed by Lot's serving as host 
to the strangers and his effort to protect them from the sexual desires of the citizens of 
Sodom by offering them his virgin daughters in their stead (Wyschogrod, 2003:37). 
Also in the Old Testament many laws specifically require hospitality and concern for 
strangers in particular: “if you have resident strangers in your country, you will not 
molest them. You will treat resident strangers as though they were native-born and 
love them as yourself for you yourselves were once aliens in Egypt” (Leviticus 19:33–
4).  
 
However, the acceptance of the strangers is closely linked to them being able to 
convert. The Hebrew Bible has several terms that recognise different kinds of 
“strangers”. At the one end of the spectrum lie the native Israelites or ezrach, and at 
the other the nokrim and zarim, foreigners or aliens. These were often regarded “with a 
mixture of suspicion, fear and loathing as possible enemies, oppressors or plunderers, 
with whom it was wrong to mix too closely or pursue military alliances” (Spencer, 
2004:86). Between the two terms, which might be translated as natives and foreign 
nationals, there lay the ger (gerim in plural) and the toshav. Ger is usually translated as 
stranger or sojourner but is a more subtle concept than those terms suggest. 
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Throughout the Old Testament, gerim are often mentioned alongside hired hands, the 
poor, widows and orphans, implying that they were vulnerable or even dependent, but 
the main nuance was that they were there to stay (contrary to nakrim and zarim) 
alongside and sometimes with the ezrach (Spencer 2004:85–7). Kristeva notes that ger 
includes also the idea of the “convert”, so sometimes it would be translated as 
“proselyte”. Ger-toshav would be a resident foreigner while ger would refer to 
conversion-naturalisation. In both cases, however, the respective foreigners partake 
the spirit of Judaism and obey the Mosaic laws (1991:68–9). 
 
On the contrary, philoxenia,22 religion or identity notwithstanding, is a virtue among 
the Stoics, as mentioned by Bolchazy among others. For the first time, the city-state is 
proclaimed to be able to embrace the far-limits of the world: “I am a man, and nothing 
human is foreign to me”, attributed to Menander, is taking up by later Stoics and 
transformed into caritas generis humani, i.e., Cicero’s articulation of the bond between 
all humans despite borders, race and religion, and thus, in a way, into the first political 
cosmopolitanism (Kristeva 1991:56–7). Stoicism foreshadowed some aspects of 
Christianism with regards to hospitality. In Christian hospitality, Arterbury sees little 
that is distinct from the general practice of hospitality in the Mediterranean world: “as 
one would expect, Christian hospitality largely functioned as the continuation of 
either Greco-Roman hospitality within a Greco-Roman context or Jewish hospitality 
within a Jewish context.  Thus, for the most part, early Christian hospitality was in 
continuity with the broader Mediterranean social convention of hospitality” 
(Arterbury, 2005: 94). Christly love, St Augustine’s brotherhood with the neighbour 
and pilgrimage (this last becoming a fully-fledged practical activity) lead Christianism 
to elaborate a hospitality code (Kristeva, 1991:85). Some practices distinctive to 
Christian hospitality, however, include “Christians first attempting to locate fellow 
believers in a particular region in order to request hospitality from them”; prominent 
recipients of Christian hospitality being the poor, widows, and especially traveling 
missionaries;  and women, widows, and especially bishops being prominent hosts 
(Arterbury, 2005: 96–97). As Cavallar notes in his seminal book The Rights of Strangers  
 
Christianity supported many beliefs of Stoicism, such as the vision of a 
universal community. As in the case of some Stoics, the overall picture is 
                                                        22	Philoxenia	is	the	current,	modern	Greek	word	for	hospitality.	
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ambivalent. On the one hand, St Paul endorsed the vision of a universal 
brotherhood where all differences – such as the Greek and Jew, barbarian and 
Scythian – disappear. But Christians also kept widespread distinction between 
the civilized Greeks or Romans and the “pagans” alive – the latter were often 
identified with the “barbarians” outside “the world” (Cavallar 2002:62).  
  
The Christian church will be the main agent of hospitality all the way up to and during 
the Middle Ages, inheriting the responsibility of “pagan” or polytheist sacred places to 
offer the right of sanctuary. Along with the right of sanctuary and the preceding Stoic, 
Roman and later Christian conceptions of hospitality, a legal framework, which will 
enfold the modern legal discussion on hospitality, is also bequeathed to modern times. 
Both will be examined briefly below. 
 
 
1.2.1.3 The right of sanctuary: hospitality in the Middle Ages  
The general idea of protection or asylum afforded to fugitives is one, undoubtedly, of 
exceedingly ancient origin (Shoemaker, 2011). It is often connected with the 
beginnings of city-states and new communities. Romulus, the mythical founder of 
Rome, for example, is said to have made the Palatine hill an asylum for fugitives, a 
myth to which the Romans clung with pride, believing that their ancestors had been a 
mixed concourse of outlaws and refugees (Lee-Stecum, 2008). Trenholme observes 
with regards to this myth that “it probably did not have any greater significance than 
that in new communities fugitives and criminals were not unwelcome, as they would 
increase the male population” and that the story of asylum was a later addition of 
some historian (Trenholme, 1903:3). Plutarch does not make this differentiation when 
he notes in his Romulus that as soon as the foundation of the city was laid “they 
opened a place of refuge for fugitives, which they called the temple of the Asylean 
God. Here they received all that came, and would neither deliver up the slave to his 
master, the debtor to his creditor, nor the murderer to the magistrate” (Plutarch, 
1928:16). 
 
Cities of refuge exist even earlier than this in the Middle East. In the beginning, there 
were three such Hebrew cities, which later become six, three on either side of the 
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Jordan. Biblical references 23  to the use of asylum indicate fugitives seeking the 
protection of the altar, thus implying the existence and recognition of sanctuary 
afforded by religion (the case of Adonijah in the Kings James’ version). The use of 
temples as asylums was very common in ancient Greece where almost every temple 
afforded protection and people who took refuge there were considered suppliants 
(Gorman, 1994 and others). Disrespecting this asylum was considered an outrage that 
would be properly punished by the gods, as evidenced in the myth of the Cylonian 
shame.24 With Romans, efforts were made to better regulate and limit the right of 
asylum. Tacitus in his Annals (III:60) tells us that in the time of Tiberius all the so-
called asylums of Greece were ordered by the Roman Senate to produce legal proofs of 
their right to exercise the privilege of protecting criminals, resulting in the closure of 
many (cited in Trenholme, 1903:6). The use of temples was less often resorted to 
under the Roman Empire as “Roman law (…) took little or no account of religious 
sentiment when it came in conflict with the proper punishment of evildoers and 
criminals”, while asylum was only afforded after formal inquisition could be made and 
judgment, based on evidence, given (Trenholme, ibid.). Slaves and fugitives, who 
wished for protection, could generally flee for safety to the statues or busts of Caesars 
while criminals would never flee to the Capitol. In all cases, asylum seemed to give 
suppliants time before trial or final decision of their case: “a development more 
consistent with the Roman idea of the state, and with Roman law and custom” 
(Trenholme, 1903:6). 
 
This would again be reversed and asylum would become more encompassing with the 
advent of Christian churches, especially after Constantine’s Edict of Toleration in 313 
AD, which would later be expanded by special laws concerning church asylums 
promulgated by Theodosius the Great and Theodosius the Younger in the late 4th and 
5th century (Trenholme, 1903:7). In relation to this practice, attested by St. Ambrose, 
St. Gregory Nazianzen and Ammianus Marcellinus, the earliest recognition of asylum 
                                                        23	In	three	passages:	Exod	21,	Num	35	and	Deut	19.	The	second	prescribes	the	cities	appointed	as	asyla,	 calling	 them	 “cities	 of	 intaking”	 for	 possible	 criminals.	 The	 third	 passage	 “stresses	 the	responsibility	of	the	community	to	establish	easily	accessible	asyla	(…).	The	humanitarian	purpose	of	these	laws	is	obvious”	(Greenberg,	1959:125)	24	Following	 their	 failed	 coup,	Cylon	of	Athens	and	his	 supporters	 took	 refuge	 in	a	 temple	on	 the	Acropolis.	 While	 Cylon	 and	 his	 brother	 escaped,	 his	 followers	 were	 cornered	 and	 according	 to	Plutarch	 and	 Thucydides	 (1.126),	 they	 were	 persuaded	 by	 the	 archons	 to	 leave	 the	 temple	 and	stand	trial	after	being	assured	that	their	lives	would	be	spared.	They	were,	however,	killed	instead	and,	 as	 a	 result,	 the	 leader	 of	 the	Athenian	 archons	who	 ordered	 the	 killing	 and	his	 family	were	exiled	and	said	to	be	cursed	by	the	gods	for	violating	the	laws	against	killing	suppliants.	
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granted by the Church dates from a constitution of 21 November 419 (Vauchez, 
2000:126). Inspired by the Augustinian idea of pastoral duty, where bishops had to 
plead with secular authorities to stay the execution of criminals, sanctuary was 
provided in order to give sinners the opportunity to do penance and avoid everlasting 
damnation, and also to refugees and others in search of clemency. This kind of 
“episcopal intercession on behalf of sanctuary-seekers resonated with late Roman 
aristocratic traditions of intercession on behalf of supplicants, and the institution was 
therefore to some extent in harmony with its broader cultural and legal context” 
(Lambert, 2013:120). 
 
At first, certain kinds of offenders were excluded from the right to asylum (such as 
debtors to the treasury or Jews who pretended to be converts, excluded by Theodosius 
the Great, or murderers, adulterers and rapists, debarred from asylum rights in 
Justinian’s Novella)25 and the churches themselves were under a lot of strain, since 
great men often put themselves under the security of the asylum to avoid persecution, 
leading Charlemagne and others to make further efforts in restricting asylum during 
the 8th and 9th century. Despite this, the medieval Church soon was able to grant an 
extensive right to asylum,26 establishing it in Europe as a Christian custom and 
institution. More concretely, the development of the cult of the saints and their relics, 
which offered a more immediate protection than the divine one, entailed a renewal of 
the right of asylum, “since the saint was thought to protect the places that were 
consecrated to him”. In this way, the church, the monasteries and their often 
extensive properties enjoyed privileged status (Vauchez, ibid.), strengthened further 
over time by provincial and church councils (e.g. Clermont 1095; Reims 1131, Pisa 
1134; second Lateran council 1139 – among others). In the early middle ages sanctuary 
functioned mainly in the context of feud, facilitating the enforcement of truces and 
peace (Lambert, 2013) and for this reason, Shoemaker argues, it was “a crucial feature 
of royal law” (2011:92), which contrary to older scholar assumptions supplemented 
central secular power (i.e., a state’s government) rather than undermining it. Thus, the 
institution of sanctuary coexisted harmoniously with contemporary legal cultures and 
                                                        25	Novella,	XVII,	c.7	26	As	early	as	441	AD	the	Council	of	Orange	ordered	that	no	 fugitive	seeking	sanctuary	should	be	surrendered,	while	 the	 Synod	of	Orleans	 in	511	 extended	 the	privilege	 to	 the	Bishop’s	 residence	and	 thirty-five	 paces	 beyond	 the	walls	 of	 the	 building	 –	 the	 triginta	 eccleciastici	 passus	 (cited	 in	Trenholme,	1903:9)	
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within the broader medieval cultural context.  
 
As stated by Jean-Loup Lemaître in the Encyclopedia of the Middle Ages (Vauchez, 
2000:127), the right of asylum remained undisputed in the Μiddle Ages and was 
recognised by lay jurists such as Beaumanoir, but it was progressively called into 
question, notably by city authorities, and was flagrantly breached in the 16th century, a 
demise reflecting “a significant shift away from medieval understandings of crime and 
punishment” (Lambert, 2013:121). Some scholars (Shoemaker, for instance) consider 
this demise to be linked to canon law’s development of a “new deterrent-oriented 
approach to penal law” where “the interest of authority in certain and exemplary 
punishment swept the field and the venerable privilege [of sanctuary] was no more” 
(2011:173). While the close relation between a sovereign and a religious understanding 
of sanctuary/asylum-granting is debated (see for instance Lambert, 2103:122), it 
makes sense that the strengthening of a clearly territorially-demarcated state in late 
medieval times not only undermined customs of religious provenance but also 
involved an increasingly exclusionary tendency in the treatment of Others, whose 
status was considered impure (i.e., they were either criminals or foreigners). 
 
 
1.2.2 Hospitality in modern times and up to the French Revolution 
1.2.2.1 Attempts for a legal definition 
Classical antiquity and the Middle Ages laid the foundations of the modern European 
idea of a global legal community (or Rechtsgemeinschaft, as Walter Schiffer called it) of 
humankind (magna communitas humani generis) (Schiffer, 1954:99–108). The idea 
encompassed two elements: the concept of a law of nature or natural law (ius naturale, 
ius naturae), and the notion of a law binding all humans (ius gentium, literally the law 
of nations or peoples, droit des gens, Völkerrecht) (Brown, Nardin and Rengger, 
2002:311–324).  
 
The notion of ius gentium was first used by Cicero and was taken over by various 
Roman jurists, the statements of which, despite not fitting together, were incorporated 
into the emperor Justinian’s Digest. The Digest would influence and shape almost all 
early modern European international lawyers: ius gentium would be used by Francisco 
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de Vitoria, later translated as “law of nations”, while Jeremy Bentham would come up 
with the neologism “international law” (to become prominent after the 1840s) and 
Immanuel Kant would suggest the use of Staatenrecht or ius publicum civitatum among 
other recommendations, which would shift the scope and meaning of ius gentium. 
Independently of its shifts and evolution, it is important to note that the main idea 
behind ius gentium, an otherwise legally polysemic term, is “the idea of a legal 
commonwealth, a ‘law common to all humans’ (ius commune omnium hominum)” 
(Cavallar, 2002:64–5). It is under this law common to all humankind that hospitality is 
examined. Legal authors such as the aforementioned, but also Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf 
and Emmerich de Vattel, developed in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries distinct 
arguments and doctrines in the context of ius gentium and hospitality. These were 
often designed to support claims overseas (see the cases of Vitoria and Grotius), were 
sometimes influenced by Christian teachings and tended to equate commercial with 
civilised societies and contrast them with barbarian or uncivilized ones; they were thus 
overall “both teleological and utilitarian and presuppos[ed] a thick concept of good” 
(Cavallar, 2002:254).   
 
The early 16th century Spanish scholastic Francisco de Vitoria is the first to turn 
hospitality from an ancient Greek and Roman custom to a right under the law of 
nations (Pagden, 2003:186). Vitoria claims that there is a right “of natural partnership 
and communication” as part of the law rooted in the notion of a global moral 
commonwealth. This encompasses the right to travel (ius peregrinandi), the right to 
dwell in the countries or territories visited, the right to trade, the freedom to use 
common property, the ius solis, or freedom of residence, nationalisation and 
citizenship and the negation of a right of expulsion without just cause (Cavallar, 
2002:107–8). In his Reflectiones Theologicae, he argues that the Spaniards had a right to 
go to the Indies and live there “because it has been the custom from the beginning of 
the world for anyone to go into whatever country he chooses [since all things were 
held in common], and prohibition of entrance is violent measure not far removed from 
war” (Sibley, 1906:1). 
 
Vitoria’s right of natural partnership is severely criticised by Samuel von Pufendorf, 
who argues that it does not apply in the case of a multitude of immigrants whose 
object is to effect a permanent settlement, and whose intentions are dubious and 
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hostile (Sibley, ibid.). Pufendorf’s own emphasis on state sovereignty has an impact on 
the notion of hospitality as, unlike Vitoria and Grotius, who will be examined later, he 
stresses the right of any community to refuse visitors (Cavallar, 2002:201). On the 
subject of the right of asylum, Pufendorf observes that “humanity, it is true, engages 
us to receive a small number of men expelled from their home, not for their demerits 
or crime”, especially if they are eminent for wealth or industry, and not likely to 
disturb our religion or our constitution. But when it is the case of a multitude of 
immigrants seeking admission into the territories of a State, he considers the risk is so 
great that it may affect the very existence of that state, reducing it to the same 
deplorable state as the political offender for whose benefit the right of asylum exists. 
The danger of espionage by aliens should also be considered (Of the Law of Nature and 
Nations cited in Sibley, 1906:6–7).  
 
Grotius, on the other hand, agrees with Vitoria, arguing in favour of the rights to travel 
and to trade, naming the first one “the law of human fellowship”. In De Jure Belli ac 
Pacis, he discusses the subject of foreigners and immigration along with the right of 
expulsion. Drawing on Vitoria and on a rich European tradition favouring hospitality 
and commerce, he argues that while various conditions and precautions could be 
imposed to protect the owner when someone wanted to pass over a territory under a 
dominium of a people, banished persons may seek a new home in the territories of 
other nations, and that their right to do so may be asserted by force if necessary. 
Therefore the right of passage is as with Vitoria perfect and enforceable (Sibley, 
1906:3; Cavallar, 2002:147). 
 
To conclude with one last legal theorist representative of the different approaches to 
hospitality, Emmerich de Vattel argues in his The Law of Nations or the Principles of 
Natural Law (1758/1844) that “it belongs to every free and sovereign State to decide in 
its own conscience what its duties require of it, and what it may or may not do with 
justice” (Book 3, Ch.12 in Brown, Nardin, Rengger, 2002:375). Like Pufendorf, Vattel 
states that a nation has the right to expel the foreigner or even detain her, as 
immigration may become a source of danger because of the facilities it affords for 
espionage (1844:375). Finally, Vattel rejects in the Law of Nations the idea of a 
universal commonwealth (1844:x–xiii) because “he thinks it undermines the 
indispensable distinction between voluntary law (droit des gens volontaire) and 
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necessary law (droit des gens nécessaire or “the inner law of conscience”)” (Cavallar, 
2002:307) favoured by his predecessors; a distinction which should be maintained so 
that “we may never confuse what is just and good in itself with what is merely 
tolerated through necessity” (cited in Onuf, 2009:340).  
 
Interpreting Cavallar’s study, Gideon Baker proposes that there are two axes 
coordinating the evolution of a law of hospitality from Vitoria up to Kant: “this early 
modern tradition of thought was bounded by two poles – right of communication and 
right of property”, which constituted the law of hospitality while all at the same time 
threatened to unravel it (2011b:1423). The itinerary of the hospitality law is, as the 
preceding discussion indicates, not straightforward: from Vitoria and Vattel, who 
dither between property and communication as the core of a law defining hospitality, 
failing to anchor it convincingly in either, to Pufendorf and Kant, who succeed in 
doing so, robbing it however of its innate character. According to Baker, the 
importance of hospitality to early modern accounts of the international stemmed from 
the widely held view that, as an outworking of innate human sociability, there was a 
natural right of communication. Hospitality, the welcoming of the stranger, was 
thereby seen as a key tenet of the law of nature and nations (2011b:1425).  
 
Based on communication, Vitoria takes as a given that language and friendship 
indicate that human beings are meant for social life. His understanding of a right to 
hospitality derives, thus, from “natural partnership and communication”, a precept of 
“the law of nations” “which either is natural law or derives from it” (Cavallar, 
2002:278). Vattel, on the other hand, establishes that property comes before 
hospitality. In his chapter “Rules with respect to Foreigners” (1844:171–177), he draws 
a distinction between the requirements of “humanity and justice” and the “rules of the 
law of nations”, emphasizing the overarching importance of the latter (Baker, 
2011b:1428-1430). 
 
Baker underlines the tensions running through both these arguments, which he 
qualifies as inadequate to support a coherent law of hospitality. He then turns to 
Pufendorf and Immanuel Kant, considering them as the first theorists to lay the 
foundations of a hospitality law, even in a negative or ineffective way, again along the 
lines of property and communication. In the case of the former, Pufendorf is seen as 
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the first of the natural lawyers to stress the right of any community to refuse visitors 
(2011:1433–1437). Basing his arguments on property, Pufendorf seeks to move 
international hospitality from a perfect to an imperfect duty analogous to friendship – 
while it may be desirable, it is not enforceable, no right comes attached to it (Cavallar 
2002:201). Hospitality is therefore turned into charity. In the case of Kant and his 
Third Article of Perpetual Peace, on the other hand, the “right of resort” or visitation 
echoes the right of communication upheld from Vitoria onwards. I return to Kant in 
1.2.2.4. 
 
1.2.2.2 Enlightenment and Hospitality: Imperial Gaze? 
“Hospitality is therefore naturally lost in Europe”, concludes Louis de Jaucourt, one of 
the most prolific Encyclopaedists, in the relevant article on Hospitality in the 
Encyclopaedia, or a Systematic Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts, and Crafts (1765:314) of 
the French Enlightenment, after having described in great length its glorious past. The 
reason is that Europe’s population has been transformed by the 18th century into a 
population of travellers and traders, and the security of vessels, vehicles and roads, the 
ease of movement and trading and the hostels to be found along the way have replaced 
the generous assistance, “the act of humanity”, that the hospitality of the ancients 
used to provide. The issue of security suggested by Smith (fn 17) is resonant here. It is 
commerce, and the profit it provides, that has broken the charity that hospitality once 
stood for.27 In the past, according to de Jaucourt, hospitality was part of natural law as 
long as it fulfilled three criteria: that it was offered to a stranger (“someone away from 
his fatherland”), who was presumably decent or at least not likely to cause us harm, 
while there could be no question of profit by the act of hosting her. 
                                                        
27	My	rendition	of	this	French	article:	“L’	hospitalité	s'est	donc	perdue	naturellement	dans	toute	l'Europe,	parce	que	toute	l'Europe	est	de	venue	voyageante	&	commerçante.	La	circulation	des	especes	par	les	lettres	de	change,	la	sûreté	des	chemins,	la	facilité	de	se	transporter	en	tous	lieux	sans	danger,	la	commodité	des	vaisseaux,	des	postes,	&	autres	voitures;	les	hôtelleries	établies	dans	toutes	les	villes,	&	sur	toutes	les	routes,	pour	héberger	les	voyageurs,	ont	suppléé	aux	secours	généréux	de	l'hosp	talité	des	anciens.		L'esprit	 de	 commerce,	 en	 unissant	 toutes	 les	 nations,	 a	 rompu	 les	 chaînons	 de	 bienfaisance	 des	particuliers;	 il	 a	 fait	 beaucoup	 de	 bien	&	 de	mal;	 il	 a	 produit	 des	 commodités	 sans	 nombre,	 des	connoissances	plus	 étendues,	 un	 luxe	 facile,	&	 l'amour	de	 l'intérêt.	 Cet	 amour	 a	 pris	 la	 place	des	mouvemens	 secrets	 de	 la	 nature,	 qui	 lioient	 autrefois	 les	 hommes	 par	 des	 noeuds	 tendres	 &	touchans.	 Les	 gens	 riches	 y	 ont	 gagné	dans	 leurs	 voyages,	 la	 jouissance	de	 tous	 les	 agrémens	du	pays	où	ils	se	rendent,	jointe	à	l'accueil	poli	qu'on	leur	accorde	à	proportion	de	leur	dépense.	On	les	voit	avec	plaisir,	&	sans	attachement,	comme	ces	fleuves	qui	fertilisent	plus	ou	moins	les	terres	par	lesquelles	ils	passent”.	(D.	J.)	Encyclopédie,	1751–1772,	8:314.	
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This seems to be a common perception among 18th century writers. Diderot, in another 
collaborative work, the History of the two Indias (1770, Histoire des deux Indes, 
essentially an encyclopaedia of commerce between Europe and the East, which proved 
to be very popular at the time), remarks that the profit made makes the provider of 
hospitality, the host or innkeeper, “ni votre bienfaiteur, ni votre frère, ni votre ami”: not 
a foreigner’s benefactor, brother or friend. Instead, the “cash nexus” makes the host a 
kind of servant. When the stranger leaves, writes Diderot elsewhere, in the usual 
lyrical language of the time, the host, who only cares about money, will no longer 
remember her (Diderot, 1995:686).  
 
Parallel to this account of hospitality, as a custom that is now in decline, the 18th 
century and especially the Enlightenment establishes an idea which despite its old 
origins only now gains traction: that of the stranger as the noble savage. From 
Alexander Pope to Benjamin Franklin and romantic primitivism as a reaction to 
Hobbes’ brutish state of nature to Montesquieu’s Lettres Persanes, the foreigner is here 
presented as an uncorrupted and essentially harmless Other to the Self, someone that, 
despite being morally superior, the Self could and probably should civilise, since this 
nobility is based on “an apparent absence of traits such as property, formalised law or 
class divisions” (Ellingson, 2001:27). This civilising mission, which already underlies 
some of the legal thinking accompanying colonisation, as seen in the previous section, 
is not really challenged by the Enlightenment, which seems to be harbouring 
orientalist or at least “proto-orientalist” prejudices.28 This observation upsets the 
traditional, linear understanding of a triumphant liberal evolution of the political:   
 
one of the filtering devices that we use to control entry into the stories we tell 
ourselves about the eighteenth century is our sense of 1789 as a culmination of 
Revolutionary political thought and rejection of the Old Regime (Still, 
2011:284). 
 
                                                        28	Klausen	 in	 his	 review	 of	 Judith	 Still’s	 book	Hospitality	 notes	 that	 “it	 is	misleading,	 to	 attribute	Orientalism	 to	 the	 eighteenth	 century”,	 reminding	 us	 of	 how	 Edward	 Said	 points	 mostly	 to	 the	nineteenth-century	discourses	of	 the	 civilisational	 inferiority	of	 the	Other	 (2012:267).	 Judith	Still	emphasises	that	 the	Enlightenment’s	 imaginary	of	Otherness	 in	 the	East	(but	 the	argument	about	Otherness	can	be	made	more	generally)	was	more	plural	and	ambivalent	(2011).	
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“[T]riumphalist celebrations of the allegedly liberal, tolerant universalist humanism of 
the philosophes” therefore need to be corrected. I am attempting to do the same with 
the “culmination” of their thought: the French Revolution. 
 
1.2.2.3 Hospitality under the French Revolution. 
L’ étranger? Expression barbare dont nous commençons à rougir et dont nous 
laisserons la jouissance à ces hordes feroces que la charrue des hommes 
civilisés fera disparaître sans effort,29  
states Anacharsis Cloots, a Prussian baron but French citizen since 1792 and 
representative of the Oise region at the French National Convention.30 Cloots made his 
point in 1793, when he intervened in the constitutional debate in order to defend his 
project for a universal Republic of humankind, arguing in favour of banning the 
barbarous expression that was the term “foreigner/stranger” (Wahnich, 1997:7). The 
founding principles of his project are simple enough: the only legitimate sovereign is 
humankind; the only legitimate law is the rights of man inherent in nature; borders are 
artificial. At the moment where the French constitution is debated in the context of 
the universality of law and rights, for Cloots’ universalism the word “foreigner” is 
indeed a barbarous expression.  
 
While liberty, equality and brotherhood among all members of humankind despite 
nationality are only alluded to at this stage (both in the 1791 Constitution as well as 
in Robespierre’s draft Declaration of 1793; they only become the French national 
motto in the 19th century), they exist as an inspiring slogan in the first years of the 
revolution. Seen in conjunction with the second article of the Déclaration des droits de 
l’homme et du citoyen, which, connected with the extradition of criminals, prescribes 
the “resistance to oppression” – and constitutes in this way, according to Noiriel 
(1991:32), “a negative version” of the right to asylum – one comes to the conclusion 
that hospitality duties preoccupied the national convention deputies early on during 
the Revolution. Looking at the parliamentary archives of the period, we do indeed see 
                                                        29	“The	foreigner?	A	barbarous	expression	for	which	we	begin	to	blush	and	the	joy	of	whose	use	we	will	leave	to	these	ferocious	hordes	that	the	civilized	men’s	plow	will	make	disappear	effortlessly”,	
Archives	 parlementaires	 [French	 Parliamentary	 Archives],	 vol.	 63,	 p.396,	 26	 April	 1793,	 my	translation.	30	The	 National	 Convention	 (la	 Convention	 Nationale)	 was	 the	 single-chamber	 assembly	 from	September	1792	to	October	1795	during	the	French	Revolution,	which	among	other	things	ratified	the	abolition	of	slavery	in	the	French	colonies.	
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that following a lengthy debate, the Montagnard Constitution on 24 June 1793 
proclaimed for the first time that the French people “would give asylum to foreigners 
who, in the name of liberty, are banished from their homelands”, while refusing it to 
tyrants (Article 120). For Robespierre, the right of asylum has to do with “the most 
important question of public law”,31 while in April 1793 he insists at the Girondin 
committee on the need for amendments and for the addition of further articles 
involving the right of asylum in connection with resistance to oppression.32 In theory 
at least the convention and resulting constitutions seem to prove Saint Just’s 
affirmation right:  
 
The French people declare it to be the friend of all peoples; it will religiously 
respect treaties and flags; it offers asylum in its harbours to ships from all over 
the world; it offers asylum to great men and virtuous unfortunates of all 
countries; its ships at sea will protect foreign ships against storms. Foreigners 
and their customs will be respected in its bosom (Duval, 1984:441). 
 
Albert Mathiez notes that this take on asylum should not be surprising given France’s 
history towards hospitality. “Revolutionary France showing itself to be welcoming to 
foreigners has only followed monarchic France’s tradition” (Mathiez, 1918:8, my 
translation). This is proven for Mathiez by the great number of foreigners who were 
present in important roles even before the grandiose proclamations of the French 
Revolution in 1789, roles that were key for national independence: as soldiers but also 
as superior officers (Baron Grimm), principal ministers in the last government of Louis 
XVI (Necker), etc. “If there were so many foreigners in military posts, this was because, 
under the Ancien Régime, the state may have had rights over the budget but not over 
the persons”, while “the king was mainly an entrepreneur responsible for the national 
defence”(Mathiez, ibid.). However, Mathiez seems not to notice that this is not really 
hospitality at all, since it involves payment for services rendered, something that was 
very common in empires and kingdoms.  
 
Independently from the French past and the existence or not of a tradition of 
                                                        31	A.P.	t.23,	5	March	191,	p.695,	cited	in	Noiriel	p.33	32	As	well	as	on	related	issues	of	individual	rights.	Archives	Parlementaires,	t.63,	annexe	p.197	sq.,	22	April	1793	
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welcoming foreigners, the right of asylum is, however, flouted in practice. From the 
same year, 1793, the antagonism between the two main proclaimed requirements of 
the Revolution becomes evident, heightened by the declaration of war between France 
and Austria: the generous welcome towards the persecuted of the whole world versus 
the exclusive defence of the nation’s citizens (Noiriel, 1991:34). Soon enough, the 
French Revolution’s fundamental tension between the universality of humankind and 
the need for anchoring citizenship tips the scales towards the latter. With the advent 
of the revolutionary concept of the “sovereign people”, “the individual is identified 
with her homeland and all citizens are summoned to defend it” (Noiriel 1991:34–5). As 
a result, all foreign nationals are suspect, potential enemies and traitors, able to harm 
the revolution’s project. “From the February of the same year, the ‘universalism’ of the 
Revolution’s beginnings gives its place to a virulent nationalism, illustrated in the 
multitude of measures taken against the foreigners” (Noiriel, ibid.). In August, Garnier 
de Saintes proposes a decree, according to which all foreigners “who obtain a 
hospitality certificate will be required to wear on the left arm a tricolour ribbon on 
which the word hospitality along with the name of the nation they were born in will be 
written”. In December (6 Nivôse year II), foreigners, such as Anacharsis Cloots and 
Thomas Paine, are excluded from representation; in May 1794 (6 Prairial year II) 
English persons are accused of crimes against humanity (Wachnich, 1997:10–11). 
“From now on, every internal or external crisis will be translated in a doubling of 
mistrust and harshness towards the foreigners”, notes Mathiez (op.cit). Citizen 
committees are placed in every commune to verify the foreigners’ loyalty and 
situation. Destitute and bad patriots are expelled; some are sent to the guillotine 
(Cloots) or are imprisoned (Paine); those authorised to stay in France have to carry 
special safety cards (cartes de sûreté speciales. Noiriel, 1991:35–6). Of course these 
measures concern mainly the foreigners who arrive in the country after the declaration 
of war and are not always equally applied if at all. The Montagnards themselves 
consider them transitional, a necessary part of the emergency laws. They are indeed 
abandoned after the Terror, along, however, with any references to the “right of 
asylum” (Noiriel, 1991:36). 
 
With regards to this Sophie Wahnich, writing in L’impossible citoyen, her study of the 
foreigner/stranger in the French Revolution’s discourse, observes contrary to Albert 
Mathiez that there is a xenophobe past, a past of exclusion of the foreigner/stranger 
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Other, which is inscribed in the heart of the revolutionary episode (1997:10). This 
translates into the oxymoron that can be found in the revolutionary discourse. A 
language of friendship, hospitality and brotherhood, such as Saint-Just’s imperative 
“you must create a city, i.e., citizens who are friends, who are hospitable and 
brothers”, rubs shoulders at the same time with the exclusion of nobles and strangers: 
“Ban the residence in Paris to all nobles, to all foreigners: the court was in the past 
banned to plebeians”.33 In the same movement Saint-Just manages to set out both the 
normative values of social and political ties and the practical frontier of the 
revolutionised city. “The noble and the stranger cannot be the friend, the host, the 
brother”. On one hand, there is the unlimited political subject and on the other, the 
sovereign nation, the uncertain search of a determined community (Wahnich, 1997:9–
17): hospitality and suspicion, friendship and treason, brotherhood and exclusion.  
 
1.2.3 Kant 
[H]ospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when 
he arrives on someone else’s territory (Kant et al., [1795] 1991:105) 
 
Picking up from the equation of hospitality with charity in the 16th century, and 
Vitoria’s attempt in the 17th to base it on the right of communication (discussed in 
1.2.2.1), Immanuel Kant is essentially the one who brings the term of hospitality back 
to the fore in the late 18th century: all subsequent and current references to hospitality 
in IPT and IR tend to relate to him and his essay “Toward Perpetual Peace” (Zum 
ewigen Frieden, 1795). There he offers a set of six “preliminary articles” that have the 
aim of reducing the likelihood of war, but which cannot avert it altogether. Then, in 
order to establish permanent peace, Kant adds three more articles, this time 
“definitive”. While the first two concern, respectively, the type of constitution a state 
needs to have and its participation in a union with other states, the third definitive 
article supports a cosmopolitan right of universal hospitality. Frequently 
uncommented upon (Benhabib, 2004b:26), the third article with the title Das 
Weltbürgerrecht soll auf Bedingungen der allgemeinen Hospitalität eingeschränkt sein 
(Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality) (Kant, 
1991:105–108) is the only right Kant designates as cosmopolitan (Weltbürgerrecht). 
                                                        33	AP,	vol.88,	p.545,	germinal	an	II	
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Written following the 1795 Peace Treaty of Basel, which ended the war between 
revolutionary France and Prussia, Kant’s suggestions for reaching perpetual peace 
“envisioned a harmonious coexistence of territorial states on the basis of human 
commonalities, including the fact that everyone was originally a foreigner (xenos) on 
earth” (Kim, 2011:13). Since interaction among human beings has increased to the 
point that they have “entered in varying degrees into a universal community (…) a 
violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere” (Kant et al., 1991:107–8, 
his emphasis). At this level of universal interaction, the right of hospitality is a very 
essential element of perpetual peace. Men have such a right  
 
by virtue of their communal possession of earth’s surface. Since the earth is a 
globe, they cannot disperse on an infinite area, but must necessarily tolerate 
one another’s company. And no-one originally has any greater right than 
anyone else to occupy any particular portion of the earth (Kant et al., 
1991:105–6).  
 
Thus two dimensions are clear: first, this is not a question of philanthropy or charity 
but of right; and secondly, boundaries between inside and outside or private and 
public as well as questions of origin are not to be considered hospitable.  
 
For Kant, the universal nature of the right of hospitality stems, on the one hand, from 
the law of nature seen earlier (ius naturale) aiming at “the preservation of one’s own 
nature, which is to say, one’s own life” (Lambert, 2003:17), and, on the other, from 
Gesellschaft, i.e., society,34 where there is “a right of temporary sojourn, a right to 
associate or to visit (zugesellen), which all men have” (Kant et al., 1991:103). Said right 
“can be understood as belonging to the class of rights pertaining to immunity” 
(Lambert, op.cit), since strangers are immune from being treated with hostility or from 
being considered as an enemy immediately upon arrival, even if they end up being 
refused reception. The status of the stranger could be defined as hostile, only after/ if 
she fails to respect the conditions of hospitality, that of “behav[ing] in a peaceable 
manner in the place s/he happens to be in” (Kant, 1991:106).  
                                                        34 	Perhaps	 foreshadowing	 the	 Gemeinschaft–Gesellschaft	 (community-society)	 debate	 between	German	sociologists	Ferdinand	Tönnies	and	Marx	Weber	in	early	20th	century,	“Kant	saw	society	as	sadly	becoming	an	end	in	itself	rather	than	the	means	to	a	common	end”	(Elliott,	2012:309)	and	life	in	society	as	corrupting	human	beings	and	their	good	moral	dispositions	(Zöller,	2015	:43).	
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Violence is thus foreseen, as Kant makes allowances for the guest to be refused as long 
as this does not put her in peril (“[h]e can be indeed turned away, if this can be done 
without causing his death” (Kant et al., 1991:105)),35 but provided that he is peaceful, 
the stranger should ideally be welcomed. But even as a peaceful presence, a world 
citizen is, for Kant, by nature entitled to a right of visitation,36 not to the right of an 
unconditional hospitality. According to Kant, becoming a permanent visitor 
(Gastrecht) 37  involves the draft of a friendly agreement, “a special contract of 
beneficence” (wohltätiger Vertrag), in order to become a fellow inhabitant and “a 
member of the native household” (Hausgenossen) (Kant et al., 1991:106). Since the 
surface of the earth is restricted, however, human beings need to conceive of world 
citizenship in terms of Besuchsrecht, a right of visitation and association (Kant, ibid.), 
“which is alternatively grounded in social responsibility and universal morality” (Kim, 
2011:14). While this understanding of a visitor’s rights positions Kant as a critic of 
colonial practices 38  – where, when it comes to a foreign visitor, members of 
communities have to subordinate their decisions to rational conceptions of Sittlichkeit 
(morality) “instead of reifying the symbolic power of culture, language and ethnicity” 
(Kim, ibid.) – this still fails to address the needs of those who arrive at the borders. The 
cosmopolitan right of hospitality can be seen in essence to be “limited to a right to 
offer to engage in commerce, not a right to actual commerce itself, which must always 
be voluntary trade” (Rauscher, 2012). Settlement, the recognition of individual 
problems of the foreigner at the border and provision for her long-term needs 
constitute another matter entirely.  
                                                        35	This	is	essentially	the	basis	of	the	right	of	non-refoulement	officially	enshrined	in	Article	33	of	the	1951	Convention,	 the	Convention	Relating	 to	 the	Status	of	Refugees,	 and	 is	 also	 contained	 in	 the	1967	Protocol	Relating	to	the	Status	of	Refugees	as	well	as	Article	3	of	the	1984	Convention	Against	Torture.	36	A	right	of	resort	 is	the	translation	used	in	the	CUP	publication	of	Kant’s	Political	Writings	(tr.	by	H.B.	 Nisbet,	 1991)	 used	 in	 this	 thesis,	 but	 I	 am	 opting	 instead	 for	 the	 right	 of	 visitation	most	commonly	used.	(Besuchsrecht	has	also	been	translated	as	“right	of	temporary	sojourn”).	37	As	above,	 I	am	opting	 for	right	of	permanent	visitor	 instead	of	 the	expression	right	of	guest	 that	Nisbet	uses	to	render	Gastrecht.	Permanent	visitor	is	also	the	choice	of	Benhabib	(2004)	and	Onuf	(2013).		38	In	the	edited	volume	on	Kant	and	Colonialism	(2014),	one	can	see	that	Kant’s	respective	remarks	may	be	critical,	especially	in	The	Metaphysics	of	Morals	and	Toward	Perpetual	Peace;	however,	this	has	 not	 always	 been	 the	 case.	 In	 earlier	 works,	 such	 as	 Idea	 for	 a	 Universal	 History	 with	 a	
Cosmopolitan	Aim	(1784),	“his	remarks	on	colonial	practices	and	slavery	were	at	best	neutral	and	often	suggested	 that	he	 regarded	 these	practices	as	 tolerable,	maybe	even	necessary	moments	of	the	process	of	cultural	and	historical	progress”	(Khurana,	2015).	For	more,	see	the	introduction	to	the	edited	volume	as	well	as	the	chapters	by	Pauline	Kleingeld	and	Lea	Ypi.		
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Such definition of a right is, as is to be expected, conflictual by nature. It is one thing 
to overlook community identity, its cultures, languages and myths, and to draw 
instead upon reason in order to challenge the warlike nature of the state, for example 
by suggesting a federation of enlightened republics; but without inquiring into the 
needs of the individuals who are taken under the care of the host, the right of 
hospitality is rendered feeble if not meaningless.  The element of unchecked sovereign 
power in the Kantian conception makes Samuel Moyn point out that the right of 
hospitality amounts to “a wholly minimal Weltbürgerrecht or ‘world citizen law’ that 
envisaged no more than an asylum right for individuals out of place in a world of 
national states” (2010:28). Similarly, Jürgen Habermas suggests Kant cannot have 
“legal obligation in mind” and that he glosses over the problem of defining the “legally 
binding character” or the “moral self-obligation” of an international alliance (Kant, 
1998:169–170, his emphasis).  
 
What is more, Kant does not believe that hospitality firmly complies with the 
categorical imperative or indeed any other ethical consideration. Since it derives from 
the idea that humans cannot disperse across the surface of the globe in order to avoid 
each other, and therefore must tolerate the presence of one another, “the ‘right to 
associate’ does not practically originate from a positive and gregarious spirit, but 
rather is something that only gradually develops in Man, begrudgingly, as a spirit of 
toleration” (Lambert, 2003:20). In other words, withdrawal and distance from the 
Other seem to be a human being’s natural inclination. In addition, Kant’s 
understanding of an ethical state (ethischer Staat) coincides with that of the church, 
which is not only to be ideally constituted in such a way as to combat the demoralising 
or corrupting effect of society (something that traditional churches fail to do (see fn 
34), but also and most importantly is to bear at least some resemblance to the juridico-
political state (Kant, [1793]1960:92). Such an “ethical society”, composed by a 
community of members affirming each other’s worth and supporting each other to act 
morally, takes the visible form of a church not because ethical laws have originated in 
God’s commands but because human beings are to perform their ethical duties as 
meticulously as if they were god given (Sullivan, 1994:86–7). The resemblance 
between the ethical and the juridico-political states lies in “the common character of 
their legislation and laws being “public”” (Zöller, 2015:43). However, the resemblance 
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here ends since  
 
juridico-political (rechtlichbürgerliche Gesellschaft) society is concerned with the 
outward comportment of its citizens and operates with the means of external 
constraints. By contrast, “ethico-political society” (ethischbürgerliche 
Gesellschaft) concerns itself with the moral “conviction” (Gesinnung) of its 
citizens and is essentially free of constraint (zwangsfrei). According to Kant, 
establishing an ethical state in a given community presupposes the institution 
of a juridical state in and among that community, to which the ethical state 
adds, other than its public character, its proper principle of civic unification, 
viz., “virtue” (Tugend)”. 
 
The use of hospitality in this context is odd (Benhabib, 2012:79). Caught among the 
obligation to tolerate the Other because of the earth’s surface being limited; the 
Other’s right to hospitality; and the virtue that the ethical society assigns to the 
juridical sovereign state, which in turn is responsible for the legal contours of 
hospitality, the Other is from the outset met with and defined by enmity. “The 
obligation to tolerate and the right to hospitality both imply that the other is 
originally regarded with feelings of animosity that a set of laws is now meant to 
pacify” (Minkkinen, 2009:94). From the moment the Other makes a claim beyond a 
temporary sojourn, she becomes an enemy to the Self and the community. Even if 
Kant’s cosmopolitan approach undermines the traditional particularistic attachment 
to the nomos of the earth of the sovereign nation-state – and does so, for the 
philosophy of his time, in a revolutionary fashion – it still fails to focus on the 
intricacies of the right-bearing subject. What of the powerless Other who is supposed 
to bear the right of hospitality when she arrives at the border? If they do not belong 
elsewhere, i.e., they are not citizens of another state, or have no documents, or are not 
willing to belong, does the right of hospitality given to them carry equal weight? In 
addition, what if the claims the Other is making relate to the receiving community’s 
responsibility for her visitation (because of the receiving community’s economic, 
military, hostile or other previous activity) (Sassen, 2007:441)? These and other 
questions point to the restricted nature of the right of hospitality and its lack of 
connection with ethical considerations of Otherness. They show how one might go 
about considering the complexity of the Other's claims and identity despite the 
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cosmopolitan imaginary's assumption that no such complexity truly exists. I argue 
that if hospitality were to be considered as an ethical concept, it should not be so 
closely linked to community belonging, to the centrality of the host and the institution 
of the state.39 
 
1.2.4 Hospitality: a biopolitical turn? 
After Kant and with the strengthening and improvement of the administrative 
organisation of the nation-state going hand-in-hand with the birth of independent 
states in 19th and early 20th century Europe following the fall first of the Ottoman and 
later of the Austro-Hungarian empires, we observe a turn towards a more biopolitical 
understanding of hospitality. Censuses, metrics, passports and other identification 
documents experience a great proliferation from the late 19th century to the First 
World War and even greater systematisation after that (Torpey, 1999). Following the 
dramatic easing of restrictions of movement after the Napoleonic wars during the 
mostly peaceful European 19th century, “paper walls” are increasingly raised against 
migration, mainly affecting migrants from the non-Western world40 but also any Other 
who may be considered undesirable by the receiving states.  
 
Below, I explore briefly two crucial scholarly moments describing this turn that I think 
best help us understand the biopolitical understanding of hospitality and Otherness. 
The first is Michel Foucault’s observations on the birth of biopower and biopolitics and 
the second is Hannah Arendt’s ruminations on the results of the lack of hospitality in 
the European 20th century: the stateless Other, the horrific violence that was 
experienced by this Other during the Second World War and the framework of rights 
that seeked to redress it.  
 
1.2.4.1 Foucault and biopouvoir 
Michel Foucault first discusses the term biopower (biopouvoir) in the first volume 
                                                        39	Saskia	Sassen	makes	a	similar	argument	in	the	context	of	“democratic	iterations”,	i.e.,	democratic	participation	of	the	powerless	Others	in	society	(Sassen,	2012:103).	40	Torpey	 focuses	on	 the	US	 restriction	of	 entry	 to	massive	migrant	 flows	 from	China	 in	 late	19th	century	 while	 Radhika	 Viyas	 Mongia’s	 exploration	 of	 the	 use	 of	 passports	 as	 the	 Canadian	government’s	instrument	of	control	and	deterrence	towards	specific	subjects	of	the	British	Empire,	namely	Indians,	at	the	beginning	of	the	20th	century,	makes	an	interesting	read	with	respect	to	the	connection	between	race	and	mobility	(1999).		
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of The History of Sexuality, The Will To Knowledge (1998 [1976]) and at his 1979 series of 
lectures at the Collège de France with the title “La naissance de la biopolitique”, which 
due to his early death have remained largely unpublished. There he attempts a 
historical analysis which leads to the current practice of modern states and their 
regulation of their subjects through “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques 
for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations, marking the 
beginning of an era of biopower” (Foucault, 1998:140). According to him (Foucault, 
1998:135–159), the power over life (take a life or let live), which until the 17th century 
belonged to the sovereign, has shifted towards the “power to foster life or disallow it to 
the point of death”, towards “a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that 
endeavours to administer, optimize, and multiply it”, and it has evolved along two 
basic poles. The first pole focused on the body as a machine and involved 
“disciplining, optimization of capabilities, (…) increase of usefulness, (…) integration 
into systems of efficient and economic controls” (Foucault, 1998:138–9) and was 
represented by schools, universities, workshops and the army. The second focused on 
the body as species and its biological processes: propagation of the species, mortality, 
life expectancy, longevity. Demographics, birth rates, migration controls, public 
health, housing, etc., were just a few of the aforementioned diverse techniques used to 
control and modify the processes of life.  
 
Thus, the power over life, biopower, was organised around these two poles and these 
techniques. The timing of this shift was not accidental either, as it took place along 
with the development of capitalism: “the controlled insertion of bodies into the 
machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to 
economic processes” (Foucault, 1998:140–1) were indispensable for capitalism’s 
existence. “Life” and “living being” (le vivant) come to the forefront of political 
regulation and new economic strategies. With the rise of capitalism, the “Western man 
gradually learns what it means to be a living species in a living world, to have a body, 
conditions of existence, probabilities of life, an individual and collective welfare, 
forces that could be modified...” (Foucault, 1998:142). This fact, that life and its 
reproductive and other bodily processes become regulated at the same time as they 
come to occupy the epicentre of political life, is something radical new. “For millennia, 
man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity 
for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence 
 62 
as a living being in question” (Foucault, 1998:143). 
 
The repercussions of this shift included ruptures in the pattern of the scientific 
discourse, the proliferation of technologies and regulations regarding the body, its 
health, living conditions, etc. Most importantly, though, biopower has affected the 
juridical system. With the continuous need for regulatory and corrective mechanisms, 
the law and the judicial institutions had to be “increasingly incorporated into a 
continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on)” and become adjusted 
to a new right: “the ‘right’ to life, to one’s body, to health, to happiness, to the 
satisfaction of needs” (1984:267) even if in the end, death is administered. How does 
this affect hospitality? 
 
Citizenship, migration controls, surveillance, productivity and health metrics of 
prospective labour migrants, medical screenings (Wiebe, 2008), eugenics guidance 
regarding reproduction – these are only some of the biopolitical instruments that have 
made possible the differentiation and regulation of populations in favour of the 
nation-state’s social and territorial demarcation. While Foucault is mainly focusing on 
the biopolitics within the state,41 his considerations apply to migration and issues of 
hospitality as well. Such instruments ignore the suffering and the violence migration 
entails, which in turn “arise from bordering practices that police us/them relations 
inherited in the colonial present” (Bagelman, 2015 referring to Foucault’s 1979 
interview on the Vietnamese refugee problem). They are, however, taken up and 
inscribed in the laws of hospitality, especially after the Second World War and the 
massive population movements it caused, as can be seen in the post-1948 legal 
framework and the language of rights referring to migration flows, asylum granting 
and refugee assistance. These rights interest Hannah Arendt in her discussion about 
statelessness and the importance of the human rights framework for hospitality, to 
which I turn next.   
 
                                                        41	Foucault’s	 interest	 in	 refugees	 and	 migration	 has	 been	 more	 apparent	 in	 his	 presence	 as	 an	activist	in	the	late	70s	and	before	his	death	(see	Open	Democracy’s	13	November	2015	articles	on	the	issue	and	especially	Colin	Gordon’s	“The	drowned	and	the	saved:	Foucault's	texts	on	migration	and	solidarity”).	
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1.2.4.2 Arendt and declarations of rights 
Hannah Arendt was able to examine first-hand the biopolitical turn in the treatment of 
the Other that Foucault would formalise a few decades later. Having been stripped of 
her citizenship in 1938, interned in a French “enemy alien” camp in 1940 and forced to 
witness the deaths and disappearances of family, friends and colleagues, Arendt 
theorised the biopolitical aspect of totalitarian politics, which were based on the 
extermination of “superfluous” individuals (Arendt, 1976: 459) even if she never used 
the term “biopolitics”. Contrary to traditional understandings that have her separating 
politics from biological life, in which her concept of “natality” relates to Heidegger and 
the existential analysis of human life,42  recent scholarly conjecture situates this 
concept within the discourse of biopolitics (e.g. Vatter, 2006; Blencowe, 2010). This 
more recent scholarship argues that “she has developed some of the most critical 
insights into the primacy of life in modern society and the reduction of people to mere 
living things in 20th-century totalitarianism” (Braun, 2007:5), not only in The Origins 
of Totalitarianism but also in Human Condition and elsewhere. What is more important 
in this debate, on which I cannot expand here, is the proof that Arendt was among the 
first contemporaries of the Nazi camps and the Holocaust in general to realise the 
“dark sides of the modern project” (Braun, 2007:7) apparent in the atrocities and 
violent treatment of Otherness. “Natality” appears as a positive or affirmative aspect 
of biopolitics; an aspect that can counteract and break away from the controlling and 
violent or negative aspects of biopolitics as these are manifested in the exclusion and 
inhospitable treatment of the Other not only in the totalitarian regimes of the 20th 
century but possibly in the future.43  
 
In this inhospitable environment, Arendt argues for the need to consider the plight of 
the Other as refugees. “In the first place, we do not like to be called “refugees”. We 
ourselves call each other “newcomers” or “immigrants””, she states in a 1943 essay 
(Arendt, 1996:110), pointing to the problem of discourse in categories of hospitality 
(See 1.3.2); and a few years later she describes in detail how the disintegration of 
empires in the interwar period has created two novel groups of people – the minorities 
                                                        42	See	Braun,	2007;	Schwarz,	2013;	Vatter,	2006.	
43 “[D]uring	 the	1950s	 (...)	Arendt	became	convinced	 that	 totalitarianism	 is	a	new,	but	 “essential”	form	 of	 government,	whose	 possibility	 therefore	must	 correspond	 to	 some	 “basic	 experience”	 of	human	beings,	and	hence	is	inherently	repeatable”	(Vatter,	2006:145).	See	also	Arendt,	1976:472–474.			
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and the stateless – and how the law in the form of the so-called Minority Treaties 
failed them, rendering them vulnerable to violence and invisible (Borren, 2008). 
Arendt is the first writer to notice so soon after the Second World War the tension 
between the political practice and the ethical obligations towards the stranger, at least 
as these are stated in international law. While the “universal ideal” of the 1948 
Declaration of Human Rights has been criticised for as long as it has existed, Arendt 
described as early as 1951 human rights as a paradoxical project (1976:355), where 
“the modern nation-state system is based on the contradiction between human rights 
and the principle of national sovereignty, which therefore, inevitably, breaks down” 
(Borren, 2008:215). The stateless refugee is the figure best exemplifying this 
breakdown. 
 
It is in “The Perplexities of the Rights of Man” in The Origins of Totalitarianism (Arendt 
1976[1951]:290-302) that Arendt embarks on her critical analysis of human rights. 
Having indicated elsewhere the perplexities arising from the groundlessness of 
modern declarations of rights (Arendt, 1990[1963]) – that, since divine authority as a 
source of legitimation cannot be summoned anymore, “secularization in the modern 
age leaves political actors with the problem of finding a new authority for the laws, 
rights and institutions they establish” (Gündoğdu, 2012:6) – she argues here that 
despite the proclamations of their universality, human rights are not “independent of 
human plurality” and are not possessed by human beings “expelled from the human 
community”. Whereas they are supposed to have been created for the people who had 
nothing left but their humanity after having fled persecution and become stateless, in 
order to indicate their inalienable dignity that no power would deny, these ideal 
universal rights were in practice assigned to the political infrastructure of nation 
states. “The idea of universal human rights was immediately linked to the power of the 
nation state; it is the nation state that determines who has the right to have rights and 
who does not”. The risks of this situation are well known: 
 
It is quite conceivable, and even within the realm of practical political 
possibilities, that one fine day a highly organized and mechanized humanity 
will conclude quite democratically – namely by majority decision – that for 
humanity as a whole it would be better to liquidate certain parts thereof 
(Arendt 1976[1951]: 299). 
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Put simply, Arendt considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to be part of a 
movement of expansion of state power over private life, notwithstanding the 
declaration’s good intentions. State power intrudes further into the zone of private life 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, instead of providing rights to the 
rightless, leads to the opposite result: the refugees and strangers in general are further 
submitted to the control of policing and other power mechanisms of the nation state. 
By completing the “organization of humanity” we succeed in throwing refugees “in the 
midst of civilization” back upon nothing but “their natural givenness” (ibid. 302), 
leaving them completely powerless in the face of the power of the state.  
 
For Arendt, the critical discussion of human rights should work mainly as a political 
critique of the incapability of human rights to provide rights for stateless refugees in 
particular and for the non-status stranger in general, aiming always, however, at the 
inclusion of the stateless refugees and non-status strangers in the political community 
in such a way that the “right to have rights” would be safeguarded. Ayten Gündoğdu in 
her recent works (2012, 2015) focuses on this exact aim, arguing that that which in 
“The Perplexities of the Rights of Man” seems initially to be a paralysing aporia 
regarding the practice and the implementation of human rights, is actually a positive 
aporetic thinking that can lead to a reinvention of human rights, which in the future 
may become more effective for the invisible and excluded Other. However, it was and 
remains obvious that, as in the case of the Second World War, state-centred politics 
not only fail the stranger Other but also expose her to an increasingly militarised and 
exclusionary set of biopolitical practices, such as those seen briefly in the 
introduction. I argue that this happens because no matter what the framework, human 
rights-based or otherwise, violence ensues from the way in which relationality towards 
the stranger Other is established. As long as the Other is considered in a polarising and 
antagonistic way or in a trivialising, silencing manner, such occurrences of violence 
will not be addressed.  
 
In what immediately follows I examine exactly this: the ways the Other has been 
theorised, categorised and understood in approaches to hospitality.   
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1.3 Hospitality and the Other 
When attempting an historical approach to the linguistic and etymological evolution 
of xenos and hospitality, an innate conflict becomes immediately apparent: a not 
always latent tension between the dictum and the praxis of hospitality mirrored in the 
mere components of the word. This intrinsic tension constitutes the indecisive nature 
of the word, what Derrida calls the term’s undecidability (1972:53). I would like to 
argue that the undecidability observed at the linguistic and etymological levels in a 
way symbolises the disparity evidenced between the acts of hospitality and the ethical 
narrative enfolding them, i.e., the contrast between the shunning of the stranger by 
agents of hospitality and the ethical discourse used by them at the same time in order 
to claim that they do nothing of the sort. 
 
Looking back at the history of the term, it seems clear that the notion of stranger is 
not defined in the ancient civilisations by fixed criteria. In purely etymological terms, 
the root of all relevant words lies in the Proto-Indo-European *ghos-ti,44 which means 
stranger, guest or host; properly “someone with whom one has reciprocal duties of 
hospitality”. *Ghos-ti evolved into the Latin root hostis, meaning enemy army, where 
the adjective “hostile” finds its origin, as does the word “host”, both with the meaning 
of multitude but also with the meaning of someone who provides hospitality. From 
*ghos-ti also comes the Greek word xenos, which has the interchangeable meaning of 
guest, host, or stranger, always denoting the outsider, the visitor of the city. 
 
Benveniste, looking at relevant derivative terms, notes that they belong to a moral 
vocabulary “permeated by values which are not personal but relational” (1973:280). 
Therefore, rather than denoting psychological states, relevant vocabulary refers to the 
reciprocal duties and obligations that transcend the meeting with the stranger, aiming 
at “the accomplishment of positive actions which are implied in the pact of mutual 
hospitality” (ibid.). “Xenos indicates relations of the same type between men bound by 
a pact, which implies precise obligations that also devolve on their descendants”, 
relations binding kings as well as private people (Benveniste, 1973:77). The same 
seems to apply partly for Latin. However, in the case of Latin things prove to be more 
                                                        44	When	an	asterisk	is	placed	before	a	word,	it	shows	that	it	is	constituted,	i.e.,	its	existence	has	been	deduced	by	linguistic	scholars	and	there	is	no	written	evidence	to	prove	the	existence	of	the	word.	(Lashley	et	al.,	2007:	17).		
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complicated given that the word for guest, hospes, appears to hold a double meaning, 
i.e., both guest and enemy. Being a compound word, hospes originally comes from 
hostis, which is also the root of Gothic gasts and Old Slavonic gostĭ, the predecessor of 
the modern word guest. So hostis had initially meant a stranger and a guest while also 
conveying the notion of equality by compensation: “a hostis is one who repays my gift 
by a counter-gift” (Benveniste, 1973:71). He is not a stranger in general but one bound 
in a relation of equality and reciprocity with the citizens of Rome due to the rights 
given to him. Benveniste surmises that it is when reciprocal relations between clans 
were succeeded by the exclusive relations between civitae that the classical meaning of 
“enemy” must have developed. In order to explain this connection, it is usually 
supposed that both versions of hostis derived their meaning from stranger, with the 
notion of “favourable stranger” developing into “guest” and that of “hostile stranger” 
into “enemy”. For this reason, Latin coined a new name for “guest”: *hosti-pet- , i.e., 
hospes, with the second component (*pot-) signifying master. This is where the noun 
hospitality would finally come from (Benveniste 1973:71–83). It is this innate conflict 
of the word, the “double bind” and “the troubling analogy in their common origin 
between hostis as host and hostis as enemy, between hospitality and hostility” – this 
aporia – that Jacques Derrida underlines in his neologism of hostipitality (Derrida, 
2000a: 15).  
 
To summarise, a stranger is someone born elsewhere, whose identity is defined from 
(place of) birth rather than death and who enjoys some specific rights: this is shown by 
the Greek xenos, meaning both “stranger” and “guest”, that is to say, the stranger who 
benefits by the laws of hospitality. There are other definitions available: the stranger is 
“he who comes from the outside”, Lat. advena or simply “he who is outside the limits 
of the community”, Lat. peregrinus. Therefore, there is no “stranger” as such. In the 
diversity of notions, the stranger is always a particular stranger, bearing a distinct 
status. All in all, the notions of enemy, stranger, guest, which for us form three 
distinct identities – semantically and legally – present in the Indo-European 
languages close connections. (Benveniste, 1969:360–1) 
 
Studies on Plato’s work and on his use of the figure of the xenos, the stranger, often 
point to the reflective use, especially towards his later works such as the Sophist and 
Statesman (Politicus), of the enigmatic figure of the anonymous xenos. The stranger in 
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these later works substitutes Socrates in the role of the dialogues’ “gamemaster”. In 
the case of the Sophist the stranger is a visitor from Elea, the hometown of 
Parmenides, who undertakes to question Parmenides’ logos, to pose, as Derrida points 
out, the fearful and possibly parricidal question.  
 
As though the Foreigner had to begin by contesting the authority of the chief, 
the father, the master of the family, the “master of the house,” of the power of 
hospitality (2000b:5).  
 
“The Foreigner here figures, virtually, a parricide son” (2000b:11). In the Statesman, 
the same stranger fulfils once again the role of the person posing the leading question 
to open the great debate of what constitutes the political being. This new role for the 
stranger takes place alongside Plato’s shift of focus away from the Parmenidean being 
and ontology towards the non-being and the distinctive dignity of the Other. So the 
“strangeness” of the main protagonist of the platonic dialogues “meets the 
[O]therness as a generic category of all, true or false, thought and discourse 
inaugurating, thus, a philosophy coming from elsewhere (venue d’ailleurs) and a novel 
way of showing that it is not possible to think of the Same without thinking of the 
Other”. We have therefore for the first time “a philosophy of the Stranger (…) in sum, 
the question of the stranger and the Other becomes a philosophical issue as such (Joly, 
1992:14–5; my translation).  
 
In contemporary political theory, Bonnie Honig makes a similar argument regarding 
the foreigner as a philosophical issue, in her book Democracy and the Foreigner (2001). 
"How should we solve the problem of foreignness?" has been for Honig the main question 
of political theory for a long time, and it continues to motivate contemporary 
discussions of democracy and citizenship, with experts trying to find the “correct 
balance” between social unity and democracy. From experts in migration to 
economists to legal scholars and philosophers, foreignness, Honig argues, is reiterated 
as a "problem" that needs solving (Honig, 2001:2). The same goes for the different 
answers to the problem: from xenophobia and strict regulation to multicultural 
arguments for broader inclusion of the foreign Other and inquiries into diversity, the 
various debates “treat foreignness as a necessary evil and assume that we would be 
better off if only there were enough land for every group to have its own nation-state”, 
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differing only in their estimate of this evil and threat (Honig, ibid.). I will consider 
these different evaluations in three parts, focusing first on the main characteristics 
defining the stranger and foreign Other (proximity and belonging); her legal 
categorisations in the context of hospitality; and finally the abject Other and her 
different forms that will interest me in this project.  
 
1.3.1 Proximity and belonging: fear of the stranger constituting the inside  
The figure of stranger as the Other would be taken up by theorists in the 20th century. 
In the field of sociology, Georg Simmel is the first to formulate a theory of 
strangerhood. In 1908 he suggested that Der Fremde  
 
[is] the stranger as a modern character-type – she who comes and stays, who 
may be offered the provisional or probationary belonging of assimilation, (…), 
that kind of belonging at the behest of the host which is always tentative, 
always open to suspension at the will of the host (Beilharz, 2000).  
 
According to Simmel, strangers are not, as common sense might have it, those who are 
not known but are instead those who have been encountered but have not been fully 
assimilated into the community. “If wandering, considered as a state of detachment 
from every given point in space, is the conceptual opposite of attachment to any point, 
the sociological form of the “stranger” presents the synthesis, as it were, of both of 
these properties” (Levine, 1971:43). The stranger is close to us, insofar as we feel 
between her and ourselves common features of a national, social, occupational, or 
generally human, nature. She is far from us, insofar as these common features extend 
beyond her or us, and connect us only because they connect a great many people 
(Wolff, 1950:402–408). The stranger also brings into our spatial circle certain qualities 
that are not, and cannot be, indigenous to it. “The stranger, therefore, is an element of 
the group itself, not unlike the poor and sundry “inner enemies” – an element whose 
membership within the group involves both being outside it and confronting it” 
(Levine, 1971:144). The nature of “our own spatial circle” is the absolute test that 
defines the stranger, empowering her existence as such by bringing her near to the 
borders of our circle but negating her at the same time as well, i.e., putting her in the 
distance. Simmel argues that “between these two factors of nearness and distance (…) 
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a peculiar tension arises, since the consciousness of having only the absolutely general 
in common has exactly the effect of putting a special emphasis on that which is not 
common” (ibid. 148).  
 
Based on Simmel’s authority, relevant literature has often reformulated the figure of 
the stranger through specific types of actors (Marotta, 2000:121), mainly situated in 
the first half of the 20th century. The Simmelian stranger has been the basis for Park’s 
“marginal man” for example: the person condemned to live at once within two 
different and antagonistic cultures, the individual “who lives in intimate association 
with the world about him but never so completely identifies with it that he is unable to 
look at it with a certain critical detachment” (1950:356). Margaret Mary Wood and 
Alfred Schütz also based their “newcomer” on Simmel’s stranger, defining her as “(…) 
an adult individual of our times and civilization who tries to be permanently accepted 
or at least tolerated by the group which [s]he approaches” (Schütz, 1944:499), with 
Schütz’s “principal, though special, example of the “stranger” [being] the immigrant” 
(McLemore, 1970:91). In a similar vein, we find Paul Siu’s “sojourner” who, 
comparable to the “marginal man”, “is treated as a deviant type of the sociological 
form of the “stranger”, one who clings to the cultural heritage of his own ethnic group 
and tends to live in isolation, hindering his assimilation to the society in which he 
resides, often for many years” (Siu, 1952:34) and Stonequist’s notion of “the 
cosmopolitan individual” or “the international mind”, also deriving from the marginal 
man theory.  
 
Guided also by Simmel and “utilis[ing] French poststructuralists such as Foucault and 
Derrida” (Marotta 2000:132), Zygmunt Bauman suggests in his theory of the 
“stranger” (1991; 1993) that the stranger is not one marked by particular existential 
propositions (such as the “stranger” of Albert Camus) but is rather the product of his 
position within modern society; she is the postmodern stranger. Bauman's stranger is 
a figure created by society insofar as it attempts to cognitively order physical and 
social space, thus creating a form of human waste. Rather than being a friend or an 
enemy, Bauman's stranger is the individual who fits neither of these categories, 
remaining suspiciously undecidable, an idea pointing towards the Derridean aporia or, 
as mentioned earlier, the term’s “undecideability”.  
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Friends and enemies work together as insiders and outsiders, whereas strangers 
inhabit the liminal zone in between (…). Following Simmel, Bauman identifies 
friendship and enmity as forms of sociation. Strangers are different because 
they represent the undecidable, the unclassifiable, a walking contradiction 
(Beilharz 2000:109–10).  
 
The stranger therefore produces fear in her very being. She is a frightening figure 
because she is not part of the (modern) order of society and does not fit within a 
preordained position, i.e., her ambivalence creates fear as society continually fails to 
pin down this conspicuously unknown element (ibid.).  
 
Beilharz looks at the intricate relationship and affinity of Bauman’s work with that of 
Claude Lévi-Strauss and highlights the two alternative but also complementary 
strategies, which modern societies deploy opposite the stranger:  
 
One was anthropophagic, annihilating the strangers by devouring them and then 
metabolically transforming into a tissue indistinguishable from one’s own. This 
was the strategy of assimilation: making the different similar; smothering of 
cultural or linguistic distinctions; forbidding all traditions and loyalties except 
those meant to feed the conformity to the new and all-embracing order; 
promoting and enforcing one and only one measure of conformity. The other 
strategy was anthropoemic, vomiting the strangers, banishing them from the 
limits of the orderly world and barring them from all communication with 
those inside. This was the strategy of exclusion – confining the strangers within 
the visible walls of the ghettos or behind the invisible, yet no less tangible, 
prohibitions of commensality, connubium and commercium; ‘cleansing’ – 
expelling the strangers beyond the frontiers of the managed and manageable 
territory; or, when neither of the two measures was feasible – destroying the 
strangers physically (Bauman, 1997: 16). 
 
This exclusion, Beilharz notes, can be seen applied in “such institutions of separation 
called concentration camps, more specifically death camps (in Nazi Germany) or 
detention centres (in contemporary Australia)” (Beilharz, 2000:120). The postmodern 
state, however, uses different strategies that are no longer premised on fitting in or 
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keeping out but on keeping the stranger moving or consuming; failure in this respect, 
as is common, turns strangers into servants and parasites living at the host’s expense, 
seen to invade their community. 
 
Returning to the theme of fear, a review of 20th century sociology makes it clear that 
theorists from Simmel and Park in the early 20th century to Ulrich Beck and Bauman 
towards its end have emphasised the social psychological disturbance, the fear, caused 
by the figure of the stranger and the insecurity of relations with her. The stranger, the 
outsider, the Other threatens to wreak havoc on the social order, “from the imagined 
community of the nation to that of the familiar neighbourhood. Individual strangers 
are a discomforting presence” (Sandercock 2005: 221–2). More concretely, fear is 
caused by the ambivalence of the stranger figure, as seen briefly above, i.e., the 
difficulty of categorising it under the heading of friend or enemy. It derives from the 
stranger’s ambivalent condition of being both an insider and outsider. This 
sociological take on the stranger, focussing on fear, is mirrored in psychoanalysis’ 
conception of the uncanny; there Freud explores how the self is repulsed by an object 
(for my purpose I identify the object here with the stranger Other; see also Kristeva, 
1991) despite recognising it at the same time as familiar or even attractive. This 
incongruous yet familiar, fearful yet congenial reaction of the self towards the stranger 
creates a cognitive dissonance that leads to the rejection of the object (Freud, [1919] 
2004:74–101). This brings to mind Honig’s argument about the pull and push relation 
between us and the foreigner: how on one hand the foreigner and stranger is a 
problem to be solved while at the same time we use the Other instrumentally to define 
ourselves and to re-found, constitute and demarcate our democracies (Honig, 2001). 
 
The fear aroused in the host group and its variations serve as a basis for ranking the 
strangeness of the outsider. The greater the fear the Other arouses in the self, argues 
Bülent Diken, the greater the degree of strangeness that is imparted to the Other; 
therefore the category of the stranger cannot be an essentialist one (quoted in Marotta 
2000:123). Bauman seems to agree that the constitution of strangerhood is related to 
fear, but in his view fear is not the key to unravelling it (ibid.) Nevertheless, as Beck 
notes (1992:130), the fear is conjoined with fascination; “the very strangeness of 
strangers is not only frightening but enticing” (Sandercock, 2005:222). 
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Thus fear, which has been at the epicentre of a social theory of Otherness, breeds 
exclusion while at the same time maintaining the Other as the opposite against which 
a society constitutes itself. This exclusion strategy uses the figure of the stranger as a 
scapegoat, a necessary use in the construction of an identity claim. Identity 
construction of the community, but also of the self, is based on the ability to explain 
its lack of fullness and completeness; and the stranger thus operates as an agent of 
this lack. “Scapegoating, the sinister type of difference as exclusion and demonisation, 
always remains a real possibility inscribed at the core of any identity claim” 
(Stavrakakis, 2007:195). In scapegoating, the Other is accused of stealing “our” 
jouissance: “every identification is bound to produce its obscene Other (…) hated 
because he is fantasised as stealing our lost enjoyment” (Stavrakakis, 2007:202). 
Girard also considers scapegoating as a mechanism strengthening the community 
through identity-formation, but also though the alleviation of internal strife and 
violence (Girard, 1986). As a result, and contrary to contract theories that consider 
that the social contract puts an end to communal violence and internal antagonism,45 
Girard argues that, paradoxically, the solution to these antagonisms is instead found 
in the displacement of this violence onto a single individual, who thus functions as a 
scapegoat and a specified enemy. Communal violence, even in a lesser dose, exerted 
on an excluded Other brings the community together and strengthens it (1977:79–80; 
259). 
 
1.3.2 The issue of categories. Legal, illegal, undocumented Other 
“Therefore, there is no ‘stranger’ as such. In the diversity of notions, the stranger is 
always a particular stranger, bearing a distinct status”. This is what Benveniste told us 
earlier (1969:360). Having argued in the introduction that the status Benveniste is 
talking about translates into categories of Otherness that are often misemployed and 
exacerbate violence, and also that a new category addressing the liminal and non-
categorisable is slowly emerging in IPT and IR, I return here to the traditional 
categories of strangerhood used in the debate of hospitality, before clarifying the type 
my thesis will be using in order to configure the Other, in the context of its proposal of 
a different conceptualisation of the ethics of hospitality.  
 
                                                        45	Girard	cites	the	Hobbesian	“violates	threatens	to	break	out,	thus	humans	are	forced	to	cooperate”	(1996).	
 74 
The three main categories legally recognised and widely used are those of asylum 
seekers, refugees and (economic) migrants. Overlapping to some extent, they are often 
used interchangeably, erroneously and / or with much confusion in the media and in 
public debate, as the current refugee crisis has shown us (UNHCR, 2015a). Asylum 
seekers are the persons who have applied for asylum under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention on the Status of Refugees, on the ground that a return to their country of 
origin will endanger their lives, there being a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, political belief or membership of a particular 
social group. An asylum seeker is considered as such for as long as her application or 
an appeal against refusal of her application is pending. The term refugee designates an 
asylum seeker whose application has been successful. In its broader context it means a 
person fleeing armed conflict or persecution as defined by the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. Asylum seekers who, through proper procedures, are not judged to be 
refugees, nor in need of any other form of international protection, can be sent back to 
their home countries (UNHCR, 2006).  
 
During mass movements of refugees (usually as a result of conflicts or 
generalized violence as opposed to individual persecution), there is not – and 
never will be – a capacity to conduct individual asylum interviews for everyone 
who has crossed the border. Nor is it usually necessary, since in such 
circumstances it is generally evident why they have fled. As a result, such 
groups are often declared "prima facie" refugees (ibid).  
 
Finally, (economic) migrants are considered to be the people that choose to move not 
because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by 
finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons. 
Migrants, contrary to the previous two categories, face no impediment to be returned 
to their home countries, as it is assumed that they continue to receive the protection 
of their state’s government.  
 
The international law protecting refugees and defining the movement of people, 
namely the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol and other legal texts, such as 
the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention, has permeated regional and national law and 
practices. As mentioned above, one of the most fundamental aspects of this body of 
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law involves the principle of non-refoulement, i.e., of not expelling or returning 
refugees back to where their life and freedom would be under threat. Other aspects of 
protection include the fair and efficient access to asylum and ensuring respect for 
refugees’ basic human rights in order for them to live in dignity and safety while 
receiving countries are helping them to find a longer-term solution. Host countries 
bear the primary responsibility for this protection with UNHCR’s advice and support. 
 
The definition of the “refugee” [in the Refugee Convention] reflected the 
universalistic aim of “protecting” the stateless, being broader than the status 
of “political refugee” that had previously been in use, and that international 
institutions refer to as “conventional” (Agier, 2011b:11). 
 
Here Michel Agier suggests that the main element of protection has come to be 
replaced by an ever more dominant function of control. This is evident not only in the 
management of camps, on which topic Agier is an expert, but also in the application of 
asylum policies. Given states’ reluctance, especially in times of economic crisis or due 
to the intensification of anti-immigration politics at home, the rate at which states 
have granted asylum has fallen over the last twenty years to its lowest modern level, at 
least in the European space. It may have picked up slightly recently following the great 
increase in applications due to the Syrian civil war,46 but until then the proportion of 
positive decisions to grant asylum in the majority of EU member states, with the 
exception of Sweden and Germany, has in the last 15 years been constantly lower than 
10%, with many countries scoring near 0% (Luxembourg, Ireland, Hungary among 
others) (Nardelli, 2015 quoting Eurostat).47 In addition, the disparities among national 
asylum systems (EurActiv, 2016),48 where the legal requirement of a maximum 35 days 
to analyse asylum requests is rarely met,49 institutional failures,50 variation of asylum-
                                                        46	The	number	of	first-time	asylum	applicants	increased	by	more	than	130	%	in	the	fourth	quarter	of	2015	compared	with	the	same	quarter	of	2014	(Eurostat,	2016).	
47 Refugee	recognition	rates	appear	to	be	very	low	in	some	EU	countries	and	very	high	in	others.	In	2014,	positive	decision	rates	for	Eritrean	nationals	varied	from	26%	in	France	to	100%	in	Sweden,	while	 rates	 for	 Iraqi	 nationals	 ranged	 from	 14%	 in	 Greece	 to	 94%	 in	 France,	 according	 to	 the	Annual	Report	2014/2015	of	the	European	Council	on	Refugees	and	Exiles	(ECRE,	2016).  48	From	refugee	 recognition	 rates	 to	 amount	of	 financial	 help,	 housing	 support,	 to	 right	 to	 family	reunification,	etc.	
49 The	real	average	is	one	year	(EurActiv,	2016). 50	For	instance,	at	the	end	of	December	2015,	the	British	Home	Office	had	to	recognise	a	bigger	than	ever	 backlog	 in	 pending	 decisions	 (initial	 decision,	 appeal	 or	 further	 review)	 for	 asylum	applications	 received	since	April	2006	because	of	a	 restructuring	of	 the	UK	Border	Agency	and	a	
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granting depending on individual adjudicators, i.e., judge and court panel preferences 
(Hangartner et al., 2015), the lack of proper data51 along with common cases of 
violence and illegal pushbacks,52 all create a real picture which is the very opposite to 
what the law foresees.  
 
I do not consider this to be accidental or a result simply of malfunctioning 
bureaucracies, mere human error or weakness. The body of hospitality law with its 
relation to the state, which must be maintained in order for it to be implemented (see 
Arendt’s critique earlier), as well as its intricate connection with violence as the source 
of its own making53 is the reason for the exacerbation of the Other’s vulnerability and 
for her exposure to violence and possibly death. Recent policies and policy changes 
surrounding asylum and their official discourse (of the so-called “Fortress Europe” 
kind) create “a new social category of asylum seeker, increasingly portrayed as 
‘undeserving’ in contrast to the ‘deserving’ refugee” (Sales, 2002:456). With 
“mainstream political debate hav[ing] been predicated on the notion that the majority 
of asylum seekers are ‘bogus’” (Schuster and Solomos, 1999:64); with state policies 
                                                                                                                                                                  decrease	in	staffing	levels	(British	Refugee	Council,	2016).	
51 Little	official	detailed	data	is	available	and	there	are	only	a	few	large-scale	quantitative	studies.	The	 data	 usually	 involve	 asylum	 seekers	 arriving	 and	 declaring	 themselves	 principal	 applicants,	with	no	or	limited	date	on	the	dependants	accompanying	them.	Therefore,	we	can	use	the	data	to	calculated	 the	number	of	 applicants	who	were	 or	were	not	 recognised	 as	 refugees,	who	were	 or	were	 not	 given	 leave	 to	 remain.	 “We	 do	 not	 have	 information	 on	 the	 number	 of	 refused	 asylum	seekers	 in	 the	 country	 at	 any	 one	 time,	 or	 on	 the	 number	 of	 those	who	 entered	 the	 country	 as	principal	 applicants	 for	 asylum	 and	 their	 dependants	 who	 remain	 in	 the	 country”	 (Aspinall	 and	Watters,	2010:v).	
52 Border	 guards	 injuring	 and	pushing	 back	 potential	 asylum	 seekers	 at	 the	Turkish	 border	with	Syria;	using	rubber	bullets	against	them	at	the	Greek	Border	with	Fyrom;	asylum	seekers	trapped	in	no	man’s	 land	 in	Hungary’	asylum-seeking,	migrant	and	refugee	women	 facing	higher	 levels	of	violence	 than	 native	 born	 women	 in	 Wales	 due	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 factors,	 such	 as	 age,	 language	barriers,	vulnerability,	isolation,	and	poverty, are	only	a	few	of	the	acts	of	violence	that	have	been	recorded	by	NGOs	in	April	(for	instance	Human	Rights	Watch,	2016a	and	others).  53	I	am	referring	here	to	Walter	Benjamin’s	understanding	of	the	law	as	produced	through	violence.	In	his	Critique	of	Violence	(2007),	where	Benjamin	considers	the	legitimacy	of	violence	and	whether	violence	itself	can	ever	be	considered	just,	he	explores	natural	law	(which	suggests	that	the	justness	of	 ends	 guarantees	 the	 justness	 of	means)	 and	positive	 law	 (which	 suggests	 that	 just	means	will	always	produce	just	ends),	and	finds	them	both	lacking,	since	they	are	part	of	a	tautological	logic	of	means	 and	 ends	 used	 by	 the	 political	 state	 to	 justify	 its	 monopoly	 on	 violence.	 Since	 “the	most	elementary	relationship	within	any	legal	system	is	that	of	ends	to	means”,	a	standpoint	outside	both	positive	legal	philosophy	and	natural	law,	from	which	acts	of	violence	“within	the	sphere	of	means	themselves”	 could	 be	 considered,	 must	 be	 found	 (2007:207–9).	 Looking	 for	 such	 a	 standpoint,	Benjamin	notes	 that	 the	 state’s	 legal	 authority	 is	based	on	 the	distinction	between	 lawmaking	or	founding	 violence	 (Rechtsetzende	 Gewalt)	 and	 law-preserving	 or	 conserving	 violence	(Rechtserhaltlende	Gewalt),	while	the	state	itself	is	founded	by	an	original	violent	act	that	precedes	any	 state	 violence.	 Among	 these	 aspects	 of	 state	 violence,	 individual	 violence	 is	 prohibited	 not	because	it	poses	a	threat	to	a	certain	rule	or	law	but	because	it	threatens	the	juridical	order	itself,	putting	the	state	monopoly	in	peril	(2007:300).	
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increasingly preoccupied with control; with no national systems for the settlement of 
refugees; with the existing support systems, welfare or other, serving to isolate asylum 
seekers from mainstream society and promote intense social exclusion (Sales, 
2002:457);54 and with any inclusionary practices for officially recognised refugees 
limited or dependent on voluntary initiative (UNHCR, 2013), refugees, asylum seekers 
and migrants are legally failed on purpose.   
 
Failures in and outside the law are further aggravated by more problems in 
terminology. Apart from the difficulties posed to the law and the broader hospitality 
framework by mixed migration (UNHCR, 2007), 55  other terms complicate the 
terminology issue further. The qualitative differentiation among “forced”, “illegal”, 
“irregular” and “undocumented”56 migration denote, I believe, the slipperiness of 
terms and categories. Scheel and Squire, for instance, underline the less restricted 
agential capacity implied in the term “illegal migrant” through its assumed (yet 
contestable) illegitimacy in comparison to forced migration. 
 
The association of migration with criminality has occurred across wide-ranging 
regions, particularly since migrants increasingly resort to the services of 
smugglers under conditions marked by the closure of legal migratory options. 
In the UK and elsewhere, an emphasis on illegality has been more popularly 
adopted as a term of abuse, and widely conceived of as antithetical to the 
victimhood associated with forced migration. “Forced migrants” on this 
reading are not the same as “illegal migrants”: the former are victims of their 
                                                        54	As	in	the	case	of	Britain	through	the	voucher	system	and	compulsory	dispersal	(Sales,	ibid).	55	UNHCR	 is	 using	 this	 term	 to	 refer	 to	 migrants	 and	 refugees	 travelling	 together,	 increasingly	making	use	of	the	same	routes	and	means	of	transport	to	get	to	an	overseas	destination,	usually	in	dangerous	 and	 lethal	 ways.	 Locating	 endangered	 mixed	 migration	 movements	 in	 the	Mediterranean	basin,	the	Gulf	of	Aden,	Central	America	and	the	Caribbean,	South-east	Asia	and	the	Balkans,	 UNHCR	 launched	 in	 2007	 a	 10-Point	 Plan	 of	 Action	 on	 Refugee	 Protection	 and	 Mixed	Migration	in	order	to	help	states	address	the	resulting	challenges.		56	The	International	Organisation	for	Migration	defines	irregular	migration	in	its	glossary	as	the:	“Movement	 that	 takes	 place	 outside	 the	 regulatory	 norms	 of	 the	 sending,	 transit	 and	 receiving	countries.	 There	 is	 no	 clear	 or	 universally	 accepted	 definition	 of	 irregular	 migration.	 From	 the	perspective	 of	 destination	 countries	 it	 is	 entry,	 stay	 or	work	 in	 a	 country	without	 the	 necessary	authorisation	or	documents	required	under	 immigration	regulations.	From	the	perspective	of	 the	sending	 country,	 the	 irregularity	 is	 for	 example	 seen	 in	 cases	 in	 which	 a	 person	 crosses	 an	international	 boundary	 without	 a	 valid	 passport	 or	 travel	 document	 or	 does	 not	 fulfil	 the	administrative	requirements	for	 leaving	the	country.	There	is,	however,	a	tendency	to	restrict	the	use	 of	 the	 term	 "illegal	migration"	 to	 cases	 of	 smuggling	 of	migrants	 and	 trafficking	 in	 persons.”	(IOM,	2015	available	at	https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms)	
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circumstances, while the latter are deemed culpable for rendering the task of 
governing human mobility increasingly difficult (Scheel and Squire, 2014:188, I 
have removed all references). 
 
One cannot help but think (as Scheel and Squire do, but also Zetter, 2007, Karakayali 
and Rigo, 2010, to whom, among others, they refer) that such labelling does not 
correspond to distinct social groups with separate characteristic figures. Leaving alone 
for the moment the question whether the Others thus labelled consider themselves to 
be what the label defines them as, different terminology, such as the one sampled 
above, corresponds more to “certain constellations of migration policy” (Karakayali 
and Rigo, 2010:129) and statal bureaucratic needs than it does to reality in itself. State 
mechanisms biopolitically observe, problematise, target and actively produce (Scheel 
and Squire, 2014:189) forced or illegal, labour or irregular or other migrant identities 
from a topdown position and according to political and bureaucratic needs.   
 
Chadran Kukathas’s inquiry into the morality of making such shady distinctions 
(2016:255) is resonant here. While his questioning is mostly focused on the moral 
distinction between refugees and immigrants, finding fault with the language of the 
1951 Convention and other UN legal texts, and concluding that the distinction is 
impossible (Kukathas, 2016:261), I believe that his doubt can be validly extended to all 
distinctions and categorisations affecting the ethics of hospitality. How is it ethically 
defendable to unquestioningly uphold a system based on a biased prevalence of the 
host/ protection providing Self towards a stranger/ protection receiver Other? I think it 
is not. As such, the Other remains an ethically non-recognised subject.  
 
Having proven that categories are slippery, overlapping and permeable; that they are 
constructed in the benefit of the provider of protection and not for the Other who 
needs it; and that protection has receded, giving its space to vitiated practices of 
control (Agier, 2011b:11–12) which put the Other, stranger, foreigner, migrant of any 
stature in peril of death, I think it is fair to say that we are left with no ethics of 
hospitality worthy of the name. It is true that challenging or doing away with 
categories may risk a further blurring in the accountability of said violent practices. 
However, it is ethical to cultivate an ethical sensibility towards the Other “by asking 
questions about things that still do not have a name” (Papadopoulos, Stephenson and 
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Tsianos, 2008:xiii). In the following section I ask the question of the Other who has no 
name.  
 
1.3.3 Abject other and biopolitics  
What is this ethically non-recognised subject? As seen earlier, Bauman thinks that she 
is a figure who does not hold any particular existential traits but is instead constituted 
by the self and modern society (Bauman, 2003). As such she is considered to be a form 
of human waste, supernumerary, a scapegoat and a pariah to the society, bare life 
caught between the inside and the outside of the sovereign state, the Muselmann of 
the camp, a person able to go unmissed or be categorised in a multitude of ways that 
do not correspond to her own perception of self or even her objective external state. 
She is the abject Other. 
 
In a contrapuntal movement to Lacan’s “object of desire”, where an object enables the 
subject to coordinate her desires and to create meaning, and thus allows the 
intersubjective community to exist, Julia Kristeva (1982) describes the abject as 
something beyond the subject/object binary, and she points to a threatened 
breakdown of meaning and of community caused by this exact lack of binary 
distinction. With no distinction between subject and object or between Self and Other, 
the abject is neither object nor subject and as such “is radically excluded” (Kristeva, 
1982:2). It is linked to “what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect 
borders, positions, rules” (1982:4).  
 
Abjection suggests rejection of all that which horrifies in the self and in other. 
It might be located in art, just as it is manifest in racism and xenophobia, in 
representations of the “monstrous” other, in the dehumanising spaces of 
incarceration wherein the other is the very corporeality of rejection and denial 
(Jabri, 2009:231).  
 
Moving away from these psychoanalytic connotations and focusing on political and 
ethical theorisations, the figure of the abject Other can be seen in the liminal figures57 
                                                        57	Liminality	 is	 a	 concept	 borrowed	 from	 an	 earlier	 work	 by	 Arnold	 Van	 Gennep	 (1960),	 who	discussed	the	in-between	moments	of	rites	of	passages	in	tribes,	developing	the	idea	at	great	length	and	in	multifaceted	ways	that	cannot	be	fully	explored	here.	The	main	idea	is	that	liminality,	along	
 80 
explored extensively in the biopolitical framework, as in the case of Agamben’s bare 
life. 
 
Agamben catches up with this biopolitical configuration of the abject Other, following 
up on Arendt’s hints concerning the link between the rights of man and the nation-
state and her critique of the human rights declaration, which he will later elaborate in 
his consideration of the birth-nation and man-citizen link, seeing in them the 
originary figure of the inscription of natural life in the juridico-political order 
discussed earlier in this chapter (Agamben, 1998:127). However, while, as has been 
seen already, for Arendt the critical discussion of human rights aims at the eventual 
inclusion of the Other in society, for Agamben the situation is different: “the 
instrumental emphasis on the rights of man and the rapid growth of declarations and 
agreements on the part of international organizations have ultimately made any 
authentic understanding of the historical significance of the phenomenon almost 
impossible” (Agamben, 1998:127). Humanitarianism and relevant declarations present 
human rights as “proclamations of eternal, metajuridical values binding the legislator 
(in fact, without much success) to respect eternal ethical principles”, keeping us from 
seeing them in their true historical dimension regarding the role they play in the 
nation-state: that of inscribing “bare life” “in the nation-state’s juridico-political 
order”, making it therefore part of the structure of “the earthly foundation of the 
state’s legitimacy and sovereignty” (ibid.). “Whereas Arendt sees potential in a 
different adaptation of human rights, Agamben sees human rights as part and parcel of 
a totalizing infringement of the political sphere over ‘bare life’” (Hemel, 2008:18).  
 
Agamben argues that the figure of the refugee, being excluded from humanity, is no 
longer an exception in our current paradigm. On the contrary, “man-as-citizen is 
completely taken up in an omnipresent power-structure determined by the nation 
state”: because the power situation determines our very structure of being, the refugee 
shows how our current paradigm is dominated by a hold over life that actively strips 
the excluded of their right to be human (ibid.). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  with	marginality	and	structural	inferiority,	constitutes	and	provokes	cultural	forms,	which	in	turn	provide	men	with	templates	of	models	which	reclassify	man’s	relationship	with	society,	nature,	and	culture,	inciting	him	to	action	as	well	as	thought.	
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 The concept of the refugee, (and the figure of life that this concept represents) 
must be resolutely separated from the concept of the rights of man (...). The 
refugee must be considered for what he is: nothing less than a limit concept that 
radically calls into question the fundamental categories of the nation state, from 
the birth-nation to the man-citizen link, and that thereby makes it possible to 
clear the way for a long-overdue renewal of categories in the service of a politics 
in which bare life is no longer separated and excepted, either in the state order or 
in the figure of human rights (Agamben 1998: 134). 
 
Inclusion and integration in a host community is no longer possible in modernity: “we 
are all refugees”. Since birth is automatically linked with state/ nation/ territory, 
“there is no autonomous space within the political order of the nation-state for 
something like the pure man in himself”; nativity or birth (that is, bare human life) is 
made into the foundation of the nation-state’s own sovereignty (Agamben, 1995:116).  
 
According to Agamben, a long procedure, dating back as far as 1679 and the writ of 
habeas corpus, where the lives of individuals became increasingly inscribed within the 
state order through diverse biopolitical techniques,58 gave birth to homo sacer,59 a Latin 
term for “the accursed man”, a figure of archaic Roman law, which for Agamben 
designates an individual that may be killed by anyone without any legal repercussions 
since he or she had already been banned from the juridical-political community. This 
“sacred man” is reduced to mere physical existence, thus embodying the concept of 
                                                        
58 Like	 the	ones	described	by	Foucault,	whom	Agamben	relies	on	heavily,	and	seen	earlier	 in	 this	chapter:	 techniques	 that	 influenced	 the	 instruments	 of	 regulation	 (e.g.	 the	police,	 prison	 system)	and	of	the	technologies	of	the	self	(health,	reproduction).  59	Homo	sacer	and	bare	life	are	the	main	Agambenian	concepts	and	belong	to	what	is	known	as	the	Homo	Sacer	series,	which	consists	of	four	volumes	and	eight	or	nine	books	in	total	(not	written	in	a	strict	chronological	order).	The	series	shows	Agamben’s	insistence	on	working	out	the	contours	of	his	 biopolitical	 project.	His	 first	 reference	 to	homo	 sacer	 is	 in	Language	and	Death	 (1982/2006).	The	Homo	Sacer	series	contains:	I:	Homo	Sacer:	Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life	(1995/1998)	II,	1:	State	of	Exception	2003/2005)	II,	2:	The	Kingdom	and	the	Glory:	For	a	Theological	Genealogy	of	Economy	and	Government	(2007/2011)	II,	3:	The	Sacrament	of	Language:	An	Archaeology	of	the	Oath	(2008/2013)	II,	5:	Opus	Dei.	An	Archaeology	of	Duty	(2012/2013)	III:	Remnants	of	Auschwitz:	The	Witness	and	the	Archive	(1998/1999)	IV,	1:	The	Highest	Poverty.	Monastic	Rules	and	Form-of-Life	(2011/2013)	IV,	2:	The	Use	of	Bodies	(forthcoming)	(II,	4	is	missing	without	being	clarified	whether	it	is	to	be	expected)		
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“bare life” and providing the basis for the rule of sovereignty, since the sovereign body 
does not decide simply over the life and death of human beings as in the past, but over 
who will be recognised as a human being at all.  
 
Understood in this way, biopower and its politics, biopolitics, extend a long way back, 
like a river running “its course in a hidden but continuous fashion” (1998:21) before 
they surface in the 20th century’s totalitarian regimes and later in its mass democratic 
states. In the case of the camp, bare life is incarnated in the figure of the Muselmann, 
the Nazi concentration camp internee who had reached such a state of physical 
debility that “one hesitates to call them living: one hesitates to call their death death” 
(Levi, 1989:90, also cited in Agamben, 1999:44).60 As is to be expected, this long 
procedure does not stop here. If the stranger, the stateless, the refugee are the homines 
sacri par excellence, this does not mean the remaining categories have escaped such 
danger. For Agamben (1995), we are all in essence and in a latent form refugees and 
homines sacri, exposed to the violence and arbitrariness of sovereign power. From this 
perspective, “all citizens can be said (…) to appear virtually as homines sacri” and their 
production as such is a constitutive but unrecognised part of politics (Agamben, 
1998:111). 61 Even citizens, the people of a state and within a state, are not exempt. 
Citizenship or other rights do not shield them from the biopolitical fate of naked life. 
We are all refugees (Agamben, 1995).  
 
 
                                                        
60 The	full	quote	being: “The	Muselmänner,	the	drowned	form	the	backbone	of	the	camp,	an	anonymous	mass,	continually	renewed	and	always	identical,	of	non-men	who	march	and	labour	in	silence,	the	divine	spark	dead	within	them,	already	too	empty	to	really	suffer.	One	hesitates	to	call	them	living:	one	hesitates	to	call	their	death	death”	(Levi,	1989:90).  
61 As	Edkins	and	Pin-Fat	note,	the	way	Agamben	relates	bare	life	to	Foucault’s	biopower	has	been	contentious	 (Edkins	 and	 Pin-Fat,	 2005:6).	Many	 scholars	 (Lemke,	 2005;	Ojakangas,	 2005;	Dillon,	2005;	 Bull,	 2007)	 have	 been	 critical	 of	 the	 use	 of	 “biopouvoir”	 by	 Agamben,	 focusing	 on	 the	difference	between	Agamben’s	 and	Foucault’s	use	of	 the	 term	with	 regards	 to	 sovereignty.	Apart	from	 considering	 biopower	 and	 biopolitics	 to	 be	 more	 recent	 than	 Agamben	 does,	 Foucault	distinguishes	 between	 biopolitics	 and	 sovereignty,	 highlighting	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 former	 to	stress	 the	productive	capacity	of	power,	which	cannot	be	reduced	 to	 the	ancient	sovereign	 “right	over	life	and	death”	(Lemke,	2005:3,	Ojakangas,	2005:6).	Foucauldian	biopower	is	about	optimizing	life,	rendering	it	healthier	and	more	productive	and	useful,	not	reducing	it	to	bare	life,	but	instead	focusing	on	the	productive	value	of	individuals	and	populations.	This	kind	of	life	cannot	be	grasped	by	the	Agambenian	notion	of	bare	 life:	given	that	 for	Foucault	 life	 is	 the	object	and	the	subject	of	biopower,	it	is	everywhere,	from	the	nutritive	life	to	the	intellectual	life,	from	the	biological	levels	of	life	to	the	political	existence	of	man.	Consequently,	sovereignty	and	bio-power	are	antithetical	and	cannot	converge	as	they	do	in	Agamben’s	schema:	“biopower	is	the	antithesis	of	sovereign	power,	its	concept	of	life	is	the	antithesis	of	bare	life”,	argues	Ojakangas	(2005:11).	The	modern	paradigm	for	 Foucault	 could	 not	 therefore	 be	 the	 concentration	 camp.	 If	 a	 paradigm	 had	 to	 be	 found,	 this	could	perhaps	be	the	welfare	system.	 
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Conclusion 
The conceptual history attempted does not yield the evidence to support either a 
narrative of progress in the implementation of more open and welcoming hospitality 
practices, nor an opposite regressive route. Traditionally under the auspices either of 
the religion or the state, the concept of hospitality has been legally defined by natural 
law scholars often in relation with the notion of a global moral commonwealth. In this 
context, it needed to fulfil certain criteria, among which there was the lack of any 
danger that the foreigner, to whom hospitality is offered, could harm us. Embedded 
either in property or communication, in the universal brotherhood of the French 
Revolution or in the Kantian cosmopolitan right, hospitality is caught in a constant 
antithetical relation between the theory of an opening to the Other and an 
exclusionary praxis.  
 
The creation of a stranger Other, constitutive of Self identity is accentuated in the 20th 
century by a biopolitical turn in matters of hospitality. The categories of Otherness 
that ensue in IR and IPT remain in need of clarification with an eye to address the 
non-ethically recognised subject who, as such, is more vulnerable to violence. Having 
discussed the abject liminal Other and her biopolitical nature, and some of the 
critiques against the intricacies of Agamben’s definitions, which I cannot examine in 
further detail here, the need for the theorisation of a liminal and not clearly 
categorisable Other is, I believe, already evident. The category of liminal and abject 
figures who are “considered to be of no use to us, only burdening us with obligations, 
like useless mouths” (De Beauvoir, 1983) and who are depersonalised and excluded, is 
what different terms, like the ones already mentioned, but also Edkin’s missing missing 
(Edkins, 2011), the non-insured surplus life (Duffield, 2007), the liminal figure (Mälksoo, 
2012) and the undecidable (Bauman, 1991), are trying to convey. The multitude of 
these terms, which keep cropping up in contemporary theory, point, I believe, to the 
need for a new and broader category of the liminal person in society. Such a broader 
category is also necessary if the ethics of hospitality that I am proposing is to make 
sense. Given the current lack of such category, I will be referring to the figure of the 
irregular and undocumented migrant when I use “the Other” in the rest of this work 
(as I have already indicated in the introduction). In the following chapter, I am looking 
at issues of exclusion but also of subjectivity, constituted by a relation of responsibility 
towards the Other in IR and IPT ethical thinking. 
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 THE NORMATIVE TURN IN IR. THE ETHICS OF 2 /
HOSPITALITY IN IR LITERATURE 
 
 
Introduction 
Explicitly or implicitly prescriptive, normative theory is mainly concerned with 
interpreting, challenging and ideally improving the organisation and conduct of 
international actors, i.e., states, institutions and individuals (Hutchings, 1999:1–27). 
There has been a lot of debate about the normative aspects of International Relations 
(IR) and whether there has been a recent revival of interest in ethical arguments in the 
discipline. From “old agenda” concerns such as war and violence to “new agenda” ones 
such as questions of international distributive justice (Brown, 1992:3) and for reasons 
ranging from strictly national interests to global interdependence, the premise is that 
international actors are faced with the essential ethical question: what ought we to do 
in circumstances like these? (Frost, 2008) Despite historical developments, new forms 
of warfare, different kinds of crises and the changing hierarchy of international 
concerns, the ethical “ought to” question traditionally refers to states, institutions and 
individuals as citizens (a state’s own or foreign). With regard to border crossing and 
hospitality in general, ethics of migration, ethics of movement and membership are 
the usual normative categories that encompass them. The main issues involve 
questions of rights (immigration and / or free movement as human right), state 
responsibility and special obligations deriving from international law, issues of 
citizenship and selection criteria for membership, and the issues of categorisation of 
migrants, like the ones addressed in 1.3.2 above with an emphasis on labour 
migration.62 Liminal, abject figures such as the ones also seen in the previous part, 
which are central to the ethics of hospitality, are rarely taken into account in the chief 
IR debates; and this is something I will be addressing later in this chapter.  
 
First, I believe it is necessary to start by exploring what has come to be called the 
normative or the ethical turn in International Relations, and to seek to address the 
lack of any extensive reference to the ethics of hospitality. This will be done in the first 
                                                        62	A	random	check	of	the	most	recent	volumes	on	matters	of	migration,	such	as	Sarah	Fine	and	Lea	Ypi’s	Migration	in	Political	Theory:	the	Ethics	of	Movement	and	Membership	(2016)	and	Alex	Sager’s	
The	Ethics	and	Politics	of	Immigration	 (2016)	 (as	well	 the	 slightly	older	but	 seminal	The	Ethics	of	
Immigration	by	Joseph	Carens	(2013))	present	and	focus	on	these	exact	topics.	
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section of this chapter. The rest of the chapter will attempt to justify the use of 
poststructuralist approaches in the body of the thesis, focusing on issues relevant to 
hospitality and making the case against human rights and neo-Kantian ethics 
literature, critiquing their failure to properly consider hospitality and arguing in 
favour a poststructuralist approach. It will proceed in five stages. It will first look at 
ethics in IR and the supposed unease (Nardin, 2008:594) with which mainstream IR 
engages with ethics beyond the level of simple prescription. In continuing, I will be 
focusing on the specific relation of IR and IPT with borders and on rights relating to 
movement of persons. Moving on from borders and rights of movement, in the third 
part I will look more specifically at other neo-Kantian approaches that contribute to 
the question of hospitality, namely distributive justice and justice as equality and 
membership. The fourth part will present the poststructuralist approach to ethics and 
hospitality, suggesting that it rectifies what seems to be missing from the previous 
ethical approaches, namely the consideration of an ethical subjectivity deriving from 
the relation with the figure of the stranger Other and the responsibility towards her. 
Recognising its importance for my own project, I focus in the conclusion on what I 
consider the two main drawbacks in IR poststructuralist thought when it comes to 
creating a proper ethics of hospitality: the way in which it deals with the third in 
Levinas and its insistence that, for hospitality to matter, there must first exist a border 
– a view which discounts the possibility of an autoimmunitary ethics of hospitality. 
 
2.1 IR and ethics 
The speculation about the normative turn in IR is vast. Depending on the approach, 
the normative or ethical turn is still underway; never took place; happened 30 years 
ago; in the years after the fall of the Berlin Wall; or post-9/11. Stanley Hoffmann 
positions it in the mid-1980s (1988:28), Mervyn Frost, writing in 1998, thinks that it 
still has not been taken, but that the then-recent developments “may have opened up 
the possibility for the taking of the normative turn”, (1998:119) while Chris Brown has 
often argued that there is not really a turn to be taken. Contrary to appearances, 
argues Brown, the idea that the normative turn is something new is in itself 
problematic: IR has always been imbued by ethical concerns, as can be seen both by 
the English School and Morgenthau’s fifth principle of political realism.63 The idea of 
                                                        63	The	 fifth	principle	of	political	 realism	stipulates:	 “Political	 realism	refuses	 to	 identify	 the	moral	aspirations	of	a	particular	nation	with	the	moral	laws	that	govern	the	universe.	As	it	distinguishes	
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such an ethical turn is more a reaction to Waltzian structural realism and the anarchic 
problematique than anything else.64 Having said that, Brown does admit that ethics “as 
a project” has shifted from the margins of IR theory towards a more central position 
(Brown, 1992), but he believes that it still remains far from the centre, since IR 
scholars in their discussion on a range of issues “for the most part” keep “(…) their 
ethical stances concealed under a disguise of scientific objectivity” (Frost, 1998:119). 
 
Increasing preoccupation with individual human rights, issues of distributive justice, 
humanitarian intervention, immigration and as of late with terrorism is suggested to 
be the force behind this normative turn. Whilst such reorientation would seem normal, 
since “humans are always confronted with the imperative of [ethical] action” (Frost 
1998:122), this could not be said for mainstream IR scholarly work. The positivist bias 
in the discipline, which relies on a strong fact vs. value distinction, has tended to set 
the task of IR scholars: that task is to explain events in world politics through the use 
of “covering laws, which are grounded, in the final instance, in observable factual 
data” (Frost, 1998:123). This is the scientific objectivity mentioned above. In addition, 
a general scepticism in the discipline with regards to the epistemological status of 
value judgments, which are “generally presented as being subjective, arbitrary, 
relative, and not based on anything approaching the firm foundation of observable 
                                                                                                                                                                  between	truth	and	opinion,	so	it	distinguishes	between	truth	and	idolatry.	All	nations	are	tempted-and	few	have	been	able	to	resist	the	temptation	for	long-to	clothe	their	own	particular	aspirations	and	actions	 in	 the	moral	purposes	of	 the	universe.	To	know	that	nations	are	subject	 to	 the	moral	law	 is	 one	 thing,	while	 to	 pretend	 to	 know	with	 certainty	what	 is	 good	 and	 evil	 in	 the	 relations	among	nations	 is	quite	another.	There	 is	a	world	of	difference	between	 the	belief	 that	all	nations	stand	under	the	judgment	of	God,	inscrutable	to	the	human	mind,	and	the	blasphemous	conviction	that	God	is	always	on	one's	side	and	that	what	one	wills	oneself	cannot	fail	to	be	willed	by	God	also.	The	 lighthearted	 equation	 between	 a	 particular	 nationalism	 and	 the	 counsels	 of	 Providence	 is	morally	 indefensible,	 for	 it	 is	 that	 very	 sin	 of	 pride	 against	 which	 the	 Greek	 tragedians	 and	 the	Biblical	prophets	have	warned	rulers	and	ruled.	That	equation	is	also	politically	pernicious,	for	it	is	liable	to	engender	the	distortion	in	judgment	which,	in	the	blindness	of	crusading	frenzy,	destroys	nations	and	civilizations-in	the	name	of	moral	principle,	ideal,	or	God	himself.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	exactly	the	concept	of	interest	defined	in	terms	of	power	that	saves	us	from	both	 that	moral	 excess	 and	 that	political	 folly.	 For	 if	we	 look	at	 all	 nations,	 our	own	 included,	 as	political	 entities	pursuing	 their	 respective	 interests	defined	 in	 terms	of	power,	we	are	able	 to	do	justice	 to	all	of	 them.	And	we	are	able	 to	do	 justice	 to	all	of	 them	in	a	dual	sense:	We	are	able	 to	judge	 other	 nations	 as	 we	 judge	 our	 own	 and,	 having	 judged	 them	 in	 this	 fashion,	 we	 are	 then	capable	 of	 pursuing	 policies	 that	 respect	 the	 interests	 of	 other	 nations,	 while	 protecting	 and	promoting	 those	 of	 our	 own.	Moderation	 in	 policy	 cannot	 fail	 to	 reflect	 the	moderation	of	moral	judgment”	(Morgenthau.	1978:13-15).	64	See	King’s	College	London	New	War	Studies	at	50	podcast,	 'Ethics	and	War	Studies'	with	Chris	Brown	 and	Mervyn	 Frost,	 May	 2012,	 available	 at	 http://warstudies.podomatic.com/entry/2012-05-25T05_43_35-07_00,	last	visited	on	18	January	2013.			
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data which underpin factual judgments” (Frost, 1996), have undermined discussions 
about the relation of ethics and IR. Statements and work in ethics were and sometimes 
still are considered “soft” in a broad sense since they cannot be empirically tested. 
Thus, the tendency to rename UK higher education courses on “ethics” as 
“international political theory”, as if these were synonyms, ought to come as no 
surprise. Finally, mainstream IR’s focus on a Hobbesian understanding of sovereignty 
tends to juxtapose “ethics” with “international affairs”, which are consequently 
defined in mutually exclusive terms (Walker, 1993). 
 
However, such an approach is often criticised and is found to be lacking. 
Interpretations of world affairs and international-relations studies, which do not take 
into account the norms of the actors being studied, are considered deficient, while 
norms are presented at the same time as important variables, which should not be 
overlooked. Emphasis on moral duties and obligations, the freedom of the moral agent 
and voluntary actions – i.e., the use of a Kantian or deontological theoretical 
framework – to deduce said norms is also deemed problematic. This is not only 
because “the inclusion of norms in explanations still falls short of a serious 
engagement with normative questions” (Frost, 1998), but mainly because such law-
based approaches presuppose that norms are universal and inherently moral by 
definition. This Kantian view of a universal moral system is materialised in the form of 
rights, which in their turn are safeguarded by states.  
 
Considering both approaches, Terry Nardin maintains that IR shows a certain unease 
in regards to ethics (2008:594–611). For Nardin, it should be considered as a subfield 
of IR, and he argues that its presence in the field is rather recent (though he avoids 
speaking of turns and exact dates). Instead he presents international ethics (all 
lowercase) as a relative newcomer to the field of IR, with the first books dealing 
specifically with the subject appearing only in the mid-1980s, consolidating a 
literature that had earlier begun to accumulate as a reaction to substantive questions 
posed by events such as the Vietnam War and famine in Africa.65 Given this fact, 
international ethics in IR constitute, according to Nardin, a branch of applied ethics, 
                                                        65	Nardin	mentions	Beitz	et	al.	 in	1985	as	the	first	edited	volume	speaking	of	IR	and	ethics	per	se;			the	previous	literature	is	asserted	to	consist	of	Wasseerstrom,	1970;	Cohen,	Nagel,	&	Scanlon,	1974;		Walzer,	1983	among	others.		
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whose aim is to guide and advise public policy. This, as he himself recognises, is 
problematic. The reason why is that it turns ethics into a technical subject where 
philosophers become “possessors of the relevant expertise” and political philosophy a 
mere extension of moral philosophy, what Bernard Williams calls “political 
amoralism” (2005). Other problems lie in the implication that “public policy should be 
guided and judged by the same principles that govern individual conduct” and that the 
aim of international ethics scholarship “is to prescribe rather than to understand” 
(2008:595–6).  
 
In his discussion Nardin seeks, as others have done, to explore the possible basis of 
ethics: interests, agreement, rights and morality. Recognising that “the language of 
rights is vulnerable to inflation as interests are promoted to rights”, he concludes that 
the most important, the superior basis for ethics is justice (2008:597–608), which is 
understood to be connected with enforceable duties towards others (my emphasis). 
Whilst he seems to recognise the limited scope of such understanding, he insists on 
this feature as distinguishing justice from beneficence (a duty but not a duty of justice 
since it is not enforceable) and from moral duties (which one may have but cannot be 
compelled to perform – Nardin’s emphasis, 2008:601). The question of course arises: 
what of the duties that are not enforceable? Does their un-enforceability make them 
less ethical? And is it not enforceability defined by a legal framework that ethics 
should seek to inform? One cannot fail but detect a contradiction in Nardin’s effort to 
marry a limited understanding of justice and justice as the best basis for ethics: 
“[Justice] is a discourse not about what is in fact lawful within a given legal order but 
about what moral prescriptions it would be proper to make legal” (ibid.). Therefore, 
questions intrinsic to hospitality such as sovereignty and its limits, cultural pluralism, 
freedom of movement, economic inequality and the use of force “can be brought 
within an integrated theoretical framework” (Nardin 2005; 2006, cited in Nardin, 
2008:601). However, these prescriptions should be calculated against “inviting certain 
failure or incurring excessive costs”. We come full circle to considering interests as the 
basis of ethics, despite the commitment to keep moral considerations “distinct from 
those of economics, strategy, and prudence” (2008:609). 
 
In a very similar vein, Chris Brown adds another layer to the debate of normative 
prescriptions by emphasising the rift between cosmopolitan and communitarian 
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approaches (1992). Finding the label “ethics” problematic in itself and opting for IPT 
instead, Brown argues that cosmopolitanism is represented by Enlightenment thinkers 
such as Kant and has the rational individual and universal humanity as its ethical 
points of reference, whereas communitarianism is positioned within the counter-
Enlightenment movements of Idealism or Romanticism and the writings of their 
authors such as Rousseau, Hegel and Mill, who see particular preestablished relations 
and communities, often in the form of states, as the core of and basis for ethics 
(Brown, 1992). As Fiona Robinson correctly notes, “the central normative debate in 
international relations has been, and continues to be, over our obligations, identities, 
and responsibilities as citizens of nation-states” and those as human beings (1999:73), 
underlying a “fragmented moral experience” of our “double existence as men [sic] and 
citizens” and “the dichotomy between citizenship and humanity” (Linklater, 1982:36–
7). This dichotomy is for Brown an analytical classificatory tool ordering IR theory, 
which is more or less inclusive for the modern age (1992:27) and from which political 
theories and positions can be formulated (1992:75–6).66 He tests this by applying it to 
what he considers the three main agendas of normative IR: state autonomy, 
distributive justice and the use of force (1992:102–3); normative IR and IPT are thus 
called to address specific dilemmas and actions through cosmopolitan and / or 
communitarians lenses, adjusting theory to a very specific, already pre-decided, binary 
framework. Explicit questions of Otherness, hospitality and borders do not appear in 
these three main agendas, either as primary or secondary concerns.  
 
It would not be surprising to assume that such a binary set up is destined to result in a 
deadlock; Brown himself readily admits that reaching a decision is not only 
painstakingly difficult but more often than not controversial, since there is a real clash 
of values involved, rendering ethical questions regarding the use of violence and state 
autonomy (to name a few issues of the three main agendas) unanswerable (1992:126, 
183). Robinson picks up on this, finding this dichotomy to “obscure any way of moving 
forward”, offering us “neither an adequate method of critique nor a practical way 
forward” (1999:75). R.B.J. Walker similarly finds such debate to be “rather stale” 
(2003:273) where participants tend to forget how history and their own analyses are 
                                                        66	Brown	supports	this	by	adding	that	“all	variants	of	international	relations	theory	can	be	seen	as	falling	 into	one	or	 the	other	camp	without	 too	much	violence	being	done	 to	 the	 intentions	of	 the	theorist”	(ibid.).	
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often constitutive of the problem they are trying to address (2003:283). That is to say, 
the respective cosmopolitan and communitarian narratives are historically and 
theoretically constituted as the mirror-opposite of each other, in such a way that the 
supposedly desired intersection between politics and ethics that they are attempting 
will always be impossible, especially given the fact that IR is firmly ethically situated 
within the principle of state sovereignty (Walker, 1993). For Walker, state sovereignty 
is conceived by IR theory as both a question and an answer (1993:66), “that is, both as 
an originating source of questions of normativity in the international realm, and an 
answer, already expressed within its ontological categorisation, that ethical possibility 
is situated solely in the sovereign realm of politics” (O’Louglin, 2014:31). State 
sovereignty  
 
embodies an historically specific account of ethical possibility in the form of an 
answer to questions about the nature and location of political community. 
Specifically, the principle of state sovereignty offers both a spatial and a 
temporal resolution to questions about what political community can be, given 
the priority of citizenship and particularity over all universalist claims to a 
common human identity (Walker, 1993:62). 
 
As such, ethical responsibility and decision towards the Other is always circumvented 
by the limits of state action and borders: “within states, universalist aspirations to the 
good, the true and beautiful may be realisable, but only within a spatially delimited 
territory” (ibid).  
 
Therefore, according to Brown’s schema (the one generally accepted in mainstream IR 
theory), on one hand Kantian ethics “tells us what ought to be rather than what is”, 
through pronouncements “suitable only for ideally rational, individuated, similar 
agents”, and on the other, “communitarian ethics appears to tell us what is and, often, 
that this is indeed how things ought to be”, showing “a disturbing moral complacency 
about the configuration of moral boundaries”, with both approaches aiming in essence 
to make the case for universally applicable principles,67 whether these are derived from 
                                                        67	While	 ethics	 of	 the	 communitarian	 kind	will	 not	 interest	me	here,	 it	 is	worth	highlighting	 that	they	 too	 presuppose	 some	 notion	 of	 universal	 truth	 in	 their	 conception	 of	 the	 state	 as	 the	most	important	 community,	 whose	 members	 are	 united	 by	 a	 common	 moral	 identity.	 On	 this,	 see	Robinson,	1999:73	but	also	Cochran,	1999.	
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a common humanity or from the ethical prioritization of one’s own community. 
 
Antifoundational approaches, like poststructuralism, attempt to transcend the 
cosmopolitan/communitarian binary and reconfigure the question of universality. 
Brown acknowledges this but dismisses them because, as he argues, “rather better 
reasons than those offered by Derrida or Barthes would be required before most people 
would be prepared to throw overboard the social thought of two-and-a-half millennia” 
(1992:235). While poststructuralism neither suggests the overthrow of philosophical 
social thought nor of course offer reasons for such an overthrow, Brown’s is a quite 
common stance towards poststructuralism in IR, as well as in other disciplines: it has 
often been pejoratively associated with forms of relativism, scepticism and nihilism 
(Popke, 2003:299). In worse cases, it is seen as a self-indulgent practice in 
performative games of language, inconclusive or not up to the task of the ethical 
enquiry. The poststructuralist critique of foundationalism and universalism and its 
attempts to theoretically challenge or even dismantle “normative” understandings of 
ethics are the source of such critiques, which are not only harsh but which, more 
importantly according to this thesis, are missing the point. I argue that, as has been 
asserted elsewhere (Bauman, 1993; Braidotti, 2008), poststructuralism’s sense of 
ethics lies exactly in this introduction of doubt and instability, in its focus on the 
undecidability of the ethical decision, and in its insistence on exploring the roles of 
multiplicity and power in meaning, reality, truth and knowledge. This does not mean 
that any possibility for the accomplishment of justice is foreclosed – another very 
common interpretation, this time also by readers sympathetic to poststructuralism 
(and deconstruction). Speaking of the impossibility of justice means for Derrida also 
committing to its possibility (Bankovsky, 2012:5); the impossibility referred to is 
another form of doubt and reflection, of putting justice into question by 
poststructuralism. As self-evident, value-free, objective, scientific and universalised, 
ethical paradigms are thus put into question and destabilised, with the aim of 
exploring the natural limits to our thought (Zehfuss 2002:246), resulting often in 
open-ended resolutions or what Campbell and Shapiro (1999:xi) refer to as “an ethics 
of encounter without a commitment to resolution or closure”.  
 
Poststructuralism, and poststructuralist ethics by extension, does all this 
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in order to show that these things [concepts considered natural and obvious] 
have their history, their reasons for being the way they are, their effects on 
what follows from them, and that the starting point is not a (natural) given but 
a (cultural) construct, usually blind to itself (Johnson quoted in Edkins and 
Vaughan-Williams, 1999:74).  
 
As a result, all assumptions about and representations of reality are politically laden 
(Zehfuss, 2002:196–249). Poststructuralism emphasises this political character in 
order to undermine the rationalist-positivist bias of philosophical realism and 
traditional ethics. Using approaches such as the Foucauldian archaeology and 
genealogy (1977; 1989) and the Derridean deconstruction (1990), it seeks to unearth, 
trace and reconceptualise concepts, which are taken for granted, such as the state 
(Edkins and Vaughan-Williams, 1999:2–5), and the sovereign subject.  
 
Conventional accounts of ethics in IR are seen thus to  
 
depend on the notion of a prior and autonomous sovereign subjectivity 
(whether it be the individual, the state, or some other corporate actor) 
deploying either a supposedly universal moral code (the deontological view) or 
muddling through their situation in order to achieve what might be thought of 
as the best possible outcome (the consequentialist account) (Campbell and 
Shapiro 1999:viii).  
 
Poststructuralist approaches challenge this unified conceptualisation of the sovereign 
and the ethical subject in numerous ways: whereas IR poststructuralist scholarship 
borrows mostly elements from Levinas’ and Derrida’s thought on the importance of 
identity, subjectivity, and difference (or différance) with regards to the Other, 
poststructuralist thought at large has much more to say about the subject, especially in 
its French “moment”.68 From “Deleuze’s ethics of amor fati (1992; 1995), Irigaray’s 
                                                        68 	Alain	 Badiou	 speaks	 of	 a	 French	 philosophical	 moment:	 “[W]ithin	 philosophy	 there	 exist	powerful	 cultural	 and	 national	 particularities.	 There	 are	 what	 we	 might	 call	 moments	 of	philosophy,	 in	 space	 and	 in	 time.	 Philosophy	 is	 thus	 both	 a	 universal	 aim	 of	 reason	 and,	simultaneously,	one	that	manifests	itself	in	completely	specific	moments.	Let	us	take	the	example	of	two	 especially	 intense	 and	 well-known	 philosophical	 instances.	 First,	 that	 of	 classical	 Greek	philosophy	 between	 Parmenides	 and	 Aristotle,	 from	 the	 5th	 to	 the	 3rd	 centuries	 BC:	 a	 highly	inventive,	 foundational	 moment,	 ultimately	 quite	 short-lived.	 Second,	 that	 of	 German	 idealism	
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ethics of sexual difference (1984), Foucault’s search for the ethical relationship (1976; 
1977; 1984a,b), (…) [to] the established tradition of Lacanian ethics of psychoanalysis, 
which defends intersubjectivity” (Braidotti, 2008:26),69 the issue of subjectivity and 
especially ethical subjectivity stands at the forefront of the issues on which 
poststructuralism focuses. A poststructuralist ethical position, as I understand it, is 
not to be found (only, at least) in the realms of human rights, like the ones seen below 
in 2.2 or in distributive justice (2.3), i.e., in a liberal individual definition of the subject 
that exists before rules and norms are applied to her; on the contrary, I agree with 
Braidotti that such “a definition hinders the development of modes of ethical 
behaviour that respond to the contradictions of our era” (ibid.), contradictions 
emphasised in the issue of hospitality, as for instance the current “refugee crisis” 
accentuates. Instead, it lies in questioning, deconstructing and deterritorialising the 
mainstream visions of the said subject, in lingering on the threshold of the ethical 
decision and in conceiving responsibility through the addressing of the Other. “The 
ethics of poststructuralism is located in and through the construction of subjectivity” 
(Der Derian, 1997:58) and in a reconceptualisation of the responsibility to the Other.  
 
I explore this in greater detail and in closer connection to hospitality in the last part of 
this chapter. Suffice it here to say that the reason I am basing my conceptualisation of 
an autoimmunitary ethics of hospitality on previous IR work on poststructuralist 
ethics is my belief that, at least in the case of hospitality, border crossings and 
treatment of undocumented or irregular migrants, traditional, normative IR 
approaches have to a great extent failed. I argue that having ethical concerns codified 
as applied ethics (in an advisory role to public policy) or in a legal apparatus (human 
rights, international law, etc.) may not have diminished the breadth of suffering, 
violence, brutality and conflict as much as possible – especially in times of crisis. More 
often than not, the plight of migrating individuals caught in such situations of extreme 
suffering is made worse by the fact that normative and legal frameworks of protection 
                                                                                                                                                                  between	Kant	and	Hegel,	via	Fichte	and	Schelling:	another	exceptional	philosophical	moment,	from	the	late	18th	to	the	early	19th	centuries,	intensely	creative	and	condensed	within	an	even	shorter	timespan.	 I	 propose	 to	 defend	 a	 further	 national	 and	 historical	 thesis:	 there	 was-or	 there	 is,	depending	 where	 I	 put	 myself-a	 French	 philosophical	 moment	 of	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 20th	century	which,	toute	proportion	gardée,	bears	comparison	to	the	examples	of	classical	Greece	and	enlightenment	 Germany.”	 (2005),	 last	 visited	 on	 https://newleftreview-org.gate3.library.lse.ac.uk/II/35/alain-badiou-the-adventure-of-french-philosophy	 on	 January	12th,	2016.		69	See	also	Nancy	(Fagan,	2013)	
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are at play. The increasingly militarised framework of current hospitality practices in 
the European space is a case in point: this framework is assisted and legitimised by a 
normative discourse of quotas and brain drain, categorising distinctions between 
refugees and migrants, and specific police-like forces like Frontex, all of which are 
based on a rather strict state-centred conceptual agenda. Different approaches that 
may challenge such normative human rights-based and applied ethics hospitality-
apparatuses are often considered utopian and relegated to the level of the individual, 
as well as solidarity and voluntary networks. Before I return to this in 2.4, I will 
examine in more detail the approaches to hospitality, which I find lacking. 
 
 
2.2 IPT and the case of borders 
Issues of borders, especially in their relation with sovereignty, and issues of 
responsibility towards the stranger, whether individual, institutional or statal, have 
constituted important parts of on-going theoretical discussions in IR. The term 
hospitality rarely if ever appears,70 despite the neo-Kantian nature of some of these 
discussions. Kant’s understanding of hospitality is presented and briefly addressed 
(Benhabib, 2004b; Seglow, 2005; O’Neill, 2008) but is seldom followed up in 
contemporary IPT. Systematic discussions around hospitality are therefore rare, and in 
the attempt to elicit any indices of hospitality in contemporary political theory, one 
cannot but address ethics of migration, as well as the more general discussions taking 
place around it, such as those regarding border crossing and management, issues of 
citizenship, as well as issues of global redistributive justice, where hospitality may 
appear in the guise of issues of migration. In regards to this scarcity of analysis, Veit 
Bader suggests that  
 
historically, moral and political philosophers and political theorists have rarely 
discussed migration; none developed a coherent ethics of migration. Only in 
the past thirty years have theorists begun to think about the issue, but still we 
do not have any comprehensive and systematic treatment (2005:331).  
                                                        70	Some	 exceptions	 are	works	 by	Dan	Bulley	 (2006;	 2009;),	 Gideon	Baker	 (2009;	 2010a;	 2010b)	and,	without	referring	explicitly	to	hospitality,	David	Campbell	and	Michael	J.	Shapiro	(eds.)	(1999).	I	am	referring	here	only	to	works	addressing	Derridean	ethics	of	hospitality	–	not	those	undertaken	under	 the	umbrella	of	 a	Derridean	homage	 (as	 for	 example	M.	Fagan	et	 al	 (eds.)	 (2007)	Derrida:	
Negotiating	the	Legacy).		
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Bader, like most other scholars that attempt a literature review of migration, starts off 
with Henry Sidgwick’s early 20th-century “first systematic treatment of issues of 
membership, exit, and entry”, i.e., his book The Elements of Politics (1908), only then 
quickly to jump to the 1980s in order to refer to the works of Michael Walzer, Joseph 
Carens and later on to John Rawl’s Law of Peoples, the latter’s implications for the 
global justice debate in general and the influence, positive or negative, on his 
“successors” in particular.  
 
More concretely, when considering the debates around the ethics of migration, Bader 
(2005) distinguishes roughly between universalist (or moral cosmopolitan, globalist, 
impartialist) and particularist approaches, dividing universalist approaches into “(i) 
utilitarianism focusing on happiness, utility, or, more recently and promisingly, 
welfare or basic needs” (he is here considering Peter Singer and Robert Goodwin); “(ii) 
More deontological approaches, stressing different varieties of equal rights of all 
human beings, like libertarian property or natural rights or the different varieties of 
egalitarian liberalism or basic rights” (under this subcategory he is considering Hillel 
Steiner and Cecile Fabre for libertarian property, Anne Dummet for natural rights, 
John Rawls, Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge, Brian Barry, Joseph Carens, Simon Caney 
and M. Freeman for what he calls “the different varieties of egalitarian liberalism”) 
and, finally, Henry Shue for basic rights. He calls his third and last universalist 
subcategory “more duty- and virtue-oriented approaches like O’Neill’s” (335). 
Particularist approaches are presented in an equally diversified manner in his article, 
but given that they stand opposed to issues of open borders and responsibilities/duties 
of hospitality, they will not be examined here.  
 
While widely encompassing, Bader’s categorization in a way fails to take into account 
the tensions among moral and legal cosmopolitanism, globalist and neo-Kantian 
subcategories of his “universalist” approach, whilst he does not sketch fully the 
theoretical move towards the prevalence of global social justice (such as the Pogge 
account) when addressing issues of hospitality in contemporary IPT. With the case for 
open borders waning (Carens’ relevant article is now more than 25 years old, while 
neo-Kantians like Benhabib and O’Neill either fail to present a detailed alternative or 
fall silent, leaving only Philip Cole to the task) and with the discussion about free 
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movement becoming deadlocked in practical questions of quotas, policies, etc., the 
incorporation of migration issues into the global redistributive justice debate has come 
to appear as the only viable narrative.  
 
As briefly mentioned above, it is not the aim of this work to analyse the case for closed 
borders. Taking for granted that ethics of hospitality is located within the discussions 
for (more) open borders, its aim is instead to focus on the weaknesses of these 
discussions, their contradictions and their overall problems. Therefore, the first part of 
the rest of the chapter will be structured along these lines: it will first look at what is 
considered to be the seminal works on (ethics of) migration in IPT (Walzer and 
Carens). It will next focus on the attempt to construct an ethics of migration around 
the right of free movement and the right to leave, and in continuation it will explore 
how issues of migration are incorporated in the discussions of global justice, other 
neo-Kantian approaches and Philip Cole’s work.  
 
2.2.1 In the beginning was the border 
Affluent and free countries are like elite universities; they are besieged by 
applicants. They have to decide on their own size and character. Whom should 
they admit? Ought they to have open admissions? Can they choose among 
applicants? What are the appropriate criteria for distributing membership? 
(Walzer 1981:2) 
 
While the analogy drawn with universities might be considered contentious (as the 
ones with neighbourhoods and clubs, which Walzer also attempts in the second 
chapter of Spheres of Justice, 1983), International Relations theory of the 
communitarian lens seems to believe along the same lines that only “moral laws of 
commerce and war determine what we owe to outsiders” (Walzer, 1981:2), towards 
whom there are mostly negative obligations, i.e., not to harm, kill, rob, etc., while 
positive obligations extend only within established groups and communities. “The 
primary good we distribute to one another is membership in some human community” 
(1983:31). Even when a positive moral principle is to be recognised, as Walzer does in 
his contribution to the edited volume Boundaries (Brown and Shue, 1981), such 
obligations to strangers do not and should not exceed mutual aid or Good 
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Samaritanism (1983:33–4). Otherwise, communities are closed and self-sustained, 
made up from people committed to a common life. Responsibility towards the Other 
should therefore be calculated through policy prescriptions, quota policies, 
community interests, distribution of membership, granting of citizenship, obligations 
of host states towards source countries and vice versa, etc.  
 
Spheres of Justice (1983), where Walzer has expanded on this approach to immigration, 
is largely considered to be the first scholarly IPT work to address issues of borders and 
migration, described as a “locus classicus for academic immigration sceptics” (Seglow, 
2005:324) or as the first book “to break the deafening silence [on immigration] in 
contemporary practical philosophy” (Bader, 2005:335). His second chapter on 
membership, extracts of which we saw briefly above, positions Walzer as the main 
representative of the case for “the legitimacy of immigration restrictions” (Scheffler, 
2007:105). While I think that assigning to Walzer this status should be open to debate 
and that it may be worth exploring whether it would be more productive to inquire 
into the theoretical possibility of seeing Walzer as a representative of a certain non-
cosmopolitan view of global justice (instead of a supporter of states solely having 
broad and justified discretion over their immigration regimes),71 this is not an analysis 
that can be undertaken here, nor is it necessarily relevant to the attempt at 
constructing an ethics of hospitality of the kind that I am envisaging.  
 
Goodin finds another way to argue for closed borders away from “narrow 
communitarian values” (1992:10). Closed borders according to him are desirable, if not 
a natural consequence for living in “an imperfect world” (assigning silently open 
borders to a universalistic utopia): as Keynes was convinced of the need for barriers to 
free trade in favour of greater national self-sufficiency and state welfare, so do closed 
borders (admittedly a “second best proposition”) allow countries to reach ideal 
conditions for its citizens and safeguard them from citizens of “other nations of the 
world that are not yet ready [to do so]” (1992:11). Summing up our brief, selective 
                                                        
71 If	 we	 were	 to	 look	 briefly	 at	 the	 main	 argument	 of	 Walzer’s	 membership	 chapter,	 this	 could	probably	 be	 encapsulated	 in	 the	 following	 essential	 sentence:	 “the	 members	 of	a	 political	community	have	a	collective	right	to	shape	the	resident	population	–	a	right	subject	always	to	the	double	control	that	I	have	described:	the	meaning	of	membership	to	the	current	members	and	the	principle	 of	 mutual	 aid”	 (1983:52).	 Mutual	 aid,	 meaning	 of	 membership	 to	 current	 resident	members	of	a	community,	who	decide	upon	any	new	membership	according	to	a	right	of	 internal	choice	–	these	are	the	main	four	principles	defining	the	strict	conditions	of	accepting	the	stranger.			
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overview on the case against open borders, its essence lies in legitimate states having a 
general right to political self-determination, which in turn involves a more particular 
claim to freedom of association. As a result, citizens of said legitimate states are 
morally entitled to determine whom they would like to let into their community, if 
they would like to invite anyone at all. Legitimate states are entitled therefore to 
unilaterally design and execute immigration policies of their own and consequently to 
a right to exclude (Wellman and Cole, 2011:155).  
 
If the chapter on membership in Spheres of Justice is indeed the locus classicus, then 
Joseph Carens’ article “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders” (1987b) is the 
point of departure for cosmopolitans (Seglow, 2005:234), standing diametrically 
opposed to the former and criticising it in its last part. Examining the Nozickean, 
Rawlsian, and the utilitarian approaches to ethics, Joseph Carens (1987b) concludes 
that despite their differences, there is little justification in any of them for restricting 
immigration. On the contrary, he argues, “borders should generally be open and 
people should normally be free to leave from their country of origin and settle in 
another, subject only to constraints that bind citizens in their new country” 
(1987b:251). This is a goal toward which we should strive (1987b:270). He considers 
such an argument to be even stronger for people migrating from third world countries 
since citizenship in western liberal and affluent democracies is “the equivalent of 
feudal privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances” 
(1987b:252). His argument is examined briefly below. 
 
Following Nozick’s work and his interpretation of Locke, Carens finds a state’s right to 
exclude the stranger using claims based on property rights to be unsustainable. The 
importance of natural law rights (such as the right to acquire and use property) lies 
with its assumption about moral equality: everyone has a right to property, and 
citizenship cannot undermine this right or give rise to any distinctive claim, even if 
citizens end up being disadvantaged by the presence of aliens as no one has a right to 
be protected against competitive disadvantage. The state exists only to “enforce the 
rights which individuals already enjoy in the state of nature” (Carens, 1987b:253), and 
since its land does not constitute collective property, it therefore cannot exclude 
anyone. Individuals themselves have the right to exclude other individuals (aliens or 
co-citizens) as far as their own property is affected (hence natural rights do not secure 
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the elimination of poverty or inequality), but they cannot do so as members of a 
collective.72  
 
In regards to the Rawlsian approach, which he admits to be the “most illuminating” 
(1987b:252), Carens examines Theory of Justice’s original position, trying to apply it on 
a global level. He readily admits that the way he does this is far from Rawls’ intentions, 
since in his work Rawls envisaged an explicitly closed system where questions of 
immigration could and would not arise (1987b:255). However, Carens considers that 
the Rawlsian “justification for an activist state with positive responsibilities for social 
welfare” can be applicable to a broader context and that this is warranted by the 
nature of the questions addressed, as well as the virtues of the Rawlsian approach as a 
general method of moral reasoning (1987b:255, 257). As a result, it is assumed that the 
two justice principles would again be chosen behind a veil of ignorance and would 
have to be applied globally, with the next task being the design of institutions to 
implement them. Given that the position assumed behind the veil of ignorance is the 
one belonging to the worst-off or the most disadvantaged, i.e., that of the alien who 
wants to immigrate, “one would insist [that] the right to migrate be included in the 
system of basic liberties”. So, as the right to free mobility within a given society is 
taken as an important liberty, the same would apply for mobility on a global level, a 
comparative point that Carens also makes in an earlier work of his regarding the 
welfare state (see 1987a).  
 
What about threats to the public order made by this liberty? Distinguishing between 
the ideal and non-ideal world of Rawls’ theory, Carens considers that the unrestricted 
right to migrate can be sustained in both, even if the non-ideal provides more grounds 
for concern than ideal theory. More concretely, he argues that there is little room for 
restrictions on immigration in ideal theory, given simply that, if unrestricted 
immigration were to lead to chaos and the breakdown of order, those in the original 
position would endorse restrictions on it, even if the two principles applied. Rawls 
foresees that liberty may be restricted for the sake of liberty and this would be one of 
these cases. In “a world of just states with an international difference principle (…), 
                                                        72	Nozick	 makes	 a	 small	 distinction	 for	 small	 face-to-face	 communities,	 which	 he	 distinguishes	clearly	from	the	state:	such	small	communities	may	be	formed	by	individuals	that	decide	to	bring	their	property	together	and	take	decisions	in	common	(Carens,	1987b).		
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the likelihood of mass migrations threatening the public order of any particular state 
seems small” (1987b:259). More realistic concerns arise for non-ideal theory: vast 
economic inequalities among nations, disagreements about the nature of justice, high 
numbers of immigration and the need to protect oneself against a possible armed 
invasion or convert subversion are some of the dangers that Carens considers. 
Warning against the expansive use of the public order argument and the unrealistic 
hypothetical speculations of some of these concerns, Carens does recognise that some 
restrictions are likely to be justified. Nonetheless, even in this case, “priority should be 
given to those seeking to immigrate because they have been denied basic liberties over 
those seeking to immigrate simply for economic opportunities” (260–1). Impacts of 
immigration on the worst-off and of the kind envisaged by the brain drain hypothesis 
are seen to be contrary to liberal thought.  
 
Finally, he reflects on some of the most common conventional arguments for 
restricting immigration under the light of the Rawlsian approach: a. citizens’ greater 
entitlement to rights b. immigration reducing the economic well-being of current 
citizens and c. the effect of immigration on the culture and history of a society. He 
finds that all three are undermined, either by the primary goals of the original position 
in the case of a. (birthplace and parentage contingencies deemed arbitrary), or limited 
by the two principles in the case of b. (liberty and difference principle) or, in the case 
of c., not of relevant moral consideration unless there is a threat to liberal democratic 
values. According to Carens, preserving a distinctive culture is ruled out as a reason to 
restrict immigration if we are to follow Rawls’ discussion on perfectionism 
(1987b:261–2). Utilitarianism, on the other hand, is not considered at any great length 
by Carens. He summarily decides that however a felicific calculus is to be considered 
(in economic or pleasure terms), the “raw data” and facts, with millions of poor and 
oppressed who only have to gain from immigration, prove that a utilitarian calculus 
could not but support an open borders approach to immigration.  
 
What is interesting to note is the Rawlsian influence in both of these “extreme” cases 
against and for immigration: while Carens refers to Rawls’ theory of justice as a 
support for open borders, Rawls himself cites approvingly Walzer’s position, 
expressing support at the same time for “a qualified right to limit immigration” 
(1999:39 note). “On the other hand, Rawls suggests that immigration would cease to 
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be a problem in the ‘Society of liberal and decent Peoples’” (ibid. 8–9), whereas Walzer 
insists that “immigration will remain an issue even after the claims of distributive 
justice have been met on a global scale” (1983:48)” (Scheffler, 2007:105). Rawls’ 
influence, also prevalent in the discussion of global redistributive justice examined 
below, seems to constitute a trap for discussions of hospitality,73 especially in Anglo-
Saxon IPT which is defined par excellence by Rawls. His mono-dimensional 
understanding of community, with no consideration for power, gender, social relations 
or differences, and its taking for granted of a holistic acceptance of a greater good with 
no radicalization or indeed politics,74 fails to take into account the multi-faceted 
demands of an ethics of hospitality. Rawls’ assertion that “Unanimity is possible; the 
deliberations of any one person are typical of all” (Rawls, 1971:263) cannot of course 
be the case in reality. Focusing closer on the question of Otherness, the situation is 
further aggravated by Rawls’ understanding of reciprocity (citizens must reasonably 
believe that all citizens can reasonably accept the enforcement of a particular set of basic 
laws). This leads to impartiality, which needs to be shared by everyone in order for 
one’s responsibility towards the Other (and vice versa) not to be limited: all persons 
are functioning in the capacity of moral agents; hence, persons who are free, equal, 
instrumentally rational and reasonable are all expected to accept the content of 
justice. “This requirement provides a practical way of negotiating the obligation to 
respond to the needs of the particular Other and to the needs of all Others, including 
one’s own needs”, notes Bankovsky (2012:51). Finally, interrelated with the above is a 
last problem that lies with the Rawlsian focus on the “art of the possible”. Deriving 
from the requirements mentioned just above is the fact that justice’s conclusions can 
in a way be foreclosed: since we are all impartial and rational moral beings, abiding by 
the needs not only of the others but also our own, justice is always possible. However, 
this does not address the difficulty of conflictual claims of Others under a certain 
                                                        73	And	 probably	more	 broadly:	 despite	 the	 clarity	 and	 sturdiness	 of	 Rawl’s	work	 and	 the	 fact	 he	reinvigorated	 the	 study	 of	 justice,	 I	 believe	 that	 the	 excessive	 dependence	 of	 mainstream	Anglosaxon,	liberal	IPT	on	him	and	his	work	functions	as	an	impediment	to	connections	with	issues	relating	to	the	primacy	of	community.	See	Anthony	Lang’s	suggestion	on	how	Rawlsian	distributive	justice	remains	disconnected	from	the	wider	sphere	of	the	global	economic	order	(2014).	74	Considering	the	issues	of	public	or	common	good	and	social	welfare,	the	following	comment	by	Dummett	is	particularly	interesting:	Dummett	mentions	the	case	Van	Duyn	v.	Secretary	of	State	for	
Home	Affairs,	where	the	European	Court	had	to	consider	the	case	of	a	Dutch	woman,	a	member	of	the	 Church	 of	 Scientology,	 who	 had	 been	 refused	 entry	 to	 the	 UK	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 her	 entry	would	not	be	conducive	to	the	public	good	in	the	UK.	“While	the	exclusion	of	this	particular	woman	was	upheld,	the	Court	made	clear	that	the	British	Home	Secretary	could	not	define	the	public	good,	as	 regards	 a	 Community	 national’s	 entry,	 in	 any	way	 except	 the	 definition	 of	 ordre	public	 in	 the	Community’s	law”	(1992:177).	
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skewed status quo:75 thus, instead of engaging critically with the possibility of injustice 
and with existing political systems, such a conceptualisation of justice may become a 
system’s explication and justification (Shabani, 2003:104).  
 
Poststructuralism is more successful in this, but I will return to it later. In the 
following section, I will instead focus on the two main rights that are marshalled when 
the case for open borders is made on the basis of a human rights approach. These are 
the right to free movement and the right to leave.  
 
2.2.2 Free movement  
In his 1908 book mentioned earlier, Sidgwick tried to address more systematically the 
issues of entry and exit along lines with which Walzer would agree: the right to leave 
is, compared with earlier consent theories, more restricted by arguments of 
expediency (1908:225, 213, 247) and emigration is governed by the military and 
population policies of empires (1908:213ff, 247). The individual right to entry and all 
attempts to impose upon states “as an absolute international duty, the free admission 
of immigrants” (1908:309f, 248), is rejected: “a state must obviously have the right to 
admit aliens on its own terms, imposing any conditions on entrance or any tolls on 
transit, and subjecting them to any legal restrictions or disabilities that it may deem 
expedient (…) it may legitimately exclude them altogether” (1908:248). However, the 
rigour of exclusion, “excluding them altogether”, might be limited by distributive 
justice (1908:255) and be mitigated by “the practical allowance of free immigration” 
(1908:255): “the free admission of aliens will generally be advantageous to the country 
admitting them” (1908:310, 306f).  
 
Much later, Goodin and Barry, in their 1992 edited volume on borders, explore free 
movement. In their work the inflow of people is seen against that of, and they consider 
that the argument for freer movement is liberal egalitarian in form (the premises are 
essentially egalitarianism and universalism) (1992:7). As such, their approach derives 
from the idea that life prospects should be roughly equal for everyone, where everyone 
is defined as people in general and not people of a certain political and civic definition. 
In this context, freer (and not free) movement should be allowed a form of 
                                                        75 	Something	 that	 poststructural	 approaches,	 based	 on	 the	 Levinasian	 understanding	 of	 the	obligation	to	respond	to	such	claims,	do.	
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compensation towards the less advantaged from richer countries, which have failed to 
honour the norms of international distributive justice.  
 
Similarly to the work of Carens seen above (who also participates in Barry and 
Goodin’s edited volume), Ann Dummett makes the case for the extension of natural 
law to the international sphere. If an alien is “someone who, by an accident of birth, 
born in the wrong place or to the wrong parents, is not a citizen” (1992:171), whatever 
applies for other accidents of birth (gender, colour, ethnic origin) should apply to an 
alien, too. Exclusion or unequal treatment due to lack of nationality should be 
condemned. Would such extension be possible? It would be, and there is actually, 
according to Dummett, a momentum in international theory that may culminate in the 
formalisation of a right to migrate. The freedom of movement already exists but “for a 
practical and not a logical reason” the international legal framework has chosen to 
keep it within national boundaries, due to the insistence of states. She rejects the 
Walzerian argument that distinctiveness of culture and groups depends upon closure, 
citing the case of the modern US as an example; nor does she accept that such 
distinctiveness based on the collective right of a community to determine its own 
character can stand above universal human rights and more specifically above the 
right to move freely (ibid). Like Carens, however, she also admits to the need for 
restrictions of movement imposed by the state if large influxes of people should 
jeopardise the human rights of other individuals, returning in a way to the impossible 
task of ethically squaring the circle that is the migration question. 
 
Whilst elsewhere in the edited volume it is admitted that each theory of borders will 
allow for some differential treatment among different kinds of transnational 
movements (e.g. different rules will apply for transnational movement of cattle and 
people), there is in Goodin an overall presumption of symmetry: without adequate 
justification for any differential treatment, a symmetry is expected among different 
kinds of border crossing. No discrimination is allowed between human and finance 
capital, for instance, unless this is morally proven to be necessary (1992:14–15). As 
would be expected, of course, such discrimination is attempted by some of the 
contributors to the edited volume. Brian Barry argues that people and money “have 
such different characteristics that there is really no reason for expecting them to be 
treated in the same way” (1992:285). He supports this by pointing to what he considers 
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to be two important differences: movement of financial capital is made on the 
presumption that people on both ends benefit, while for that of human capital no such 
presumption can be taken for granted. Secondly, the influx of people can alter 
societies beyond recognition (according to Barry, this is not true of emigration), 
something that foreign financial capital does not do. In essence, Barry argues, 
consistency of policies affecting the movement of financial and human capital should 
be sought “at the level of principle and objective” and not of instruments. As with 
Walzer, the community has the final say in this (1992:285–7).   
 
There are a series of criticisms to be made here. One obvious criticism arising in 
relation to this rather economistic approach, a criticism also levelled against 
distributive justice below, is the identification of rich countries with host countries, 
i.e., countries which receive large flows of migrants. On the contrary, resource-rich 
countries can and are often themselves hubs for emigration (Stiltz, 2016:67) due to 
political instability, undemocratic regimes, political or other kinds of prosecution, 
disrespect of minorities, etc. In addition, in this edited volume – though the point is 
not made explicitly – migrants are treated as if they were mostly, if not only, economic 
migrants; hence the close comparison with financial capital. Other categories 
(refugees, individuals fleeing persecution, or moving without a particular reason) do 
not seem to be part of the object of study. Furthermore, such a narrow economistic 
approach bypasses the economistic aspects of migratory flows and their control. On 
one hand, it is often proved that, contrary to popular (and populist, anti-immigration) 
legend, migrants contribute to the host economy. On the other, controlling migratory 
flows through border checks, supervision and other security measures is itself a 
“flourishing market” (Rodier, 2012: 13), with a security economy acquiring an 
increasingly important role every day (ibid.).  
 
What is more important though is Goodin’s and others’ discussion of the concept of 
symmetry. Is it or is it not moral to expect entities that cross borders to be treated the 
same? Why should financial capital cross borders unencumbered while people should 
not, as Barry suggests? I find the explanations given in this respect problematic; they 
are definitely not informed by any kind of ethical consideration. The idea that foreign 
financial capital does not alter societies (while immigration surely will do), apart from 
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its lack of nuance,76 historicity and basis in fact,77 also betrays a certain political and 
ethical bias. The assertion that financial capital should be allowed to move more freely 
than individuals despite the latters’ reasons, needs and / or suffering, is not 
necessarily embedded in ethical concerns either for the host community, for statal or 
individual responsibility, or for how to fulfil one’s responsibility towards the Other. It 
instead discloses a belief in a liberal political and economic state system that by its 
robustness alone will improve living standards for everyone – no matter where they 
live and come from. As a result, a stark asymmetry is equally to be found between the 
policies that enforce the right to leave and the right to free movement. In the volume 
just discussed, both Carens and Goodin consider hypocritical the variety of standards – 
and therefore the variety of policies – by which states govern the two rights. They are 
right to do so: a right to emigrate cannot exist when one has nowhere to go. I discuss 
the right to leave below. 
 
2.2.3 The right to leave 
[T]he right to leave does not imply the corresponding right to enter a particular 
country. Whatever the argument over the authority of the state to block 
emigration, there is little dispute over its right to limit immigration. The two 
issues are not symmetrical: departure ends an individual’s claims against a 
society, while entry sets such claims in motion. Control of entry is essential to 
the idea of sovereignty, for without it a society has no control over its basic 
character. (Dowty, 1989:14) 
 
Frederick Whelan addresses the right to leave in conjunction with the right to change 
one’s nationality, both featuring in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in his 
seminal 1981 article. While he does not consider it to be among the most important 
human rights, he argues that, if we are to judge by the intensity of the desire to 
exercise it, or the suffering its infringement causes, then the right to leave is still very 
interesting, especially for its implications for some traditional concerns of political 
philosophy (namely state sovereignty and borders), as well as for the “project for a new 
                                                        76	Immigration	does	not	have	to	alter	the	host	society,	especially	beyond	recognition.	And	what	of	the	case	where	the	changes	introduced	are	actually	in	the	best	interest	of	the	host	society?	77	One	 does	 not	 have	 to	 look	 much	 further	 than	 the	 investment	 of	 foreign	 capital	 in	 London	property	to	see	how	this	has	negatively	affected	a	whole	generation	of	 local	 inhabitants	and	their	ability	to	acquire	(Hill,	2013).	
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world order” towards which its recognition in international law may incline (implied 
here is a cosmopolitan world order where borders will not matter) (1981:636). 
 
According to Whelan (1981:639–640), the right to leave, i.e., Art.13(2), which 
stipulates that “everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, i.e., 
that anyone (citizen or alien) may leave any country, at any time, for any reason”, falls 
clearly in the category of the traditional type of civil rights. Despite its being presented 
as one of the “fundamental rights”, it is newer than most of these.78 Whilst the right to 
leave is thus put forward as a human right, it can also be considered to be an aspect of 
the liberty associated with natural rights, conceived by Whelan and an in general as 
“rights of fundamental importance, which individuals may be supposed to have had in 
a conceivable state of nature” (1981:640). The right to leave one’s country is also 
reaffirmed later in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in 
other international human rights conventions. However, in 1963, and during the vote 
for the reaffirmation of this right, a report was published that concluded that said right 
is “by no means to be generally recognized” and that more people were “effectively 
confined” behind national boundaries now than ever before in history (UN Review 
1962:30–32, quoted in Whelan, 1981:642). The tensions this right caused with the 
USSR and the Soviet bloc almost since its inception (see for instance the acrimonious 
disputes with the Soviet Jews in the 1970s)79 are reflected in the 1975 Helsinki Accord, 
where, following proposals from communist states, there emerged a compromise; one 
that appears to indicate a retreat from the more sweeping “right to leave” of the UDHR 
and the Covenant. Facilitation of emigration is called for only in the special cases of 
family reunification and marriage between persons of different nationalities, and the 
stipulation that applications for exit permits should be examined “favourably and on 
the basis of humanitarian considerations” (Council of Europe, 2002:493–520) seems 
almost to conceive emigration as a matter of permission rather than as a human right 
(Leary, 1977:132; Whelan, 1981:643).  
 
Discussing justifications of the right to leave (1981:647–650), Whelan finds tentative 
                                                        78	Concerning	this	“newness”,	Whelan	notes	that	a	sort	of	predecessor	of	the	right	in	question	can	only	be	located	in	the	Magna	Carta	and	in	no	other	“famous	documents	that	set	forth	the	rights	of	persons	against	governments”	(1981:640).	79	See	Aliyah,	 i.e.,	 the	mass	 immigration	 of	 Soviet	 Jews	 during	 the	 1970s	 to	 Israel	 after	 the	USSR	lifted	its	ban	on	Jewish	emigration.	
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support from the classical liberal period of modern political thought, namely Locke, 
legal theorists (such as Grotius, Puffendorf, Wolff, Burlamaqui, and Vattel) and finally 
Thommas Jefferson. As expected, all of them, and most emphatically the two first 
cases (Lock and legal theorists), argue along the lines of individual consent to the state 
and political power:  
 
the original moral status of individuals is as free and equal beings, in 
possession of certain natural rights, unattached and without ties or obligations 
to any political society; political ties are conceived as being established 
(legitimately) only on the basis of consent, real or supposed, and the members 
of the states thus formed always retain some degree of independence from and 
even claims against the state (1981:647). 
 
Locke is among the few contractarian theorists to question the membership in and the 
obligations to society bequeathed to future generations by their ancestors, while the 
legal theorists find it difficult fully to defend a natural or fundamental right of 
emigration, since they are all essentially working on theories of state sovereignty, i.e., 
theories that attempt to sketch systematically the proper form and authority of the 
modern state and its relations with other states. Vattel is probably something of 
exception to the rule due to his effort to identify cases where such a right could be 
fully upheld (e.g. in this case of the failure of a society to meet its obligations or when 
the right to self-preservation is in peril, etc.). Jefferson on the other hand is the most 
outspoken supporter of emigration, relating it to the colonists and their natural right 
to emigrate from the British Dominions, and as a result to American independence 
(1974:4). 
 
Arguments against the right to emigrate vary more in nature and content: Whelan for 
his part focuses initially on ancient writings (Plato’s Laws and Cicero and the debt to 
the polis or political community deriving from political membership) and then on 
English legal and constitutional theory and Blackstone. He pays particular attention to 
the idea of emigration as a legal right that can be restricted or rescinded by a royal act, 
as well as the theory of “natural allegiance”, i.e., the allegiance of a natural born 
subject to the state for the benefits enjoyed since birth (Whelan, 1981). Whelan finally 
examines policy restrictions of modern states that countered the right to emigration 
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and which fell under the category of mercantilist concerns (where emigration to some 
colonies is prevented, for example) and a broader utilitarianism that focuses on the 
strengthening of the state (1981:643–646).   
 
Another very common point raised against the right to emigrate is the so-called 
“brain-drain” or “human capital flight”, perceived as effects of labour mobility (Abella, 
2013; Kapur and McHale, 2012 among others). According to those who subscribe to 
this theory, brain-drain causes issues of public health, as seen for example in the great 
outflow of medical professionals from Africa, a continent devastated by diseases and 
containing thirty-nine out of the forty-nine least developed countries in the world 
(Ypi, 2008:402). When applied to this issue of emigration, an egalitarian theory of 
justice would seem to require the placing of restrictions on the outflow of productive 
citizens wherever this results in harm to the sending societies. The higher the exit of a 
skilled workforce in a particular state, the more the welfare standards of the remaining 
citizens will be negatively affected. Ypi argues that a theory of justice in emigration 
must be able to give equal weight to the claims of outgoing migrants and to those of 
citizens in sending societies. For her, this does not mean abolishing freedom of 
movement altogether; it simply requires placing restrictions on emigration when it 
threatens to reduce the general welfare of citizens in the sending societies (Ypi, 
2008:409). Stiltz considers this the “no right to renounce civic obligations” (Stiltz, 
2016:66), i.e., that in many cases sending countries have invested in the training of 
professionals, “staff institutions and improved health, educational and development 
outcomes for their native population” (2016:67), an investment that professionals 
have to honour by not emigrating (or by accepting extraterritorial taxation if they end 
up doing so (Stiltz, 2016:75)). Carens addresses in a different manner the brain-drain 
hypothesis, suggesting that priority rights to migrate should be given to the least 
skilled, since their departure would presumably be less harmful to those left behind 
(1987b). He also argues that another result of this hypothesis might involve 
compensation to poor countries when skilled people emigrate. However, he opposes 
the implication “that we should actually try to keep people from emigrating (by 
denying them a place to go) because they represent a valuable resource to their 
country of origin”, since this “would be a dramatic departure from the liberal tradition 
in general and from the specific priority that Rawls attaches to liberty even under non-
ideal conditions” (1987b:261). It is unclear how such an implication can be avoided, 
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whether in his argument, Ypi’s or Stiltz’s. 
 
As is obvious from the discussion so far, the main tensions that a right to emigrate 
brings out relates to the issue of individual consent versus traditional claims of states 
over citizens, and the implication of this for the international system as a whole: most 
importantly, the symmetry of said right with its “opposite”, i.e., (a basic right to) 
immigration. Immigration and emigration are morally asymmetrical, Walzer 
(unsurprisingly) argues; the right to leave one country does not entail the right to 
enter another (any other) (1983:10). Whelan himself instead makes the point that such 
symmetry should not even be expected: the right to emigrate (and similar civil 
liberties) are not claim-rights, therefore it only imposes negative duties of abstinence 
from interference with other parties (1987:651). However, extended closed border 
policies would of course undermine completely the right to leave. How is this 
symmetry to be addressed?  
 
Ypi (2008) promotes a “general principle of justice in migration”, which consists of 
two parts: justice in immigration and justice in emigration. Justice in immigration 
indicates when restrictions on incoming freedom of movement are unjustified and 
provides a principled way of assessing the distribution of benefits and responsibilities 
between migrants and citizens of host societies. Justice in emigration indicates when 
restrictions on outgoing freedom of movement are unjustified and provides a 
principled way of assessing the distribution of benefits and responsibilities between 
migrants and citizens of sending societies. Justice in migration therefore identifies 
permissible and impermissible restrictions on freedom of movement and articulates 
how benefits and responsibilities should be distributed between all affected parties 
(migrants, citizens of host societies and citizens of sending societies). Hence, the 
general principle prescribes the following: if restrictions on freedom of movement 
could ever be justified, such restrictions ought to take equal account of justice in 
immigration and justice in emigration (2008:391).  
 
As in the case of Walzer, there are objections to this principle. These usually deny the 
symmetry between entry and exit along three dimensions: the nature of free 
associations, the type of obligation that entry and exit call into question and the 
impact on community values. The latter being a traditional communitarian claim 
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against open borders, it will not be taken into account here. However, I would like to 
use it as a springboard for my own critique: under those schemes, whether strictly 
communitarian or less so, citizens remain obligatorily connected to their fellow 
countrymen simply because they share the same country of origin with no essential 
ability to cut these ties if they desire to do so (Stiltz, 2016:76). The arbitrariness of this 
obligation, which does not take into account the issue of individual self-determination 
and self-identification, fails also to address the danger this obligation entails. Contrary 
to the cases of clubs, universities, marriages (!) and other rhetorical schemas that 
supporters of the asymmetry tend to use, the asymmetry between the right to leave 
versus the right to move/enter leaves the right-bearer in a dangerous territorial and 
civic limbo. As Philip Cole astutely remarks  
 
There is a “space” of statelessness, but it is not one anybody would wish to 
enter – it is deeply problematic and dangerous, and nobody can develop their 
life prospects in that space to any degree. While it is plausible to suppose that 
the right of exit does not entail a right of entry into the other kinds of 
associations (…), in the case of the nation-state there is a need to enter another 
association in order to enact the right to leave, and so in this case it is plausible 
to suppose that the right of exit does imply the right of entry (Cole, 2011:204).  
 
It is this stateless limbo that I find to be of great importance and that the human rights 
approaches seem so far to fail to address.  
 
In addition, founding claims to exit on justice and on the interests both of the sending 
and the receiving states and, by implication, on their enforcement capabilities, is 
problematic. Judging by the externalisation of borders and border management under, 
for instance, the Fortress Europe concept already alluded to in this thesis and to be 
discussed in more detail in chapter five, it is obvious how such foundations can be 
easily undermined: state interests strictly understood, combined with continuing, 
colonial-like relationships between developed and less developed states (as seen in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy agreements with EU’s Eastern Neighbours) or with 
states of the global south (as in the case of Italy and Libya and their Friendship Treaty 
of 2008 or the EU mobility partnerships) usually serve austere economic needs and 
anti-immigrant feelings in receiving countries, rather than addressing in any genuine 
 111 
and fair way the need to implement the rights of free movement and to leave, such as 
have been discussed above. If we look at the Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs), 
for instance – programmes established by the EU in Eastern Europe (Belarus, Ukraine, 
Moldova), Tanzania, the Horn of Africa and North Africa (Tunisia, Libya, Egypt), “in a 
spirit of shared responsibility to a more accessible, equitable and effective 
international protection system”, and not to be used as a “substitute for, or reason for 
denying, access to protection in Europe” – we find that these were deemed by the Red 
Cross, after almost a decade of close monitoring, to be ineffective. Despite some 
“protection dividends” for the countries that would have been sending immigrants to 
Europe were they not participating in the RPP, the challenges were great:  
 
limited to no increase of resettlement places (EU), limited project absorption 
capacity (Ukraine), limited integration opportunities coupled with the 
increasing phenomenon of racism and xenophobia (Eastern Europe), political 
instability (Libya, Egypt), insecurity (Kenya), large scope of needs (Horn of 
Africa) and lack of ownership of the project by local authorities (all places) 
(Faure-Atger and Red Cross, 2013:27–28).  
 
If one’s ethical focus is on the individual and the responsibility to her, as mine is in 
this project, then human rights approaches to the question of border crossing are 
proven at best inconclusive. Even if we agree to a bare minimum of rights, it remains 
unclear why the community’s freedom of association and right to internal peace 
should be judged to be more important than an individual’s minimal right to survival. 
In the face of circumstances that threaten the life of prospective irregular migrants, 
why should a community’s concerns for the preservation of its identity and prosperity 
be judged on an equal level with a migrant’s right to life? I would argue that it should 
not be. In addition, the asymmetry proposed by the ethics of migration approaches is 
further undermined by the fact that not enough evidence exists proving that more 
open migration policies would wreak havoc to receiving states, and by the frequent 
observation that people tend to be sedentary and unwilling to emigrate unless there 
are greatly pressing reasons, and that, even when this does happen, immigration 
contributes positively to the receiving societies (Dustmann and Frattini, 2014).  
  
 
 112 
2.3 Other neo-Kantian approaches to hospitality 
2.3.1 Distributive Justice 
Distributive justice does not show much concern for liminal figures and abject Others. 
Concerns about migration and movement of individuals, on the other hand, are more 
common but still rather peripheral. However, their nature, defined usually by 
movements from the Global South or the conflict-stricken periphery towards a core of 
wealthier states, does present a certain interest, since distributive justice deals with 
problems arising from the distribution of benefits and burdens. Sager clarifies them 
below at a minimum level: 
 
a theory of distributive justice must identify the metric of justice (what is to be 
distributed, e.g., resources, welfare, capabilities), the principle or principles 
used for allocation (e.g., equality, sufficiency, priority, desert, entitlement), the 
site of justice (e.g., social, economic and political institutions, individuals), its 
scope (e.g., the community, state, world), and the conditions that give rise to 
claims of justice (e.g., the moral worth of all human beings, social cooperation, 
coercive institutions) (2012:58).  
 
As Sager’s exposition shows, the focus is metrics, and as such distributive justice’s 
approach to immigration is utilitarian. Beitz does not accept this (1999:209 fn 49). 
However, when commenting on why closed borders are not, as argued by some, “in the 
interest of humanity at large”, he still bases his argument on derived value:   
 
[U]nder contemporary conditions, it seems unlikely that the value derived by 
their citizens from the cohesion and order of relatively well-endowed societies 
is greater than the value that could be gained by others from the redistribution 
of labour (or wealth) that would be brought about by adherence to 
cosmopolitan policies (Beitz, 1999: 209). 
 
In a similar vein and based on calculations of value, Pogge does not think that 
immigration will solve poverty. The reason is twofold: on one hand, the needy of the 
world (who Pogge estimates at 1.3 billion) are more than the wealthy states could ever 
admit. Hence, poverty cannot be alleviated through migration. On the other hand, 
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immigration does not serve the poorer: even if affluent states open their borders to a 
certain degree in order to accept immigrants, they will do so on a basis of merit. 
Competition among immigrants will ensue and the more skilled, the better educated 
and endowed will be selected. He makes a similar (and to my mind spurious) argument 
regarding remittances, maintaining that when immigrants send money home, it is 
usually to families who are already more privileged (2006:710–20).80  
 
As with other distributive justice arguments, economic interests prevail over 
individual rights. As Benhabib observes, for distributive justice scholars,  
 
[t]he natural duty of assistance has implications for migration rights, in that 
such assistance to economically poor and disadvantaged societies is expected 
to reduce the pressure of migratory movements on richer societies 
(2004b:1770). 
 
It is true, redistribution is considered to be more effective than migration and open 
borders since the majority of potential migrants would be more prone to remain in 
their home countries were they given the opportunity. For distributive justice scholars, 
“it is better to shift resources to people, rather than permitting people to shift 
themselves towards resources” (Seglow, 2005:229). Kymlicka argues that “if states do 
meet their obligations of international justice, then it is permissible for them to 
regulate admissions so as to preserve a distinct national community” (Kymlicka, 2001: 
271). Tan attests to that: he argues that “border restrictions on the part of well-off 
countries can be justly maintained only in a context of a global arrangement [of 
distributive justice] that those kept out can reasonably accept as reasonable” 
(2004:176). Benhabib, on the contrary, denies that migration rights can or should be 
subsumed under distributive justice claims (Benhabib, 2004b:72). She gives two 
reasons for this: first, our globalised world is not a “system of co-operation” to which 
principles of justice properly apply (although it does contain “significant 
interdependencies”); second, global principles of justice may not be compatible with 
democratic self-governance (Benhabib, 2004b:95–105). 
                                                        80	I	have	not	found	a	way	to	check	how	this	is	corroborated.	If	families	were	already	privileged,	why	were	 remittances	necessary?	Could	 it	 not	 be	previous	 remittances	 that	 have	 assigned	 to	 families	this	relatively	privileged	status?	
 114 
 
Interestingly enough, while both Beitz and Pogge (among others) make the distinction 
between more and less privileged immigrants to argue in favour of regulated 
immigration, they fail to address said economic benefit as unjust value: “those with 
fortunate economic endowments (…) can sort themselves into new membership 
systems that impose very harsh conditions on the excluded” (Jordan and Düvell, 
2003:97–8). Contrary to appearances, benefits and privileges are never put into 
question. Reference to them is limited only under a strictly defined duty of assistance. 
On a more general note, the language is starkly indicative of distributive justice 
priorities: “shift people to sources”; “well-off countries can justly maintain border 
restrictions”; states “have the permission to regulate admissions” while individuals 
have no permission to regulate themselves. Here there appears once again the issue of 
self-determination and the silencing of individuals directly concerned (prospective 
migrants).  
 
The issue of silencing forces us to consider the possibility that the problem lies in the 
actual foundations of distributive justice. Lidahl for example argues there is a serious 
dilemma for distributive justice when it comes to immigration, one that even 
undercuts the possibility of distributive justice per se, namely the preference accorded 
to the members of the group who will define by themselves the openness of borders, 
the acceptance or not of strangers and so on. Accepting the existence of this 
preference, Lidahl argues that, for decisions of this kind to be deemed just, the 
strangers as a collectivity have to be addressed on an equal footing by the “we” of the 
community members.  
 
For there can indeed be no distributive justice without a first-order preferential 
differentiation: a manifold of individuals view themselves as the bounded 
group, both civically and territorially, that, acting in its own interest, 
determines what accrues to whom. Political reciprocity and suum cuique 
tribuere81 are the two sides of the same coin. At the same time, the second-
order preferential differentiation implies that the acts of a collective subject 
                                                        81	Often	 translated	 as	 "to	 (give)	 each	 his	 own"	 or	 "may	 all	 get	 their	 due",	 the	 term	 appears	 as	 a	principle	of	justice	pronounced	by	Socrates	in	Plato’s	Republic	and	later	in	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	
Ethics,	as	an	alternative	conception	to	justice	as	fairness.		
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that separate inside from outside, and member from non-member, eo ipse posit 
a more encompassing common interest as intersubjectively constituted. In this 
way, the spatial and civic boundaries of a polity are not merely the expression 
of subjectivity, in the sense of arbitrariness, but also involve the claim to a 
standard of objectivity – of justice – with respect to which the polity is not the 
sole custodian. Although distributive acts take place from the first-person 
plural perspective of a spatially bounded “we”, acts that decide on the legality 
or illegality of boundary crossings by immigrants can only claim to being just, 
in a self-consistent way, if they posit the first-order preferential distinction 
between inside and outside in a way that safeguards the extended “we” of a 
second-order preferential differentiation. The inclusive exclusiveness of 
boundaries renders possible distributive acts that can claim to being just to the 
extent that the first-order asymmetry they must posit affirms and remains 
consistent with the second-order symmetry they must presuppose (2011:140–
1). 
 
Lindahl further argues that this axiom of his not only is viable but also, by focusing on 
the importance of boundaries, that it may function along with the figure of the 
boundaries as a certain guarantor of a cosmopolitan project. He refers to Benhabib’s 
“another cosmopolitanism” (2011:141). I look at this in what follows.   
 
2.3.2 Justice as equality and as political membership 
Benhabib argues that a post-Westphalian conception of sovereignty will need to 
address migration and cross-border movements on their own terms and without 
subsuming them under distributive justice (2004b). The right to cross borders, she 
further maintains, belongs with other human freedoms and should not be dependent 
upon the outcome of the redistributive measures briefly sketched above. Philosopher 
Phillip Cole concurs with this and sets as a goal for ethical philosophy that it define 
the grounds for a human right to freedom of international movement (Cole, 2000). 
Liberal political philosophy, as it stands and of the kind explored above, he argues, not 
only is in a stalemate when it comes to addressing the ethics of migration, but it is 
essentially confounded, incoherent and at odds with its core principles.82 
                                                        82	He	 is	 focusing	 on	 liberal	 political	 philosophy	 for	 two	 reasons:	 namely	 because	 he	 identifies	
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While liberal political philosophy is committed, according to Cole, to the moral 
equality of all persons and makes concessions to the arguments in favour of open 
borders, sooner or later most of its pro-open borders strands end up finding reasons 
for restrictions, “often on the grounds that as it [i.e., restrictions] is such a widely 
accepted practice in liberal democratic states, a justification must be possible” 
(2000:13). So even if it does not follow the argument about identity (Walzer) or 
nationality (Miller) and therefore makes no appeal to community or nation but instead 
to values more central to the liberal tradition such as order, equality and welfare, 
liberal philosophy still seeks to justify the division between members and non-
members, and is still concerned with the boundaries of membership or with what can 
morally justify the exclusive membership practices of modern states. Hence, it again 
fails to address the paradox of citizenship as a basis of community: liberal states may 
indeed be made of liberal equal polities of free and equal citizens, but at the same time 
these same polities rest upon the existence of outsiders who are refused a share of the 
goods of the liberal community. Membership of these communities is taken for 
granted by liberal political philosophy, based on the assumption that the question of 
belonging and membership has been answered in a way that satisfies liberal principles 
– an assumption that remains “highly questionable”, since membership suffers from 
the same defect that distribution does, namely that of arbitrariness, especially when 
natural and historical contingencies are taken into account (2000:5).83 Democratic 
citizenship makes a clear distinction with regard to who can participate in the political 
community and who cannot, and this is at odds with the moral equality of persons.  
 
Doing away with the two viable liberal options which ascribe to moral equality a 
limited role (either by recourse to community identity or nation or to more central 
values such as public order, welfare etc.), leaves us, Cole maintains, with a third 
option, which resembles a “Hobbesian landscape”: admitting that liberal coherence 
(between moral equality and migration constraints on the state level) cannot be 
achieved, that exclusive membership practices are non-liberal or illiberal, and thus 
leaving liberal states to do whatever is in their interests and in the interests of their 
                                                                                                                                                                  current	normative	political	philosophy	as	predominantly	 liberal	political	philosophy;	and	because	states	 that	 describe	 themselves	 as	 liberal	 democracies	 play	 the	 leading	 role	 in	 shaping	 a	 global	immigration	regime	(2000:	xi).	83	The	Derridean	“fabulous	retroactivity”,	seen	in	the	introduction,	comes	again	to	mind.	
 117 
citizens. If open borders are rejected, there is no other option. Therefore, political 
philosophy as a normative discourse (“and this is what I take liberal political 
philosophy to be” Cole remarks) comes to an end at the national border (2000: 12–13).  
 
Equality however remains important: it is the ultimate political value for Dworkin 
(1981), but for Cole, as for Kymlicka (1996), it should function as an aspiration and not 
as a basis for any theory of justice. Moving from the negative critique of the weakness 
of liberal political theory and of exclusionary practices of migratory regimes (2000), 
Cole in his later work (2011, 2012) orients his argument towards a positive definition 
of a human right to freedom of international movement. He believes that this should 
be defined in the context of an egalitarian theory of global justice, which does not just 
take for granted the priority of either individual liberty over collective concerns or of 
human rights (2012:2). The right to freedom of international movement should instead 
be “embedded in a wider perspective of what global justice requires, connecting 
theories of rights, justice and the ethics of migration (…) [and it] must give people the 
power to resist global domination and exploitation, giving them control over when, 
where, why and how they migrate, rather than the opening of international borders 
alone”. Open to more radical approaches, such as the unpacking of the nation state 
itself and the exploration of different models of postnational citizenship, Cole 
contemplates the possibility of the membership in a global political community, in 
which freedom of mobility constitutes an integral part. This vision might still be 
“sketchy, if not flimsy”, but for Cole it could and should constitute a valid project for 
current political thought (2012). Finally, Chandran Kukathas takes issue with both 
discussions of justice and the right to exit when it comes to immigration, in an effort 
“to defend immigration against critics of all stripes, and also to defend immigration 
against some of its less enthusiastic friends” (2005:207). Kukathas does not approve of 
the justice debate, considering justice as unattainable among multicultural societies 
and their irresolvable disagreements, arguing that one has to remain “suspicious of 
feasibility considerations, particularly when they lead us to morally troubling 
conclusions” (ibid.) 
 
Benhabib attempts to follow Cole’s cue in a different way, by focusing on a theory of 
just membership; she sketches it as follows: recognising the moral claim of refugees 
and asylees to first admittance; a regime of porous borders for immigrants; an 
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injunction against denationalization and the loss of citizenship rights, and the 
vindication of the right of every human being “to have rights,” that is, to belong to 
some human community. The right to have rights entails a defence of the universal 
status of personality – i.e., of being a legal right bearer-for each and every human 
being. The status of alienage ought not to denude one of fundamental rights. 
Furthermore, just membership also defends the claim to citizenship on the part of the 
alien when and if she has fulfilled certain conditions. Permanent alienage is not only 
incompatible with a liberal democratic understanding of human community; it is also 
a violation of human rights. This claim to membership must be accommodated by 
practices that are non-discriminatory in scope, transparent in formulation and 
execution, and justiciable when violated by states. The doctrine of state sovereignty, 
which has so far shielded naturalisation, citizenship and denationalization decisions 
from scrutiny by international as well as constitutional courts, must be challenged on 
these grounds as well (2004b:1786–1787, her emphasis). 
 
Despite her stated intentions, this theory of just membership and cosmopolitan rights 
seem equally to suffer from some normatively problematic claims. For instance, the 
implication that the values of Western liberal democracies have universal validity is 
key. The idea of unproblematically defending the “universal status of personality” is a 
case in point. Everyone, despite their background, is expected to enter into a moral 
conversation concerning such universal statuses. It is no longer a hypothesis, since it 
is simply taken for granted: refugees, migrants and strangers unquestionably share 
core values of the cosmopolitan and liberal kind. Similarly, Benhabib envisages a new, 
“post-metaphysical” view of cosmopolitanism, inspired by Kant and “grounded upon 
the common humanity of each and every person and his or her free will which also 
includes the freedom to travel beyond the confines of one’s cultural, religious, and 
ethnocentric walls” (2004a:40), as a response to the migratory dilemma. She thus 
argues for a right to membership for the migrant and visitor. Soon after, she betrays 
her own recommendation by suggesting that the tensions created by the presence of 
migrants and refugees and their claim to membership should be addressed through 
Habermasian discourse ethics, which however foresee that “only those norms and 
normative institutional arrangements are valid which can be agreed to by all 
concerned under special argumentation situations named discourses” (2004a:13). 
Whilst the debate around Habermasian discourse ethics cannot be addressed fully 
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here, it is surprising how, after having recognised the precarious nature of migrants, 
Benhabib then expects them to participate as equal members in a skewed dialogue, 
since “in the end any ‘dialogue’ on Habermasian terms turns out to be one-sided and 
exclusive” (Hutchings, 2005:155).   
 
It is exactly this set of weaknesses that poststructuralism helps us address.  I explore 
how it does it next. 
 
 
2.4 Poststructuralism and Ethics 
As stated in 2.1, my project is particularly interested in the way that hospitality 
envisages irregular and undocumented migrants and in the ethical approach that best 
accommodates them. I am proposing that this best approach is a poststructuralist 
understanding of autoimmunitary hospitality ethics. I have chosen to focus on 
poststructuralism, because I find it to be the only approach that, when addressing the 
difficulties for ethics discussed earlier, adds another, but this time useful, one, by 
undertaking to show how complex, non-static social structures and constructs of 
power, of gender and of other kinds, define not only our constitution and actions but 
also our normative considerations. By emphasising this complexity and insisting on a 
multi-layered, essentially open understanding of Otherness, poststructuralist 
hospitality ethics refrain both from viewing the world as ideal and homogeneous and 
from the need (that is also a trap) to provide prescriptions of what is ethically 
acceptable or just in such a world. With an eye to avoiding a series of polarisations – 
between ethics and IR, state vs. individual, structure vs. agency – poststructuralists 
attempt to theorise the ethical in a global context while keeping the Other centre 
stage. I look below at how poststructuralist ethics does this. 
 
2.4.1 Poststructuralist IR 
In her overview chapter on Poststructuralism in IR (2009), Maja Zehfuss focuses 
mainly on these exact two pillars: subjectivity and responsibility. She does so in “an 
attempt to understand without resort to external authorities or transcendental values” 
moral and political systems “proceed[ing] from an interdependency of caring and 
responsibility that cannot be separated from the pluralism and relativism of multiple 
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identities” (Der Derian, 1997:57). David Campbell’s work can perhaps be considered 
the first and most elaborate in this vein in IR scholarship. Focusing on the idea of de-
territorialisation, i.e., “of moving away from supposedly secure grounds and reportedly 
rock-like foundations” (1993:91), Campbell proposes a rethinking of ethics, along with 
a recasting of the Self’s identity opposite Alterity, in order to address the intricacies of 
the contemporary world. This identity of the subject incorporates ethics in order to 
exist in opposition to traditional approaches, which see ethics as “a set of rules and 
regulations adopted by autonomous agents” (Campbell, 1993:92). As a result, it is in 
the responsibility towards the Other that subjectivity and selfhood is created in a 
radically interdependent state of relationality, argues Campbell; and in this 
connection he refers directly to Levinas’ book about sovereignty and ethics in the 
context of the Gulf War narratives in 1993.  
 
He expands on the same topic by advocating the “affirmation of alterity” (1998a:3, 
182, 206) in order to address new, post-Cold War forms of violence, defined by 
“ethnic” and “nationalist” traits. In his book National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity 
and Justice in Bosnia, he argues that the failure to affirm alterity, i.e., to recognise “the 
radical interdependence of being that flows from our responsibility to the [O]ther”, is 
the reason why the West failed in its response to Bosnia (1998a:191). Such a principle 
should not be confined to a normative framework of tolerance but instead should aim 
towards possible emancipations84 of the Other, even if this means the engendering of 
antagonism and conflict. In essence, affirming alterity 
 
goes beyond the narrow and static confines of tolerance and maintains that the 
active affirmation of alterity must involve the desire to actively oppose and 
resist – perhaps, depending on the circumstances, even violently – those forces 
that efface, erase or suppress alterity (206).  
 
To envisage the form of a political life that will embody such affirmation, Campbell 
thinks, one has to turn to Derrida, 85  to move in essence from the Levinasian 
                                                        84	Campbell	 argues	 that	 the	 traditional	 objective	 of	 “‘the	global	 emancipation	 of	 humanity’	 in	 the	name	of	a	universal	 subject	enacting	a	universal	history”	 is	no	 longer	 the	promise	of	progressive	politics,	 but	 instead	 de-politicises	 and	 disenables	 domains	 of	 social	 life	 with	 its	 totalising	aspirations	(1998a:204–5,	his	emphasis).	We	should	instead	speak	in	terms	of	“emancipations”	in	the	plural,	and	be	enabled	by	deconstructive	thought	in	order	to	do	so.		85	Referring	 to	 Simon	 Critchley	 and	 his	 move	 to	 supplement	 Derrida	 and	 deconstruction	 with	
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unconditional responsibility towards the Other to the stage of a decision (or of 
undecidability, to be more exact). In his work on re-conceptualising and re-politicising 
humanitarianism (1998b), it is exactly this move that enables the opposition and 
resistance mentioned above, far from traditional, normative and prescriptive ethical 
frameworks.86  
 
Michael Dillon argues along similar lines: calling the idea of secure prescriptive ethics 
a “command ethic”, he finds it to be not just problematic but – were we to submit to it 
uncritically – really dangerous, evil and totalitarian in the sense developed by Arendt. 
Basing his approach on Heidegger, he explores the relation of the ethical with the 
political, finding the latter to be rooted in a continuous effort to reconcile human 
freedom with the ethical encounter with the Other, always concerned with it, always in 
a mood of outrage against the injustices of the world (1996:62–3). Without calling it 
responsibility as such, at least initially, this encounter leads for Dillon to a constant, 
“irrepressible ethical insurgency” that asks for Justice to be continuously reinvented, 
since, given the international politics of Modernity (his capitals), Justice cannot be 
considered as something timeless and universal but must instead be regarded as 
something that has to be reconfigured each time (a notion echoing Derrida) (1996:63). 
The political struggle deriving from this reinvention of Justice is a “superior account of 
the ethical responsibility that the human way of being owes both to itself and to the 
Otherness to which it is indebted in the obligatory freedom into which it is thrown” 
(1996:11 and 199–204). 
 
According to Dillon, subjectivity is central to this project, but also to a 
reconstructuring of IR, deemed necessary in times of crisis for security and – as a 
result – for philosophy and political theory (1996:2). IR needs to move on from “the 
dominance of the representative calculative thought of modern subjectivity in which 
                                                                                                                                                                  Levinasian	 ethics	 and	 Levinas’	 understanding	 of	 responsibility,	 in	 order	 to	 circumvent	 the	difficulties	 in	 the	 deconstructive	 relation	 between	 ethics	 and	 politics,	 Campbell	 argues	 that	 “in	order	 to	 establish	 the	 grounds	 for	 a	 political	 life	 that	 will	 repeatedly	 interrupt	 all	 attempts	 at	totalisation”	 through	 the	 affirmation	 of	 alterity,	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	 re-supplement	 Levinas	 “in	 the	form	 of	 Derridean	 deconstructive	 thought”	 (1998a:183).	 Leaving	 aside	 for	 a	 moment	 the	correctness	 or	 not	 of	 such	 a	 reading,	 this	 constant	 back	 and	 forth	 or	 “supplementation/re-supplementation”	between	the	two	thinkers	is	in	my	opinion	a	problematic	node,	appearing	also	in	the	common	understanding	of	the	ethics	of	hospitality,	which	I	will	be	addressing	in	the	following	chapters	(chapter	three	and	four).		86	Madeleine	Fagan	(2013:19-33)	doubts	that	Campbell	ends	up	avoiding	normativity	after	all,	but	this	is	not	a	discussion	I	can	expand	on	here.		
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truth is a measure of the adequation of the correspondence between the thinking 
subject’s assertions and entities themselves” (1996:85). I am taking this to be coherent 
with the poststructuralist critique of traditional understandings of subjectivity, where 
the modern subject is perceived as coherent and autonomous. The correspondence 
between assertions and entities that Dillon mentions here refers to the relation of this 
modern subject’s agency with the Other, namely to the way in which the former’s 
agency and autonomy is dependent on her ability to logically specify, categorise and 
control Otherness, difference, and in general “a range of ‘deviant others’” (Popke, 
2003:302). Challenging this understanding of modern subjectivity recasts under a 
different light not only the politics of nation-building, colonisation and imperialism, 
but also questions the stricter identification of Self and Other with here and there, 
inclusion and exclusion respectively. As seen earlier with Walker (2.1), the principle of 
state sovereignty, in its role of settling issues of how we understand political 
community, is an “answer we need to question” (Walker, 1993:64); it is considered to 
be the problem that leads us to failure when responding to contemporary crises. 
However, and like Campbell, Dillon proceeds from the absolute focus on sovereignty to 
discuss identity and difference and how these have been fundamentally spatially-
bound.  Departing from the Heideggerian Dasein or being-there, Dillon describes the 
interpellation of the modern subject in a metaphysics of spatial presence, identified 
with the native soil and country, and analyses how the subject is for this reason 
constituted by the maintenance of this interpellation: the upholding of barriers, 
boundaries, borders.87 Secure identities and boundaries need to be problematised and 
understood in relation to the Other for Dillon (and indeed with Campbell, too) and this 
is an urgent task for IR. 
 
In “The Scandal of the Refugee” (1999:92–124), Dillon recognises in the figure of the 
refugee the “inter” of IR: the subject standing in a territory of estrangement between 
inside and outside. With no means of identification as a denaturalised entity, despite 
“bearing the name of some other previous identification and existing in a carefully 
defined nowhere place within the boundaries of some other nation or state”, the 
refugee is neither in nor out but still undeniably present (1999:101). For a discipline 
                                                        87	Derrida	calls	this	metaphysics	as	ontopology:	“an	axiomatics	linking	indissociably	the	ontological	value	of	present-being	to	its	situation,	to	the	stable	and	presentable	determination	of	a	locality,	the	topos	of	territory,	native	soil,	city,	body	in	general”	(1994:82).	
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like IR, which depends so heavily on ontopolitical borders,88 the refugee constitutes a 
scandal, “calling into question the nature of political and ethical conduct” (Popke, 
2003:302). She forces inquiry into the ways she is treated, addressed and 
acknowledged beyond practices of objectification and governmentality, compelling IR 
and IPT to make the Other as a refugee the “focus of attention that it deserves to be” 
(Dillon, op.cit.). The resulting challenge to political thought is not limited to a mere 
modification of existing theory; it extends even to its very point of departure 
(2013:65), which should take into account  
 
the concurrent operational force of a difference that can never be rendered the 
same. Such a difference, it has to be added, is more than oppositional 
difference and so the thinking of it is not dialectical. Hence it does not offer the 
saving turn of an Aufhebung or synthesis promised by Hegelian negation and 
difference. This is an account of difference that is intra rather than merely 
inter, and which is a positive process of differentiation rather than simple 
negation. (Dillon, 2013:66) 
 
Subjectivity within strangerhood, difference within a subject itself, along with the 
assumption of a responsibility towards the Other that exceeds moral imperatives but is 
based on the openness towards her (Dillon, 1996:145) – these are the most important 
elements of a poststructuralist IR and poststructuralist ethics that an autoimmunitary 
ethics of hospitality can build upon. Of course not all poststructural thinkers agree in 
their understanding of these elements, nor do they approach them in a similar way or 
in a common programme (see Dillon’s discussion in 2013:65–6). More unitary visions 
of subjectivity along with conflictual claims are present. However, for the needs of my 
discussion here it is not necessary to expand further on the details. I would like to 
focus on hospitality instead: while these elements are therefore absolutely vital, where 
exactly does hospitality appear in these discussions?  
 
Dillon does refer to hospitality in a very close reading of Derrida’s work on the relation 
between the messianic and violence, focusing on how the claim of hospitality (itself 
coupled with hostility and violence) may guarantee a lesser violence and avoidance of 
                                                        88	Dillon	finds	the	refugee	to	be	a	scandal	for	philosophy,	epistemology	and	politics	more	generally.		
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the worst (Dillon, 2013).89 The context is, however, always Derridean and rarely, if at 
all, departs from the discussion of violence to discuss proper hospitality issues, either 
at a theoretical or practical level in the form of borders, border-crossings or migration. 
David Campbell, on the other hand, refers to hospitality as such only once (1998a:294, 
n56), in a passage taken from Derrida’s Specters of Marx: the setting is again a 
Derridean textual analysis without consequences for an actual discussion of what 
hospitality, or an ethics of hospitality, may entail. As a result, hospitality does not 
appear in any of the indexes of his books. The focus is instead mainly on questions of 
violence, war and subjectivity, as well as with questions of intervention and 
nationality – priorities that the texts’ provenance in the 1990s can easily justify.  
 
Along with their theorisation of subjectivity as something possible only in relation to 
the Other, the features of this body of work that are most central to the ethics of 
hospitality that I am proposing are its questioning of ontopology and territorialisation 
of responsibility, as well as its invitation to be sceptical and to problematise the 
distinctions between, on one hand, normative concerns and empirical theory, and, on 
the other, a supposedly established literature on ethics versus a theoretically-poor 
domain of IR (Campbell and Shapiro, 1999). The proposals by Dillon, Campbell and 
Shapiro (to whom I turn next) – and by others, too – of a poststructuralist alternative 
to the sole theory of ethics in IR, have provided the springboard for the discussions of 
hospitality in IR to which my own project is related.  
 
2.4.2 On hospitality 
Around the same time that Campbell and Dillon argued for the de-territorialisation of 
responsibility, Michael J. Shapiro explored Derridean hospitality as such, becoming the 
first IR scholar to do so (1998; 1999). Focusing on what he calls “moral” and “political 
geographies”, he looks at global spaces beyond the dominant nation-state system as 
loci where the autonomy and well-being of persons whose identity is not based on 
geopolitical boundaries may be at stake (1998). Starting from a critique of mainstream 
political philosophy and its ethical exclusions, similar to the one explored above, 
Shapiro is interested in exploring the implications that alternative theoretical 
approaches may have for an ethics of global hospitality. To do so he examines a broad 
                                                        89	Le	pire,	the	worst	possible	violence:	I	am	explaining	and	discussing	this	in	detail	in	4.2	
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range of geographies, from the representational violence of imperial structures to 
ethical centrepieces like Kant’s vision of an improving mankind tending towards a 
universal community, pushing forward to a post-Kantian, antifoundational landscape 
outside the limits of mainstream ethical philosophy (1998:699). He therefore 
deconstructs the discourse of Kant’s three critiques – focusing on the centrality of the 
state and the creation of a cosmopolitical subject – to conclude that it is Kant’s 
discussion of hospitality that inspires ethical models that seek to transcend the 
limitations of traditional ethics, as this is defined by a strict geopolitical imaginary 
(1998:702–3). 
 
One could say that his is a preliminary exploration of Derrida’s stance on hospitality,90 
mainly centred around conceptualisations of identity and difference, which engender 
exclusion, following Derrida’s visualisations of a different Europe (Derrida, 1992). 
Comparing Derrida’s vision with Kantian optimism for humanity’s progress and 
commitment to common sense and logic, Shapiro turns his attention to post-Kantian 
(in the meaning of poststructuralist) scholars (such as Foucault and Lyotard) whose 
work may enable us to rethink the relationship between space and place and the 
discourse of excluded and/ or different Others. Personhood, identity and singularity 
are all explored by Shapiro through events of discourse and loci of enunciation in and 
out of sovereign states; and he concludes by challenging neo-Kantian and optimist 
forecasts of global cosmopolitanism of the Habermasian kind, suggesting instead that, 
before we look at the global level, we need to recognise and respond to difference and 
uncategorised, fractured presences within the nation-state (1998:711–12). 
 
This early exploration of hospitality by Shapiro, as in his chapter on The Ethics of the 
Encounter the following year (1999:57–91), focuses on the interrelation among fixity 
of locution (recognisable speech acts/ discourse with already inscribed meanings) with 
specific spatio-temporal contexts and given structures of intelligibility. To explain the 
same thing in simpler words, he finds that ethics has traditionally been connected to a 
static view of the self as this is expressed in hierarchical, narrative and territorially-
bound relations, when it could instead be dynamic and temporal, historically and 
ethically evolutionary (1999:57–8). The importance of hospitality in counteracting this 
                                                        90	As	will	be	seen	in	chapter	4,	Derrida	was	yet	to	write	Adieu	to	Emmanuel	Levinas	(1999b)	and	Of	
Hospitality	(2000b),	where	the	concept	is	properly	broached.	
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static worldview is presented as closely related to the locution of the relation between 
self and Other through ethnographic self-reflection and narratives that disrupt 
dominant national narratives, and, as a result, state-oriented spatio-temporalities 
(Shapiro, 1998:711). While emphasising Levinas’ absolute importance in establishing 
the ethics of the encounter, Shapiro identifies a failure when we move to the practice 
of this ethics, a trap into which Levinas “and others have fallen prey”. This trap 
involves the lack of attention to the narratives and the personal stories of the Other, 
which Shapiro finds to be proto-ethical, in the sense that they provide the background 
where Otherness and our responsibility to it are created (Shapiro, 1999:71). A failure 
to consider these narratives entails “a certain violence of representation” of the Other 
(Shapiro, 1999:74): Levinas may have addressed the dominant narrative of Western 
philosophy and its focus on logos and the I of the self;91 however, Shapiro argues, he 
has failed to do so when it comes to addressing the Other in practice. Derrida’s work 
offers a solution to this, since deconstructive reading does not function as traditional 
critique but recognises the struggle of the Other’s narrative, “push[ing] toward the 
unthinkable or unthought” (1999:78). 
 
The emphasis on discourse and narrative in the poststructuralist renderings of the 
ethical encounter is not limited only to these first attempts by IR scholarship to broach 
hospitality by means of poststructuralism; we can see it also in the case of Elizabeth 
Dauphinee (2007; 2010; 2012; 2013), who is also exploring hospitality in writing, 
narrative and autoethnography (Dauphinee, 2007, 2010, 2013). Her work looks at the 
ethical value entailed in exploring  
 
the limitations of academic voice and its impact on those we write, the truths 
we are able to recognise and transcribe, and the ways in which the academic 
voice silences the self, who is forced to hide or minimise the often very 
personal motivations for engaging in IR scholarship (2010:799). 
 
Based on her own experience in researching war, hospitality in her case involves the 
encounter with the Other as an object of scholarship either from a distance or through 
fieldwork and personal contact, with the Other often being the victim of violence and 
exclusion. Dauphinee finds that the line separating research and fieldwork from 
                                                        91	I	return	to	this	in	the	following	chapter.	
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tourism and even voyeurism is very thin and easily transgressed (2010:816), and that 
the way we access the life and the death of the Other in our research may often betray 
a self/object relation, a misplacement of and violence against her (Dauphine, 
2013:347). The same applies for any kind of research referring to the Other, and she 
warns us of this danger by invoking – as does Shapiro – Levinas: 
 
 violence does not consist so much in injuring and annihilating persons as in 
interrupting their continuity, making them play roles in which they no longer 
recognise themselves, making them betray not only their own commitments 
but their own substance (Levinas, 1969:21, quoted in Dauphinee, 2010:816).  
 
How we enact responsibility towards the Other beyond the axes of proximity 
(coinciding with the Other spatially) and temporality (coinciding with the Other 
chronologically) is thus very important. “Intellectual hospitality” means for 
Dauphinee striving to welcome Others, who are not part of the academy, into scholarly 
discussions, which involve them and are open to questioning, to challenge and 
revision (2012). This narrative version of the ethical encounter, imbued by the 
Levinasian and Derridean views of responsibility and hospitality, has acquired traction 
in IR circles92 and is indeed very important in contributing to the conceptual mosaic of 
ethics of hospitality and its use in approaching the Other.  
 
This approach is usually based on another common trait in the IR poststructuralist 
treatment of hospitality: the tendency to explore it in relation with war and 
intervention, as Dauphinee, Dillon and Campbell’s engagement with hospitality, 
deriving to a greater or lesser extent from their work on Balkan Wars, attests. 
However, the reason for this does not only lie with the chronological context within 
which the first, tentative IR approaches to hospitality were written (in the cases of 
Campbell and Dillon at least). IR’s preoccupation with war and the emphasis on 
security and securitisation that has gripped a sizeable part of the discipline, especially 
from the mid-90s onwards, plays a very important role too. The emergence of Critical 
Security Studies strengthens this tendency further despite (or perhaps exactly because 
of) its “fundamental critique of the epistemology, ontology and normative 
                                                        92	As	the	recent	creation	of	the	Journal	of	Narrative	Politics	partly	symbolises.	
 128 
implications of traditional (realist) approaches to security that continue to privilege 
the state as the referent object of security” (Browning and McDonald, 2013:236). By 
moving the focus towards questions of life and death, of community beyond the 
centrality of statehood to issues of class, gender, race and postcolonialism, among 
other things, the critical branch of security in a sense legitimises the inclusion in its 
debates of hospitality, where difference and identity, responsibility towards 
Otherness, along with biopolitical hospitality practices of the kind I explore in the next 
section, are all very important.  
  
However, I have my reservations about whether these are valid ways to use hospitality 
conceptually. In the case of using hospitality mainly within a discourse-based and 
narrative context, I think such use is proven to be limiting and limited: the Other, as 
an object of research, no matter how she is welcomed, included, heard and involved in 
the research, remains what she has been from the beginning, i.e., an object, subjected 
to the hierarchical rules of observation, scrutiny and knowledge production, even if 
such practices are open and hospitable to her Otherness. However, if a narrative 
hospitality is limiting, the use of hospitality ethics in the context of intervention is 
genuinely highly problematic, either underusing or totally misusing the possibilities of 
the concept for IPT. As Dan Bulley remarks in a recent article (2015:189) 
 
If a state intervenes, militarily or otherwise, in the affairs of another sovereign 
state, the act may be considered right or wrong, legal or illegal, just or unjust, 
but it is not hospitable (indeed, it can be a violation of hospitality as a forceful 
incursion into another’s space). 
 
With state violence inscribed in their core, “interventions” of the type in which IR is 
interested should not be placed, I argue, under the ever-vaster heading of the 
hospitality concept, where the self and Other subjectivities are essentially confused: 
“this is to confuse being a host with being an agent[;] if the host leaves its home it can 
no longer be a host” (Bulley, 2015:189fn2). As with critical studies, hospitality can 
mainly be used to address interventionism in IR in two essential ways: on one hand, in 
helping to define group identity, enabling particular interventionist policies and/or 
legitimating intervention and its actors. On the other, in defining the ethical aspect of 
intervention, justifying its role in fulfilling our “responsibility to protect” Others and 
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contributing in some way to the reformulation of interventionism in a narrative of 
ethical diktat. Given the aporetic nature of hospitality – in favour of which I am 
arguing in this project in general, and more specifically in chapter 4 – this use of 
hospitality is not only unacceptable but in essence undermines what hospitality 
should be about, if it is to contribute to a non-hierarchical, less violent encounter with 
the Other. As with narrative ethics and politics, it does not so much entail opening to 
the call of the Other and alleviating the violence against her as it does to enabling 
state actors to better administer it. 
 
Gideon Baker is one of the IR scholars engaging with ethics of hospitality who also 
performs this linking between hospitality and intervention (2010a; 2011b),93 but he 
places it under the relation of hospitality with cosmopolitanism. In this case, 
intervention is seen as one of a “series of politico-juridical practices” at the opposite 
pole of Derridean unconditional hospitality. (2011b:111), with this series taken to 
mean limiting border crossings and granting of asylum and other conditional 
hospitality practices. In a logical leap, which is not properly explained, Baker suggests 
that “a complete dichotomisation of hospitality and intervention is neither possible or 
desirable”, equating the move to “open our door to the [O]ther” with going “forth 
forcibly to protect her in her own home” (2011b, ibid.). This opposite movement, 
inwards – towards the home, and outwards – away from the home (i.e., against the 
home of the Other) constitutes for Baker a version of the undecidable. I would perhaps 
not consider this to be so very problematic if it were not presented as an interpretative 
move directly deriving from Levinas and Derrida. However, attempting to apply 
hospitality’s aporetic nature as this is presented by Derrida94 so as to suggest that the 
undecidability between unconditional and conditional hospitality corresponds at an 
international level to an undecidability between hospitality and intervention 
(2011b:113–14) is a state-centric conjecture, which does not do justice either to 
Derrida’s conceptual work on hospitality (which stands against such state-centredness 
or any suggestions of forcibly protecting the Other) or the predicament of the Others 
(as in the case of stateless, refugees or irregular migrants), which a problematised 
approach to hospitality seeks to address. Furthermore, a confusion between perfectible 
                                                        93	Bulley’s	 earlier	 critical	 quotes	 are	 addressed	 at	 exactly	 this	 link	 that	 Baker	 draws	 between	hospitality	and	intervention.		94	See	introduction	and	section	4.3.	
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justice towards the Other with liberal interventionism (and the opposite, non-
interventionism’s identification with injustice and unimpeded violence) betrays more 
about Baker’s own oversight regarding Liberal universalism’s claims than the alleged 
misconceptions he attributes to the “liberal cosmopolitans reared on the certainties 
(the decidability) of an ethics without borders” (2011b:114). Arguing for open or at 
least more open borders does not entail any kind of ethical decisionism, as Carens’ 
work, not to mention poststructuralist and autonomy of migration approaches, clearly 
shows; on the contrary, arguments in favour of open borders are marred by lack of 
certainty, hence their rarity. I argue that the insistence that there must be a more or 
less restricted border in order for hospitality to make sense (Baker, 2011a; Bulley, 
2015; Vaughan-Williams, 2012 and others) creates a binary, which the aporetic nature 
of hospitality seeks to deconstruct. I will return to this later on, but first I need to 
address the issue of cosmopolitanism. 
 
This effort to position the ethics of hospitality under a liberal cosmopolitan umbrella 
is another problematic node in Baker’s exposition. While such positioning could at a 
first glance make sense, given the Kantian provenance of the term “hospitality” and 
Kant’s influence on the IR scholarship that broaches “hospitality issues” like the 
scholarship explored in 2.2 and 2.3 above, it essentially overstretches Derridean 
hospitality and the Levinasian understanding of Otherness in order to accommodate or 
resuscitate the old “stale” IR cosmopolitan-communitarian debate with a view to 
strengthening cosmopolitanism. Baker in principle recognises this and claims that he 
uses hospitality for this exact reason: in order to address the usual critiques against 
cosmopolitanism as a universalising totalisation, which reproduces the usual 
underlying dialectics of state-centred theorising (2011b:90–110). Levinas’ limitless 
responsibility towards the Other and Derrida’s reading of it as a cosmopolitical gesture 
provide the answer: a non-dialectical, desicionistic cosmopolitanism, i.e., maintaining 
an open door and non-dialectisable relation with the Other while calculating the risks 
and implementing the constraints these limits force us to realise; taking a decision in 
the heart of undecidability (Baker, 2011b:100). 
 
Derrida does hint at such “cosmopolitics”, as he sometimes calls it, in his book 
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Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort! (1997/2001b) 95  and Of Hospitality 
(2000b), but he emphasises the tendency towards undecidability of his 
conceptualisation and not decisionism. In addition, by proposing the creation of Cities 
of Refuge,96 Derrida suggests that cities – and not states – may be the entities pointing 
the way to a hospitable future in Europe,97 while he keeps insisting (also during the 
second essay, “On Forgiveness”) on describing performance, i.e., what is performed in 
the “project of making States” and their legitimacy (2001b:57–9). Issues of state 
intervention or even non-governmental organisations’ unsolicited assistance never 
appear in his writing, but I think it is safe to assume that he would have found them in 
contradiction with the aporetic, non-hierarchical relationality with the Other that is at 
stake in hospitality. In On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness Derrida concludes that the 
dependence on state sovereignty is too powerful to allow the implementation of the 
cosmopolitanism Baker espouses, and he sets his hopes not on decisionism but on the 
active work of the self to dissociate sovereignty from the conditionality of offered 
hospitality, vying always, to my understanding, for the implementation of more open 
and more unconditional terms (Derrida, 2001b:59). Such a discussion, picking up on 
the intricacies of Derrida’s cosmopolitanism, could continue forever; however, I 
believe that despite its complexities, it should be understood quite differently from the 
way in which Baker is using it in his nevertheless laudable effort to alleviate the 
tension in the endlessly repeating, “depressingly familiar” back-and-forth of the IR 
universalism-particularism debate (Baker, 2009:108). Although Baker attempts to 
address the criticism from within, as presented for example by R.J.B. Walker, that 
cosmopolitanism actively contributes to a situation in which it becomes impossible to 
                                                        95	Translated	in	English	in	2001	and	accompanied	by	an	essay	on	forgiveness,	making	up	in	this	way	a	new	book	consisting	of	two	loosely	related	parts	(On	Cosmopolitanism	and	Forgiveness,	2001b).	96	In	 1993,	 over	 300	 writers	 signed	 a	 petition	 that	 crystallised	 the	 formative	 structure	 of	 what	would	become	the	International	Parliament	of	Writers.	In	November	of	the	same	year,	these	writers	met	in	Strasbourg	for	the	organisation’s	formal	inauguration.	According	to	the	European	Charter	of	Cities	of	Asylum,	this	group	“reaffirmed	the	need	for	an	international	structure”	that	was	capable	of	“developing	genuine	solidarity	between	writers	whose	work	and	lives	were	increasingly	being	put	in	danger”	 (Congress	of	Regional	 and	Local	Authorities	of	Europe,	 1995).	 Cities	 in	Europe,	North	America	 and	 Africa	 have	 joined	 the	 Network	 and	 each	 of	 them	 is	 chartered	 to	 provide	 physical,	financial,	and	social	stability	for	the	authors	whom	they	protect.	The	cities	represent	real	spaces	of	security	 and	 are	 designated	 as	 institutions	 that	 will	 willingly	 mobilise	 their	 varied	 public	 and	private	authorities	to	protect	and	negotiate	on	behalf	of	 their	adopted	writers.	The	expectation	 is	that	the	cities	will	each	work	to	secure	the	proper	papers	for	the	authors,	utilise	security	forces	to	maintain	 the	 writers’	 well-being,	 and	 collaborate	 with	 “local	 authorities	 and	 other	 public	authorities,	both	within	the	individual	countries	and	beyond	national	borders”	(Congress,	1995).	
97 “If	we	look	to	the	city,	rather	than	to	the	state,	it	is	because	we	have	given	up	hope	that	the	state	might	create	a	new	image	for	the	city”	(Derrida,	2001b:6) 	
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speak of ethics in IR, by oscillating between equally implausible alternatives (1993:67–
73) and “add[ing] up to a discourse that seems content to wish politics away” 
(2003:284), I believe he fails to do so, not because Derrida’s cosmopolitan ruminations 
are unfounded or vague but because the mainstream theoretical landscape of IR, with 
its emphasis on the binary of state sovereignty versus a global civil society or a 
universal borderless suprastate, is in itself problematic.  
 
I find that a similar tension may exist when hospitality is used alongside other key 
traditional IR concepts like diplomacy (Onuf, 2013) and foreign policy (Bulley, 2009). 
Although in both these cases (and contrary to intervention) one could say there is a 
proper host and an at-home as a locus for hospitality provision, I think that the state 
centredness of both concepts may end up undermining equally the notions of 
hospitality and of the key concepts at hand, mainly due to the difficulties of 
formulating state subjectivity along the lines that Levinasian and Derridean 
understandings of responsibility demand of us. In the second case – which I will focus 
on here because he is the only IR scholar who has consistently and for a long time 
(2006; 2007; 2009. 2014; 2015) written on hospitality – Bulley (2009) attempts to 
overcome the prejudice that foreign policy is without ethical ballast and looks into the 
ethicality of foreign policy beyond the binary of its possibility or impossibility. He 
argues that this binary is both overgeneralising and inadequate, since ethics and 
morality are always present in the considerations informing foreign policy and all 
other decisions regarding our treatment of Others. Following Campbell’s distinction 
between foreign policy as “practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion (possibly 
figured as relationships of otherness) that constitute their object as ‘foreign’ in the 
process of dealing with them” (Campbell, 1998c:68–9, quoted in Bulley, 2009:3) and 
Foreign Policy with capital letters “as a state-based practice towards that which is 
beyond the state’s borders, that which is ‘foreign’ and not ‘domestic’ or part of the 
‘collective self’” (Bulley, 2009:3–4), Bulley argues that such distinctions not only point 
to the ethical dimension of foreign policy but also to the fact that ethics and foreign 
policy are inseparable, since they are both concerned with how we constitute and 
relate to Otherness and tackle identical issues.  
 
Ethics as foreign policy is explored in the way it is represented, since any attempt to 
define it falls short without interpretation and description of its discourse, which 
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Bulley attempts through a reading of a number of speeches and statements relating to 
British (1997–2007) and EU (1999–2004) foreign policy among an “inexhaustible 
number” of foreign policy texts (2009:6). Seen as text, therefore, foreign policy is 
deconstructed in a Derridean way: important binaries are identified and hierarchies 
between terms of opposition are teased out in order to be challenged and reversed, 
highlighting the points of weakness of said foreign policy texts, or what Bulley refers 
to as undecidables (2009:9). Such undecidables are located in the conception of the 
ethical subject, or – what is most interesting to us here – of responsibility and of 
hospitality with the latter, examined in the binary of hospitality/ hostility, i.e., 
hostipitality (Bulley, 2009:61–80).98 Bulley focuses on hospitality within the context of 
EU foreign policy during the period mentioned above, particularly regarding the EU’s 
enlargement, and with a specific focus on the enlargement policy towards Balkan 
countries and, finally, with reference to the European Neighbour Policy.99 Expanding 
on Derrida’s conceptualisation of hospitality, Bulley teases out the hospitable 
metaphors populating the foreign policy texts of the period, which position the EU in 
the place of the host while southern, Balkan and other states-candidates for inclusion 
are seen as the Other to whom hospitality is offered. He reflects on the conditional 
character of hospitality in such policies, inquiring into the meaning of this 
conditionality for the nature of responsibility that the EU undertakes takes towards its 
neighbours. Hospitality “deconstructs and undermines itself, revealing its constitutive 
undecidability; but where do we go from here?” asks Bulley at the end of his chapter 
on EU foreign policy (2009:80). Being sceptical and critical of the limited form of 
hospitality that the EU offers, and after having expanded on the issue of hospitality’s 
conditionality versus unconditionality that Derrida discusses in Of Hospitality and 
elsewhere, Bulley concludes that the only way to overcome the stalemate created by 
this undecidability is by negotiation, not to find a middle ground but in the sense of 
“an incessant movement between the poles of contradiction within a concept, such as 
unconditional and conditional hospitality” (Bulley, 2009:81). Getting involved, 
                                                        98	“There	is	an	essential	self-limitation”	built	right	into	the	idea	of	hospitality,	which	preserves	the	distance	between	one’s	own	and	the	stranger,	between	owning	one’s	own	property	and	inviting		the	other	into	one’s	home.	So,	there	is	always	a	little	hostility	in	all	hosting	and	hospitality,	constituting	a	certain	“hostil/pitality”	(Caputo,	1997:110).	I	discuss	this	in	chapter	four.	See	also	Benveniste	on	
hospes	in	1.3.	99	A	key	part	of	EU’s	 foreign	policy,	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	(ENP)	encompasses	 the	EU’s	collaboration	 “with	 its	 southern	 and	 eastern	 neighbours	 to	 achieve	 the	 closest	 possible	 political	association	and	the	greatest	possible	degree	of	economic	integration.	This	goal	builds	on	common	interests	and	on	values	–	democracy,	the	rule	of	law,	respect	for	human	rights,	and	social	cohesion”	(EEAS	website,	March	11,	2016)	
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calculating a response, making a decision in front of contradictions and paradoxes and 
maintaining an openness towards Otherness and alterity are the main moves involved 
in the aspiration for ethical foreign policy (Bulley, 2009:82–3). As Campbell has earlier 
suggested in the case of Bosnia (1998a), this negotiation is always case-specific and 
“must be invented in the moment”, avoiding the simple application of ethics (Bulley, 
2006:658). 
 
As Bulley himself recognises, hospitality “has never been a focus of foreign policy 
analysis” (2009:61). He attributes this to the liminality of the concept and its 
positioning between the domestic and the international, upsetting their distinction. I 
believe he is right to point out in the same breath that this positioning is nonetheless 
what makes hospitality of fundamental importance for IR: a concept that brings the 
outside into the inside, “contesting and cross-examining the separation” between the 
two (ibid.). As such, one could expect hospitality to be the most appropriate concept to 
address a field like foreign policy, where international borders and boundaries are of 
constitutive and critical importance. However, it is exactly these boundaries that 
define mono-semantically the actors of his analysis, i.e., nation-states and the EU as a 
supranational institution, which may cause problems for a deconstructive 
interpretation of hospitality in a foreign policy context.  
 
The first point of contention is in my opinion the formation of the subject, the who of 
hospitality: Bulley readily recognises its importance for the possibility of ethics and 
dedicates a whole chapter to discussing it (2000:15–35). Through his textual reading 
he finds that British and European foreign policy are dominated by the respective 
collective subjects, where “we” and “our” are based on a set of (moral) principles and 
values, which seem to be under threat (2009:15–16). Despite this, Bulley rightly claims 
that “a fully present subject” is impossible as a foundation of ethical foreign policy and 
that subjectivity is constructed through the competence to assume responsibility and 
prevent human suffering. Responsibility towards the Other and the foreign is the main 
constitutive element of subjectivity, which is marred by moments of undecidability 
(2009:16). In the case of the European Union said subjectivity-through-responsibility 
has to be constantly reaffirmed, emphasised and described, proving the EU to be a 
problematic subject (2009:20).  
 
 135 
Despite the chapter’s well-documented analysis of this problematic nature and of the 
lack of a clear answer to the who of ethical foreign policy, the EU still seems to be 
taken into consideration as a tentatively unitary subject when it comes to its relation 
to hospitality. Notwithstanding its fragmentary and undecidable nature, to which 
Bulley insistently refers (for instance, 2009:20–23; 30–32 and elsewhere), the EU is 
still identified with a kind of “European home”, marked by its sense of responsibility 
towards neighbours and prospective members (2009:62). I think this idea of an at least 
tentative common home is overstretched: while it makes sense that such a responsible 
“European home” configuration would be predominant in the speeches of the 
president of the European Commission of the time, Romano Prodi, the failure to 
address the fragmentation of this “home” and its implication for subjectivity-
formation is palpable. Poorer member–states’ ambivalent stance towards EU 
enlargement, which would potentially put them in the dire position of having to 
compete more aggressively for EU structural funds or reconsider long-held national 
grudges,100 and of course the rise of far-right and xenophobic politics at the national 
level that followed the economic crisis of 2007, but which were already in motion in 
the late 1990s/ early 2000s,101 undermine the attempt to envision even a non–fully 
present subject; something that Prodi’s speeches in their hyperbole  may also be trying 
to address and conceal. Although Bulley takes every precaution to state clearly that EU 
subjectivity is shrouded by significant doubts (Bulley, 2009:22), I believe that, contrary 
to his exposition, the construction of the EU-as-subject as a regional, responsible 
“home” is at best really precarious.   
 
Similarly, the other who of hospitality, as in the Other whom responsibility and 
hospitality addresses, is equally shaky: is this Other a unitary entity? And to what 
extent? What form may responsibility take? Bulley suggests that during the period in 
question, the two main notions around which responsibility was organised were the 
responsibility to protect and the responsibility to save, with the former considered to 
be the most crucial (2009:36). Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq, Africa as a 
general object/ Other (in the case of Britain’s construction of subjectivity in ethical 
                                                        100	See	Greece’s	contentious	national	debate	on	Turkey’s	EU	accession	 following	 the	 failure	of	 the	Annan	plan	for	Cyprus.		101	See	 for	 instance,	 Jean-Marie	 Le	 Pen	 and	 his	 progress	 to	 the	 second	 round	 of	 the	 presidential	election	 in	 2002	 or	 Jörg	 Haider’s	 participation	 in	 Austria’s	 government	 in	 2000,	 both	 on	 anti-European	and	anti-eastward	European	enlargement	platforms.			
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foreign policy) – these are some of the constitutive Others whose call to the 
responsible subject is never clearly presented. How is this call valued and decided 
upon? Given that responsibility does not exist in a vacuum but corresponds to the 
need of an Other, how can we textually deconstruct the EU’s subjectivity when the 
Otherness that sets this subjectivity construction in motion is so vague and disparate 
in nature? Does the impact of Britain’s and the EU’s actions (saving and protection in 
the former, enlargement, European Neighbourhood Policy practices in the latter) 
derive from their responsibility, proportionately important and equally felt 
everywhere? I believe that these mostly unanswered questions reveal two problems: 
first, they reveal that in such cases, where a state or a group of states are assigned 
ethical subjectivity constructed through responsibility and hospitality, issues of 
oppressive hierarchies and subject/object (as in an objectified Other) relations 
constitute more prominent dangers than in other cases of subjectivity formation, the 
move that a poststructuralist, deconstructive ethical approach wants to avoid. 
Secondly, they suggest that an assumption is being made about the homogeneity of 
needs of the Other at the receiving end, who was and remains voiceless. My 
assumption is that this is due to the fact that state entities are not necessarily 
amenable to ethical subjectivity formation of the deconstructive kind and that at least 
as far as hospitality is concerned, the ethics of hospitality should mainly address calls 
of individual Others such as migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and individuals caught 
in in-between categories, on one hand, and practices of Othering present in border 
crossings, on the other. Aiming to uphold an ethics of hospitality at a statal level is 
fraught with contradictions and presents among other problems the danger that the 
“risks and costs of these contradictions are not fairly spread among individuals and 
places” (Mamadouh, 2010:1108).  
 
Having said that, the way Bulley analyses the Derridean intricacies of responsibility 
and hospitality, applying them to a difficult field in the heart of IR, is both subtle and 
all-encompassing. His exposition on the unsettling elements of Derridean 
autoimmunity (2009:25–29) is very informative in the way it foregrounds the 
impossible choices inherent to dealing with internal threats, either in the form of the 
destruction from the inside or in the form of self-destruction to pre-empt said 
destruction. I am basing on this my own discussion of autoimmunity in chapter four. 
Bulley’s later work on refugee camps and governmentality (2014) and the need to 
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move beyond Derrida in our conceptualisation of an ethics of international hospitality 
(2015) informs the vision of my project, as this is discussed on chapter five and four 
respectively.  
 
Speaking of camps, I will finish this itinerary through poststructuralist and critical 
engagements with hospitality in IR by briefly exploring a sizeable part of scholarship 
on camps, borders, border-crossing, politics of mobility and migration studies. This 
scholarship is interdisciplinary and its allegiances often overlap and bring together a 
series of fields, such as human geography, citizenship studies, human rights, border 
and security studies, critical migration studies, etc., to name only a few. From Roxanne 
Lynn Doty’s work on exceptionalism at the border (2006; 2007; 2011 among others) to 
Engin Isin’s (2013; and Nielsen, 2008) work on citizenship, from Nicholas De Genova’s 
work on deportation (2010), from Vicki Squire’s work on mobility (2012) and Nick 
Vaughan-Williams’ on biopolitical security (2012 and others) to Kim Rygiel’s work on 
camps (2011; 2012 and others), this scholarship may rarely if at all refer to hospitality 
by name per se, but it is to a great extent informed by the critical and poststructuralist 
spirit explored in this chapter, and it has been inspirational for my research on the 
biopolitical aspect of my project and more specifically in my theorisation of 
autoimmunitary hospitality (chapter four) and my discussion of the camp for strangers 
(chapter five). This critical scholarship on borders, migration and mobility often but 
not exclusively finds inspiration in the biopolitical. Agamben’s relevant writings on 
bare life and exceptionalism (explored briefly in 1.3.3) is often in the background, and 
the abovementioned critical scholarship engages with Agamben’s work, albeit often to 
oppose it.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Ever since philosophy assigned itself the role of ground it has been giving the 
established power its blessing, and tracing its doctrine of faculties to the 
organs of State power (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:376). 
 
Shapiro opens his article on The Events of Discourse and the Ethics of Global 
Hospitality (1998:695) with this exact quote: Deleuze’s scathing critique of Kantian 
and Hegelian philosophers who have based their thought on the assumption that the 
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secular state is indeed wise in its power, suggesting that in this way they are blessing 
the state and legitimising it, hence becoming its accomplices. Although Shapiro rightly 
remarks this is a statement defined by an exaggerated anti-Kantian spirit (ibid.), 
poststructuralism’s ethical agenda and biopolitical approaches of the Agambenian 
kind are not very far from stating the same. Traditional ethical approaches to 
migration and border crossing, as the ones examined above in sections 2.2 and 2.3, are 
to a certain extent caught in this legitimation of state power and an expression “of the 
limits of the contemporary political imagination when confronted with persistent 
claims about and evidence of fundamental historical and structural transformation” 
(Walker, 1993:5), failing to understand the complexities of migrant flows beyond the 
importance of a territorially-bound community. More than twenty years after Walker’s 
observation, IR theory continues to produce narratives of the international and of 
ethical responsibility towards Otherness based on the opposition of an “inside of the 
state (the realm of the possibility of the good life) and the outside (the realm of 
anarchy and struggle)”, a distinction that condemns more complex issues such as the 
ethical response to the Other to reduction and deferment (Zehfuss, 2013:153).  
 
Therefore, one of the main problem with the main approaches explored in 2.2 and 2.3 
(with perhaps the exception of Kukathas and Cole) is that they seem to be based on an 
absolute political and schematic clarity: nation-states are clearly and indisputably 
defined, based on communities with coherent identities, whilst their stance towards 
the stranger to the community, either through their immigration policies or their 
overall hospitality rationale, are equally transparent, not to mention fair and rational. 
Most importantly, the clarity of definition involves the stranger too: her status is 
deemed rational when she is an economic migrant in search of better life opportunities 
and/ or a refugee, fleeing a war or some kind of persecution. Liminal figures such as 
irregular and undocumented migrants are rarely accounted for. Even when the 
categories of economic migrants and refugees are not spared from random violent 
practices and exclusion, as is often the case in the current refugee crisis for instance,102 
the ambiguous category of the stranger Other discussed in 1.3 is even more at risk. 
Assumptions, community-based understandings of Otherness, mobility metrics, 
                                                        
102 See	 Amnesty	 International	 (2013),	 ECRE	 (2013)	 and	 UNHCR	 (2013)	 and	mass	media	 for	 the	period	2010	to	date,	exposing	the	vulnerabilities	of	people	seeking	–	even	when	they	are	eligible	for	–	international	protection,	who	are	ill-treated	and	pushed	back	in	flagrant	violation	of	international	law. 
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argumentation of the kind we have seen in these sections, are based on this – false, in 
my opinion – imaginary regarding political life and migratory movements. The 
complexity, either of the historical, regional and postcolonial nature of the global 
order or of the actual reasons of migration, is disregarded.   
 
A way to circumvent this has typically been, on one hand, to bestow the autonomous 
subject with a set of rights, which can ideally be legally enforced within the boundaries 
of political jurisdiction or, on the other, by looking at justice through the concept of 
equality, either in the form of equal (re)distribution of resources or equality in 
community membership. We saw the first case above, while exploring the scholarship 
on free movement and the right to leave (2.2.2 and 2.2.3 respectively) and the second 
in the neo-Kantian debates on distributive justice (2.3.1) and just membership (2.3.2) 
for migrants. Such solutions are related to Kant and his belief in a project of 
modernity, which could be universally extended for the benefit of humankind through 
the application of reason and judgment (Shapiro, 1998) and to Rawls and his belief in 
justice as a mechanism for binding individuals. These attempts, which also address the 
problem of hospitality towards the Other, are part of an “attempt to internalise the law 
of reason, to develop the autonomous rationality, the mature personality realisable 
within each individual so that it might act in accordance with some universal moral 
norm” (Walker, 1993: x). However, we can see how these approaches have often failed 
very dramatically the strangers at the border, especially at critical times. Inequality of 
opportunity to reach the borders and make asylum claims,103 migrant acceptance 
decisions based on skewed evaluations of merit, dubious externalisations of borders,104 
and a global institutional structure that is not merely unjust, but which actively 
violates the negative rights of people at the borders,105 have severely undermined the 
scope and effectiveness of mainstream approaches. I believe that this should not be 
considered as an accidental failure but is inherent in the systems of these approaches, 
                                                        103	Failure	of	 the	 competent	authorities	 to	 register	asylum	applications	at	points	of	 entry	and	big	cities	of	countries	at	the	border	of	the	EU	has	been	officially	recognised	as	a	major	issue	for	over	10	years	(Greek	Council	for	Refugees,	2015).	
104 See	for	 instance	how	Salil	Shetty,	Amnesty	International’s	Secretary	General,	 finds	that	despite	being	 among	 the	 most	 important	 promoters	 of	 Human	 Rights,	 the	 EU,	 when	 put	 to	 the	 test	(following	the	recent	refugee	crisis),	 failed	in	every	meaningful	way.	 In	deviation	from	hospitality	and	human	rights	conventions,	 it	opted	 for	a	deal	with	Turkey	 to	manage	refugee	 flows	 that	was	proven	in	courts	to	be	both	“flawed	in	a	practical	sense”	and	“flawed	in	legal	terms”	(Lowe,	2016).	105	As	 Pogge	 suggests	 that	 it	 has	 done	 for	 the	 global	 poor	 (20002).	 I	 share	 Pogge’s	 belief	 even	 if	Risse	(2005),	among	others,	disagrees.		
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as Deleuze seems to suggest in the quote seen at the beginning of this chapter. Dillon 
seems to agree, at least as far as what he calls the complicity of the human rights’ 
framework is concerned:  
 
the discourse of universal human rights (as well as the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness) becomes complicit in this process through its 
insistence that “everyone has a right to a nationality” (UN 1961: Article 15). 
The corollary, of course, is that no one has a right not to have a nationality or 
not belong to a state. Only this form of political subjectivity is licensed, an 
insistence that poses particular difficulties to, for example, nomadic and 
indigenous peoples, and not only to such peoples in the lands that the West 
usually thinks of as strange (Dillon, 2013:91).  
 
At the ethical level, mainstream approaches to migration have similar problems in 
their treatment of precarious Otherness, since their ethical responses to these Others 
are often marginalised, as in the case of Joseph Carens’ recent book The Ethics of 
Immigration (2013), where the ethical is mainly limited to questions of citizenship, 
naturalisation and social membership, and is not extended to irregular migration or 
even Others on the move or in the process of being accepted into a society.106 Apart 
from being marginalised, ethical responses are also trivialised by the idea that 
“questions are ethical only if they are treated as answerable” (Franke, 2000: 326). We 
saw earlier in the chapter how Brown sees the question of ethics as fundamentally 
unanswerable even if the thinkers he often analyses disagree. I believe that this 
reflects a general move in normative IR, despite appearances to the contrary: the 
conventional stance that the calls on precarious Others cannot reasonably and by 
definition ever be addressed. As a result, the normative choice to focus on the state 
and the community instead of engaging with the outside of the cosmopolitan 
/particularistic binary or the stranger is presented as a one-way street and 
unavoidable. Normative IR, human rights approaches and ethics of migration obscure 
possibilities outside this “obvious” choice.  
                                                        
106 I	 wonder	 whether	 these	 concerns	 about	 conditions	 of	 citizenship,	 naturalisation,	 inclusion,	temporary	workers	and	social	membership	do	not	really	constitute	more	of	an	ethics	of	integration	than	ethics	of	immigration,	since,	for	inclusion	and	naturalisation	to	be	considered,	all	these	people	should	be	able	get	to	borders	safe	and	sound	first.			
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Carens’ recent book is again indicative here: while in an interview with the Washington 
Post in 2013 he calls out the conventional assumption that “most people think that 
states have the right to decide which people they do or do not want to let in, and what 
rules they expect immigrants to follow” (Matthews, 2013), he admits that for most of 
the book, which was published in the same year, he did not  
 
challenge that assumption directly. Two-thirds of the book accepts that general 
assumption, which I call the conventional view, precisely because most people 
accept it, but I try to show that the conventional view is not quite as sweeping 
as people sometimes suggest (Carens in ibid). 
 
Carens further argues that he wants “to consider the possibility that deeply embedded 
and widely held views about immigration were morally problematic” (2013:299). His 
focus is on questions of principle, and he cautions that we also need to consider 
questions of priority and questions of political feasibility. The reason for this, to a 
certain extent at least, has to do with the need to reach an overlapping consensus 
(2013:330 n12), in the Rawlsian understanding, i.e., that political principles, which 
govern liberal democratic societies, can find justifications in many different moral 
views (Rawls, 2005). In the case of Carens, it relies upon an overlapping consensus 
among different political theorists and among ordinary people from different 
democratic societies about the moral appeals in the arguments.  
 
I find that here as in the majority of the approaches explored in 2.2 and 2.3, we have a 
kind of contradiction: if we do accept, as Carens does and as I think he is right to do, 
that “citizenship in Western democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal class 
privilege” (2013:289), in essence an illegitimate privilege, and that controls over 
immigration uphold this privilege and maintain this inequality, one needs to be vocal, 
and to distance oneself from the need for consensus. Privileging consensus based on 
an understanding of a deliberative democracy model or communicative ethics of the 
Habermasian and Rortian kind (Mouffe, 2003:9), represents, I think, a misconception 
both of the ethical nature of democracy and of our innate ethical responsibility 
towards the Other. At the end of 2.2.1 I addressed how the Rawlsian influence on the 
mainstream Anglo-Saxon IR constitutes part of the latter’s problematic relation with 
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and essential failure to address the needs of strangers. The Rawlsian penchant for 
consensus along with its influence on the mainstream approaches of 2.2. and 2.3 is a 
great case in point. Rawls suggests that only the achievement of an overlapping 
consensus justifies the legitimate exercise of coercive political power and by 
extension, the keeping of the stranger at the border, violently pushing her back, with 
her address falling on ethically deaf ears. Achieving such a consensus, for Rawls, 
provides citizens with “the deepest and most reasonable basis of social unity available 
to us as members of a modern democratic society” (Rawls, 2005:133–4). But what if 
overlapping consensus is not just harmful but even lethal, as in the case of people 
attempting to cross the Mediterranean? Isn’t there an ethical responsibility that 
transcends the need for consensus? I think that under this light, the idea that there is a 
need for an overlapping consensus in order for a decision to be made leads us not to 
ethics, justice or the creation of the moral community that Rawls is supposedly 
pursuing, but instead to a political unity, which is a different issue altogether. As 
Chantal Mouffe notes, “this is why an approach like deconstruction, which reveals the 
impossibility of establishing a consensus without exclusion, is of fundamental 
importance for grasping what it is at stake” (Mouffe, 2003:9), both in democratic 
politics but most importantly in ethics of immigration. So what is at stake?   
 
It is our relation to the liminal and precarious Other, which may shield her from 
exclusion, silencing and in the worst case death. A deconstructive approach to 
hospitality and to this relation with the Other enables us to address the problematics 
of identity, difference, voicelessness and precarity in Otherness and to be critically 
sceptical towards claims about secure identities and the authorisation necessary for 
the Other to exist (Campbell, 1998b:509). This enabling entails the creation of an 
ethical subjectivity radically different from the reasonable, autonomous one of 
normative IR of either a deontological universal moral code or of the consequentialist 
concern for the best possible outcome. The radical difference lies in the absolute need 
for a response towards the Other, “not by referring to some abstract and anonymous 
law, or judicial entity, but because of one’s fear for the Other” (Levinas quoted in 
Campbell, 1998a:174) as the self is essentially bound to her. It therefore also entails 
the acknowledgment that  
 
as humans in society, we are ethically located by definition, we are all Others 
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somewhere to someone, we are inherently bound to and never alienated from 
Otherness and we cannot be detached from Otherness. This significantly 
reframes the traditional notion of subjectivity and responsibility in that now 
the identity of the ethical subject is constituted, not via its autonomy and 
independence from Otherness, but in its obligation to and responsibility for 
Others. (George, 1995:210) 
 
This ethical subjectivity has been explained and elaborated upon by the 
poststructuralist IR approaches, poststructuralist ethics and by the specific work on 
hospitality I have discussed in section 2.4. There we saw how subjectivity is realised 
through our relation with the Other and motivated by the principle of affirming 
alterity, placing responsibility at the heart of relational ethics. We saw also how 
hospitality (in the contexts of discourse, war, intervention, foreign policy and 
migration) can become the embodiment of such ethics; how we can identify ethics as 
hospitality, as it were (I return to this in chapter five). The work on Levinas and the 
analysis of Derrida’s relevant work on this kind of subjectivity and hospitality have 
been very inspirational and crucial to making my project possible. I have found though 
two main drawbacks: firstly, Levinas’ conceptualisation of responsibility has been 
considered by poststructuralist IR scholars to be limited and to lead us to an ethico-
political dead-end when it comes to include the third107(e.g. Campbell, 1998a:176–81; 
Dauphinee, 2007:25–6), hence the need to supplement him with Derrida. Secondly, 
the insistence of the absolute need for a border in order for an ethics of hospitality to 
exist, with the implication that this ethics would always be truncated by the demands 
of conditionality (e.g. Baker, 2011a; Bulley, 2006; Vaughan-Williams, 2007a).  
 
In the first case, this distrust of how far Levinas can get us in our study of 
responsibility towards Others in the plural, seems to me to mirror the critiques aimed 
at Campbell, namely that either there are notions and foundations of universalism that 
Campbell himself has sought to criticise (Cochran, 1999:136–7) or, on a more 
sympathetic note, that his reliance on Levinas in order to problematise this exact 
notion of universalism may not be wise (George, 1995:211), or even overcorrects 
Levinas, making him more “Levinasian” than Levinas himself (Campbell, 1998a:181). I 
believe that even if elements of universalism exist in Levinas (as Jim George suggests, 
                                                        107	The	Other’s	other.	Explained	in	detail	in	section	3.4	
 144 
this may not be avoidable since Levinas is “haunted by the memory of the Holocaust, 
the basis of a global evil”, 1995:211), his is a universalism quite different than the one 
found in the rationalised universals of mainstream ethical philosophy. Furthermore, 
the concern for Otherness, difference and particularity inherent in his understanding 
of interhuman responsibility undermines issues of universalism, redefining 
subjectivity as “heteronomous responsibility in contrast to autonomous freedom” 
(Campbell, 1994:463); a responsibility coming before my freedom as a subject can still 
be valid when we enter the field of the third and politics. I suggest that this is possible 
through the concept of fraternity, which, despite its gendered characteristics, succeeds 
in bridging the gap of Other and third and addresses the worries of limitations in the 
Levinasian approach. In the second case, I find that this insistence on the border 
undermines Derridean hospitality in embedding it again in the binary of an 
inside/outside, despite professing to do the opposite. This insistence seems to me to 
inadvertently betray a disbelief in the idea that hospitality ethics might offer us the 
theoretical armoury to do to linger on the threshold of undecidability but also 
overcome it with a decision.  In chapter five I revisit the conceptualisation of 
autoimmunity to show that this insistence can be done away with, along with the 
barriers it creates for any attempt to take the decision about hospitality seriously, 
while in my last chapter I look at how the camps for strangers may be a place where 
this autoimmunitary hospitality is already put in practice. I start by addressing my first 
concern in the next chapter.  
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 LEVINAS: OTHERNESS AND FRATERNITY 3 /
 
 
Introduction 
The originality of Levinas’ work is often located by scholars in its ethical character, 
which is not to be misunderstood as an attempt to elaborate a treatise of moral 
philosophy. As Levinas himself notes in Entre Nous (1998), his ethics is not motivated 
by an urgent need to develop ab ovo an ethical code setting out the structure and rules 
governing the relations among nations, good public policy and private conduct. This is 
not because the ethical values defined in his work are less fundamental; to the 
contrary. Their lack of practical application does not subtract from Levinas’ main 
intent, which is to explore ethics “in relation to the rationality of the knowledge that is 
immanent in being and primordial in the philosophical tradition of the West, (…) 
beyond the forms and determinations of ontology” (1998:xi). This contrast with 
knowledge (and its intertwining with being) and ontology is a constant in Levinas’ 
work on ethics along with the following core ideas: the Other as the epicentre of ethics, 
the face as the “locus” of the ethical encounter and the infinite responsibility deriving 
therefrom and imposed on oneself.  
 
Apart from poststructuralism and poststructuralist ethics, Emmanuel Levinas’ 
contribution to ethical and political philosophy has rarely been considered at great 
length in IR scholarship. Not even the advent of Critical International Theory and 
poststructuralist approaches and their subsequent exposing of the issues of exclusion, 
difference and the historically contingent power structures accepted a priori in 
mainstream IR theory, as in the cases explored in the previous chapter, seem to have 
offered a fertile environment for the in-depth consideration of Levinas’ work in 
mainstream IR. It is true that Levinas is often mentioned in discussions of global or 
international ethics and international political theory (Hutchings, 1999; 2010; Bell, 
2010), 108  but his presence usually serves mainly as a reference point for 
poststructuralist and/or postmodernist thinkers. His work appears to be more 
prominent in some discussions of poststructuralism per se (Edkins and Vaughan-
                                                        108	It	is	interesting	to	note,	however,	that	Shapcott	makes	no	reference	whatsoever	to	Levinas	in	his	chapter	on	hospitality	in	his	International	Ethics	(2010).	Derrida	is	barely	mentioned	either.		
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Williams, 1999; Zehfuss, 2009), where discussions of Otherness indebted to him are 
emphasised in poststructuralism’s examination of questions of subjectivity and 
identity (see discussion in 2.4). While he features as one of the important critical 
theorists in Edkins and Vaughan-Williams’ volume on Critical Theorists and 
International Relations (2009), his work has rarely been engaged in debates outside 
poststructuralism in earnest. One exception to this is perhaps Iver Neumann’s work on 
the Uses of the Other (1999), which uses mainly the Self/Other relation to address the 
exclusion of the “East” in European identity formation.  
 
Within poststructuralism in IR, the first engagement with Levinas happens in the 
1990s and in the context of the wars in the Balkans. As we saw earlier, David 
Campbell’s work of the period on the de-territorialisation of responsibility features 
prominently and is a good example of the general poststructuralist stance on Levinas, 
despite the critiques from within.109 There Campbell focuses on Levinas’ account of 
responsibility only to supplement it with the Derridean understanding of it and his 
criticisms. Here we find a very common – and problematic – characteristic of IR 
theory’s relation with Levinas, if one can speak of a proper relation. This is the 
Derridean lens, or the “Derrideanized reading” (Hutchings, 1999:80) under which 
Levinas’ work is seen, a small lens, which often gives a distorted picture. The 
encounters of International Relations with the Derridean concept of hospitality is a 
good case in point: as seen in the second chapter, these encounters either make a brief 
reference to Levinas’ essential influence on it (e.g. Baker, 2011a) or choose to ignore it 
altogether (Baker, 2013). In the former instance, the reference is made solely through 
the Derridean lens: Derrida’s objections and critiques are incorporated in the 
presentation of Levinas’ contribution or not highlighted sufficiently.  
 
If the IR ethical “turn” is to be defined by the ethical reconceptualisation of 
responsibility and subjectivity, then the absence of engagement with the Levinasian 
oeuvre seems odd, especially when considering Levinas’ focus on defining the ethical 
subject, the ethical moment and the contours of ethical relation as the edifying 
discourse of a primary philosophy.110 If individual and institutional responsibility and 
                                                        109	See	for	instance	Edkins	(2005),	Franke	(2000)	and	Fagan	(2013).		110	Ethics	as	first	philosophy:	this	oft-quoted	phrase	appears	in	Totality	and	Infinity	(1969:304)	and	much	later	in	Levinas’	interview	with	Philippe	Nemo	(1985:75).	It	has	been	used	as	the	title	of	two	collections	 of	 essays	 about	 Levinas’	work	 by	 other	 scholars	 and	 a	 late	 essay	 by	 Levinas	 himself.	
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their ethics acquire more ground, as they have been doing in recent decades in IR 
theory, and given that the issues of identity, alterity and exclusion have become 
increasingly prominent, how can Levinas remain unexplored, especially in ethics of 
migration? The answer may lie in the fact that Levinasian writings are often seen as 
(and are) overtly obscure and complicated. In addition, the accusation often levelled 
against him, that his work is in essence underlain by religiosity and theological 
concerns, seems to play a great role in putting researchers off. Finally, the figure of the 
third, seen broadly as “a complication of the line between the ethical and the political” 
(Fagan, 2013:12), constitutes a stumbling block even for the scholarship that does 
engage with Levinas. Perhaps the lack of in-depth engagement with his work or the 
abandonment at the nodal point of the third are indeed signs of his work not being at 
all useful to the ethical considerations of IR.  
 
This chapter argues against this view of Levinas’ work. Its contention is that Levinas’ 
intellectual project does constitute an ethics, which is convincingly based on the face-
to-face relationship and the importance of alterity. Calling this relationship 
“metaphysical”, Levinas does not assign to it theological connotations, nor does he see 
it in terms of a highest being or cause (1974:84). On the contrary, he situates his ethics 
within intersubjectivity and the lived immediacy of everyday life (Levinas, 1981:74), 
with the face-to-face relationship at their core. As already seen in chapter two, 
traditional IR approaches and ethics of migration literature either implicitly or also 
often explicitly base themselves on an exclusionary, power-contingent understanding 
of the Other and an Us versus Them ordering of society, based on the primacy of the 
autonomous liberal subject, even when they purport to contradict it. As the present 
chapter goes on to argue, Levinas differs in this, and this is his greatest contribution to 
the ethical debate. The fact that the other person addresses me, calls on me and 
presents me with a demand to respond, constitutes a multilayered affective event of 
everyday life that cannot be sufficiently explained through a lordship/bondage view of 
the relation with the Other or through other understandings that lack any 
consideration for the Other’s subjectivity. It is this chapter’s contention that Hegelian, 
                                                                                                                                                                  Diane	Perpich	notes	that	Jacques	Rolland,	in	his	2000	book	Parcours	de	l’Autrement,	points	out	that	this	 identifying	 of	 ethics	 with	 first	 philosophy	 gradually	 disappears	 in	 Levinas’	 works	 between	1961	and	1974.	However,	 given	 that	Levinas	does	not	 explicitly	 renounce	 such	understanding	of	ethics,	I	do	not	consider	this	gradual	disappearance	as	indicative	of	a	change	of	heart	or	deviation	in	his	intellectual	project.		
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Kojèvian, existentialist and liberal accounts of the relation with the Other cannot 
provide us with anything more than descriptive readings of the Other (she being a 
refugee or an undocumented migrant) and of hospitality’s issues. The same goes for 
the Buberian egalitarian view of the Other, which elides difference, and for the 
exclusionary framework of Agamben’s homo sacer, and other biopolitical approaches.  
 
Levinas offers as an alternative the face-to-face encounter with the Other, arguing 
that the latter’s demand on me constitutes a precognitive 111  experience, which 
commands the use of my sentience and emotion. The encounter does not necessarily 
need to be conflictual, nor does the presence of the Other limit me; it invests me, 
“promotes my freedom, by arousing my goodness” (1974:200). This does not mean 
that the possibility of conflict is banished; rather, a dialogue is initiated, which acts as 
a proof that the normative demands of the Other on me are truly recognised and 
welcomed. In addition, this intersubjective experience allows me to discover my own 
particularity beyond held beliefs and knowledge. The Other is no longer a number to 
be managed, an individual to be kept outside or at the border, but a subject to whom I 
bear an infinite responsibility to respond.  
 
Thus, ethics becomes a primary philosophy, which does not start with Logos or God but 
with the human encounter and communication, an optics through which all other 
philosophical issues may be viewed. While the infinite responsibility imposed on one 
by the face of the Other (to be explained below) cannot lead to moral prescriptions on 
how one should act or live their life (something Levinas never purported to do), it still 
defines the ethical moment and can lead to fertile ethical questioning. The 
impossibility presented to us by an infinite ethical demand, I argue, constitutes the 
essence of ethics, i.e., the failure by definition of ethical certainties and decisions 
when living life in common with other people. It is this tension brought about by the 
uncertainty and the infinitude of responsibility that leads us to question, reconsider, 
fight against and embrace our ethical position in the world that is constitutive first of 
                                                        111	I	interpret	precognitive	here	and	in	the	rest	of	the	chapter	as	that	stage	of	the	encounter	where	the	human	sensibility	is	created	within	a	continuum	of	sensibility	and	affectivity	as	an	opposition	to	the	 sense	 of	 moral	 obligation	 of	 the	 Kantian	 kind,	 where	 the	 sense	 of	 being	 is	 based	 on	 the	rationality	 of	 the	 Self.	 The	 reason	 for	 referring	 to	 the	 precognitive	 is	 because	 “in	 every	representation	 of	 the	 [O]ther	 as	 an	 object	 of	 thought,	 the	 invocation	 of	 the	 [O]ther	 in	 the	 very	discourse	 that	 thematises	 [her]	 means	 that	 something	 (or,	 more	 exactly,	 someone)	 escapes	inclusion	within	the	thematisation”	(Perpich,	2008:75).	
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ethical life and then of justice. Albeit obscure and at times leading to theoretical 
impasses, Levinas’ ethical vision is a useful compass and should be used as such. 
 
His ethical vision is unhindered by the advent of the third, contrary to the scepticism 
of poststructuralist scholarship. While the third does indeed call into question the 
ethical encounter between Self and Other, this does not necessarily mean – as I argue 
later in the chapter – that this leads to a divided loyalty of the Self or her being 
overburdened with extra responsibilities (Perpich, 2008:58). Levinas’ earlier concept of 
fraternity is crucial to avoiding this. I use it in order to show how, against said 
scepticism, the advent of Others in the plural may strengthen the original ethical 
relationship, irrespective of whether it moves it from the face-to-face precognitive 
relation to a field of justice (Simmons, 1999) or not (Bernasconi, 1999). The advent of 
the third person enhances the Self’s responsibility in an anarchical way, creating a 
never-ending oscillation between ethics and politics (Simmons, 1999:83) that the 
concept of fraternity helps us address. Given that Levinas’ rarely addresses the concept 
of hospitality by name,112 his understanding of fraternity is what comes nearer to it. 
  
These are thus the main four axes along which my chapter is organised. I start by 
looking at the relationship between Self and Other, inquiring into how the 
lordship/bondsman dialectic still informs philosophical approaches to Otherness. I 
then turn to Levinas’ work proper: I explore his account of the human relation, the 
ethics of responsibility deriving from the face-to-face encounter, to finish with a 
discussion of fraternity as a way to address the commonly considered problem of the 
third and to look at the ethics of responsibility in society. As Atterton and Calarco 
argue in their recent volume on Levinas113 – and with this I am in full agreement – the 
                                                        112	The	common	confusion	that	he	does	relates	with	Derrida’s	calling	Totality	and	Infinity	a	treatise	in	hospitality	(Derrida,	1999a:21).	
113 In	 the edited	 volume	 Radicalizing	 Levinas	 (2010),	 Peter	 Atterton	 and	 Matthew	 Calarco	 are	arguing	in	favour	of	a	re-evaluation	and	reappropriation	of	Levinas’	work.	They	consider	that	there	have	 been	 two	 waves	 of	 Levinasian	 scholarship:	 the	 first	 one,	 located	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s,	focused	mainly	 on	 commentary	 and	 the	 exposition	 of	 the	 Levinasian	 oeuvre.	Mostly	 inspired	 by	
Totality	and	Infinity	and	catching	“many	philosophers	trained	in	the	traditional	ethics	of	Kant	and	Mill	 unawares”	 (2010:x),	 this	 wave	 undertook	 to	 explain	 the	 central	 concepts	 and	 themes	 of	Levinas’	philosophy,	phenomenology,	ethics,	criticisms	of	Heidegger	and	other	issues.	Derrida	was	an	 exception	 to	 this	 rule,	 attempting	 from	 early	 on	 (1964)	 to	 engage	 critically	with	Totality	and	
Infinity	and	other	individual	articles	by	Levinas,	putting	him	in	this	way	on	the	map,	so	to	speak,	of	poststructuralist	 scholarship.	To	a	great	extent,	 this	 is	what	 triggered	 the	second	wave:	Derrida’s	
Violence	and	Metaphysics	created	an	interest	around	Levinas	that	translated	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	into	 what	 Atterton	 and	 Calarco	 call	 “an	 intense	 bout	 of	 navel	 gazing”	 or,	 better	 yet,	 an	 inward	
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time has come for an “explicit attempt to situate and explore Levinas’ work within the 
context of the most pressing socio-political issues of our time” (2010:x), a task 
characterised for them by a special urgency, given the rampant current conflicts and a 
shaken “confidence in the authority of the face”. While I do not consider that we now 
live in a world that is more conflict-ridden than before, nor that there has ever been a 
confidence in or for that matter any authority of the face to speak of, I believe that 
they are right to suggest that there is a growing number of attempts to engage with 
current issues on the basis of a Levinasian theoretical approach, despite the difficulties 
the latter presents us with. Butler’s use of the Levinasian ethical encounter to 
approach war violence and the case of the Israeli–Palestine conflict more concretely is 
a good case in point, along with the consideration of Levinasian responsibility in her 
search for a new ethical practice that entails critical autonomy while being grounded 
in a differentiated sense of the human subject (2006; 2005; 2009; 2012). By extension, 
the use made by relational ethics of Levinas is another example: following on Butler, 
relational ethics draws on Levinas in order to think about and promote efforts to link 
with Otherness “across fractures of hurt, oppression and suffering” and “to challenge 
patterns of exclusion and dehumanisation in zones of intense political conflict” 
(Frosch, 2011:225). Similarly, there are other attempts in the same context to engage 
with contemporary theoretical and political issues: to deal with world hunger 
(Bernasconi, 2010), with the challenges posed by environmentalism and animal ethics 
(Perpich, 2008; Llewelyn, 2010; Calarco, 2010), and to address and redefine the 
problematic relationship between postcolonialist, gender and identity scholarship 
with Levinasian work, due to the latter’s patriarchal, andro- and Eurocentric elements 
(Eaglestone, 2010; Perpich, 2008, among others). I believe a similar reconsideration of 
Levinas’ thought should happen within IR in order to address the Other at the border. 
The following is partly an attempt to this effect.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  exploration	 of	 Levinas’	 writings,	 focusing	 on	Otherwise	 than	Being	 and	 an	 attempt	 to	 situate	 his	oeuvre	 in	 the	 confines	 of	 poststructuralism	 and	 read	 it	 along	 deconstructionist	 lines.	While	 this	engendered	a	series	of	fertile	inquiries,	many	of	which	were	used	in	this	chapter,	as	I	argue	in	the	introduction,	hospitality	 is	 a	 good	 case	 in	point	of	 this	 second	wave	 scholarship,	 being	a	 concept	mainly	 theorised	and	evaluated	 through	a	 specifically	Derridean	 lens.	Now	a	 third	wave	 is	 in	 the	rising	 in	 the	 social	 sciences,	 situating	 Levinas’	 work	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 discussions	 on	environmentalism,	animal	ethics,	technology,	cybernetics,	etc.,	with	varying	degrees	of	success.				
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3.1 Self and Other 
As we have seen so far, questions of Otherness and responsibility have plagued 
political and ethical thought in their attempts to identify the optimal relationality 
with the stranger or liminal Other, her position and her treatment. I have already 
argued that philosophical conceptualisations of our relation with the Other are 
constituted by issues of hierarchy and power, which are often taken for granted for the 
simple reason that these conceptualisations have stood the test of time and logic. 
More concretely, I would like to argue in this section that it is Hegelian and Kojèvian 
understandings which inform and underlie the greatest part of the theoretical work on 
the relationship between Self and Other. In referring to it the term “master-slave 
dialectic” is often used, taken from a well-known part of Hegel’s The Phenomenology of 
Spirit (Die Phänomenologie des Geistes) (1807; English trans. 1979), entitled 
“Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage”, the 
first of two subsections in the “Self-Consciousness” chapter.  The master and slave 
binary is often seen as a mistranslation of the German terms Herrschaft und 
Knechtschaft, actually meaning lordship and bondage. This part explains how Self and 
Other are constructed as self-conscious beings through being recognised as such by 
each other.  
 
Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; (…) [Self-
consciousness] becomes one with itself again through the cancelling of its 
otherness; (…) Consciousness finds that it immediately is and is not another 
consciousness, (…), and has self-existence only in the self-existence of the 
other. Each is the mediating term to the other, through which each mediates 
and unites itself with itself; and each is to itself and to the other an immediate 
self-existing reality, which, at the same time, exists thus for itself only through 
this mediation. (…) They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one 
another. (Hegel, 1979:106) 
 
According to Hegel, self- and mutual recognition is essential to human awareness and 
interaction, which in turn form fundamental parts of the Self’s consciousness. Self-
knowledge cannot be achieved through solitary introspection; rather the Self can only 
see itself when what it sees is another’s self-consciousness. Following recognition, the 
Other as a distinct presence is experienced as an obstacle by the Self, since individual 
 152 
consciousness cannot be free and independent anymore. Given that the Other cannot 
be suspended, i.e., killed, because this would nullify the possibility of any recognition, 
there must be some kind of compromise through reconciliation. Therefore the 
previous objective, individual ‘I’ is joined by the determination of another individual 
self-consciousness: as a result, there is the union and the creation of a “universal self-
consciousness”, i.e., one consciousness is universalised through the other. The 
lordship/bondage relationship is at the root of this universal self-conscious creative 
process: each thinks the Other through the terms of the Self, consequently the one 
reflects the Other like a mirror, but also reflects the Other reflecting herself; the only 
way for this to be overcome is through a struggle for domination and submission, with 
the aim and result of “supersed[ing] the [O}therness of itself” (Hegel, 1979:180).  
 
“It becomes clear that any reflexive relation that self-consciousness seeks to have is 
itself only possible through an intentional relation to an Other” (Butler, 1987:50). The 
life and death struggle with the Other appears also to be crucial. Only through this 
struggle is autonomy eventually developed and attained, since merely living is not 
enough to discover oneself. One has to struggle and risk their life if they are to be 
recognised as more than a person: as an independent self-consciousness (Hegel, 
1979:187). The struggle is eternal since even by acquiring lordship status such 
recognition is impossible: the slave or bondsman is not in a position (as an equal) to 
offer it. Annihilating the Other is not an option either, given that being in life is what 
keeps this struggle going. The subjugation of the Other by the Self is, in a nutshell, 
what keeps things in balance. Each side knows that they need the Other to survive and 
so they cooperate by sustaining their roles.  
 
The lordship/bondsman dialectic, with its emphasis on recognition and survival, still 
informs in one way or another most of the current discussions around subjectivity and 
relationality. To a great extent this is related to the introduction and propagation of 
Hegel’s thought in France by Alexandre Kojève, whose seminar on The Phenomenology 
of Spirit at the Parisian École Pratique des Hautes Études in the 1930s, attended by 
Lacan, Merleau-Ponty, Bataille, Breton and Sartre among others, had been greatly 
influential in creating what is called the French moment in philosophy114 and in 
                                                        114	See	 footnote	 68,	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 French	 philosophers	 of	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 20th	century	who	influence	in	their	way	the	discussions	about	Otherness	and	hospitality.		
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defining continental radical thought. Despite and beyond its continental impact, 
though, this hierarchical understanding of Otherness is also crucial for analytical and 
Anglo-Saxon philosophy as explored in chapter two.  
 
Kojève’s approach was not one of mere elucidation and propagation by teaching. 
Rather he used Marx’s materialism and Heidegger’s ontology of being as prisms 
through which Hegel might be interpreted; and this led to a fundamentally original 
recasting of Hegel’s thought. One of the main themes promoted by Kojève is a 
teleological idea that the end of time will be reached when the lordship/bondsman 
dialectic is overcome. This dialectic is presented by Kojève as key to Hegel’s thinking 
and the understanding of the processes of historical progression. Emphasis is given to 
the desire of recognition as a moving force towards a Heideggerian understanding of 
“self-becoming” and a Marxist reading of the master/slave dialectic, with the need for 
mutual recognition now acquiring class traits and becoming a paradigm of all forms of 
social conflict and emancipatory process. A constant struggle between Self and Other 
is therefore seen as something natural, part and parcel of the nature of things and of a 
constant progress forward. In this respect, the excessive, violent and “totalitarian” 
aspects of the master/slave dialectic are also accentuated. 
 
This understanding has been very influential: from Sartre’s understanding of self-
awareness established through the gaze of the Other (Sartre, 1957) to 
postcolonialism’s emphasis on recognition and resistance (Ashcroft et al., 1995), a 
conflictual understanding of Otherness inspired by a master/slave dialectic is 
omnipresent. As mentioned in the introduction, my decision to focus on Sartre and 
postcolonialism derives from their relevance to the discussions of subjectivity and 
dualism explored in what follows, the biopolitical understandings of hospitality and 
their contrast with Levinas’ conceptualisation of Otherness. In the case of Sartre, the 
argument is that self-awareness comes when the Self is confronted with the gaze of 
the Other, which has an absolute objectifying value. As such, it is only then that the 
existential subject becomes aware of her own presence, but at the same time the 
objectifying gaze robs the Self of her inherent freedom. Postcolonialism’s relationship 
with the Hegelian and Kojèvian legacy, on the other hand, is much more problematic 
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and vexed. 115  Nonetheless, the master/slave dialectic has still been essential in 
postcolonialism’s critique of imperial domination, the relation between colonisers and 
the colonised, the importance of the recognition of the colonised Other, etc. In both 
cases, as in the scholarship inspired by these two main approaches, not only is there 
not a tendency to avoid violence, but violent structures and struggles seem to be 
prescribed. Additionally, what is more interesting is that despite the promise of self-
becoming, this continuous struggle is not characterised by success, but instead by 
recurring failure. As Žižek observes referring to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
 
does [it] not tell us again and again the same story of the repeated failure of the 
subject’s endeavour to realise his project in social substance, to impose his 
vision on the social universe—the story of how the big Other, the social 
substance, again and again thwarts his project and turns it upside-down? 
(Žižek, 1999:76)  
 
Therefore, engendering violence and a very strictly defined hierarchy, the master/slave 
dialectic does not seem to either empower self-becoming or even essentially challenge 
established categories. However, the problem identified in this thesis lies with the 
hidden egocentric monism of this approach, which seems to be arguing that “all truths 
and values can ultimately be reduced to the transcendental activity of an autonomous 
subject” (Peperzak, 1993:19) beyond relationality and Otherness. Such an approach 
focuses on all experiences deriving from “the Same”, “which realises itself by 
appropriating them” (ibid.). The Otherness of the Other cannot reveal itself beyond 
the Self’s dominating consciousness and hence, responsibility for the Other, empathy, 
care and hospitality seem to be accorded limited if any space. 
 
Unfortunately, a similar movement happens in the biopolitical approaches to the 
Other, despite their general usefulness when it comes to considering hospitality 
practices and bordercrossing in the study of hospitality ethics. Here again, the 
preoccupation of scholarship with Hegel’s master/slave dialectic encapsulates a 
preeminent concern with agency, often seen as essential to survival. The agency of the 
                                                        115	See	 for	 instance,	Edward	Said’s	 (1993)	 critique	of	 the	dialectical	 categories	 and	philosophy	of	history,	 Homi	 Bhabha’s	 “ambivalence”	 towards	 it	 (2011)	 and	 the	 vast	 debate	 around	 Hegel’s	relationship	with	the	Haitian	revolution	(for	instance,	Buck-Morss,	2009).		
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excluded, persecuted, banned Other, i.e., a figure who by definition is found in a 
position of bondage, is further emphasised because of the way it is used to negotiate, 
organise, resist or challenge the binary relationship with its opposite, lordship. Within 
biopolitical scholarship Agamben has been often criticised for devaluing such 
agency116 while other approaches like autonomy of migration emphasise the possibility 
for the stranger Other to exercise her agency under the auspices of alternative nexuses 
for the deployment of power, supporting networks, solidarity links, etc., in order to 
create the appropriate circumstances for her survival. A fundamental challenge – one 
that goes so far as changing the framework under which the Other occupies the place 
of the “slave” – is not usually the envisaged result that agency under the master/slave 
dialectic reaches; the focus instead is on resistance and a sense of belonging. Looking 
at the autonomy of migration, this is especially the case: “acts of refusal” and 
subversion of migrants (Papadopoulos et al., 2008), setting up of networks, escapes 
and unexpected insurgencies, etc., are proofs of agency that may target state 
institutions, sovereignty and the overall framework that binds them down; however, 
they mostly aim at creating relationships among “slaves” themselves. While this may 
be – and many times is – empowering and enables strangers, migrants and Others to 
take some control over their destiny, it still ties them down in a Self/Other-as-object 
binary and in a constant struggle, in which the subjects may change their positions 
within the structure, but will never undo the binary structure itself and the 
appropriation of the Other by the respective master.  
 
The same happens with Agamben’s biopolitical reading of the Other. First, I should 
note that I disagree that his conception of bare life is devoid of subjectivity; in his 
Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (1999),117 Agamben does outline a 
certain account of subjectivity when, opposite the Muselmann, he positions the 
witness, the one that bears testimony to the reduction of life to naked life that takes 
place in the concentration camp. With the living corpse of the Muselmann on the one 
side and the ones who survived and lived to speak about it on the other, Agamben 
defines subjectivity as the “production of consciousness in the event of discourse” 
(Agamben, 1999:123). Subjectivity spans these two sides and is born of the relation 
                                                        116	See	fn	61.	117	The	third	instalment	of	the	Homo	Sacer	Series,	Remnants	of	Auschwitz	constitutes	an	account	of	an	ethics	of	testimony,	which	is	founded	in	bearing	witness	to	the	thing	one	cannot	bear	witness	to:	the	monstrosity	of	the	extermination	camp.	The	Muselmann	is	the	central	figure	in	this	ethics.		
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between the two: bare life and testimony, with the latter constituting the space where 
resistance to sovereignty can be articulated; speech as the first political aspect of life: 
“the human being exists in the fracture between the living being and the speaking 
being, the inhuman and the human” (Agamben, 1999:135). Similarly, the shame felt by 
the survivor, as Primo Levi describes it in the third chapter of The Drowned and the 
Saved (1989), “is the constitutive affective tonality of subjectivity”, Agamben argues 
(Mills, 2003). Disassociating it from the notions of guilt and innocence, he finds shame 
to derive from the ontological situation of being consigned to something that one 
cannot assume (Agamben, 1999:105, cited in Mills, op.cit).  
 
Having completed this detour, I would like to return to the dualism I find inherent 
both in Agamben’s and other biopolitical work engaging with Otherness. Be it the 
itinerary between the blurred distinction of man and citizen, the conceptual pair of zoe 
and bios or the binary of the Muselmann versus the witnessing human, I contend that 
Agamben’s work is imbued with a dichotomy and an Us versus Them understanding of 
the Other. This binary is again one of clear hierarchy, since the Muselmann and the 
speaking witness, man and citizen, are on the same side (that of the Other) and 
incapable of undoing the bipolar structure they are tied into. Even if witnessing allows 
for an empowering potentiality of activity and resistance, where bare life re-
appropriates and reclaims its life from the sovereign power, with its ability first to 
recognise and testify to its own nakedness and then regain the power to die, survive or 
act on its own body,118 this empowered subjectivity seems to me to be problematic: in 
the case of Agamben and the case of witnessing, it is defined in narrowly political 
terms, strictly and exclusively linked with the power of Logos, the Aristotelian 
condition of the political par excellence. In the scholarship inspired by his work, the 
empowerment problem is conceived in narrow terms: through resistance, flight and 
self-harm that leaves the Self/Object binary unscathed.  
 
Contrary to this oppositional understanding of relationality and closer to the ethical 
encounter advocated in this thesis, is the relationship with the Other as seen by Martin 
Buber (1923/2000). Buber maintains that subjects can enter into symmetrical and non-
oppositional relationships and form true partnerships. Oppositional relationships, he 
                                                        118	We	should	consider	here	the	sowing-lips	protest	of	Abbas	Amini	(Edkins	and	Pin-Fat,	2005)	or	other	self-harm	and	self-immolations	undertaken	as	acts	of	resistance.	
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argues, with their treatment of Others as objects, are essentially unethical. He instead 
sees two ways with which the Subject can engage with the world. The first, experience, 
is very common to everyone, as it involves the experience the subject has with objects, 
the “I-It” relationship as he calls it. This relationship is defined by a certain distance 
and lack of engagement while it simultaneously defines the world more or less as we 
know it, through its predominance in economics, politics, but also personal and family 
life. The preponderance of the “I-It” relationship in modern life, Buber argues, has 
resulted in alienation, angst and meaninglessness (2000:70–1).  
 
The second is more intricate as it involves a genuine encounter with the Other, where 
the Other comes to symbolise an entire universe of meaning: this is the “I-Thou” 
mode of engaging with the world, through which both the I and the Thou are modified 
in their essence. The “I-Thou” constitutes a dialogical relation contrary to the 
monological of “I-It” according to Buber (1947/2002:1–21): Self and Other relate to 
each other with their “whole being” in an authentic meeting with the one another. 
Such relation is direct. No system of ideas, no foreknowledge, and no fancy intervene 
between I and Thou” (Buber, 2000:26). “Experiencing the other side” leads to 
inclusion, and that is “what makes it possible to meet and know the other in his 
concrete uniqueness and not just a content of one’s experience” (1947/2002: xiii). Not 
to be confused with only the use of language, Buber argues that dialogue can take 
place even in a moment of silence, where Self and Other are just fully present to each 
other (Gordon, 2001:51).119 While not disputing that each Self is  
 
born an individual, Buber draws on the Aristotelian notion of entelechy, or 
innate self-realisation, to argue that the development of this individuality, or 
sheer difference, into a whole personality, or fulfilled difference, is an ongoing 
achievement that must be constantly maintained. In I and Thou, Buber explains 
that the self becomes either more fragmentary or more unified through its 
relationships to others (Scott, 2010).  
 
The emphasis is therefore on the in between of the relationship (Zwischen) 
                                                        
119 “In	 the	 deadly	 crush	 of	 an	 air-raid	 shelter	 the	 glances	 of	 two	 strangers	 suddenly	 meet	 for	 a	second	in	astonishing	and	unrelated	mutuality;	when	the	All	Clear	sounds	it	is	forgotten;	and	yet	it	did	happen,	in	a	realm	which	existed	only	for	that	moment”	–	this	is	one	of	the	multiple	examples	Buber	gives.	This	is	to	be	found	in	his	essay	“What	is	Man”	(1947/2002:242). 
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contradicting both Heideggerian and existentialist accounts of becoming and relating. 
A societal, public and personal life built upon such a relation of openness and 
acceptance is the solution to the woes of modern life seen just above. Love and 
responsibility towards the Other eschew meaninglessness and alienation while setting 
strong foundations for an ideal society (Buber, 2000:73–126).120  
 
One can easily see why Buber’s reflection on the human meeting with God in the third 
part of this seminal book121 and his Talmudic references, along with his openness 
towards a fundamentally ethical encounter with the Other, would position him as an 
intellectual figure standing near Levinas. However, such parallels would obscure 
essential differences between the two. Buber speaks of a symmetrical, voluntarily 
agreed coexistence. Inspired by God and by an idea of a common good, the I-Thou 
“partnership” embarks on the building of a better community on the basis of 
reciprocity. Levinas in his long engagement with Buber’s work122 raises questions 
against this reciprocity and mutuality and attempts to distance his own account of the 
intersubjective from Buber’s. For Levinas,  
 
it is questionable whether the relation with the otherness of the Other which 
appears as a dialogue of question and answer can be described without 
emphasising paradoxically a difference of level between the I and the Thou 
(Levinas, 1989:72).  
Therefore, it is the asymmetry that defines the relation of Self and Other and not 
symmetry. If one is to insist on symmetry and reciprocity, that would mean excluding 
the possibility of the Other coming to us not with an address of equals but instead with 
an appeal. In the case of the ethical relation, Levinas argues, the Other may be poorer 
but at the same time she stands higher than I because of this exact poverty, nakedness, 
need (ibid.). The distinction between Self and Other is realised not because of the 
difference of specific personal attributes but due to the difference in primacy: the 
Other comes first because of her nakedness and need, of her appeal to the Self’s 
                                                        120	In	a	separate	third	step,	Buber	escalates	this	encounter	with	the	even	more	fulfilling	encounter	with	God,	which	I	will	not	be	addressing	here.		121	Written	 in	 1923,	 the	 I-Thou	 [Ich-Du]	 is	 Buber’s	most	 influential	 philosophic	work	 influencing	Judaic	and	Protestant	thinking	alike.		122	References	to	Buber	can	be	found	in	various	Levinas’	works	(for	instance	in	Totality	and	Infinity	and	Time	 and	 the	Other)	 before	 his	 1982	 final	 essay	 on	 Buber	 “Apropos	 of	 Buber:	 Some	 Notes”	(Levinas,	1994:40–48)	
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responsibility in front of this need. Hence, the lack of symmetry and the difference of 
height in the relationship between Self and Other: this is in essence a break with what 
Levinas considers “Buber’s formalism” (ibid.).  
 
Similary, Buber’s “I-Thou” relation seems to Levinas to be missing the element of 
time, consisting instead of meetings, “which are, for Buber, dazzling instants without 
continuity and content” (Levinas, 1994:12). The lack both of this time perspective and 
of the possibility of asymmetrical Self/Other encounters render Buber’s description of 
the “I-Thou” relation problematic for Levinas, a kind of “rarefied ether of spiritual 
friendship” (1989:73) and of an idealised human encounter (Mumford, 2013:49). Such 
idealisation leaves no space to consider the relation with the Other who does not 
appear as an equal or as a member of a specific protected community, something that 
the Stranger or the undocumented migrant, of the type considered in this thesis, rarely 
is. Buber’s divine providence and the duty to a specific community are essential parts, 
I think, in his kind of relationality. Self-determination or even determination as 
responsibility and response to the call of the Other are not at play, the symmetry of 
the two agents rules all. To the contrary, relationality as understood in the ethics of 
hospitality I am proposing, reflecting in essence relationality in modern life, is by 
definition asymmetrical, and for this, Levinas’ approach is of paramount importance. 
Common good may not be attained, nor violence avoided through this asymmetrical 
ethical encounter. However, room can still be found for the given hierarchy to be 
challenged by basing it on the “difference of height” mentioned above: the 
unconditional, inescapable responsibility towards the Other and a subjectivity defined 
by it. I focus on these Levinasian elements in the rest of this chapter.  
 
  
3.2 Human relation 
“In the beginning was the human relation” 
E. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity  
 
Contrary to the usual philosophical importance given to a human’s ontological 
relation to herself or to the totality of things called the world (relations Levinas refers 
to as egology and cosmology, respectively), Levinas claims that man’s ethical relation to 
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the Other123 is ultimately prior to any other relation (1986:21) and that it is because of 
this primacy of the interhuman relation that human beings are interested in questions 
of ethics at all. This relation, the encounter with the Other, which has a central role in 
Levinas’ major mature works,124 has a particular nature: the Other sways me with an 
unworldly force and in an unparalleled disruptive way for my consciousness. Her 
presence presents me with a command, from which I cannot escape. The demands 
made on the I by the presence of another human being is not something new for 
philosophy: for example, among others, traditional phenomenologists, such as Levinas 
was early in his career,125 notice how one can see that the Other is like me, acts like 
me, appears to be master of herself as I am, and that we together share a social 
universe. However, Levinas remains dissatisfied with how the phenomenon of the 
Other is considered, for instance in Sartre (Levinas, 1986:17) or in Western ontology in 
general. What these understandings lack, according to him, is the command made by 
the Other mentioned above: the Other addresses me, calls on me. The command does 
not have to be real or even to be uttered in order for me to feel the summons implicit in 
the Other’s presence. The summons is binding. In this encounter (even if it later 
becomes competitive or violent), the I first experiences itself by the fact that it is 
called and liable to account for itself. It responds as called by duty. This duty to 
respond to the Other “suspends my natural right to self-survival, le droit vital”. The 
ethical relation to the Other stems “from the fact that the self cannot survive by itself 
alone, cannot find meaning within its own being-in-the-world, within the ontology of 
sameness” (1986:24). This is the core of the intersubjective life for which Levinas 
argues and which constitutes the central locus for his ethics and of most of his work.  
 
The disagreement Levinas has with these understandings and “Western ontology” in 
                                                        123	In	this	thesis	so	far,	Other	with	capital	“O”	has	been	used	in	order	to	render	both	the	Levinasian	“autre”	and	“autrui”.	About	the	problems	of	translating	these	two	terms	and	Levinas’	unsystematic	capitalizing	 and	other	 relative	matters,	 there	 is	 a	detailed	discussion	by	Adriaan	Peperzak	 in	 the	introduction	of	Emmanuel	Levinas:	Basic	Philosophical	Writings	 (1996:xiv–xv).	However,	 I	 believe	that	 for	 the	 needs	 of	 this	 thesis,	 the	 choice	 to	 use	 ”Other”	 interchangeably	 does	 not	 create	 any	misunderstandings.	Wherever	there	is	such	a	danger,	the	“human	Other”	will	be	used	to	translate	“autrui’.		124	In	1961	Levinas	published	Totalité	et	 Infini,	which	 is	 formally	his	doctorat	d’état	 (Totality	and	
Infinity,	 1969)	 and	 in	 1974	 Autrement	 qu’	 être	 ou	 au-delà	 de	 l’essence	 (Otherwise	 than	 Being	 or	
beyond	Essence,	1991)	125	A	 vast	 debate	 surrounds	 Levinas’	 position	 in	 phenomenology:	 opposite	 arguments	 are	 often	made,	 such	 as	 that	 his	 approach	 to	 ethics	 is	 post-phenomenological	 (Kearney)	 or	 is	 deeply	embedded	in	it	and	expands	Husserl’s	work	(Drabinski,	etc.).	Simon	Critchley	suggests	that	Levinas’	allegiance	 to	 phenomenology	 is	 mostly	 methodological	 (1992:246).	 While	 this	 is	 not	 a	 debate	relevant	to	the	discussion	of	hospitality,	I	tend	to	agree	with	Critchley’s	proposition.	
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general derive from what he considers to be “a certain, specifically Greek, way of 
thinking and speaking” which equates truth with an intelligibility of presence, by which 
he means “an intelligibility that considers truth to be that which is present or 
copresent, that which can be gathered or synchronized into a totality that we would 
call the world or cosmos” (1986:17–22). Therefore, by equating truth with presence, 
two terms of a relation, however different they might be in nature or in time 
(divine/human, past/present), “they can ultimately be rendered commensurate and 
simultaneous, the same, contained in a history that totalizes time” (1986:19), in 
permanent synchronicity. For Levinas, it is the opposite that actually happens. “I am 
defined as a subjectivity, as a singular person, as an I, precisely because I am exposed 
to the Other”. The answerability towards the Other is what makes me an individual I; 
this is a responsible or ethical I (we will see this Levinasian position in further detail 
later) “to the extent that I agree to depose or dethrone myself – to abdicate my 
position of centrality – in favour of the vulnerable Other” (1986:27). This in contrast 
with a Western understanding of being concerned for my own being and with the 
possession of my own being considered as primary, of “mineness”.  
 
In Totality and Infinity (1974) Levinas attacks exactly this, i.e., what he considers to be 
the monism of Western thought, a totalizing force where the universe seems to be 
“reduced to an originary and ultimate unity by way of panoramic overviews and 
dialectical syntheses” (Critchley et al., 1996:x) and where the human and the divine 
Other are reduced to a totality of which they are sheer elements. Western ontology, as 
in the case of Sartre’s consideration of the Other, tends to reduce the Other to the 
categories of the same, according to Levinas; and he sees it as a modality of unity and 
fusion with the self (1986:17). Against this, he argues, philosophical thought should 
consider the “nonsynthesizable ‘separation’ that characterizes the relations between 
the Other and me”. For him, Ego,126 related to the platonic Same, is the totality, 
characterised by the preeminent position it has in the understanding of the world: the 
Ego is the central point of reference and order of the world, symbolised as the 
consciousness (perhaps in need of a capital “C”) of Western philosophy. The heteron, 
the Other, on the other hand, is the infinite. The Other, the other human being one 
encounters, represents infinity because of her ungraspable or incomprehensible 
                                                        126	It	may	be	useful	to	note	that	Levinas	uses	the	words	self,	ego	and	I	interchangeably,	as	I	also	do	here.		
 162 
character. As such, while the encounter can be real, the way the Other is revealed to 
me is beyond any categorisable phenomenon or ontological framework: “the 
description must also use ethical terminology” (Levinas, 1996:xi). This uncategorisable 
encounter constitutes an asymmetrical relationship, according to Levinas: the Other’s 
infinity presents the Self with an infinite demand that needs to be met, a demand that 
precedes any choice or decision made by me. Here Levinas disagrees with Buber and 
his description of the I–Thou ethical relation as a symmetrical co-presence.127 The 
encounter with the Other is always asymmetrical and “this essential asymmetry is the 
very basis of ethics: not only am I more responsible than the other but I am even 
responsible for everyone else’s responsibility” (1986:31). As it is expected, these 
characteristics of the encounter with the Other create a strong tension, which is to be 
found in all great theoretical debates about justice, freedom, fraternity, love, etc. 
Levinas attempts to deal with this tension between the asymmetry of the relationship 
with the Other and me, between the demand of her presence and my enjoyment of the 
world, between the totality of consciousness and the infinite character of Otherness.  
 
 
3.3 The face, Otherness, ethics of responsibility. 
Ph. N.: In the face of the Other you say there is an “elevation”, a “height”. The 
Other is higher than I am. What do you mean by that? 
E. L.: The first word of the face is the “Thou shalt not Kill.” It is an order. There 
is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke to me. 
However, at the same time, the face of the Other is destitute; it is the poor for 
whom I can do all and to whom I owe all. And me, whoever I may be, but as a 
“first person”, I am he who finds the resources to respond to the call. 
Ph. N.: One is tempted to say to you: yes, in certain cases. But in other cases, to 
the contrary, the encounter with the Other occurs in the mode of violence, hate 
and disdain. 
                                                        127	Apart	from	the	discussion	of	Buber	in	Totality	and	Infinity	(1974:213),	Levinas	refers	to	him	in	his	interview	with	Richard	Kearney	(1986:13–33).	For	the	relationship	between	the	Levinasian	Self	and	Other	and	Buber’s	I–Thou,	see	Bernasconi,	“‘Failure	of	Communication’	as	a	Surplus:	Dialogue	and	 Lack	 of	 Dialogue	 between	 Buber	 and	 Levinas”,	 in	 Bernasconi,	 R.	 and	Wood,	 D.	 (1988),	 The	
Provocation	 of	 Levinas:	 Rethinking	 the	 Other,	 100–35;	 and	 Tallon,	 A.	 (1978)	 “Intentionality,	Intersubjectivity,	and	the	Between:	Buber	and	Levinas	on	Affectivity	and	the	Dialogical	Principle”,	
Thought,	 53:	 292–309.	 Critchley	 also	 makes	 a	 short	 reference	 in	 The	 Ethics	 of	 Deconstruction	(1992:225).	
 163 
E.L.: To be sure. But I think that whatever the motivation which explains this 
inversion, the analysis of the face such as I have just made, with the mastery of 
the Other and his poverty, with my submission and my wealth, is primary. It is 
the presupposed in all human relationships. If it were not that, we would not 
even say, before an open door, “after you, sir!” It is an original “After you, sir!” 
that I have tried to describe. (1985:88–9) 
 
Diane Perpich makes a valid point when, considering the amount of pages devoted to 
the significance and implication of one of the main Levinasian keywords, the face, she 
finds that any relevant commentary cannot but “look shopworn or obvious” (2008:51). 
One has to defy, however, the danger of another trite attempt to engage in depth with 
this cornerstone of Levinasian ethics, given its centrality and importance, especially 
for constructing an ethics of hospitality. According to Levinas, the Other manifests 
herself as “the naked face of the first individual to come along”. Do the features of this 
face matter? Not in the first instance, since looking at, recognising and describing the 
face does not implicate you in a social relationship. One does not access the face 
through recognition or knowledge: rather, it is a “straightaway ethical” process, while 
the feature that stands out is the face’s uprightness, its defencelessness and its 
nakedness. Its destitution. Used in both metaphorical and literal ways, Levinas 
acknowledges an essential poverty in the face, which is exposed and open to menace 
and violence against it (Levinas, 1985:85–6). How does the face affect us? Exactly by 
the presence of this destitution and poverty; the face of the Other presents us, in an 
immediate manner, with an ethical claim and a need to respond to it. The vagueness of 
the Other’s identity is multiply emphasised by Levinas: the Other is unknowable and 
beyond the capacity of the Self’s comprehension. This is “crucial for Levinas’ theory of 
ethics, because it protects the Other from being assimilated by the Self, which is 
necessary for the maintenance of the ethical relation. In other words, the Other, in 
order to remain Other, needs to be protected from the tendency of the Self to identify, 
classify, label, or otherwise ‘know’” (Dauphinee, 2009:238). It has meaning, “it is 
meaning and meaning without context”, the face cannot become content, it is 
uncontainable, it escapes from being as a correlate of a knowing and leads you beyond 
(Levinas, 1985:85–6, translation altered).  
 
Judith Butler underlines how the face may not exclusively be a human face: borrowing 
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from Levinas’ 1984 essay “Peace and Proximity”, she sees the “face” operating as a 
catachresis, i.e., an overreaching use of the word, equally possible to describe, for 
example, a person’s back or the craning of a neck (Butler, 2006:133). This is a 
discussion that may complicate things,128 without however being especially important 
for the message the face carries for Levinas: as described in the quote at the beginning 
of this section, the appearance of the face carries an order, a commandment, the first 
word. It is this discursive symbolism of the face that is of paramount importance, and 
not whether the face can entail more bodily aspects or at what point knowledge and 
recognition of the face takes place.  
 
The face thus plays a dialogical role: “[f]ace and discourse are tied” (Levinas, 1985:87). 
Its presence disrupts me from my narcissism (Butler, 2006:138) and calls me to 
respond in such a way that I am in essence held hostage:  
 
I am pledged to the other without any possibility of abdication. I cannot slip 
away from the face of the other in its nakedness (…); to approach is to be the 
guardian of one’s brother; to be the guardian of one’s brother is to be his 
hostage (Levinas 1998:71–2).  
 
The face of the Other calls me to respond. One could obviously talk of an antiphasis 
here: if my relation to the Other is pre-linguistic, how can the Other call me? This is a 
recurring problem in understanding the Levinasian Self/Other relationship, which at 
least for the purposes of this chapter I treat as no more than the resulting tension of a 
wager that Levinas ventures by placing first the intersubjective, but pre-linguistic, pre-
conscious encounter, broadly understanding it as a perceptual experience apt to root 
human language in human bodies and intersubjectivity (Bergo, 2011).  
 
In any case, Levinas makes clear that his aim is not to insist or show that “the Other 
forever escapes knowing” (1969:89) or to put knowledge in doubt or even enshroud the 
                                                        128	And	 complicate	 them	 further	 it	 surely	 does,	 as	 Diane	 Perpich	 realises	 when	 remarking	 that	Levinas,	 in	Totality	and	Infinity,	 states	more	 than	once	 that	 the	 “whole	body”	 is	 a	 face.	Perpich	 is	clearly	 against	 any	 conclusion	 that	 the	 face	 is	 a	 body,	 and	 argues	 in	 favour	 of	 resisting	 “a	metaphysical	or	re-essentialising	interpretation	of	the	notion	of	the	face”	(explaining	“[w]hereas	a	body	can	appear,	the	face	does	not	and	cannot”,	i.e.,	the	body	can	be	represented	and	be	an	object	of	knowledge,	while	the	face	resists,	at	least	in	the	way	Levinas	conceives	of	it	theoretically).	However,	she	still	considers	the	relation	between	the	two	to	be	problematic	(2008:64–5),	as	I	do	too.	
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Other in an eternal mystery. The Other can eventually be represented and treated as 
an object (Perpich, 2008:75). However, this does not undermine the initial, 
precognitive encounter with the Other or exhaust our ethical relation to her. And why 
is it important to insist on this precognitive ethical encounter? For Levinas, the point 
for doing so is that “in every representation of the [O]ther as an object of thought, the 
invocation of the [O]ther in the very discourse that thematises [her] means that 
something (or, more exactly, someone) escapes inclusion within the thematisation” 
(ibid.) This is to mean that representation, albeit inevitable, constitutes in essence an 
act of exclusion or even a violent act.  
 
Therefore, while the vision and the recognition of the facial features, as seen above, do 
not construct my relation to the Other, the implied discourse, the demand imposed on 
me by the appearance of the face of the Other, the response that is expected from me 
and the responsibility do. They constitute the authentic ethical relationship (88). Can 
this be a silent demand? Butler sees this demand as “a kind of a sound, the sound of a 
language evacuating its sense, the sonorous substratum of vocalization that precedes 
and limits the delivery of any semantic sense” (2006:134), a demand that may or may 
not be uttered. And why is this an “authentic ethical relationship”? This encounter of 
the face presents me with two forces pulling in opposite directions: the temptation to 
kill and the call to peace (you shall not kill); “the face operates to produce a struggle 
for me, and establishes this struggle at the heart of ethics” (ibid. 135). The face-to-face 
relationship and the face itself come about simultaneously (Perpich, 2008:75). This 
struggle also becomes an existential struggle. Being held hostage by the Other and her 
command, my existence is defined by her. However, the struggle is not one of 
domination such as in the lordship/bondage dialectic. The aim is not to order the 
Other to submission, nor is my existence defined by the mirroring of my self-
consciousness. Consciousness and recognition come after my encounter with the 
Other and her face. With the face symbolising the extreme precariousness of the Other 
(1996:167), not only do I address the Other when I speak to her but I also come to 
exist, as it were, in the moment of being addressed, and something about my existence 
proves precarious when this address fails (Butler, 2006:130). The face is the only 
“thing” that metaphorically breaks through existence (Bergo, 2011), because my moral 
binding to the Other does not derive from my reflexivity or autonomy but “comes to 
me from elsewhere, unbidden, unexpected, and unplanned” (Butler, op.cit.). For 
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Levinas, therefore, the relation to the Other defines my subjectivity, which is not 
atomised or independent of context, but “a radically interdependent condition” 
(Campbell, 1998a:173), constituted by Otherness (Odysseos, 2007:xxx). As argued in 
the previous chapter, this is the understanding of subjectivity through Otherness that 
has gained currency in poststructuralist scholarship and is among the main Levinasian 
influences within IR (Der Derian, 1997; Campbell and Dillon, 1993), which however, 
still feels underused.  
 
From the moral height and destitution of the face in Totality and Infinity, Levinas 
moves in Otherwise than Being to the even more radical understanding of 
substitution,129 seen briefly above in the metaphor of being held hostage by the Other’s 
command, where one could even sacrifice themselves for the Other. This 
intensification of language perhaps symbolises an effort on Levinas’ part to address 
some of the lacks of other, Western accounts of the relational I and emphasise the 
need to depart from their ontological thinking. Substitution could be seen as an 
answer to three such main accounts. Firstly to “the theorists of war” (1996:91 – here 
he mostly refers to Hobbes, with whom he seems to be in some kind of constant 
dialogue throughout his work, without though naming him or engaging with him 
textually), in an effort to prove that, contra Hobbes, generosity is not to be found in 
the Ego, unless the Ego has gone through this experience of infinite responsibility and 
substitution (Levinas, 1996:88; also Bernasconi, 2002:235). Secondly it is an answer to 
his eternal interlocutor, Heidegger: again, as with Hobbes, Levinas argues that 
sacrifice and responsibility for the Other is not possible in an understanding that sees 
the human subject mainly concerned with its own existence; “knowing of oneself by 
oneself, is not all there is to the notion of subjectivity” (1991:102). Finally, 
substitution is destined to address theorising that considers subjectivity as rooted only 
in self-consciousness. For such theorists (Levinas names Hegel and Sartre, 1991:103), 
“the identity of the I would thus be reducible to the turning back of essence upon 
itself”, and taking responsibility for the Other to the point of sacrifice is only possible 
because of free consciousness per se and not because of the “impossibility of evading 
the neighbour’s call”. This is problematic because “[t]o say that subjectivity begins in 
the person, that the person begins in freedom, that freedom is the primary causality, is 
                                                        129 	Substitution	 constitutes	 the	 “core	 concept	 of	 that	 book,	 and	 yet	 it	 remains	 enigmatic”	(Bernasconi,	2002:234).	
 167 
to blind oneself to the secret of the self” (Levinas, 1996:94–5).130  
 
Therefore, sameness or alikeness, which has usually been at the background of what 
ethically matters in Western ethical thinking, plays no role here. For Levinas, the 
shared capacity of reason, the common understanding of human flourishing or 
pleasure and pain, the importance of (similar) sentiments and habits have no say in 
responsibility and what is owed to others. He instead argues for the opposite. As 
already seen above, the I lives the embodied experience of the encounter with the 
Other: this encounter is “disruptive” for my being, obliging me to respond; it is the 
source of language and dialogue but also the roots of “intersubjectivity as lived 
immediacy”. The I discovers its own particularity when it is in front of the Other, 
addressed and implored by it, even if this address does not have any discursive 
content. This affective moment of “interruption”, as Levinas calls it, is the immediate 
experience of responsibility. 
 
Me voici. Here I am. See me here. My sheer presence precedes any self-consciousness 
or choice. The un-chosen responsibility I carry is passive, more passive than the mere 
juxtaposition of passivity with activity can reveal. Levinas describes ethical 
responsibility as insomnia or wakefulness (his emphasis) because he considers 
responsibility as a perpetual duty of vigilance and effort that can never fall asleep 
(1986:30). We do not choose to be responsible. Responsibility arises as if elicited, 
before we begin to think about it out of freedom and individual choice. Levinasian 
responsibility is not categorisable in terms of good or bad, of altruistic or non-
altruistic behaviour, and it is untransferable (Levinas, 1985:95–101). “Why does the 
other concern me? Am I my brother’s keeper? These questions have meaning only if 
one has already supposed that the ego is concerned only with itself, is only a concern 
for itself” (Levinas, 1989:106). For Levinas, such an orientation can never provide the 
groundwork for a meaningful ethics. In a world characterised by the priority of the 
Self’s ego, Others are encountered only as obstacles on the road to self-actualisation, 
wherein “every other would be only a limitation that invites war, domination, 
precaution and information” (Levinas, 1989:108). Put simply, ethics is not ethical 
when it is ultimately geared towards the pursuit of self-actualisation. In addition, his 
                                                        130	Levinas’	 understanding	 of	 freedom,	 in	 its	 participation	 in	 the	 republican	 trinity,	 is	 discussed	later	in	this	chapter.		
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ethical project is not intended to create a universal definition of Otherness, or to 
standardise the form and content of responsibility (Dauphinee, 2009:244). Ethical 
responsibility is simply “the surplus of my duties over my rights” (Levinas, 1981:159) 
and stems from the awareness that my existence generates violence in the existence of 
Others (Dauphinee, 2009:236). The recognition that my existence imperils the Other is 
the foundation for Levinas’ notion of an infinite – but guiltless – responsibility. I am 
responsible to the Other with no limitations and with no possibility of abdication. This 
forms the starting point for all subsequent political thought. But how can one 
approach the political? To this I now turn.  
 
3.4 Ethics of responsibility in society: fraternity and the third 
In the general economy of being in its inflection back upon itself, a 
preoccupation with the other, even to the point of sacrifice, even to the point of 
dying for him or her; a responsibility for the other. Otherwise than being! It is 
this shattering of indifference – even if indifference is statistically dominant – 
this possibility of one-for-the-other, that constitutes the ethical event. When 
human existence interrupts and goes beyond its effort to be – its Spinozan 
conatus essendi – there is a vocation for an existing-for-the-other stronger than 
the threat of death: the fellow human being’s existential adventure matters to 
the I more than its own, posing from the start the I as responsible for the being 
of the other (Levinas et al., 1998:xiii).  
 
Can this understanding of ethics regulate society? Levinas is categorically against such 
an idea. “As prima philosophia, ethics cannot itself legislate for society or produce 
rules of conduct whereby society might be revolutionized or transformed. It does not 
operate at the level of the manifesto or call to order” (1986:29). For Levinas, this is the 
terrain for morality to operate, i.e., in the socio-political order of organising and 
improving our human survival as a series of rules relating to social behaviour and civic 
duty. However, this morality “is ultimately founded on an ethical responsibility 
towards the [O]ther”, which in the real world is “a form of vigilant passivity to the call 
of the other, which precedes our interest in being” (ibid.). Levinas describes how ethics 
becomes morality and hardens its skin when it enters the political world but insists 
that the ethical norm of the interhuman, of the encounter with the Other and the 
responsibility it bears, must continue to inform, inspire and direct the moral order. 
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This should be the ethical foundation, and where it is relinquished, one must be ready 
to accept “all forms of society, including the fascist or the totalitarian, for it can no 
longer evaluate or discriminate between them. (…) This is why ethical philosophy 
must remain the first philosophy” (1986:30).  
 
To preclude these societal totalising tendencies and in order to address approaches of 
exclusion and violence towards the Other, Levinas makes recourse to the concept of 
fraternity, while in his later work the third, as the Other beyond the I–Other 
relationship, i.e., the others in plural, enters the discussion. Both concepts are widely 
considered as the moment when Levinas’ ethical work converses with politics 
(Bernasconi, 1999; Critchley, 2004; Caygill, 2002, among many others), “a moment of 
transition” (Dauphinee, 2009:239), an intertwinement with the political, where 
fraternity acts as the bridge between the ethical and the political and as a tentative 
solution to the tensions created by the move from the one-for-the-Οther to one-for-
the-others and to the attribution of justice.131  
 
This is a perplexing moment for Levinas’ scholars, as for some (Fagan, 2013; Critchley, 
2004 and elsewhere) it seems that, despite his best efforts, he fails by allowing his 
understanding of fraternity to promote the unity and homogeneity he purports at the 
same time to oppose.132 On the other hand, the third is considered by critics to 
introduce a “bumpy passage” from ethics to politics (Molloy, 1999:233). Along with 
the question of proximity it brings forward, which purportedly hints at the need for an 
absolute control of justice by the State (Campbell, 1998a:179), both issues are 
considered to undermine any previous discussion of responsibility. Contrary to this 
perception, I believe that Levinas’ understanding of fraternity, despite its patriarchal 
                                                        131	As	Bernasconi	 notes,	 there	 are	 at	 least	 three	main	 accounts	 of	 the	 third	 (Levinas,	 1991):	 first	there	is	the	“third	man”	as	 in	the	third	party	(le	tiers);	then	there	is	the	third	person	(la	troisième	
personne),	as	in	the	neutral	observer	whose	standpoint	corresponds	to	that	of	the	universal	reason;	and	finally,	there	is	the	notion	of	“illeity”,	from	the	French	personal	pronoun	“il”,	meaning	he.	This	is	a	difficult	notion,	referring	to	the	difference	of	height	mentioned	in	3.1;	and	it	 tries	to	convey	 the	unbridgeable	distance	between	the	Self	and	the	Other,	the	impossibility	of	pronouncing	a	“thou”	in	some	kind	of	reciprocity	with	the	other	person.	I	will	be	referring	only	to	the	third	here,	as	an	all-encompassing	 reference	 to	 the	 third	man	and	person,	 as	 the	notional	 intricacies	 are	not	 of	 great	importance	 for	 the	 argument.	 However,	 like	 Bernasconi,	 I	 believe	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 these	interrelated	 and	 sometimes	barely	 indistinguishable	 senses	 of	 the	 third	 constitute	 a	 contestation	against	“the	widespread	conviction	that	Levinas	must	be	understood	as	a	philosopher	of	ethics	who	nevertheless	had	little	to	contribute	to	our	understanding	of	the	political”	(Bernasconi,	1999:76).	132	Derrida	 is	 another	 scholar	 who	 has	 particular	 problems	 with	 the	 use	 of	 the	 term	 fraternity,	considering	it	(along	with	fraternisation)	as	a	way	of	designating	politics	rooted	in	similarities	and	not	difference	(see	Politics	of	Friendship,	2005c)	
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resonances, stands above thematisation and homogenisation and instead can be a 
helpful tool in two interrelated ways: on one hand, envisaging the Other as non-
assimilable and as the one to whom an incommensurable responsibility is owed; on 
the other, envisaging the responsibility towards the Other’s other, in this way enabling 
justice and thus allowing multiple, simultaneous ethical one-to-one encounters to 
coexist. Similarly, I dispute this common rendering of the third. Without 
underestimating the problems it presents, I argue that it enhances the responsibility I 
show to the Other. Below, I look at the third and fraternity along these lines, 
examining also some of the reactions they have provoked. I will start with the third 
even if it follows fraternity chronologically in Levinas’ work. The reason for this is that 
the third is one of the best-known Levinasian concepts, which as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, but also above, has attracted a lot of criticism, being pictured as the 
stumbling block of Levinas’ work even within poststructuralist circles. Following this, I 
will explore fraternity, arguing that fraternity can address these criticisms and bridge 
the theoretical gap that the third may have introduced into the passage towards 
politics, with an emphasis on its usefulness within the discussion for an ethics of 
hospitality.  
 
Apart from referring to the third (in its various guises) in the fifth chapter of Otherwise 
than Being (1991), Levinas also presents accounts of it in the essays “The Ego and 
Totality” (1987) and “The Other and the Others” (1969).	133  Simplifying it, the third is 
another way of referring to the other people outside the ethical relationship we have 
seen above, identified as the other selves and interrupting it. Levinas introduces le 
tiers, the third, a third party (an Other of the Other who faces me) and connects it to 
the birth of politics as the critical adjudication of conflicting interests. As seen above, 
if the I and the Other were alone in the world, the ethical relationship would have 
ordered the I to assume a responsibility for the Other alone, and “there would not have 
been any problem, in even the most general sense of the term” (Levinas, 1991:157). 
The exclusive relation of infinite responsibility to and for the Other “is troubled”, 
however, “and becomes a problem” with the entrance of a third party (ibid.). By saying 
that the third party’s presence causes a problem, Levinas refers to the existence of 
consciousness, self-consciousness and conscience more generally, of the assessing, 
                                                        133	Initially	“Le	moi	et	la	totalité”	in	the	Revue	de	Métaphysique	et	de	Morale	(1954);	“The	Other	and	the	Others”	can	be	found	in	Totality	and	Infinity	(1969).	
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weighing and judging that we associate with reflection and deliberation. This third 
party already exists in his previous work as “the whole of humanity” (Levinas, 
1969:213) and, as such, I am responsible to it, since the ethical relationship for 
Levinas, as seen earlier, is constituted in such a way that I am already responsible to 
the Other of my Other, to the Other of my neighbour, etc. However, the third imposes 
the need for comparison and assessment, and these acts belong to the order of politics. 
The third is the moment where Levinasian ethics converse with politics. In his early 
work (1992), Critchley advocates the possibility of what he calls “a Levinasian politics 
of ethical difference”, where (what he considers to be) the political impasse of 
deconstruction, i.e., the difficulty of passing from deconstruction’s understanding of 
ethical responsibility to political questioning and critique, can be overcome. Ethics 
continues to come first: “politics begins as ethics” and without the latter, the former 
may – and very often does – become totalising and totalitarian. The belief that 
political rationality may be able by itself and in itself to resolve all political questions 
is misguided and bears great risks for Levinas, since “politics left to itself bears a 
tyranny within itself” (Levinas, 199q:21). The need for nuanced conceptions of society 
and of the stranger, which may move away from rational – on first reading – 
understandings of what political decisions are good and appropriate, is enforced by the 
questioning brought about by ethical responsibility, as this has been discussed in this 
chapter. This responsibility, deriving from the ethical encounter in front of the 
infinitely demanding face of the Other, leads to a space of questioning: political life is 
repeatedly put into question in order to “interrupt all attempts at totalisation (…) 
totalitarianism, or immanentism” (Critchley, 1992:219–41) and exclusion. Levinas 
calls that “the latent birth of the question in responsibility” (1984:157; his emphasis). 
The “question” is born when the ethical relation is not between two subjects but when 
it concerns everyone, “plac[ing] itself in the full light of the public order” (1974:212). 
As already discussed, the ethical relation for Levinas is by definition distinct from the 
Buberian I–Thou relation: it is not symmetrical or self-sufficient, far from a 
conception of co-presence. To the contrary, not only is it radically asymmetrical, as 
seen so far, but also the ethical obligations hereby deriving from it are obligations 
towards a third party: others and humanity in general. “The third party looks at me in 
the eyes of the Other” (1974:213); its presence “introduces a limit to responsibility and 
allows the ‘birth of the question’” (Critchley: 1992:231), which is the question of 
justice: “what do I have to do with justice?” (1981:157).  
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It is often argued that Levinas’ thought around the opening towards the political is 
neglected (Simmons, 1999; Bernasconi, 1999). However, the third has been criticised 
by almost everyone, and especially by the scholarship presented in 2.4 (see, for 
instance, Campbell, 1998a; Dauphinee, 2007; Hagglund, 2008, Fagan: 2013 and 
others). I will return to these critiques in the conclusion, but suffice it here to say that 
the main problem lies with the arrival of the third representing an impediment for the 
face-to-face ethical encounter, annulling my responsibility to the Other, which is now 
referred to social and political constraints, strengthening in essence the state’s role in 
it. Levinas draws a quite different conclusion from his thinking of the third. Instead of 
regarding the ineluctable relation to the third as refuting the idea of an originary 
ethical encounter, Levinas claims that it paves the way for justice, taking into account 
both the singular Other and Others. What is often neglected is that Levinas himself is 
uncertain about the best way of relating the third to the face-to-face relation. Whereas 
it is commonly understood that the third appears after the face-to-face relationship 
with the Other is established, following an oft-quoted passage in Otherwise than 
Being,134 Levinas in other places in the same book suggests that the third is already 
present in the ethical relation within the face of the Other and that “in no way is 
justice (…) a degeneration that would be produced in the measure that for empirical 
reasons the initial duo become a trio” (Levinas, 1991:159). As Bernasconi observes 
(1999:76–7), this is not expressed for the first time. A close reading of Totality and 
Infinity, written some years earlier, suggests that from early on Levinas did not 
consider the third as a later-stage addition to the face-to-face ethical encounter: “it is 
not that there first would be the face, and then the being it manifests or expresses 
would concern itself with justice; the epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity” 
(Levinas, 1969:213). However, this uncertainty is baffling. On the one hand, the advent 
of the third, after the ethical relation with the Other is set up, symbolises the passage 
from the ethical to the political and as such; the political would undermine the ethical 
since the unconditional responsibility towards the singular Other would be impossible 
to uphold in the political realm of various Others. This is after all the usual main point 
of the criticism of the third. On the other hand, however, if Levinas indeed considers 
that the third already exists and is present in the face-to-face ethical encounter, 
                                                        134	“The	responsibility	 for	 the	Other	 is	an	 immediacy	antecedent	to	questions,	 it	 is	proximity.	 It	 is	troubled	and	becomes	a	problem	when	the	third	party	enters”	(1991:157)	
 173 
within the singular Other, this would suggest that the third “would serve to correct the 
partiality of a relation to the Other that would otherwise have no reason not to ignore 
the demands of the other Others” (Bernasconi, 1999:77). But which of the two is it?  
 
I believe that the second option holds water. There is the common belief that the third 
designates solely the domain of the political where “it is necessary to interrogate and 
calculate intersubjective relations in order to achieve social justice” and that the fact 
that Levinas does not renounce “his notion of a singular, ethical encounter with the 
Other, which would precede the political” means that, according to Levinas, “the 
political community should be guided by the respect for the Other, who here turns out 
to be no one less than God the Father” (Hagglund, 2004:58). Contrary to it, I believe 
that Levinas tries to convincingly bridge the ethical with the political by extending the 
relation not to a singular Other but partially to all Other Others, no matter the result. I 
also believe that his critics’ emphasis on the divine element is misplaced. In a much 
less studied essay of his, “The Ego and Totality” (1987), this is articulated in a 
significantly clearer manner. Here no transcendental or metaphysical power is evoked. 
On the contrary, Levinas argues that guilt and innocence is not due to and cannot by 
governed by the belief in a transcendent God (1987:31); that in real society, the 
actions of the Self towards the Other need to take into account the harm they may 
cause to the Others whom the Other is related to (1987:30); and that one needs to 
make sure that their the ethical relation with the Other is not neglectful of the third 
party (1987:33; Bernasconi, 1999:78). This neglect is possible in self-sufficient face-to-
face relationships like the Buberian I-Thou relationship (Levinas, 1969:213), or could 
have been possible even in Levinas’ own rendering of the ethical encounter with the 
Other; however, the fact that the third party is already present in this encounter (since 
I choose to accept this interpretation) is what makes the passage from ethics to 
politics possible (Bernasconi, op.cit). If the third party is indeed external, this passage 
would be impossible because the core of the ethical that eventually will inform the 
political, the responsibility towards the Other, would have been undermined. Instead, 
“the presence of the third party (that is of the whole humanity which looks at us) also 
commands us (my emphasis). The focus on the personal pronoun is important here: it 
is not anymore about the Other addressing me but a humanity (of Others) looking at 
us. “Separation is the precondition of the face to face, but through the third party I am 
joined with the Other” (Bernasconi, 1999:80). I believe that the best way for this to be 
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conceptualised is through his earlier notion of fraternity. 
 
Levinas has continuously underlined fraternity in his work. He “constantly reminds us, 
the modern political has been trinitarian since the French Revolution” (Caygill, 
2002:3). Supplementing the liberal tradition from Kant and Hegel, which emphasises 
freedom and, to a lesser degree, equality, Levinas insists on highlighting the third 
dimension of fraternity. With political horror and war always in the foreground of his 
thought,135 Levinas invests in this third concept in order to develop an ethics of 
alterity and subsequently find there a promise of peace. Fraternity in the way it is 
understood by Levinas becomes challenging. Along with freedom and equality, it is 
generally understood either as having universal standing or as belonging to a specific 
state, nation or race (interpretations of either the American Constitution or the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen point to these varying 
understandings). Levinas’ understanding, though, begs to differ: neither universality 
nor particularism can uphold fraternity; for him, it has to be defined beyond these two 
opposites and constitute the basis of alterity (1969; 1978). In this way, freedom and 
equality will derive from fraternity instead of the latter being a third supplement to 
the first two. In the case of this project’s specific discussion, if my relation to all 
Others at the border and within my community is defined by fraternity, this means 
that issues of belonging and community identity cannot trump my responsibility to 
the needs of the Other. In this respect, fraternity stands very close to a 
conceptualisation of hospitality, given that he has rarely used the term in itself. As I 
will discuss in the conclusion, the prioritisation of my responsibility will take place in 
an autoimmunitary fashion in my effort to spare her from suffering, violence and 
death in spite of any qualitative caveats. My freedom follows, as does the need for 
equality. As it is easy to imagine, fraternity becomes another contested Levinasian 
concept (Caygill, 2002; Critchley, 2004, among others) that relates to ethics and 
politics via the notion of justice and the third.  
 
As a concept, fraternity appears in Levinas’ work very early on and undergoes an 
evolution: from first being explored in the context of eros in his 1947 Existence and 
Existents and then along fecundity and paternity/filiality in Totality and Infinity (1961), to 
                                                        135	Levinas	survived	the	Holocaust	only	because	he	was	in	the	French	military,	while	the	majority	of	his	family	perished.	
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encapsulating the problem of subjectivity in Otherwise than Being (1974). Despite the 
understanding that “love is knowledge”, eros is, for Levinas, the first instance where 
the relation with the Other breaks away from knowledge of the Other as an object – 
the first instance where it becomes a moment of absolute alterity (1985:65–7). Some 
years later, this consideration of eros becomes marginal in Levinas’ work, and one can 
say it is partly transformed into the concepts of fecundity and paternity: away from 
their biological dimension, Levinas focuses on how these concepts involve the 
transcendence of oneself. “Paternity is a relation with a stranger who while being 
other (…) is me, a relation of the I with a self which yet is not me. In this ‘I am’, being 
is no longer Eleatic unity. In existing itself there is a multiplicity and a transcendence” 
(1969:277, his emphasis). It is a relation to the Self where one is simultaneously Other. 
This brings Levinas closer to the substitution seen earlier in this chapter, where the 
Self is called into subjectivity by the presence of the Other. The added element here is 
the multiplicity of subjects, since there is more than one paternal/filial relation. Apart 
from this inquiry into family terms, or better yet, even more than this inquiry into 
alterity as familial relation, is fraternity’s relation with the French republic motto of 
liberté, egalité, fraternité. 
 
The republican trinitarian concept seemed to have preoccupied Levinas from very 
early on. A student in Strasbourg shortly after the city was re-annexed to France and 
with the university being consequently re-founded according to the prescripts of 
French republicanism, Levinas’ early academic life was further marked by the 
reverberations of the Dreyfus affair and the meaning this acquired for French 
philosophical thought.136 If nothing else, the Dreyfus affair undermined the republican 
understanding of freedom, equality and fraternity, highlighting especially the dangers 
posed by confessional fraternity and other narrowly understood or group-based 
fraternal categories. Levinas seems to have intuited the need for an ethical concept of 
fraternity, one which is not defined “in classical Jacobin terms of the male nation 
armed, or in those of the pre-political fraternal categories of class, gender, race, 
religious confession” but in terms of solidarity with the victim of injustice (Caygill, 
2002:8).137 Again one can see here Levinas’ commitment to an encounter with the 
                                                        136	And	not	only.	See	Arendt’s	fourth	chapter	in	The	Origins	of	Totalitarianism.		137	It	would	perhaps	be	important	here	to	note	that	Levinas’	understanding	of	the	ethical	encounter	is	 at	 odds	 with	 a	 republican	 understanding	 of	 freedom.	 As	 seen	 in	 the	 chapter	 called	 “Freedom	Called	into	Question”	in	Totality	and	Infinity,	freedom	is	not	a	priori	 just	or	moral,	since	I	have	not	
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Other that is not based on common characteristics, shared identities or habits, 
customs, or an ethical imperative deriving from God, the ruling authorities or 
consequentialist considerations. Fraternity in its ethical standing is far from the 
fraternity of the nation or of some kind of community, but within the fraternity born 
by the feeling of responsibility and solidarity.  
 
While Levinas’ academic work is in constant dialogue with Husserl and Heidegger, it 
seems that at least in the early stages of his career he was influenced by the work of 
two important intellectual figures who towered over French academia at the time, 
Émile Durkheim and Henri Bergson. From Durkheim, whom he considered first as a 
metaphysician and then as a scientific sociologist (Levinas, 1985:26), Levinas borrows 
both an understanding of an organic/modern solidarity based on social differentiation 
(versus a mechanical/premodern one, based on social uniformity, on links created by 
the church or the nation, for instance (Caygill, 2002:10–11)) but also the 
corresponding critique of individualism deriving from these opposed understandings 
of solidarity. For Levinas, there is in Durkheim “a theory of ‘levels of being’, of the 
irreducibility of these levels to one another” (1985:27): a very important theory in the 
way it strengthens difference and positions one’s thought against uniformity. Bergson, 
in turn, is deemed important for his theory of la durée138 and the way it destroys the 
understanding of linear and homogeneous time, liberating philosophy from scientific 
time. As a result of this “liberation”, there is a notion of proximity (important for the 
relation of the I with the Other), understood in such a way that “it cannot be reduced 
to spatial categories or to modes of objectification and thematisation” (Levinas et al., 
1998:224), like the ones seen in the introduction in the attempt to theorise the 
stranger (cf. Ahmed, 2000 and 2004). Similarly to the non-reduction to spatial 
categories and thematisation, there is a concept of being “a little beyond being and 
                                                                                                                                                                  chosen	 freely	 my	 own	 existence.	 It	 is	 instead	 put	 into	 question	 by	 the	 welcoming	 of	 the	 Other	(1969:82–84).	The	Other	does	not	oppose	her	freedom	to	mine,	does	not	challenge	it,	nor	does	she	compel	me	 to	enter	 into	a	contract	with	her	 to	avoid	destroying	each	other	 (Chalier,	1995:6)	but	she	“calls	in	question	the	naïve	right	of	my	powers”	(Levinas,	1969:84).	Here	we	come	back	again	to	the	idea	seen	earlier	–	of	my	existence	threatening	the	existence	of	the	Other.	My	responsibility	to	the	Other	is	prior	to	my	freedom	and	not	the	other	way	around.		138	Bergson	 distinguishes	 between	 time	 as	 we	 actually	 experience	 it,	 lived	 time	 –	 which	 he	 calls	
durée	réelle	 (real	 duration)	 –	 and	 the	mechanistic	 time	 of	 science.	 This,	 he	 argues,	 is	 based	 on	 a	misperception:	 it	 consists	 of	 superimposing	 spatial	 concepts	 onto	 time,	 which	 then	 becomes	 a	distorted	version	of	the	real	thing.	So	time	is	perceived	via	a	succession	of	separate,	discrete,	spatial	constructs	–	 just	 like	seeing	a	 film.	We	think	we’re	seeing	a	continuous	 flow	of	movement,	but	 in	reality	what	we	are	seeing	is	a	succession	of	fixed	frames	or	stills.	To	claim	that	one	can	measure	real	duration	by	counting	separate	spatial	constructs	is	an	illusion.	
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otherwise than being”.139 For Levinas, Bergsonian duration can be interpreted as “a 
relationship with the Other and with God”, making possible a new understanding of 
human fraternity (2001:31). These ideas later on acquire for Levinas “full meaning 
within the Husserlian and Heidegerrian contexts” (1985:27). Essentially, this comes to 
support, in my opinion, the ethicality of not categorising the Other or Others, not 
prioritising her over them, but embracing the responsibility of the Self beyond 
thematisations of proximity, space and commonalities. The responsibility towards the 
undocumented migrant in this respect should not be deprioritised because of 
Otherness fulfilling the prerequisites of a well-defined category (refugee or asylum 
seeker), or proximity (neighbour, compatriot), or self-benefit (migrant of merit for the 
host society).      
 
As is to be expected, these concepts have provoked heavy criticism. Not only for the 
use of a heavy patriarchal language (see, for example, Derrida, 1980; 1994; Irigaray, 
1991; Chanter, 1988, among others) but also for the connection of fraternity with 
monotheism: if fraternity is understood through a father–son relationship, i.e., a 
brotherhood that is not based on race or nation but a common father, this can have 
theological dimensions where responsibility for the Other is imposed by a common 
genus or God’s command – a structure of which republicanism “is simply the secular 
translation”, according to Critchley (2004). While I find the criticisms fair and consider 
the use of patriarchal language and the references to monotheism in Totality and 
Infinity inherently problematic, or even uncomfortable, I think reading theology into 
Levinas’ use of monotheism still remains a (mistaken) interpretative choice made by 
Critchley and others; one that essentially misses and undermines the importance of 
fraternity. In contrast, this is not a choice made, for example, by Llewelyn (1995), who 
insists that this is actually an ethical monotheism, i.e., one that sees human kinship 
deriving from “the idea of a human race that refers back to the approach of the Other 
in the face in a dimension of height, of responsibility for oneself and for the Other” 
(Levinas, 1969:214). An individual approach in the Self–Other encounter but also in 
the relation with multiple Others. “To say that this monotheism is ethical is not due to 
any shared genetic [or confessional] relation to a paternal being. It is precisely this 
                                                        139	For	 him,	 Bergson	 pre-echoes	 and	 in	 essence	 makes	 possible	 later	 phenomenological	 and	Heideggerian	 conceptualisations	 of	 “being”,	 despite	 his	 differences	 with	 them	 (Levinas	 et	 al.,	1998:224),	
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relation [to a paternal being; nation, race or creed] that ethical kinship seeks to 
disrupt” (Llewelyn, 1995:125). Fraternity, despite the problematic associations with 
fecundity and paternity/filiality, points towards a relation with the Other/Others that 
resists categorisation and provides us with a double dimension: on one hand, the Self 
and Other are unique; the latter assigns meaning to the former, which was not a self-
sufficient entity before the ethical encounter. There is, therefore, fraternity at the 
level of the Self-for-the-Other encounter. But in addition, fraternity defines the 
encounter of the Self with multiple Others, where uniqueness may no longer be 
capable of being addressed, but where fraternity enables equality among the multitude 
of Others. 
 
This double dimension is enforced in Otherwise than Being, where Levinas, in what is 
perhaps a conscious self-critical move, distances himself from this patriarchal reading 
and focuses on the importance of substitution and infinite responsibility for fraternity. 
Fraternity is again present and this time is closely connected to substitution, both 
forming a basis for a proximity to the Other, a proximity not of course understood 
spatially, but as sensibility or sentience. Once more, a notion of subjectivity different 
to traditional understandings is emphasised: a movement away from intentional 
consciousness towards a level of preconscious sensing is described as necessary (the 
second chapter of Otherwise than Being, “Intentionality and Sensing”, is dedicated to 
this movement, 1991:23–59). Sensibility or sentience are the primordial elements for 
living one’s life, distinct from the existentialist, phenomenological, liberal self-
consciousness and intentionality. The subject is thus defined by its openness to the 
senses, its vulnerability and sensibility towards the Others, and is constituted by its 
asymmetrical relation with them. The abstract Ego is reduced to me, to the one who is 
being addressed by the demand of the Others. As Levinas puts it, “La subjectivité n’est 
pas le Moi, mais moi” (“subjectivity is not the Ego, but me”) (1987:150). I think therefore 
I am is replaced by I think therefore something is (Caygill, 2002:20); “That is, my first 
word is not Descartes’s ‘ego cogito’ (‘I am, I think’), it is rather ‘me voici!’ (‘here I am!’ 
or ‘see me here!’)” (Critchley, 1999:66). It is in this understanding of subjectivity that 
the ethical relation can take place. Fraternity understood in this context remains a 
radical concept; interpreted on the basis of alterity and difference, it raises the issue of 
solidarity, promises essential equality and a reconfiguration of living with others in 
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the name of the Other.140  
 
Conclusion 
“We are all responsible for all for all men before all, and I more than all the others.” 
Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, quoted by Levinas (1986:101) 
 
Rendering his own reading of Otherwise than Being, Ricoeur calls it, only half-jokingly, 
“a background of verbal terrorism” (Ricoeur and Escobar, 2004:93). The writing is 
dense, meaning intricate, references to important themes (such as justice or politics, 
for example) furtive and inconclusive. Levinas’ language and conceptualisations can 
indeed be intimidating. The infinity of the demand and the precognitive undertaking 
of responsibility are only a few overwhelming examples for the reader.  
 
More specific critiques, as hinted in many parts of this chapter, are abundant and go 
beyond the problems encountered with the entrance of the third, mentioned just 
above, and its implications for the connection of Levinasian ethics with politics. “Is 
this really ethics?” is an omnipresent, underlying concern, either voiced or not. In the 
first place, does this understanding of ethics constitute ethics? And why does the face 
of the Other present me with an infinite demand? Why should the Otherness or alterity 
constitute the basis of the ethical relation? Why not sameness? And if my 
responsibility towards the Other is so infinite that it ends up being unfulfillable, is it to 
be considered as responsibility at all? If my responsibility expands to such a degree 
that I am responsible for everything before any conscious choice, perhaps I am then 
responsible for nothing? How can an infinite responsibility brought about by 
Otherness prescribe what one should do? In addition, as also mentioned earlier, the 
consideration that Levinas’ work resembles religious metaphysics, if not constituting a 
masked theology, has been voiced often.141 For Janicaud, the claims about the face, for 
example, can only be understood as dogmatic importations from theology (Perpich, 
2008:52). Along the same lines, considering ethics to be the first philosophy, prior to 
ontology or epistemology, betrays for critics that the Other cannot only be a human 
                                                        140	Feminist	readings	of	Levinas,	especially	those	inspired	by	Irigaray,	seem	to	transform	the	theme	of	fraternity	into	that	of	love.	See	Irigaray	and	Chanter’s	chapters	in	Re-Reading	Levinas	(1991)	as	well	as	Sandford’s	The	Metaphysics	of	Love	(2000).	Conversely,	one	could	say	that	fraternity	is	at	the	base	of	Derrida’s	understandings	of	friendship	and	hospitality.	141	For	 example,	 see	Richard	Rorty,	Oona	Ajzenstat	 (2001),	Ronald	Paul	Blum	 (1983),	Dominique	Janicaud	(1991),	Rudi	Visker	(1997),	Michael	Newman	(2000).		
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person.  
 
It cannot be denied that common threads run through Levinas’ ethics and his 
Talmudic readings, which have not been reviewed above as they were not considered 
necessarily relevant. Transcendence and a priori responsibility constitute some of 
these threads, along with the concept of the Other. Not chosen, responsibility is 
imposed on one, before the command of the Other is uttered, just by the latter’s 
presence. This a priori reaction constitutes for Levinas “good beyond being”, a 
metaphysical understanding of good directly linked with the human being. Such a link 
has left both philosophers and Talmud experts dissatisfied. Some philosophers find 
that despite a (post)phenomenological point de départ, Levinas’ antifoundational 
responsibility and ethics is essentially related to a strong religious component, which 
renders his ethics irrelevant. For Talmud experts and theologians, on the other hand, 
his approach is deemed humanistic and more embedded in ethical philosophical 
thought than in Talmudic textual reading and understanding (Webb, 2006). A third 
line of argument, which is the one also supported by this chapter, considers that 
Levinas’ critics overstate the problem with theology in his work: “we can classify 
Levinas as a Jewish thinker in roughly the same sense that we can classify Hegel as a 
Christian thinker” (Wyschogrod, 2003:v). While his writings are inspired by Judaism 
and his language employs religious words or motifs, they do not constitute a 
theological project; instead, bringing together these aspects and the tension between 
theology and philosophy could be considered to be part of Levinas’ originality. 
 
Beyond the theological concerns about the god-like character of the face and the 
theological command supposedly entailed in the call for responsibility, the 
precognitive and prelinguistic character of the ethical encounter has attracted many 
criticisms as well. The fact that Levinas “systematically inverts the fundamental 
features of objectifying consciousness” [in Totality and Infinity, Otherwise than Being, 
Ethics and Infinity and elsewhere] (Perpich: 2008:57), leaves us, readers and 
commentators, at a bit of a loss. This happens because, if we are to accept that the 
ethical encounter exists beyond cognition and is indeed precognitive, then this means 
that any effort to grasp ethics through language is doomed to failure, “perpetually 
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hostage to the ontological and totality” (May, 1997:147). 142  The perception that 
Levinas’ ethics is couched in precognitive experiences, which cannot be made 
philosophically explicit or fully justified by discursive means, betrays a certain, 
positively viewed ethical non-cognitivism that is very common in Levinas’ champions. 
Levinas himself, when pressed on this point of justification, refers to small gestures of 
common courtesy as examples, such as “After you, Sir” or simply “Hello” (Perpich, 
2008:55–77). Like Diane Perpich, I am not in favour of treating this problem either by 
ironing it out with ethical non-cognitivism, as Levinas’ apologists seem to do, or by 
accepting it as a stumbling block, which proves Levinas’ project to be untenable, 
philosophically flawed or “of interest to those who share a penchant for the 
impossible” (ibid.). On the contrary, and as already argued in this chapter, I find these 
exact tensions in the unsolvable question of the authority behind the Other’s 
command, and the nascent experience of responsibility, as constitutive of the 
innovative way ethics as the-relation-with-the-Other is conceived in Levinas' work. To 
the common question about whether the precognitive betrays the existence of faith in 
an overarching, higher power, I believe the response should be that this not be the 
case. Debates in ethics, either arguing on the basis of the greater benefit of the 
community, or based on individual reason, or the categorical imperative, or some 
other kind of universal moral requirement, are after all tainted by some kind of faith in 
an explanatory framework, which is not necessarily based on reason. Furthermore, I 
find that judging the recourse to a utilitarian calculus or an appeal to the intrinsic 
rights of individuals as better frameworks for the ethical relation is not less 
problematic in terms of ethical non-cognitivism.  
 
I think that the most important critique in the context of my project, and hospitality in 
general, remains that against the third (and eventually of fraternity, if this were to be 
taken up by poststructuralist IR). As seen earlier, poststructuralist scholarship, which 
is sympathetic to Levinas’ work and makes use of it, finds the concept of the third to 
be the point at which either a leap of faith has to be made, or where Levinas needs to 
be supplemented or even given up as a lost cause (for instance, Campbell, 1994:466–8; 
Dauphinee, 2007:25–6). “Ethics is suspended at the border crossing,” suggests 
Dauphinee to this effect, and, quoting Patricia Molloy, “on the other side of the 
border, (…) we find the potential transformation of alterity into enmity” (Molloy, 
                                                        142	This	is	also	one	of	the	main	criticisms	of	Derrida	in	Violence	and	Metaphysics	(2001:95).	
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1999:213 quoted in Dauphinee, 2007:26). I find this approach to be misleading. While 
Levinas may have failed to put into practice his own theorisation of how the 
responsibility to the Other might be bridged with the third, for instance when he 
eclipsed the Palestinians from the possible Others the Self or Selves are responsible 
for,143 this does not mean his stance towards the third cannot be useful. As Butler 
suggests, “to make use of Levinas (…) is precisely to read him against his own 
Zionism” in this specific case (2014:39). This is what I am also proposing: one needs to 
depart from the weaknesses these concepts may represent and make the interpretative 
choice to use Levinasian ethics, and specifically the concept of fraternity, as “a way of 
thinking about the relationship between representation and humanisation” (Critchley, 
2004:140) and of being alert and responding to the face as a “means to be awake to 
what is precarious in another life, or, rather the precariousness of life itself” (Butler, 
2006:134). A recasting of fraternity, as the one I attempted earlier, may recover it as a 
core Levinasian concept developed to resist homogeneity and totalisation. I believe 
that we need to engage with the disquieting necessity of the passage from ethics to 
politics that defines Levinas’ work, overcoming the paralysis or resignation usually 
deriving from this passage by establishing a hiatus – a move which disregards the main 
traditional criticisms against the Levinasian oeuvre.  
 
In considering how to deconstruct the common poststructuralist criticisms of the third 
and fraternity explored above, I believe that there is a counterintuitive need to see 
how most of these criticisms rely on Derrida’s own deconstruction of Levinas. It is not 
accidental that Derrida’s reading seems to appear in most poststructuralist studies of 
ethics and hospitality “in the same breath” with expositions of Levinas’ work.144 Done 
with stern rigour, Derrida’s critique represents a disagreement on more points than he 
openly admits, and yet at the same time he still finds a way to engage deeply with and 
to praise these aspects of Levinas’ work. Bankovsky argues that the most obvious 
                                                        
143 Both	Campbell	(1994)	and	Dauphinee,	(2007),	among	others,	pick	up	on	this,	and	it	is	this	that	Dauphinee	 is	 referring	 to	when	 she	makes	 the	 statement	 quoted	 above.	 It	 relates	 to	 a	 comment	Levinas	 made	 in	 1982	 on	 French	 Radio	 regarding	 the	 who	 of	 the	 Other	 in	 the	 Israel-Palestine	conflict,	 soon	 after	 the	 Sabra	 and	 Shatila	 massacre: “My	 definition	 of	 the	 Other	 is	 completely	different.	 The	 other	 is	 the	 neighbour,	 who	 is	 not	 necessarily	 kin,	 but	 who	 can	 be.	 But	 if	 your	neighbour	attacks	another	neighbour	or	treats	him	unjustly,	what	can	you	do?	Then	alterity	takes	on	 another	 character,	 in	 alterity	 we	 can	 find	 an	 enemy,	 or	 at	 least	 then	 we	 are	 faced	 with	 the	problem	of	knowing	who	is	right	and	who	is	wrong,	who	is	just	and	who	is	unjust.	There	are	people	who	are	wrong”	(Levinas	cited	in	Caygill,	2002:192). 144	See	for	instance	Baker’s	chapter	on	Levinas	from	his	book	on	hospitality	(2011a:73-89):	half	of	the	chapter	is	dedicated	to	Derrida’s	interpretation	and	criticism	of	Levinas’	work.	
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manner of thanking, giving thanks by simply and obviously praising Levinas’s work, 
assumes a fully determined context and instantiates what Derrida calls “a dominant 
interpretation” (Derrida, 1991:37).  
 
Derrida thus follows closely the Levinasian steps, praising the pre-eminence of ethics, 
the need for Greek/Western logocentricity to take a back seat and the importance of 
the move beyond a subject-based envisaging of the world. For many, he is the reason 
behind the rekindling of interest in Levinas’ work (Alford, 2002; Atterton and Calarco, 
2010; etc.) while Levinasian ethics are considered to “provid[e] an ethical basis” for the 
Derrida’s main deconstructionist concepts. Of course the relation is much more 
complicated than that. While Derrida seems unconditionally to embrace Levinasian 
precepts when he says that “[f]aced with a thinking like that of Levinas, I never have 
an objection. I am ready to subscribe to everything he says” (Guibal and Breton, 
1986:74), he at the same time doubts whether what Levinas attempts is feasible, 
namely to define ethics against a western view of philosophy with its totality of Logos, 
while at the same time using this exact Logos/language.  
 
The Derridean influence on the question of feasibility is palpable in the critiques made 
by others against the third and fraternity, some of which were presented above. The 
view of such critics is that the third and fraternity involve a peaceful and non-violent 
relation with the Others, since they take the Other to be primordially Good, whereas 
Derrida considers alterity as being “inextricable for a notion of constitutive violence” 
(Hagglund, 2004:40). Finally, they press on Derrida’s criticism that Levinas’ approach 
constitutes a reduction of metaphysics in which the ethical is not only subordinated to 
reason but essentially cast aside, dissociated from metaphysics (see Heidegger’s 
suggestion that ethics as a term appears only at the moment “when thinking loses its 
hold” (1967:147, quoted in Derrida, 2001b:397)), and then finally erased, with the 
relationship to the Other being part of the archia, i.e., “of all reference to a centre, to a 
subject, to a privileged reference, to an origin” (ibid. 268). Talking of the pre-eminence 
of the question of Being as the main category in Western episteme, here Derrida 
underlines the importance of the Self in defining any other category, the relationship 
to the Other included. Interestingly, he fails to highlight here the fact that the word 
archia (the origin) neighbours arche, which mean power, with the two words in essence 
sharing a lexical root, both in the meanings of “origin/beginning” and “power”.  
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I believe that Levinas can teach us something more than Derrida suggests, namely that 
the relation with the third can be constitutive of violence and embrace a character of 
ethical responsibility. As the present waves of individual or non-centrally organised 
solidarity towards undocumented migrants in Lesvos, near Idomeni and elsewhere 
show us, this is possible. Therefore, there is a contradiction when Campbell (and 
others alongside him like Dauphinée, 2007; Baker, 2011) suggests, on one hand, that 
the move from the ethical to the political, i.e., from the incommensurate responsibility 
to the Other to the responsibility to the third (party) as it were, is a totalising move, 
involving a universalising component (Campbell, 1998a) and, on the other, that the 
Levinasian thought is still “appealing because it maintains that there is no 
circumstance under which we would declare that it was not our concern” (Campbell, 
1998a:176). A choice needs to be made: to sustain an ethics founded on the face-to-
face relationship with the Other while fighting for a politics that is informed by this 
relationship restrains “those who follow Cain’s position and ignore the responsibility 
for the Other” (Simmons, 1999:98). 
  
For Derrida, Levinas “oriented our gazes towards what is happening today”, the 
throngs of strangers and foreigners in all places of the earth, which by their presence 
and in themselves “call for a change in the socio- and geo-political space – a juridico-
political mutation, though, before this, assuming that this limit still has any 
pertinence, an ethical conversion” (Derrida, 1999a:71–2). Despite his disagreement, 
Derrida recognises that the Levinasian approach reaches a previously unseen height 
and level of penetration, which draws inspiration from a messianic eschatology which 
is neither theology, nor Jewish mysticism, nor dogmatics, nor morality; “it seeks to be 
understood within a recourse to experience itself” and what is most irreducible within 
experience, “the passage and departure towards the Other” (1999:103). This “naked 
experience” (2001:83) of the Self struggling to ethically establish and meet the needs 
of a responsibility towards the Others takes place in the autoimmunitary aspect of 
hospitality. I explore this in the next chapter.  
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  DERRIDA: HOSPITALITY AS THRESHOLD  4 /
 
 
Introduction  
In mid-January 2014, approximately five nautical miles off the coast of Turkey and 
near the Greek islet of Farmakonisi, twelve non-Europeans, including babies and 
children, were drowned. Amid adverse weather conditions, their boat had capsized 
during an attempt by the Greek coastguard to tow the old smuggling boat. Accounts of 
what happened are contradictory: survivors argue that they were being pushed back to 
Turkey, shouted at and threatened, and that the drowned were inadvertently killed; 
Greek authorities, on the other hand, argue that they were towing the boat to Greek 
waters and safety, that the conditions did not allow for the people on the old, adrift 
vessel to be taken aboard the coastguard’s vessel, that the “illegal” immigrants coming 
from Asia did not know anything about the sea and navigating, how to swim or orient 
themselves (Hellenic Coastguard, 2014). By gathering on one side of the boat after one 
of them fell overboard, they caused the vessel to capsize themselves. A contradiction, 
which although it might not make much of a difference in the end result (the majority 
on board were drowned), in essence symbolises the contradiction between the law and 
its application, the threshold between the force of the law and its absence, all defined 
by the presence of violence. Violence is not only to be found at the origin of law, as 
Derrida discusses in the “Force of Law” (1990),145 but as Farmakonisi and similar 
incidents show, it is also inherent in the law’s existence, application and 
misapplication (depending on which account one believes in the example above, the 
migrants’ or the authorities’).  
 
As an incident, Farmakonisi and its dead were far from exceptional: it followed on the 
tragic incident in October 2013 about a quarter of a mile from the Italian island of 
Lampedusa, where a much bigger boat sank after suffering engine failure, resulting in 
the deaths of more than 360 immigrants. Similar incidents would follow,146 locations 
                                                        145	There	Derrida	traces	the	birth	and	authority	of	 law	back	to	the	founding	moment	in	which	the	violent	origin	creates	it.	146	The	 October	 2013	 incident	 in	 Lampedusa	 has	 been	 recently	 officially	 commemorated	 (see	European	 Commission,	 Statement/14/296,	 02.10.2014)	 amid	 criticisms	 of	 EU	 officials	 and	 the	Italian	government	 (see,	 for	example,	http://tinyurl.com/WJSonLampedusa)	and	of	 their	policies,	which	followed	the	tragic	event.	Despite	the	immediate	setting	up	of	the	Mare	Nostrum	operation	by	Italy	and	the	emergence	of	EU	plans	for	Operation	Triton	(discussed	in	the	conclusion),	this	did	
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changing depending on relaxation or strengthening of controls at points of entry.147 In 
the last decade alone, there have been more than 17,500 recorded deaths in the 
Mediterranean of people trying to reach the European continent, a figure that excludes 
missing persons, while the UNHCR said 3,419 had died in the first eleven months of 
2014.148 What makes cases like Farmakonisi stand out, though, is the clear implication 
that the deaths were caused by a sustained, albeit unofficial, push-back policy, which 
seems to have become common practice in southern Europe and the western world in 
general. Similar deaths occur because of the externalisation of borders 149  and 
detention centres located in third countries, where lack of transparency in procedures 
and of respect for human rights, combined often with unstable or transitional local 
politics, allows violence against people on the move and in transit to go unnoticed. In 
this context, Farmakonisi is an exemplar of a “new” hospitality landscape: while states 
profess to abide by general hospitality-related treaties, of which the principle of non-
refoulement is the main pillar, the practice of push-backs and other borderline illegal 
actions resulting in deaths are common, as observed by NGOs and proved by 
occasional court rulings not only in Europe but on the US–Mexican border and 
elsewhere.  
 
I argue that the problem is not just the misapplication of the law: even if hospitality 
treaties and laws were properly applied, a utopian condition, if one exists, would not 
curtail violence. As discussed earlier, the law may entail violence both in its origins 
and application, and it is my contention that it is particularly laws bearing on 
                                                                                                                                                                  not	prevent	other	incidents	occurring,	such	as	the	ones	in	May	2014,	when	over	400	were	rescued	from	 a	 sinking	 vessel	 near	 Lampedusa	 and	 22	 drowned	 near	 the	 island	 of	 Samos,	 not	 far	 from	Farmakonisi.	 These	 constitute	 only	 a	 few	 examples	 from	 a	 continuing	 crisis.	 The	 International	Organisation	for	Migration	confirmed	in	late	September	2014	that	more	than	3,000	migrants	have	died	 crossing	 the	Mediterranean	 in	 the	year	after	 the	October	2013	Lampedusa	 incident,	making	Europe	 the	 most	 dangerous	 destination	 for	 migrants	 (Taran	 Brian	 and	 Frank	 Laczko,	 Fatal	
Journeys:	 Tracking	 Lives	 Lost	 During	 Migration	 Report,	 IOM	 available	 at	http://tinyurl.com/IOMFatalJourneys,	last	accessed	10	October	2014).		147	Following	the	EU-Turkey	deal	for	refugee	retention	on	Turkish	soil	struck	in	March	2016,	grave	incidents	like	the	ones	in	Farmakonisi	in	2014	stopped	taking	place	in	the	Aegean	sea,	whereas	an	increase	in	drowning	reappeared	in	the	Central	Mediterranean	and	especially	in	the	waters	outside	of	Italy	(Dearden,	2016).	148	The	same	report	from	the	UN	refugee	agency	stated	that	“more	than	207,000	people	have	made	the	 risky	 sea	 crossing	 since	 January,	 almost	 three	 times	 the	 previous	 high	 of	 70,000	 during	 the	Libyan	civil	war	in	2011”.		http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_10/12/2014_545299,	 last	 accessed	 12	December	2014.		149	See,	for	example,	the	Tunisia–EU	mobility	partnership,	the	Italian–Libyan	Friendship	Treaty	and	the	 life-threatening	 dangers	 faced	 by	 possible	 refugees	 in	 countries	 in	 democratic	 transition	 or	crisis.	
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hospitality that comprise violence (often leading to death) as one of their main 
constitutive elements, due to their exclusionary framework and the results of their 
application. Derived from predefined policy strategies, these laws fail to reflect the 
needs of an increasing worldwide mobility and allow for loose interpretations and the 
violence that ensues. Therefore, the problem is not only that the law fails, but that it is 
allowed to do so without being challenged. Can theories of ethics help us to address 
this conceptually? And if so, how? 
 
As seen in chapters one and two, the main theoretical approaches to hospitality are 
defined by subject-based understandings of Otherness and a lordship/bondage view of 
the stranger. As such, the hospitality debate is entrapped in an economic circle of 
provision and profit, of brain-drain considerations and quotas, of skilled immigration 
and minimisation of asylum provision, caught in essence in a constant antithetical 
movement between assimilation and criminalisation of the Other and embedded in a 
gradually more strictly securitised and militarised context. Unfortunately, traditional 
ethical approaches are deemed insufficient to substantively address the Other as the 
possible “object of the law” in the cases of Farmakonisi, Lampedusa, detention camps, 
etc., since in such cases the Other is in essence abject, considered and treated as 
human refuse, allowed to be missing, drowned, uncountable, vanished. Later, I will 
examine the example of the camp for strangers as a locus where this theorising of the 
Other materialises. My contention is that while biopolitical approaches provide useful 
tools with which to read the militarisation of border management and treatment of the 
Other, they fail, nonetheless, to distance themselves from a hierarchical Self/Other 
relationality, taking thus the existence of violence as a given and leaving it 
unchallenged, on the one hand, and depriving the Other of any subjectivity or 
confining it to a circle of constant resistance and flight, on the other.  
 
In this chapter, I follow on my argument that hospitality, in the Levinasian and 
Derridean understanding, is the main theoretical approach that can effectively address 
the aforementioned shortcomings. As I argued in the previous chapter through the 
concept of fraternity, this is a hospitality that engenders a theoretical space where all 
Others can be taken into consideration without the ethicality of the encounter being 
necessarily undermined. Here I will suggest that this is also an approach where the 
aporias inherent in hospitality are explored in an affirmative way. Hospitality of this 
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kind recognises violence as part and parcel of hospitality practices and, in doing so, 
allows ways to challenge and curtail it. 
 
I construct my argument by initially looking at the figure of the threshold (section 
4.1): as the actual border but also as the limit between life and death and the step 
between hospitality and no hospitality. This limit and how it symbolised the fear for 
the worst, i.e., the totalising violence against the Other, is explored in section 4.2. I 
then look at hospitality’s unconditionality/impossibility and the famous Derridean 
juxtaposition between conditional and unconditional hospitality, and then at the 
threshold of undecidability between them, in 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. I finally turn to 
autoimmunity, the concept, which I argue should inform us while we linger at the 
threshold of undecidability; that it should help us make a decision to embrace our 
ethical responsibility towards the Other. I am doing so in three stages: in 4.5 I first 
look at the Derridean concept of autoimmunity: autoimmunity constitutes for Derrida 
not only an attack on the body (politic) but also on the immune defences themselves, 
and it prompts the opening of the body to the “future-to-come”. As I will discuss in 
4.5, the use of autoimmunity, usually seen in IR as an inherent characteristic of 
democracies (e.g. Vaughan-Williams, 2007b), has been embedded in the discussion of 
terror and terrorism, emphasising the worst (le pire). I am here questioning whether 
autoimmunity needs to emphasise only the threat of the worst or can instead make the 
case for an opening – albeit dangerous – to the unknown, to the coming of Otherness 
beyond pre-established recognition of identity, characteristics, commonalities of the 
Other with the host organism. In this respect, I examine hospitality as a form of 
autoimmunity in 4.6, before suggesting in 4.7 the need to depart from, in the meaning 
of enriching, Derrida’s undecidable, and to see how autoimmunity actually informs it 
with an affirmative, more open, responsible welcome of the Others at the border.  
 
I apply autoimmunity in the context of hospitality in order to challenge the tendency 
towards an immunity of shutting down borders, stricter acceptance policies, economic 
considerations for the host, etc., suggesting that an autoimmunitary understanding of 
hospitality is conducive to the ethical encounter, an exposure to the Other, to the 
Self’s ethical responsibility to the singular Other and others in general as this was 
explored in the previous chapter. In contrast to the usual biomedicalisations of ethical 
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and political narratives plaguing the discourse of hospitality, 150  I argue that 
autoimmunity can have an affirmative role in accepting the Other and lies at the heart 
of the ethics of hospitality I am proposing in this thesis. Opening up to the welcome of 
the Other and to the Other as a whole may endanger us or lead to self-destruction. 
While this is a possibility that needs to be taken into account for hospitality to be 
considered really to be hospitality, I argue that more often than not this will not be the 
case. Autoimmunity will be presented below as an opening up to stranger Others 
whose arrival can have a productive and creative impact despite the fear of the 
opposite. As in the case of autoimmune diseases, which coexist within the living 
organism without killing it, and which make it adapt to a series of new ways of being, 
and as in the practical, current case of the southeast Mediterranean (discussed in 
detail in the conclusion), where the surge of people crossing the borders have not 
broken or even endangered local societies but have made them acknowledge their 
ethical responsibilities and find ways to address them, the ethics of autoimmunitary 
hospitality constitutes an imperative consideration. 
 
But let me start from the border. 
 
 
4.1 The threshold  
In La Bête et le Souverain (2009), Derrida ponders on the figure of the threshold, le seuil 
interdit,151 the banned or unutterable threshold, inquiring what it is in both senses of 
the French word interdit and finding it, crossable or not, to bear on the meaning of 
responsibility, “on the meaning and structure of certain limits, on what one must or 
must not do, that to which one must and must not respond” (Derrida, 2009:308). This 
derives from the fact that symbolically the considerations around hospitality are born 
right at the moment that someone or something arrives at the threshold of the border, 
in the initial surprise of contact with the Other, the stranger, the foreigner. For 
Derrida, the literal threshold of the border mirrors the figurative one: the “threshold 
                                                        150	I	 am	referring	here	 to	 the	media	 representation	of	migrants	as	masses	and	 influxes	of	 foreign	elements,	 bringing	 diseases;	 and	 to	 metaphors	 of	 camps	 and	 spontaneous	 gatherings	 as	 cells	causing	 problems	 to	 neighbouring	 healthy	 cells	 (of	 citizens),	 which	 need	 to	 be	 extracted	 or	eliminated	in	order	for	local	communities	to	remain	healthy.		151	As	 the	 English	 translator	 notes,	 the	 French	 adjective	 interdit	 means	 both	 “forbidden”	 and	“speechless”	or	“dumbfounded”	(Derrida,	2009:308).	
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from which one passes from reaction to response, and therefore to responsibility” 
itself provokes the need for a decision; responsibility is thus itself a threshold (Derrida, 
ibid.).152 Lingering on the threshold thus conceived, i.e., pondering both the borders 
and the need to respond to the dilemmas these pose, is not related to any 
understanding of them as solid and secure, as defined and given – as traditional 
ethical approaches would have it. On the contrary, their existence is, in the gesture of 
deconstructive thinking, always questioned; their secure existence is not taken for 
granted; whether understood as a border and indivisible frontier or as a solid 
foundational ground on which responsibility is calculated, the threshold is and should 
be under constant examination. Dwelling, examining, questioning the threshold; I will 
return to this in the next section.  
 
As seen at the beginning of this study and later in other chapters, the ethics of 
migration take the threshold for granted: the arrival at a state’s borders is clear, and 
definitions are ready: asylum seekers, refugees, or economic migrants arrive at clearly 
demarcated national entrance points. From there, they can be turned away or, more 
rarely, allowed entrance. Theoretically, since the threshold is given, there should be no 
need for a decision to be made, nor would the request from the Other’s presence there 
require a response. Similarly, the responsibility is not towards an Other, but towards 
upholding ordinary laws and regulations. However, as seen in the introduction and in 
later chapters, this is rarely the case. Borders as definitions can be messy, movable, 
overlapping and transgressed, over and over again. Farmakonisi, Lampedusa and the 
borders of Ceuta and Melilla provide cases in point. 
 
Apart from the practical threshold of the border, the threshold is also understood as 
the one between life and death, and, as is very often the case, these two thresholds 
coincide. It is in this correspondence of thresholds that the figure of the Other looms 
large and the need to consider a different kind of hospitality ethics is accentuated. The 
death of a stranger and foreigner of no status, of an undocumented migrant, at the 
border acquires a different meaning, since their Otherness is in a way “doubled”: when 
somebody dies in a foreign land or at sea, as in Farmakonisi, without a name, papers or 
                                                        152	As	 in	most	 of	 the	main	 concepts	 he	 deals	with	 in	 his	 later	works	 (hospitality,	 gift,	mourning,	sovereignty,	death),	the	threshold	is	for	Derrida	always	an	aporia,	a	philosophical	puzzle,	clouded	with	doubt.	
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any other classification assigned to her, she becomes doubly hidden and “unmissed”, 
“an even more foreign foreigner” (Derrida, 2000b:113). The myth of Oedipus and, in 
particular, Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus works as an allegory to this effect. 153 
Oedipus, previously a valiant king, now an old blind man, often considered a beggar, 
wanders in exile until he comes to rest at a place outside Athens, where he soon finds 
out that he is unwelcome and the grounds out of bounds, “not to be sat on or dwelt 
on” (Sophocles, 1999:2). His fast approaching death does not put an end to his sad 
fate, however. With his last resting place kept a secret, his daughters lament a double 
fact: that their father perished in a foreign land and that his grave will always be 
unknown, not to be found or visited, a death never to be properly mourned. “[W]ithout 
a tomb, without a localizable and circumscribed place of mourning (…). Without a 
fixed place, without a determinable topos, mourning is not allowed” (Derrida, 
2000b:111). A stranger who, upon her death, can never be mourned “by [her] relatives 
in mourning” is as if she never existed. She who was not visible at the threshold of the 
border, but instead unheard, her ethical demand unaddressed, and turned away, 
becomes even more invisible upon her death in a foreign land; she remains “doubly 
hidden”. “The invisibility, the placelessness, the illocality of an ‘of no fixed address’” 
(Derrida, 2000b:115-117) come together to underline the negation of the Other in the 
absence of an ethics of hospitality.  
 
Derrida refers to Oedipus in Of Hospitality to illustrate “this strange experience of 
hospitality transgressed, through which you die abroad, and not always at all as you 
would have wanted” (2000b:87). Like Oedipus himself, different embodiments of the 
Other are, as a result of current stringent hospitality practices and exclusionary 
hospitality ethics, lost without a grave, or in the cases where there is one, buried in 
nameless and/or mass graves, without a localisable tomb where mourning can take 
place.154 While this may read as an unnecessarily theoretical and abstract aspect of 
hospitality and of the relation with the Other, in the post-psychoanalytical and 
deconstructive vein of the more marginal ethics of mourning and memory, the 
question of death under a name, with a clearly signed burial at a place where mourning 
is possible, is of utmost importance. This is not something that eludes the strangers 
                                                        153	The	second	play	of	Sophocles’	Theban	Trilogy	(the	other	two	being	Oedipus	King	and	Antigone).		154	Mass	graves	containing	dozens	of	bodies	of	unidentified	migrants	who	died	crossing	the	border	have	 been	 found	 in	 2010	 and	 2012	 in	 Evros	 prefecture,	 near	 the	 Turkish–Greek	 land	 border	(W2EU,	2010).		
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who arrive at the threshold, either. In an interview with an undocumented immigrant 
during the Hypatia mass hunger strike for residence status in Athens in 2011,155 the 
interviewee confesses that one of the main motivations behind the hunger strike was 
the ability, upon their deaths, to have their dead bodies properly buried or sent back, 
“near [their] families, not to be left in a fridge with only a number”.156 The possibility 
of naming the Other, addressing her, and mourning her returns again as central to the 
ethics of hospitality.  
 
The threshold in that sense is central to the understanding of hospitality, but also of 
sovereignty, its indivisibility marking the limen between human and non-human 
being. “This threshold of responsibility is the same as that of liberty, without which 
there is no responsibility and therefore sovereignty. Responsibility, like liberty, 
implies something of that indivisible sovereignty accorded to what is proper to man” 
and from which one passes from reaction to response (Derrida, 2008:411–12). Seeing 
in it also an indivisible frontier and/or the solidity of a foundational ground, the 
threshold is the presupposition of every habitat, place or space rendering liberty, and 
therefore sovereignty, localisable and supervised. 157  With its “foundational or 
terrestrial, territorial, natural or technical, architectural, physical or nomic” 
indivisibility and solidity, the threshold is always the beginning of the inside or the 
beginning of the outside (Derrida, 2008:416), at the heart of every possibility.  
 
Farmakonisi is, in this respect, an ideal example of the threshold as the topos of 
hospitality: lying roughly on the sovereign borders of a state, it symbolises the fluidity 
and porosity of these borders that, along with the fluidity of mass movements, despite 
                                                        155	In	January	2011,	300	migrants	from	North	African	countries,	who	had	been	long-term	residents	in	Greece	(some	for	over	ten	years),	but	had	not	yet	been	able	to	secure,	or	had	lost,	their	residence	and	work	permits,	 decided	 to	 go	on	hunger	 strike	 in	order	 to	 force	 the	government	 to	 recognise	their	 just	 demands	 for	 rights	 and	 grant	 them	 legal	 status.	 Generally	 known	 as	 the	 Hypatia	 case,	from	 the	 name	 of	 the	 building	 where	 the	 hunger	 strikers	 found	 refuge,	 this	 hunger	 strike	 was	unprecedented	 for	Greek	 but	 also	 European	 standards	 and	 required	 a	 significant	mobilisation	 of	social	 and	 political	 resources,	 drawn	 mainly	 from	 the	 Greek	 leftist,	 antiracist	 and	 anarchist	movements,	 which	 were,	 however,	 not	 only	 unprepared	 for	 dealing	 with	 the	 demands	 of	 the	situation	but	also	divided	as	to	the	appropriateness	and	timeliness	of	the	strike.		156 	Interview	 to	 SKAI	 radio,	 28	 February	 2011,	 available	 at:	 http://tongue-in-cheek.tumblr.com/post/3582573155.	157	While	 Derrida	 refers	 here	 to	 zoological	 gardens	 and	 psychiatric	 hospitals,	 following	 up	 on	 a	previous	discussion	of	marginal	beings,	animals	and	the	mentally	ill,	the	discussion	is	applicable	to	“every	 habitat	 (familial,	 urban,	 or	 national),	 every	 place	 of	 economy	 and	 ecology	 [,	 which]	 also	presupposes	 thresholds,	 limits	 and	 therefore	 keys”	 (2008:	 414),	 and,	 as	 I	would	 like	 to	 argue,	 to	camps	for	strangers,	indeed	perhaps	par	excellence	to	camps.	
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temporary obstacles, remain incessant;158 a threshold that keeps shifting like an oasis. 
At the same time, it emphasises the debatable nature of the law itself: a threshold 
between what is legally acceptable and unacceptable, bringing out the contrasting 
interpretations of law between, in this case, two countries. With Turkey and Syria 
being the sole countries of the eastern Mediterranean that are not signatories to the 
international maritime treaties defining territorial waters,159 the respective hospitality 
responsibilities exist in a legal vacuum and are disputed. Legal thresholds are 
continuously pushed, with different sovereign entities assigning moral responsibility 
to others rather than themselves.  
 
 
4.2 Dwelling on the threshold : le pire 
Supposing that we dwelled on the threshold, we would also have endured the 
ordeal of feeling the earthquake always under way, threatening the existence of 
every threshold, threatening both its indivisibility and its foundational solidity 
(Derrida, 2009:310).  
 
The reason for constantly “feeling the earthquake”, for challenging and questioning 
set thresholds, is to avoid le pire, the worst, i.e., the worst violence(s), the totalising 
violence against the Other. Such violence is not a figment of a philosopher’s 
imagination. Its prefigurations, Derrida suggests, are already apparent, materializing 
themselves “in the name of identity”, cultural or otherwise. Looking at Europe, 
Derrida sees signs of such possible violence in current practices, policies and 
behaviours towards the Other: “we recognize all too well without yet having thought 
                                                        158	The	numbers	of	people	crossing	sea	borders	in	the	Mediterranean	has	again	increased	sharply	in	recent	years	after	the	tightening	of	land	border	controls	imposed	by	the	EU	and	its	border	agency	Frontex.	This	followed	a	few	years	that	saw	stability	in	numbers,	during	which	land	borders	were	the	 ones	 crossed	 more	 often	 in	 an	 unauthorised	 way.	 This	 proves	 once	 more	 how	 the	 political	regime	of	mobility	control	fails	in	essence	to	limit	mobility	but	instead	directs	it	to	different	routes	(UNHCR,	2015b).		159	Territorial	waters	 are	 usually	 defined	 as	 the	waters	 covering	 12	 nautical	miles	 from	 a	 state’s	coast.	Beyond	these	12	nautical	miles,	waters	are	considered	international	and	are	governed	by	the	relevant	 international	 maritime	 law.	 In	 the	 Mediterranean,	 an	 exception	 of	 six	 nautical	 miles	 is	given	due	to	the	close	proximity	of	islands	and	neighbouring	states.	In	cases	like	Farmakonisi	(and	other	islands,	which	are	often	the	stage	of	similar	tragedies	and	which	lie	very	close	to	Turkey),	the	distance	between	the	two	countries	is	less	than	five	nautical	miles,	meaning	the	actual	border	(and	thresholds	 of	 state	 responsibility)	 are	 contested.	 (I	 would	 like	 to	 thank	 Dr.	 Dimitra	 Petza	 of	 the	Greek	 Ministry	 of	 Maritime	 Affairs,	 Islands	 and	 Fisheries	 for	 her	 assistance	 with	 this	 and	 for	providing	me	with	the	necessary	literature).		
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them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or 
nationalist fanaticism” (Derrida, 1992:6). Some violence may be inevitable in the 
relation with the Other; however, it is the Self/Object understanding of 
intersubjectivity and its skewed structure, implied in traditional understandings of 
positionality, which aggravates the forms violence can take and renders le pire 
possible. This is done initially by depriving the Other of the ability to be a creator of 
value and meaning, and it is potentially further exacerbated by increasingly evolved 
tools of control, supervision and containment, such as the ones discussed in the 
following chapter. It can be argued that the technologies of surveillance, control and 
containment at the border, such as those of the camp, may herald indices of the worst 
violence. Left to themselves, such technologies can dissociate, relocate, disembody or 
dispossess the Other. Their globalising power spares no institution of hospitality. 
Because the worst violence is a force of destruction and annihilation, the threat it 
poses is infinite. 
 
This is, thus, the greatest risk: a totalising violence, arkhe- (or arché)-violence,160 
originary or foundational, which lies at the core of intersubjectivity as it is 
traditionally understood in the Self/Other schemas of domination seen earlier in this 
work, and which annuls the Other and, with her, the possibility of a future-to-come, 
                                                        160	Derrida	discusses	foundational	violence	in	his	“Force	of	Law”	(1990),	which	draws	the	attention	of	the	English-speaking	world	to	Walter	Benjamin’s	Critique	of	Violence.	There,	Benjamin	considers	the	legitimacy	of	violence	and	whether	violence	itself	can	ever	be	considered	just.	In	the	process	of	his	argument	(Benjamin,	2007:277–9),	he	explores	natural	law	(which	suggests	that	the	justness	of	ends	 guarantees	 the	 justness	 of	 means)	 and	 positive	 law	 (which	 suggests	 that	 just	 means	 will	always	produce	just	ends),	 finding	them	both	lacking,	since	they	are	part	of	a	tautological	 logic	of	means	 and	 ends	 used	 by	 the	 political	 state	 to	 justify	 its	 monopoly	 on	 violence.	 Since	 “the	most	elementary	relationship	within	any	legal	system	is	that	of	ends	to	means”,	a	standpoint	outside	both	positive	 legal	 philosophy	 and	 natural	 law	 where	 acts	 of	 violence,	 “within	 the	 sphere	 of	 means	themselves”	 could	 be	 considered,	must	 be	 found.	 Looking	 for	 such	 a	 standpoint,	 Benjamin	 notes	that	the	state’s	legal	authority	is	based	on	the	distinction	between	lawmaking	or	founding	violence	(Rechtsetzende	Gewalt)	and	law-preserving	or	conserving	violence	(Rechtserhaltlende	Gewalt)	while	the	 state	 itself	 is	 founded	 by	 an	 original	 violent	 act	 that	 precedes	 any	 state	 violence.	 Benjamin	states	 that	 all	 violence	 has	 to	 be	 one	 or	 the	 other,	 otherwise	 “it	 forfeits	 all	 validity”.	 He	 finds,	however,	 that	 there	 is	a	contamination	between	the	 two,	as	 in	 the	case	of	 the	police	 for	 instance,	which,	 in	 its	actions,	 is	both	 lawmaking	and	 law	preserving	(2007:286–7).	This	example	helps	us	understand	 how	 every	 act	 of	 lawmaking	 violence	 anticipates	 its	 preservation,	 blurring	 therefore	the	distinction.	For	Benjamin,	this	contamination	shows	that	the	state	exists	in	a	condition	of	decay.		In	“Force	of	Law”,	a	seminal	text	in	its	own	right,	especially	in	critical	legal	studies,	Derrida	in	turn	looks,	in	its	first	part,	at	the	paradoxes	inherent	in	enforcing	the	law	and	the	“mystical	foundation”	of	law,	and	then	establishes	what	is	now	a	well-known	distinction	between	deconstructible	law	and	undeconstructible	justice,	to	be	reflected	in	the	distinction	between	conditional/laws	of	hospitality	versus	unconditional/law	of	hospitality	explored	later	in	this	chapter.	Here,	the	totalising	violence	against	 the	stranger	and	Other	not	only	annuls	our	responsibility	 to	her	but	also	preserves,	as	 in	Benjamin’s	reading,	the	order	that	allows	such	violence.		
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the à-venir. For Derrida, the future-to-come, as the coming of the Other, must remain 
unpredictable and incalculable, uncertain and irreducible to any programme, in order 
for it to maintain “the undetermined messianic hope in its heart” (Derrida, 1994:81).161 
This messianic hope involves the opening to a future where the arrival of the Other 
with its open-ended impact is affirmed by our ethical responsibility towards her. Here 
Derrida already hints at the autoimmunity which I will soon discuss: even if the 
unpredictable future entails violence or self-destruction, we still have to be open to it, 
to be open to the experience of what is not foreseen or what is considered impossible 
(for instance, to accept the arrival of an unforeseen number of migrants irrespective of 
their being eligible for refugee status or not) if we are to honour our responsibility 
towards upholding justice, hospitality and ethics beyond economic calculations and 
the fear of the unknown (1994:82). 
 
The predictability can take various forms: abstraction, partitioning, possession, 
objectification, reproduction, religion, absolute knowledge and state violence,162 but in 
the case of hospitality, predictability comes in the form of programming, calculating, 
implementing immigration parameters and in the prescriptions of hospitality laws in 
general. Justice instead lies in the realm of the incalculable, reigns in the undecidable, 
asks for the experience of the aporia, of the impossible experience (Borradori, 
2003:168). If justice is divorced from hospitality laws, if it does not inform them, the 
law can be reduced to pure violence, and this is when the worst (le pire) may take 
place: in the form of totalitarianism, of total annihilation, even in the form of the 
Holocaust (Derrida, 1990). No calculation or humanism can be measured against this 
excess.  
 
The worst violence is, therefore, a force of destruction, of annihilation, and is 
combined in Derrida with radical evil. Despite borrowing the notion from Kant’s 
Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793), Derrida understands it in a rather 
different way. While in Kant (and other philosophers) humans have an innate 
                                                        161	See	 the	 overall	 discussion	 of	 Fukuyama	 and	 others	 in	 chapter	 two	 of	 the	 Specters	 of	 Marx	(1994:61–95),	 from	 where	 the	 citation	 above	 also	 comes.	 In	 brief,	 there	 Derrida	 criticises	 the	aversion	 to	 open-endedness	 that	 thinkers	 like	 Fukuyama	 –	 but	 also	 Hegelian	 and	 Marxist	approaches	–	show	when	they	envisage	the	future.	Their	aversion	walks	hand	in	hand	with	a	fear	of	alterity	as	they	look	forward	to	a	single,	closed,	predictable	future.	162	See,	 for	 example,	 Derrida’s	 “Force	 of	 Law”	 (1990),	 Specters	 of	Marx	 (1994),	 Of	 Spirit	 (1989),	
Archive	Fever	 (1995),	Philosophy	in	a	Time	of	Terror	 (2003)	(to	name	only	a	 few	of	his	works)	 for	discussions	of	the	incarnations	of	predictability.		
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propensity to evil even as they are equally predisposed towards good, and it is a matter 
of free will to which one they will resort, in Derrida the radical evil is already present 
in the good that one strives to attain.163 Recognising this is of the essence: the 
possibility of evil is not only inherent in all ethical judgments but it is what makes 
judgment ethical in the first place. Accepting the person arriving at the border without 
knowing the eventuality of such a move (and not as a result of mere calculation and 
prescription) is what makes our decision to accept them an ethical one.164 What is the 
threshold, then, if not the step between hospitality and no hospitality?  
 
 
4.3 ‘Step of Hospitality/No Hospitality’  
Let us say yes to who or what turns up, before any determination, before any 
anticipation, before any identification, whether or not it has to do with a 
foreigner, an immigrant, an invited guest, or an unexpected visitor, whether or 
not the new arrival is the citizen of another country, a human, animal, or 
divine creature, a living or a dead thing, male or female. (Derrida, 2000b:77) 
 
Derrida dedicated a series of seminars to “hospitality” in 1996. Of those, only two have 
been published, in Of Hospitality (1997 in French/2000b in English): the “Foreigner 
Question” and “Step of Hospitality/No Hospitality”, delivered by Derrida in Paris in 
January 1996. While he exhorts us to say yes to anyone or anything that turns up, 
Derrida readily recognises that this is practically impossible and that implementing it 
directly into politics may risk generating perverse effects (2005a:131). This 
impossibility is another threshold to ponder, one of deciding between hospitality and 
no hospitality, a threshold intelligently conveyed with the same exact expression in 
French for both notions: pas d’hospitalité.165 The impossible is another threshold on 
                                                        163	This	has	raised	a	vast	debate	regarding	Derrida’s	(a)theism	or	negative	theology,	a	discussion	of	which	 is	 not	 necessary	 here.	 For	 this,	 see	 Hagglund	 (2008),	 Caputo	 (1996,	 1997),	 and	 Kearney	(2009).	What	is	interesting	to	retain	from	this	discussion	is	Hagglund’s	rejection	of	the	notion	that	there	has	been	an	ethical-religious	“turn”	in	Derrida’s	thinking,	leading	the	former	to	argue	instead	that	a	radical	atheism	informed	the	latter’s	writing	“from	beginning	to	end”	(Hagglund,	2008:1).	164	“[T]he	thought	of	‘radical	evil’	here	is	not	concerned	with	it	as	an	eventuality.	It	is	simply	that	the	
possibility	of	something	evil,	or	of	some	corruption,	the	possibility	of	the	non-accomplishment,	or	of	some	failure,	is	ineradicable.	And	it	is	so	because	it	is	the	condition	for	every	felicity,	every	positive	value	 –	 the	 condition	 for	 ethics	 for	 instance.	 So,	 if	 you	 want	 to	 eradicate	 the	 possibility	 of	 this	negative	 then	 you	 destroy	 what	 you	 want	 to	 save.	 Thus	 ethics	 couldn’t	 be	 ethical	 without	 the	ineradicable	possibility	of	evil.	(That’s	why	it	is	not	simply	Kantian	–	although	it	has	something	to	do	with	Kant.)	 The	possibility	 of	 infelicity,	 non-fulfillment,	 is	 part	 of	what	 it	 is	 that	we	want	 to	 save	under	the	name	of	ethics,	politics,	felicity,	fulfillment,	and	so	on”	(Derrida,	2000:352).		165	Pas	means	in	French	the	step,	and	is	also	the	negative	particle/adverb	forming	the	negation	in	the	 French	 language.	 See	 the	 discussion	 of	 pas	 as	 step/negative	 particle	 in	 Aporias	 (Derrida,	1993:6–11).	
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which to linger.  
 
As in the case of the Levinasian understanding of subject and Other, possible and 
impossible should not be seen as an antithetical pair nor as a hierarchical relation. For 
Derrida, the possible “is” the impossible, since the one undermines even as it fortifies 
the other; they exist within and sustain one another, beyond “a simple word game, a 
playful paradox or dialectical facility” (Derrida, 2002b:350). “The impossible has 
already occurred,” argued Derrida as early as 1964, in his discussion of Levinas’ Totality 
and Infinity.166 The demand of the Other has in some way been articulated to us the 
minute she appears at the border, “the question has begun” (2001b:98) before we even 
notice, our response is thus pending, and fulfilling it properly is practically impossible. 
Does this impossibility render hospitality and our responsibility towards the Other 
void? On the contrary, and as in the concept of fraternity discussed in the previous 
chapter, the impossibility inherent in being absolutely open and, in practical terms, 
exposed towards the Other who comes, despite the fear of whatever nefarious 
consequences this arrival may cause, lies at the heart of the ethics of hospitality and 
ethics in general (Derrida, 2002b:347–353). Keeping the entailed risks in mind, “we 
cannot and must not dispense with the reference to an unreserved hospitality. It is an 
absolute pole, without which the desire, the concept and experience, and the very 
thought of hospitality would not make any sense” (2005a:131). 
 
This impossible in essence coincides with unconditional hospitality, its pure form is a 
“transgressive step” both for the invited guest and the visitor: “transgressive” because 
they are to step over what in practice may be uncrossable thresholds; unconditional 
hospitality asks us to go from difficulty to difficulty, from impossibility to 
impossibility,  
 
as though hospitality were the impossible: as though the law of hospitality 
defined this very impossibility, as if it were only possible to transgress it, as 
though the law of absolute, unconditional, hyperbolical hospitality, as though 
the categorical imperative of hospitality commanded that we transgress all the 
laws (in the plural) of hospitality, namely, the conditions, the norms, the rights 
                                                        166	In	“Violence	and	Metaphysics”,	first	translated	in	English	in	1978;	I	am	using	the	2001	edition	in	this	thesis.	
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and the duties that are imposed on host and hostess. (Derrida, 2000b:75–6)  
 
Apart from being impossible in practical terms, unconditional hospitality cannot be 
organised, either on a state level or otherwise. Ce qui arrive, arrive – whatever happens, 
happens, whoever comes, comes – is what unconditional hospitality stipulates. In 
addition, it is only when understood in these terms that hospitality is worthy of its 
name (Derrida, 2003: 129). While it cannot be organised, it is exactly through pure and 
unconditional hospitality, in its hyperbolic definition and as a standard so high that it 
is impossible to meet, that hospitality as understood in everyday terms, i.e., 
conditional hospitality, exists. “Pure hospitality, unconditional or infinite, cannot and 
should not be other thing than the exposition to risk. If I am certain that the comer I 
am receiving is perfectly inoffensive, innocent and will be beneficial to me (…) this is 
not hospitality” (Seffahi, 1999:169). Similarly, a state that provides to the stranger 
from its surplus, “from generosity or good nature” or according to measures of 
convenience, is not acting on hospitality (Seffahi, 1999:174). “For to be what it ‘must’ 
be, hospitality must not pay a debt or be governed by a duty” (Derrida, 2000b:83). 
Unmotivated and unpredictable, the giving of hospitality can only exist in such a 
vacuum of incentives.  
 
This understanding of unconditional hospitality and our duty to respond have often 
been criticised as utopian or for undermining the space (the home, the state) that 
makes conditional hospitality possible in the first place. Along these lines, German 
journalist Thomas Assheuer, interviewing Derrida in 1998, suggests that the notion of 
“tout autre/the wholly other”,167 could be used as a new name for utopia. Derrida, albeit 
defending the critical powers of utopia and the latter’s resistance against “’realistic’ or 
‘pragmatic’ cop-outs”, refutes such an association, distinguishing the impossible from 
the dreams, demobilisation and inaction the conceptualisation of utopia usually points 
to. The impossible has instead duration, proximity and urgency (2005a:130–1) and 
constitutes the core challenge for an ethical decision. Instead of being utopic, it is 
aporetic. Understood in this way, the impossible is something deconstruction 
                                                        167	Tout	autre	est	tout	autre,	the	wholly	other	is	every	other:	Derrida	considers	the	wholly	other	to	be	every	human	being,	in	their	singularity,	without	the	need	for	this	Other	human	being	to	have	a	recognisable,	 fixed	 and	 foreseeable	 identity	 in	 order	 to	 be	 accepted	 and	 to	 be	 able	 to	 demand	 a	commitment	 of	 unconditional	 responsibility	 (2002a),	 a	 type	 of	 bond	 not	 defined	 by	 their	membership	 in	 a	 community	 or	 state	 or	 other	 grouping	 (1994).	 See	 also	 Vaughan-Williams’	discussion	of	singularity	to	this	effect	(2007).		
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constantly engages with (Attridge, 2010: 59).168 Striving to reach the impossible in the 
context of hospitality, I argue, does not negate conditionality but informs it to the 
greatest possible extent. The commitment to unconditional hospitality does not 
destroy the main positions of the host and the Self, the inside part of the borders, but 
instead opens them up to the greatest possible extent towards the unknown and the 
real meaning of being ethical, responsible and just.  
 
Conditional hospitality, on the other hand and contrary to common understanding, 
also constitutes a transgressive step:  
 
it is as though the laws (plural) of hospitality, in marking limits, powers, rights, 
and duties, consisted in challenging and transgressing the law of hospitality, 
the one that would command that the “new arrival”, be offered an 
unconditional welcome (Derrida, 2000b:76). 
 
Such understanding presupposes that hospitality is only understood as an unreserved 
gesture against traditional understandings, which would consider it in the same 
wavelength as tolerance and charity, or as a necessary gesture for fulfilling a state’s 
economic or other (self-)interests. Laws, rights and duties that derive from conditional 
hospitality, albeit necessary in practice, are always bound to fall short of the spirit of a 
hospitality deserving to be so called. The stranger and Other is welcomed with 
conditions or on condition (Ahmed, 2012:43): these range from the time of her stay to 
questions of personal merit, from her usefulness to the host to issues of successful 
integration. In the case of the irregular or undocumented migrant she is often 
unconditionally turned away. As such, conditional hospitality constitutes a 
transgression of unconditional hospitality. 
 
This other side of the transgressive step is something that Kant has missed, according 
to Derrida. More concretely, the former is missing the inherent tension and 
contradiction between “the law, in the absolute singular” and “the laws in the plural”. 
Hence, in attempting to conceive a law of hospitality in juridical terms, Kant is in 
                                                        168	Derek	 Attridge,	 in	 his	 discussion	 of	 deconstruction’s	 involvement	with	 the	 impossible,	 cites	 a	long	 list	of	Derridean	statements	over	 the	years	 that	relate	 the	experience	of	 the	 impossible	with	deconstruction	in	general	and	concretely	with	the	concepts	of	the	gift,	law,	responsibility,	decision,	hospitality,	etc.	(2010:60).		
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essence destroying the principle he has set out to create. “The law and the laws [of 
hospitality] are both contradictory, antinomic, and inseparable (…), [t]hey incorporate 
one another at the moment of excluding one another” (Derrida, 2000b:81). Contrary to 
the Kantian understanding, hospitality cannot come about by acting “in accordance 
with duty” or even “from or out of duty”, as Kant distinguishes.169  
 
For if I practice hospitality “out of duty”, this hospitality of paying up is no 
longer an absolute hospitality, it is no longer graciously offered beyond debt and 
economy, offered to the [O]ther, a hospitality invented for the singularity of the 
new arrival, of the unexpected visitor (Derrida, 2000b:83).170 
 
 
4.4 The threshold of undecidability  
The law [of unconditional hospitality] is above the laws. It is thus illegal, 
transgressive, outside the law, like a lawless law, nomos anomos, law above the 
laws and law outside the law (...) But even while keeping itself above the laws of 
hospitality, the unconditional law of hospitality needs the laws, it requires them. 
This demand is constitutive. It wouldn’t be effectively unconditional, the law, if 
it didn’t have to become effective, concrete, determined, if that were not its being 
as having-to-be. It would risk being utopian, abstract, illusory and so turning 
over into its opposite. In order to be what it is, the law thus needs the laws. 
(Derrida, 2000b:79) 
 
These two understandings of hospitality are therefore heterogeneous, i.e., they can be 
bridged only “by an absolute leap beyond knowledge and power” and are at the same 
time indissociable. Opening my door to the Other is not without risk, does not occur 
                                                        169	Kant	in	the	Groundwork	of	the	Metaphysic	of	Morals	argues	that	only	acts	performed	out	of	duty	have	 moral	 worth.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 acts	 performed	 merely	 in	 accordance	 with	 duty	 are	worthless	 (these	 still	 deserve	 approval	 and	 encouragement),	 but	 that	 special	 esteem	 is	 given	 to	acts,	which	are	performed	out	of	duty.	170	Discussing	duty	elsewhere,	Derrida	comments	in	relation	to	Kierkegaard	that	 if	duty	is	obeyed	“only	in	terms	of	duty,	I	am	not	fulfilling	my	relation	to	God.	In	order	to	fulfill	my	duty	towards	God,	I	must	 not	 act	 out	 of	 duty,	 by	 means	 of	 that	 form	 of	 generality	 that	 can	 always	 be	 mediated	 and	communicated	 and	 that	 is	 called	duty.	 (…)	 ‘The	duty	becomes	duty	by	being	 traced	back	 to	God’	(Kierkegaard,	 1983:68).	 Kant	 explains	 that	 to	 act	morally	 is	 to	 act	 ‘out	 of	 duty’	 and	 not	 only	 ‘by	conforming	to	duty’.	Kierkegaard	sees	acting	‘out	of	duty’,	in	the	universalisable	sense	of	the	law,	as	a	dereliction	of	one’s	absolute	duty.	It	is	in	this	sense	that	absolute	duty	(towards	God	and	the	in	the	singularity	 of	 faith)	 implies	 a	 sort	 of	 gift	 or	 sacrifice	 that	 functions	 beyond	 both	 debt	 and	 duty,	beyond	duty	as	a	form	of	debt”	(Derrida,	2008:64).		
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without giving something determinate; the unconditional therefore needs to be 
inscribed in the conditional, otherwise it may remain inexistent (2003:129–130). This 
is the paradox and the aporia of hospitality.171  
 
The place of the aporia of hospitality is the threshold; hospitality is a threshold 
phenomenon for Michael Naas, “another way of saying that it is and must remain, in 
its every conceptuality, an open question” (2002:154). A philosophical puzzle or a state 
of puzzlement, aporia hides in its form, the privative morpheme a- and -poros, the 
essence of hospitality. Poros being the passing, the crossing over (usually of a sea or 
river), aporia is the impasse, the topos of without-passage. In “Beyond Aporia?”, Sarah 
Kofman (1988) underlines the inherent difficulties in translating poros and aporia and 
their semantic richness. They are in essence untranslatable:  
 
to recognise the untranslatability of poros and aporia is to indicate that there is 
something about the terms, which Plato borrows from a whole tradition, that 
breaks with a philosophical conception of translation, and with the logic of 
identity that it implies. (Kofman, 1988:9–10)  
 
The terms pertain instead “to the logic of the intermediary” (Kofman, 1988:27). As 
with the case of conditional and unconditional hospitality, these terms do not exist 
within the limits of a binary logic but instead coexist and interact in a non-dialectical 
movement. Aporia is for Kofman the mother of philosophy and at the same time 
analogous to the sea in its chaotic expanse and ceaseless movement (Kofman, 1988:10, 
17). This aporetic space, which “Plato likens to Tartarus172 – a chaos without bounds, 
the intolerable itself” (Naas, 2008a:60), is filled with indeterminacy and uncertainty 
that in their turn render any decision difficult or impossible.  
 
The need to remain at this threshold is indeed disorienting and even paradoxical: if 
hospitality is the aporetic experience as Derrida suggests, how can one experience the 
aporia? Can aporia be experienced? How can chaos or a passing, which is never 
traceable, like a path traced in water or on the sea surface, be experienced?173 The 
                                                        171	See	Derrida	(1993:13–21)	for	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	Derridean	aporia(s).	172	Below	Hades,	Tartarus	in	Greek	mythology	was	where	souls	where	judged	after	death.		173	“What	would	such	an	experience	be?”	asks	Derrida	 in	Aporias.	 “The	word	also	means	passage,	
 202 
answer is tentatively affirmative, but we need to be warned that there is a sort of 
double bifurcation in the aporetic experience, what Derrida calls “the aporetic 
crossroads”, a sort of “double postulation, contradictory double movement, double 
constraint or double bind [that] paralyzes and opens hospitality, holding it over itself 
in holding it out to the other, depriving it of and bestowing on it its chance” (Derrida, 
2000a:15). The task, therefore, can never be simple: thinking and deciding about 
hospitality is akin to attempting to address an aporia from within an aporia. Our 
thinking and deciding will need to be aporetic both in their nature and their locality; 
and it is at this aporetic locality that “political, juridical, and ethical responsibilities 
have their place” (Derrida, 2003:130).  
 
This aporetic topos is the undecidability. Any attempt to reach a decision without 
crossing the aporia or lingering on its threshold is one that has fundamentally failed to 
take its responsibility to the Other or the decision’s effect on the Other seriously into 
consideration. A decision based on such an attempt, that is, on certainty and 
calculation, reveals instead a conception of responsibility owed towards a state of 
affairs, a system of rules, the state or other ruling body, not a responsibility towards 
the Other, either as a stranger, a foreigner or as a fellow member in a shared 
community. Decisions based solely on calculability and certainty of rules are apt to 
entertain a totalising perception of the Other, of categorisable figures, falling neatly in 
undeniable strategies and courses of action. In the case of Farmakonisi, the obvious 
decision to be taken was either to keep the foreigners from crossing illegally, out of 
Greek waters and inside the Turkish border or later, when things went awry, to save 
the strangers who managed not to drown, according to the obligation under the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (“SOLAS”), to which Greece is a 
signatory. The fact that the first decision to push back seemed so obvious and was 
followed without questioning was, according to most reports, what led so many people 
to their deaths in the case of Farmakonisi and elsewhere (ProAsyl, 2013). The need for 
a decision based on calculation and certainty is an attempt “at freeing oneself from the 
                                                                                                                                                                  traversal,	endurance,	and	rite	of	passage,	but	can	be	a	traversal	without	line	and	without	indivisible	border.	Can	 it	 ever	 concern,	precisely	 (in	all	 the	domains	where	 the	questions	of	decision	and	of	responsibility	that	concern	the	border	–	ethics,	law,	politics,	etc.	–	are	posed),	surpassing	an	aporia,	crossing	 an	 oppositional	 line	or	else	 apprehending,	 enduring,	 and	putting,	 in	 a	 different	way,	 the	experience	of	aporia	to	a	test?	And	is	it	an	issue	here	of	an	either/or?	Can	one	speak	–	and	if	so,	in	what	sense	–	of	an	experience	of	the	aporia?	An	experience	of	the	aporia	as	such?	Or	vice	versa:	Is	an	experience	possible	that	would	not	be	an	experience	of	the	aporia?”	(Derrida,	1993,	14	–15).		
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uncertain terrain of being”. This “attempt at freeing oneself from the aporia of such 
notions as decision and responsibility” (Anker, 2009:54) is at the root of the worst 
violence suffered by the Other. Similarly, as Lawrence Hatab argues alongside Derrida, 
the search for a decisive ground in ethics can be understood as an attempt to escape 
the existential demands of contention and commitment (2008:241). Moral “decisions” 
and the sense of “responsibility” for decisions may in fact be constituted by the global 
undecidability of ethical questions.  
 
It is important here to clarify that “[t]he undecidable (…) is not merely the oscillation 
between two significations or two contradictory and very determinate rules, each 
equally imperative (…) or the tension between two decisions”. It is the experience of 
that which is obliged to give itself up to the impossible decision. “A decision that 
didn’t go through the ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free decision, it would 
only be a programmable application or unfolding of a calculable process. It might be 
legal; it would not be just” (1990:963). Therefore, for Derrida, and the argument of this 
thesis, a responsible decision worthy of its name must first pass through the 
undecidable and thus uncertain space of aporetic temporality. For Derrida, the 
undecidable is the precondition for decision, just as certain events are only possible as 
impossible.  
 
If there is decision and responsibility they should pass the test of aporia and 
the undecidable. From this moment – which is not just a phase, it is, in a way, 
an interminable moment – by the trial of this impossibility to decide or to 
dispose of a previously defined rule that would allow one to decide. In a certain 
way, I must, beyond all not know where to go, not know what to do, not what I 
should decide, so that a decision where it seems impossible – should be 
possible. And therefore a responsibility.174 
 
To not know, to not have the condition of calculability and certitude, is thus the space 
for a true decision to occur. If one knows where one is going, there is no need for 
decision, for it is simply a matter of following a path, a path not made by first being 
held in the uncertain space of aporia and indecision, but one made simply through an 
                                                        174	Transcript	 of	 Safaa	 Fathy’s	 documentary	 film	 Derrida’s	 Elsewhere,	 cited	 in	 Michael	 Anker	(2009:44).	
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already known and thus determinable space. 
 
The “ordeal of the undecidable” is thus the space from which a true and free decision 
occurs, according to Derrida. Without this aporetic space of uncertainty, there would 
be movements of thought in calculability, movements structured around 
preconditioned knowledge, but there would not be the absolute responsibility of 
making a decision when one does not know, or have access to previously known 
outcomes or conditions.  
 
In short, any decision, in the sense we are now discussing, is momentarily 
without measure. This decision without measure, this decision structured 
around undecidability, is a decision thus in excess or outside of being in 
general. It opens up, in its excess, the possibility of a world beyond calculation 
and totalisation. The excess of decision in undecidabilty does not end once a 
decision is made, for as soon as a decision is made, it folds back into the aporia 
of future decisions (Derrida, 2009).  
 
As such, hospitality is perfectible in perpetuity, it is in essence, as other Derridean 
aporetic schemas, a hospitality-to-come. This does not refer to a future, perfect 
hospitality, nor to a time where hospitality of this kind will finally be present, since 
hospitality is not a regulative idea in the Kantian understanding. In it there is the 
impossible – its promise is inscribed in hospitality itself, “a promise that risks and 
always risks being perverted into a threat”. The commitment in the possibility of the 
impossible and in the undecidability of each decision, which should remain 
disconnected from calculations of knowledge and science, provides the nexus, the 
threshold between conditional and unconditional hospitality (Derrida, 2003: 120, 115). 
“Ethical judgment (…) takes place in an ungrounded way, indeed becomes only 
possible from such groundlessness” (Raffoul, 2010:6).  
 
 
4.5 From immunisation to autoimmunity: hospitality to come? 
I could (…) inscribe the category of the autoimmune into a series of both older 
and more recent discourses on the double bind and the aporia. Although aporia, 
double bind, and autoimmune processes are not exactly synonyms, what they have 
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in common, what they are all, precisely, charged with, is, more than an internal 
contradiction, an [un]decidability, that is, an internal-external, nondialectisable 
antinomy that risks paralyzing and thus calls for the event of the interruptive 
decision. (Derrida, 2005b:35) 
 
Despite being critical of the biomedicalisation of the hospitality narrative, I need to 
engage here with a medical concept par excellence – that of autoimmunity. However, 
in the hospitality context I argue that immunisation and autoimmunity as discussed by 
Derrida not only constitute interesting political concepts, but that the latter, 
appearing as another expression of the Derridean ethical aporia, may also be 
considered in ethical terms, thus supplementing in a useful way my exploration of a 
new kind of hospitality ethics. 
 
Autoimmunity, a medical and biological term, refers to the system of immune 
defences of an organism turning against its own healthy cells and tissues. 
Autoimmune diseases are presented as a “painful, suicidal, and terrifying relation to 
one’s own body” (Andrews, 2011:3). With Jacques Derrida, autoimmunity enters the 
deconstructive philosophical discourse. It is very often argued to be a concept that 
appears late in Derrida’s life, approximately in the last decade of his work, with its loci 
classici being first and foremost “Faith and Knowledge” (1996/2002a in English), then 
the discussion he has on autoimmunity with Giovanna Borradori in Philosophy in a 
Time of Terror (2003), shortly followed by Rogues (2005b). It is true that Derrida first 
engages explicitly and in depth with autoimmunity in 1996, when describing how both 
religion and science, i.e., faith and knowledge, traditionally define themselves in “a 
logic of autoimmunisation”. This means that both are described in terms of some kind 
of absolute sovereignty, wholesome and untainted: “‘immune’ in the sense of 
‘unscathed’, untouched by Otherness, and invulnerable to ingression” (Lewis, 2014).175 
Derrida attempts here to show that such an immune disposition is essentially 
untenable “due to the very logic of immunity itself, according to which it is always 
possible for immunity to turn back on itself to become autoimmunity” (ibid.).  
                                                        175	“We	are	here	 [the	 relation	between	 religion	 and	 tele-technoscientific	 reason,	 i.e.,	 science]	 in	 a	space	where	all	self-protection	of	the	unscathed,	of	the	safe	and	sound,	of	the	sacred	(heilig,	holy)	must	protect	 itself	against	 its	own	protection,	 its	own	police,	 its	own	power	of	 rejection,	 in	short	against	its	own,	which	is	to	say,	against	its	own	immunity.	It	is	this	terrifying	but	fatal	logic	of	the	autoimmunity	 of	 the	 unscathed	 that	 will	 always	 have	 associated	 science	 and	 religion.	 (Derrida,	2002a:79–80)	
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Starting with immunity, Derrida relates it to being exempt:  
 
The “immune” (immunis) is freed or exempted from the charges, the service, 
the taxes, the obligations (munus),176 the root of the common of community.177 
This freedom or this exemption was subsequently transported into the domains 
of constitutional or international law (2002a:80, fn27) 
 
such as in the categories of diplomatic, parliamentary and public office immunity. 
Similarly, ecclesiastical immunity coincides with the inviolability of the asylum of 
churches and monasteries and a special status with regards to the exertion of state 
power. Seen biologically, “the immunitary reaction protects the ‘indemnity’ of the 
body proper in producing antibodies against foreign antigens”. While it is clear that 
Derrida sets out his thinking based on the biological aspect of the term, he is 
attempting to extract a theoretical ethico-political context for it, feeling “authorised 
to speak of a sort of general logic” of immunity and autoimmunisation (ibid.). 
 
It is in this logic that one can situate his attempt in Philosophy in a Time of Terror and 
Rogues to address terrorism and the internal tensions of democracy in terms of 
autoimmunity. Democratic states and communities and democracy in general178 strive 
to be immune: safe and clearly demarcated borders, stable politics, autonomy, self-
protection and self-sufficiency. These are accompanied by a tendency for democracies 
to close in on themselves and exclude the outside, on which they often depend for 
their survival, and with it exclude foreign elements and Otherness. This tendency for 
self-closure is a kind of repression, which has nefarious consequences, namely 
producing within, in autoimmunitary fashion, the outside dangers it tries to preempt. 
“[R]epression in both its psychoanalytical sense and its political sense – whether it be 
                                                        176	Signifying	obligation	but	also	gift.		177	Derrida	 considers	 immunity	 to	 be	 related	 in	 différance	 with	 community,	 but,	 as	 later	 with	Esposito,	who	makes	a	similar	point,	this	is	not	a	distinction	or	debate	I	will	be	addressing	here.		178	It	 is	 important	 to	 clarify	 here	 that	 Derrida	 is	 not	 referring	 to	 democracy	 only	 in	 terms	 of		democratic	 government	 or	 system	 confined	 to	 a	 state.	 As	 Dan	 Bulley	 helpfully	 summarises:	“Following	 Plato’s	 portrait	 of	 the	 democrat	 in	 the	 Republic,	 Derrida	 associates	 democracy	 with	freedom/liberty	 (eleutheria)	and	 license	(exousia),	which	 is	also	whim,	 free	will,	 ease,	 freedom	of	choice,	the	right	to	do	as	one	pleases.	Thus,	from	Ancient	Greece	onwards,	‘democracy’	is	conceived	on	the	basis	of	this	freedom	[Derrida,	2005b:22].	This	freedom	and	license	associates	itself	with	the	concept	of	human	rights,	the	rights	that	protect	one’s	democratic	freedoms”	(Bulley,	2009:26).	
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through the police, the military, or the economy – ends up producing, reproducing, 
and regenerating the very thing it seeks to disarm” (Derrida, 2003:99). The examples 
given are cases where democratically elected parties ascend to power (as in Algeria in 
the 1990s, with the election of an extremist Islamic party, or Germany in the 1930s, 
with the Nazis’ rise to power) with the aim of attacking democratic freedoms or even 
putting an end to them, what in essence is considered to be democracy’s constitutive 
flaw par excellence. Terrorism could also be linked to another facet of autoimmunity: 
once again, the openness of democratic societies allows it to take root and flourish (for 
instance through the freedoms of speech, movement, etc., as seen in the cases of 
home-schooled terrorists), while efforts to suppress it often lead to the suspension of 
democratic tenets and human rights, in an illustration of how democratic freedoms 
may attack their own defences from within. 
 
Despite and beyond the links with terrorism and the internal dynamics of democracy, 
immunity and autoimmunisation brings us back to the oppositional register of the Self 
and Other seen earlier in this work. This exact opposition is at the core of immunity: 
from the biological connotation of resistance or fortification against infection, disease 
and other elements external to the Self to a more political one, “[i]n order to function, 
[immunity’s] definition must presuppose the principles of non-contradiction and 
excluded middle, according to which (…) – given that there is no third possibility – the 
exclusion of the [O]ther fully defines what the self is” (Lewis, 2015). This definition is 
hierarchical, as the immune system protects the Self from the Other (substance, 
disease, foreign element), drawing simultaneously the boundary between the two. 
“The self radically excludes all otherness: individuals are individual substances which 
do not depend on others for their existence, and they are radically separated from 
these others” (ibid.). Autoimmunity comes to occupy this boundary and transform it 
into a threshold.  
 
I argue that Derrida places autoimmunity there as a reaction to the danger posed by 
9/11 and terrorism in general, which would risk identifying life within politics with 
security and sovereignty and the ensuing fear / need for protection with the core of 
subjectivity. Autoimmunity challenges this because it allows Derrida to relate life with 
danger and the unforeseen, against all technical and legal systems that seek to 
immunise it by closing  borders, strengthening surveillance or increasing policing. By 
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doing so, he promotes the choice to remain open to Otherness against the conflation 
of security with sovereignty, and as such makes us consider the arrival of the 
uncategorisable Other at the border as a part of an “autoimmunitary process, [a] 
strange behaviour where a living being, in quasi-suicidal fashion, ‘itself’ works to 
destroy its own protection, to immunize itself against its ‘own’ immunity” (Derrida, 
2003:94). I engage with this way of looking at the Other’s arrival at the border in the 
next section. 
 
 
4.6 Hospitality as an autoimmunitary concept? 
“Inscribed (…) into a veritable ‘best of’ collection of Derrideo-phemes or 
deconstructo-nyms” (sic) of other aporias, Naas argues that autoimmunity “breathes a 
new life” into these earlier aporetic terms. It does this by one means in particular: by 
addressing practices or actualisations of concepts (of democracy, at least in his 
discussions in 2003, 2005b) instead of focusing solely on the concepts per se and their 
discourses, as is done with the earlier terms of justice, gift, hospitality (Naas, 
2008a:135). I find myself disagreeing with Naas, however, not only because I find the 
terms “Derrideo-phemes” and “deconstructo-nyms” inane, feeding into a negative 
representation of Derrida’s oeuvre in the Chomskyan or Searlian vein,179 but mainly 
because a contradiction soon follows: while he finds autoimmunity to breathe a “new 
life” into earlier Derridean concepts and aporias, he subsequently accepts (Naas, 
2008a:135–6) that it relates to différance – a concept elaborated as early as the 1960s 
– and its real political nature, contra its critics.  
 
Despite my disagreement on this point and Naas’ chronological contradiction, I think 
he is right both to relate autoimmunity with Derrida’s early work and to see in it a 
connection with practice. Contrary to the common belief discussed earlier, 
autoimmunity should be considered as an ever-present Derridean concept. Not only 
because autoimmunity as a term appears earlier than “Faith and Knowledge”, both in 
Specters of Marx and the Politics of Friendship (Haddad, 2006: 512) but also, I would like 
to argue, because it is already presented in “Plato’s Pharmacy” (1981) and is related to 
                                                        179	The	 caricature	 of	 convoluted	 French	 philosophy:	 Noam	 Chomsky	 blames	 Lacan,	 Derrida	 and	Žižek	summarily	for	“empty	intellectual	posturing”	(2012)	and	argues	that	their	work	is	lacking	in	actual	theory,	whereas	John	Searle	accuses	Derrida	of	general	theoretical	“terrorist	obscurantism”	(1983).		
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pharmakon: “this ‘medicine’, this philter, which acts as both remedy and poison, 
already introduces itself into the body of the discourse with all its ambivalence” 
(1981:70). 180  While the two terms are not synonymous, autoimmunity, just as 
pharmakon, is constituted by a very specific ambivalence. Both function in ambivalent 
ways, at once remedying and poisoning a body: the physical body, a body politic, a 
community or system. This should not be seen as simply a case of a double meaning, 
ambiguity or even polysemy, “but of a word with no self-identical meaning” (De Ville, 
2010:6; n 13).  
 
Immunity (as the rapport between an exogenous antibody generator/ a threat/ a 
foreigner on one side and the body/ organism/ state/ community on the other) and 
autoimmunity (as the system’s own defence resulting both in self-protection but also 
self-harm) are not and cannot be seen as clearly defined and absolute opposites, but 
two processes defining each other. The image of an immune system functioning as an 
absolute and safe boundary towards the outside is false. Autoimmunity, being a proof 
of this, constitutes the limen where inside and outside linger, being in essence 
inseparable. “Autoimmunity exposes the external as intrinsically internal” (Johnson, 
2010). Derrida agrees: “[b]etween the immune and that which threatens it or runs 
counter to it (…), the relation is neither one of exteriority nor one of simple opposition 
or contradiction. I would say the same about the relationship between immunity and 
autoimmunity” (2005b:114).  
 
Understood in these terms, can autoimmunity be applied to hospitality? I argue that it 
can and should. If, when approached deconstructively, pharmakon points to the binary 
of the stable categories of the Self and Other, as well as inside and outside in Plato 
and, by implication, in Greek/ Western rational thinking and philosophy in general, so 
                                                        180	Among	other	things,	which	refer	to	the	relation	between	speech,	writing	and	Platonism,	and	as	such	cannot	be	discussed	here	 in	 full	 length,	Derrida	points	out	 that	while	Plato	 in	 the	 text	of	his	dialogues	 refers	 to	 a	 series/family	 of	 words	 such	 as	 pharmakeia-pharmakon-pharmakeus,	 any	reference	to	pharmakos,	a	family	term	and	“an	experience	present	in	Greek	culture	even	in	Plato’s	day”,	is	conspicuously	absent.	The	experience	understood	here	is	a	sacrifice	ritual	in	the	context	of	a	catharsis	 for	 the	polis:	pharmakos	 “has	been	compared	to	a	scapegoat”	whose	expulsion	 from	the	city	or	death	outside	the	city	walls	was	deemed	necessary	at	a	time	of	disaster,	invasion,	famine	or	plague	 in	 order	 to	 placate	 the	 gods	 and	 purify	 the	 city’s	 interior.	 “The	 evil	 and	 the	 outside,	 the	expulsion	of	the	evil,	its	exclusion	out	of	the	body	(and	out)	of	the	city	–	these	[were]	the	two	major	senses	of	the	character	and	of	the	ritual	[of	pharmakos]”	(Derrida,	1981:129–30).	One	cannot	fail	to	notice	 here	 the	 striking	 similarity	 between	pharmakos	with	 the	 later,	 Roman	 law	 figure	 of	homo	
sacer.	Diken	and	Lautsen	consider	pharmakos	 to	be	 the	concept/ritual	predecessor	of	homo	sacer	(2005:109)	without,	however,	providing	any	attestation	to	that.		
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too does autoimmunity. Derrida reiterates this point in one of his earlier (i.e., than 
“Faith and Knowledge”) references to autoimmunity, while being interviewed about 
drugs and addiction. In the following extract, he refers more specifically to Aids: 
 
The various forms of this deadly contagion, its spatial and temporal 
dimensions will from now on deprive us of everything that desire and a rapport 
to the other could invent to protect the integrity, and thus the inalienable 
identity of anything like a subject: in its “body”, of course, but also even in its 
entire symbolic organization, the ego and the unconscious, the subject in its 
separateness and in its absolute secrecy. The virus (which belongs neither to 
life nor to death) may always already have broken into any “intersubjective” 
space. (1995:241) 
 
Autoimmunity thus serves to deconstruct the concept of the self (Johnson, 2010). 
Esposito seems to be arguing along the same lines when he also talks about Aids:  
 
What is affected by Aids is not only the health protocol but an entire 
ontological scheme: the identity of the individual as the form and content of its 
subjectivity. True, cancer also eats away at it, just as vascular disease shakes its 
foundations. But Aids ravages its subjectivity because the disease destroys the 
very idea of an identity-making border: the difference between self and other, 
internal and external, inside and outside (2011:62).181  
 
Borradori, concluding her interview with Derrida on the real and symbolic suicides of 
autoimmunity in democracies, agrees that the role of autoimmunity “is to act as a 
third term between the classical opposition between friend and foe. As we have seen, 
to identify a third term is a characteristically deconstructive move aimed at displacing 
the traditional metaphysical tendency to rely on irreducible pairs” (Borradori in 
                                                        181	Although	 Esposito	 departs	 from	 Derrida’s	 work	 in	 his	 study	 of	 immunity/autoimmunity,	 and	their	work	 shows	many	 similarities,	 they	 reach	different	 “conclusions”,	 if	 they	 can	be	 called	 that,	with	 the	 former	 suggesting	 a	 rethink	 of	 community	 in	 order	 to	 address	 the	 perverse	 effects	 of	immunisation/autoimmunisation.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 his	 general	 work,	 where	 he	 attempts	 a	more	positive	and	affirmative	reading	of	biopolitics,	here	Esposito	emphasises	a	hierarchical	Self/Other	divide	despite	seemingly	arguing	against	“the	incompatibility	between	self	and	other”	(2011:171)	and	the	impermeability	of	the	boundary	between	the	two.	The	need	that	he	advocates,	to	embrace	the	Other	in	order	to	form	the	subject’s	own	identity,	is	a	testament	to	this.	Unfortunately,	although	extremely	interesting,	this	is	not	something	I	can	engage	with	here;	it	remains	a	point	for	a	future	project	to	address.		
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Derrida, 2003:152). 
 
Accepting therefore that the concept of autoimmunity befuddles the traditional 
hierarchical opposition between Self and Other and, as a process, breaks down 
boundaries, divisions and the need to sustain them through preventative measures 
(and, in the case of hospitality, militarised and violent techniques), I argue that it 
cannot but be considered as an essential part of hospitality. Hospitality is 
autoimmunitary. As argued earlier, hospitality cannot be considered as such if it is not 
plagued by the dangers of autoimmunity; “would a hospitality without risk, a 
hospitality backed by certain assurances, a hospitality protected by an immune system 
against the wholly [O]ther, be true hospitality?” asks Derrida (2003:129). Hospitality is 
autoimmunitary in its inherent contradiction between unconditional openness and 
calculatory management of borders. This autoimmunitary logic, in a skewed 
understanding of border, community and organism protection, leads to tragedies such 
as the ones experienced in Farmakonisi, Lampedusa and elsewhere. This is not the 
only form autoimmunitary may take, however; a more positive and affirmative 
understanding is possible.  
 
To understand hospitality as autoimmunitary in an affirmative way, one should be 
prepared to look at autoimmunity in a different light to the one in which it has usually 
been seen (and rightly so) in British IR scholarship: i.e., linked to a great extent with 
discussions of terrorism post-9/11,182 focusing mainly on the inherent self-destructive 
dynamics of democracies and less on state or institutional subjectivity. Albeit a helpful 
analytic instrument to this effect, autoimmunity, as I have just argued, can also be 
read in a different way: I think the time has come for the opening up of the concept’s 
purview and logic to include hospitality and its ethics and practices, keeping in mind 
that Derrida indeed “granted this autoimmune schema a range without 
limits”(2005b:124). This, I argue, would parallel Derrida’s own move from a negative 
to a positive understanding of autoimmunity:  
 
autoimmunity makes it possible for the integrity of the organism to be 
destroyed, it can precipitate the end of life, but it also opens up the possibility 
                                                        182	Namely,	 Nick	 Vaughn	Williams’	 2007	 article	 “The	 Shooting	 of	 Jean	 Charles	 de	Menezes:	 New	Border	Politics?”	and	Dan	Bulley’s	Ethics	as	Foreign	Policy	(2009).	
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of prosthetic grafts, transplants, and implants, which can prolong life. The 
“intruder” to which one is hospitable may turn out to be an enemy or a friend. 
It is this duplicity in value that Derrida uses to authorise his generalisation of 
the logic of autoimmunity. (Lewis, 2014)  
 
Such a positive understanding involves the opening up to the stranger as the opening 
to the incalculable, to ce qui arrive et l’arrivant, i.e., to what may happen, or to the 
event, and to the one who arrives, whoever this is, despite fears of any deleterious 
consequences. 
 
We must be cautious to not easily discount autoimmunity as a mere poison 
threatening to destroy our defences, but as a possible medicine that opens up 
chances and hope. The threat is perfectly apparent; however, what is the 
optimistic chance of autoimmunity? Quite simply, hospitality. In this regard, 
autoimmunity is not an absolute ill or evil. It enables an exposure to the other, 
to what and who comes – which means that it must remain incalculable. 
Without autoimmunity, with absolute immunity, nothing would ever happen or 
arrive; we would no longer wait, await, or expect, no longer expect another, or 
expect any event. (Derrida, 2005b:152) 
 
The relation with people, the strangers arriving at the borders, does not need to be one 
of exteriority, nor one of antagonism. The presence of the Other, who by “intruding” 
addresses me, calls me into an ethical relation and provokes a consideration of my 
responsibility, where sameness and the hierarchy between Self and Other can be 
significantly undermined. The core of this intersubjectivity, as advocated and 
presented in the previous chapter by Levinas and sustained throughout the work of 
Derrida, is the essence of the positive understanding of autoimmunity and of the 
ethics of hospitality considered and advocated here. Seizing the opportunity in an 
open and nonhierarchical manner lies at the heart of the ethics of hospitality as 
advocated by this thesis, as does the need to keep in mind the autoimmunitary nature 
of this opportunity, in other words, that it can be seized and handled in different and 
contrasting ways, remaining nonetheless open to every eventuality. The opportunity 
given by the presence of the Other is an “opportunity or chance and threat, threat as 
chance: autoimmune”, while hospitality is “already a question of autoimmunity, of a 
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double bind of threat and chance” (2005b: 82, 52, respectively) beyond a clearly 
delineated subject-object relationality. Bulley refers to this when discussing the 
autoimmunitary subject, refuting a common criticism, namely that the deconstructive 
understanding of the subject is an absent subject:183  
 
The subject is neither object nor non-subject; rather, it never fully is. It is never 
fully either present or absent, subject or object (…); yet it is both at the same 
time. It is always a becoming object of the subject and a becoming subject of 
the object, or, as Williams more elegantly puts it, [s]ubjectivity undergoes a 
perpetual play of (de)constitution or “constitutive loss of self”. (Williams, 
2001:133, cited in Bulley, 2009:34) 
 
The hyperbolic promise and hopeful chance to treat the opportunity of the Other’s 
arrival in an ethical way is instituted by the need to be open to the à-venir, to the to-
come. Opening up to the unforeseen, to what comes each time in a unique and novel 
way, seems to me to be the only or at least the best possible ethical way of being and 
relating with the Other – otherwise, to repeat Derrida’s words in the above reference, 
“nothing would ever happen or arrive” beyond a circle of harm and violence calculated 
and confirmed a priori. This ethics of hospitality, understood thusly, is affirmative; 
affirmative in the way Braidotti, who does not harbour a great deal of sympathy for 
Derrida,184 defines as follows: 
 
In affirmative ethics, the harm you do to others is immediately reflected on the 
harm you do to yourself in terms of loss of potentia, positivity, capacity to 
                                                        183	Bulley	 here	 refers	 to	 Christina	 Howells’	 criticisms	 that	 the	 deconstructed	 subject	 resembles	more	 the	 non-subject	 of	 structuralism	 (i.e.,	 part	 of	 the	 system,	 which	 makes	 the	 subject,	 as	 a	relational	 entity,	 existent)	 than	 a	 subject	 in	 its	 own,	 deconstructive,	 right	 (Howells,	 1998).	 His	tackling	of	the	said	criticisms	address	equally	successfully,	I	think,	her	later	suggestion	(2007)	that	the	deconstructive	subject	owes	more	to	the	Sartrean	one	than	Derrida	was	willing	to	admit.		184	Often	referring	to	herself	as	standing	in	the	Deleuzian	part	of	post-structuralism,	Rosi	Braidotti	considers	Derrida’s	work	to	be	underlined	by	mourning	and	as	a	result	not	affirmative	enough.	She	takes	 issue	 with	 the	 “Levinas-Derrida	 school	 (sic),	 currently	 pursued	 by	 Butler,	 Critchley,	 and	others,	 [where]	 the	 emphasis	 falls	 on	 vulnerability	 as	 the	 defining	 feature	 of	 the	 human.	 The	potential	 capacity	 to	 be	 wounded	 and	 hence	 to	 require	 the	 care,	 solidarity	 and	 love	 of	 others	becomes,	by	extension,	 the	major	ethical	requirement”	(2011:304).	While	she	goes	on	to	argue	 in	favour	of	a	nomadic	affirmative	ethics	where	Otherness	is	addressed	beyond	hospitality	and	justice,	in	particular	in	“the	ways	in	which	[it]	prompts,	mobilises	and	allows	for	flows	and	affirmation	of	values	and	forces	that	are	not	yet	sustained	by	the	current	conditions”,	she	fails	to	clarify	what	this	means	 exactly,	 and	 ends	 up	 admitting	 that	 “Levinas’	 case	 is	 complex”	 (2011:305),	 and	 his	understanding	 of	Otherness	 very	 close	 to	 the	Deleuzian	 (and	her)	 understanding	 of	 the	 ethics	 of	affirmation.		
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relate and hence freedom. Affirmative ethics is not about the avoidance of 
pain, but rather about transcending the resignation and passivity that ensue 
from being hurt, lost and dispossessed. One has to become ethical, as opposed 
to applying moral rules and protocols as a form of self-protection. An adequate 
ethical relation is capable of sustaining the subject in his or her quest for more 
inter-relations with others, i.e., more “Life”, motion, change and 
transformation. The adequate ethical question provides the subject with a 
frame for interaction and change, growth and movement. It affirms life as 
difference-at-work and as sustainable transformations. An ethical relation 
must confront the question of how much freedom of action we can endure. 
(Braidotti, 2011: 289) 
 
Ethics of hospitality is pregnant with this affirmative move: an interruptive decision, 
the one we saw Derrida calling for in the opening quote of this section, is needed. 
Addressing the hiatus of the inherent undecidability of hospitality, such a decision is 
necessary so as to call the bluff of the autoimmunitary aspects of hospitality. More 
recent work on radical immunology may be able to help us to this effect, by showing 
how immunisation is not only illusory but that autoimmunity, in this case an opening 
up to growing numbers of stranger Others at the border, may bring productive and 
fertile transformations to the Self.  
 
 
4.7 Departing from Derrida: autoimmunity at the border as a 
vital paradox 
Failing in most cases to find the cause of these diseases, western medical practice 
presents autoimmunity as a completely paradoxical procedure (Burnet, 1969:vii) that 
consists of a kind of “category crisis”, undermining the foundational capacity of the 
immune system to distinguish between “self” and “non-self”. “Many practising 
immunologists even go so far as to characterise their discipline as the ‘science of 
self/non-self discrimination’” (Cohen, 2004:7), as Burnet, the father of immunology, 
named it.185 Ιn a traditional understanding, this is not far from the truth: the immune 
                                                        
185 Australian	microbiologist	Frank	Macfarlane	Burnet,	“the	Colossus	of	modern	immunology”	(Cohen,	2004:7)	introduces	this	binary	of	self/non-self	(SNS)	as	early	as	1949	(Tauber,	2000:242).	His	book	Self	and	Not-Self:	Cellular	Immunology	Book	One	defines	this	distinction	as	an	axiom	of	
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system needs to “fight” against “alien” intruders carrying infectious diseases, bacteria, 
viruses, or parasites to “defend” the body. “This was after all how biological immunity 
was initially imagined by its first theorist, the Nobel prize winner Elie Metchinkoff, 
who defined it as the organism’s ‘natural capacity’ for ‘host defen[c]e’” (Cohen, 
2004:7). However, this initial understanding of immunity had very soon to be altered, 
since the natural capacity for host defence was observed to turn against the self, an 
event that was reimagined by immunologists as suicidal attack. “Horror autotoxicus” 
is what Paul Ehrilch (the second theorist of immunity, who was the first to notice this 
“suicidal attack”, and who shared the 1908 Nobel prize with Metchnikoff) called it.   
 
It should not be considered a coincidence that Burnet, who coined the self/non-self 
distinction, was interested in philosophical biology. Influenced by Alfred North 
Whitehead’s theorisations of “self-creation” and “self-identity”, where “the self 
emerges from the activity of encountering an objective world” (Anderson and Mackay, 
2014:153), but also perhaps by Jung,186 for whom the Self (always with a capital S) is a 
central archetype, which defines the totality and an individual’s sense of meaning and 
purpose without any reference to the outside world or the Other, and is realised 
through the process of individuation (Jung, 1991:275–354), Burnet’s binary in 
explaining immunity’s function betrays in its wording a certain self-centred 
philosophical speculation on individuality. “Immunology has always seemed to me 
more a problem in philosophy than a practical science” says Burnet (1969:17, also 
cited in Anderson and Mackay, 2014:150), and it is this speculative philosophical 
foundation that I want to unearth and challenge. I believe Derrida’s approach of 
autoimmunity is the best way to do so.  
 
Looking at immunologists’ formulations, it is easy to demonstrate that the way 
immunity and autoimmunity are conceptualised confirms that the body and the 
individual is considered as a non-contradictory, self-affirmed entity that easily 
recognises the “alien” and as such rejects it.  The “horror autotoxicus” is as a result a 
“dysteleogic” possibility, which is irrational, fearful and out of the ordinary. 
                                                                                                                                                                  Burnet’s	clonal	selection	theory,	which	generally	explains	how	the	immune	system	responds	to	infection:	‘‘[t]he	need	and	the	capacity	to	distinguish	between	what	is	acceptable	as	self	and	what	must	be	rejected	as	alien	is	the	evolutionary	basis	of	immunology’’	(1969:vii). 186	While	there	is	vast	speculation	about	this	(for	instance,	Tauber	and	Podolsky,	1994),	a	clear	link	to	Jung	has	not	been	established	(Anderson	and	Mackay,	2014:150)	
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Addressing parts of the Self as alien constitutes a horror. Drawing the parallel to my 
discussion of hospitality, the way the self is a priori conceived in the traditional 
approaches to hospitality discussed earlier – i.e., as a Self which is non-contradictory 
and fixed in her identity (an identity often deriving from the community to which she 
belongs) – cannot but lead to a view in which the responsibility deriving from the 
presence of the Other, and in practice from the Other’s presence at the borders, is seen 
as a horror, a toxifying and poisoning horror that should be resolved either by turning 
the Other back (in traditional approaches of a communitarian nature) or by accepting 
her after quotas are administered, concerns about brain-drain are addressed, etc. (as in 
neo-Kantian approaches to hospitality and the ethics of migration).  
 
What both sides of the parallel (biology’s understanding of immunity/ autoimmunity 
and traditional understandings of hospitality) conceal, however, is that they are both 
based on the foundation of an inimical Self versus Other relation. The auto of “horror 
autotoxicus” and of “autoimmunity” disguises a reductionist conceptual merging of 
the morally diverse category that is the Self with the physiological functions of a 
bodily system (Tauber, 2000:242). Traditional understandings of hospitality act in a 
similar, albeit reverse mode: they confuse a certain defence mechanism of systems 
(where self-protection, in the form of a state’s closing down of borders and 
boundaries, appears as the logical, if not “natural”, step) with the diversity that the 
human category of the Self can take, as in its ethical, political, psychological and 
existential meanings. They assign to the autonomy of the Self and her ability to define 
her own boundaries a natural, supposedly scientifically proven immunity, 
characteristic of a narrow definition of survival where the unaccounted, permitted 
presence of the Other is considered to undermine it. The Self has to impose on the 
Other and reject her as alien in order to survive. As it is understood in this parallel, the 
autoimmunity  
 
ensconces a foundational assumption of Western political rationality – that is, 
to be a person means to have a body – in and as “human nature”. Part of 
biological immunity’s success, both as a medical concept and a cultural 
explanation, derives then from its function as a “hybrid” (in the sense Bruno 
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Latour gives to the term)187 that naturalises the social relations of property 
ownership as a physiological imperative. Conversely autoimmunity becomes 
anathema not just because it wreaks havoc in human bodies but also because it 
confounds the political ontology that underlies our entire way of life. Perhaps 
that is also why “autoimmunity” continues to provoke if not horror at least 
misunderstanding, despite all efforts to the contrary (Cohen, 2004:8).   
 
My effort to present here a different understanding of autoimmunitary hospitality is 
another effort to the contrary. In my project’s case, the hybrid is the mediation of 
international political theory in presenting the strife at the borders and the lack of 
underlying ethical responsibility towards the Other that arrives there as a natural 
phenomenon, when in fact this is an association based on traditional understandings 
of ethics – understandings that are themselves derived from the primacy of the nation 
state and an inimical Self/Other relation. Autoimmunity, I have already argued, allows 
us to see beyond this and focus on cases of real life where individual ethical 
responsibility has surpassed such “natural” understanding of responsibility and the 
world. 
 
There have been recent attempts by radical immunologists to debunk the way 
autoimmunity is portrayed as a self-destructive horror and expose the intricacies that 
autoimmunity presents in Burnet’s traditional schema of self/non-self. These 
scientists, like Polly Matzinger (1994; 1998), challenge the traditional host vs. alien 
model of immunity by “taking autoimmunity not as a paradoxical exception but as a 
normal abnormality” (my emphasis – Cohen, 2004:9). It is suggested that the immune 
system does not function along the distinguishing line of “self/non-self” and that 
while autoimmunity (or autoreactivity) may be a form of danger, it does not need 
“necessarily [to] be dangerous and can indeed be useful” (Matzinger, 1998:407). It is 
“the presence of events (rather than entities) that locally endanger or stress tissue” 
                                                        187	Bruno	Latour	 in	We	Have	Never	Been	Modern	(2002)	explains	that	a	hybrid	 is	 the	result	of	any	process	of	association	and	that	it	will	always	defy	the	categories	assumed	beforehand	for	explaining	it.	 Opposing	 nature	 to	 society,	 natural	 to	 artificial	 and	 reality	 to	 construction	 in	 an	 attempt	 at	purification	will	 paradoxically	 give	 rise	 to	more	hybrids.	The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 the	 scientific	phenomenon	observed	in	a	laboratory	is	rarely	if	ever	the	pure	expression	of	a	reality,	but	is	rather	the	one	that	resisted	the	laboratory’s	effort	to	investigate	it.	Such	efforts	are	in	essence	mediations,	intended	 to	mobilise	 reality.	Once	we	 cannot	pin	 it	 down,	we	 fabricate	 it.	 Therefore,	whatever	 is	referred	to	as	a	natural	phenomenon	is,	 in	fact,	an	association	that	would	not	be	possible	without	the	laboratory,	the	research	programme,	and	the	specific	way	that	is	developed	for	describing	it	in	a	research	paper.	What	is	accounted	for	as	real	is	a	construction,	therefore	a	hybrid.		
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(Cohen, 2004:10) and not the alien entities, which may actually be benign or even 
necessary. Thus, the need is to focus on the “qualitative assessments of lived relational 
dynamics” and not “a permeable frontier that needs to be defended” (ibid.). Immune 
selfhood is much more ambiguous than has been traditionally understood, 
contemporary studies warn, “and deeper understandings of immune tolerance have 
highlighted how much of the foreign the immune system actively ignores” (Tauber, 
2015:390). Not only that, but autoimmunity may be a critical requirement for a stable 
and positive environment in which the self can be maintained. In addition, and as 
logically follows, similar studies suggest that the language used traditionally to define 
autoimmunity clouds the new ways of thinking around the immune and the 
autoimmune, and that such language, in essence constituted by “semantic remnants 
of a dichotomous self/non-self theory”, should be modified if not replaced (ibid). The 
fact that autoimmunity can be a healthy and useful process (Mutsaers, 2016:120) 
bringing about necessary evolution shows the “intriguing paradoxicality proper to an 
autonomous identity” (Varela, 1991:85). The Self is not a delineated entity that needs 
to be threatened by the Other or sacrifice herself to respond to the demand of the 
Other’s presence: to the contrary. Autoimmunity (and by extension, autoimmunitary 
hospitality) is a normal abnormality that opens up all kinds of new possibilities.  
 
As such it materialises a critical tension that Western political philosophy and 
Western bioscience both collude to make disappear. Our notions of selfhood 
and identity assume the singularity of “a body” that we possess as the ground 
of our being. Yet autoimmune illnesses reveal that this singularity is fairly 
problematic if not entirely illusory. Indeed, they suggest that our sense of 
selfness is predicated on the disavowal of our own otherness as well. (Cohen, 
2004:10) 
 
I argue, thus, that as the scientific conceptualisation of autoimmunity is contingent on 
specific vital philosophical assumptions about what we imagine our embodied “selves” 
to be, and as Tauber and other contemporary historians of science and immunologists 
suggest that these assumptions are problematic if not outright erroneous, the same 
logic applies for those fears raised for the immune Self and border by an ethics of 
hospitality governed by the ethical responsibility for the Other. As I argued at the 
beginning of this thesis, the traditional conceptualisations of hospitality depend on 
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certain fundamental assumptions about how we envisage the Self to react in situations 
where a decision about hospitality needs to be made. Informed by community 
concerns, an egotistical view of human nature, mainly Hegelian theorisations of the 
Self/Other relation and Rawlsian understandings of justice, hospitality as 
unconditionally open to the Other is considered utopian, the equivalent of “shooting 
oneself in the leg”. However, just as Tauber and others do in the scientific field, I argue 
that we need to challenge traditional ethics’s assumptions and embrace the 
affirmative autoimmunity of an open ethics of hospitality: if “‘autoaggressive immune 
behaviours’ could lead us to ask new questions about what our ‘self’ is anyway” 
(Cohen, 2004:10), then similarly ethical practices of solidarity in camps of strangers, of 
assisting undocumented, irregular migrants, and of accepting larger numbers of 
stranger Others than the quotas defined by state policies or considered “safe” for the 
community, can lead us to ask us whether “conventional wisdom” regarding what 
hospitality should entail is really wise and whether it is obliterating the possibility of a 
myriad positive transformations for the Self and Selves. “If, for example, autoimmune 
disorders represent the body’s violent misrecognition of parts of itself as non-self, how 
stable can the received notions of ‘self’ be?” (ibid.) is a question that resonates with 
the ethics of hospitality I am proposing here. An autoimmunitary understanding of 
hospitality complicates and problematises the ethical understanding of the Self who 
cannot just have a singular and unified approach towards the Other: upon the 
Other’s/Others’ arrival, the Self does not necessarily have to display threatening or 
self-protective reactions, but may open up to the unexpected, potentially fecund 
changes such arrivals bring. “As autoimmune illnesses might provoke productive 
differences: differences that can lead to transformations, which are at once personal 
and political, local and global, material and spiritual” (Cohen, 2004:9), so can 
autoimmunitary hospitality.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Pharmakon, autoimmunity, hospitality: if it were not for the tragedy involved, Derrida 
would perhaps smile at the coincidence that Farmakonisi, the island of pharmakon (or 
should it be best related to pharmakos?),188 a potential place of salvation and safe 
                                                        188	See	earlier	footnote.		
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haven, proved due to a lack of hospitality ethically considered and a failure to uphold 
the law and laws of hospitality, to be a place of sacrifice and an anonymous, cold tomb. 
The Syrians, Libyans and Others of different nationalities or of still unidentified 
provenance call for a change in the way our ethical responsibility is understood and 
materialised. Ethics of hospitality, as an opening to the Other, stranger and foreigner, 
'accompanies this call and helps us to hear and address it. This ethics provides the 
framework for challenging and underlining the importance of these crimes against 
hospitality, such as the ones taking place in the Mediterranean today, at the gates of 
the European Union, in detention camps and “hospitality centres”, pitting them 
against the lesser crime of hospitality, what states and international law call the illegal 
crossings of borders, illegal stays, etc.189 
 
It could be argued, as Assheuer does, that the advantage of hospitality towards other 
moral concepts is that it is “less abstract and perhaps more apt for thinking a justice 
which always has to address itself to a singular [O]ther”. In addition, according to 
Derrida, “the topic of hospitality focuses on what is today most concretely urgent and 
the most proper for the articulation of a political ethics” (Derrida, 2005a: 132). 
However, what does it mean to speak of political ethics? Isn’t hospitality only an 
ethical concept and, in this sense, probably apolitical? Referring to Levinas and 
comparing the way he addresses peace, Derrida finds that he gestures towards an 
understanding of hospitality, which is “neither purely political, in the traditional sense 
of this term, nor simply apolitical. It belongs to a context where the reaffirmation of 
ethics, the subjectivity of the host as the subjectivity of the hostage, broaches the 
passage from the political towards the beyond of the political or toward the ‘already 
non-political’” (1999a: 82). This passage is in essence the à-venir, the space and 
temporality of the hospitality to-come. While envisioning hospitality to come is useful 
in opening up the decision of hospitality practices to the unknown, considering the 
responsibility towards the Other beyond the political or the apolitical, Derrida fails, I 
                                                        189	The	expression	crime	of	hospitality,	or	délit	d’hospitalité,	(re)appeared	in	French	politics	and	the	discussions	 around	 immigration	 during	 the	 protests	 against	 the	 infamous	 Debré	 law	 in	 1997,	which,	 following	 the	 Pasqua	 laws	 of	 1993–94,	 renders	 criminal	 the	 provision	 of	 accommodation	and	 shelter	 to	 “illegal”	 immigrants.	Derrida	denounced	 this	 crime	 in	 late	1996	at	 a	 speech	 in	 the	Théâtre	des	Amandiers	in	Nanterre,	during	a	solidarity	evening	with	sans	papiers	(1997).	In	his	“A	word	of	welcome”,	he	suggests	that	crimes	of	hospitality	should	be	distinguished	“from	an	‘offense	of	hospitality	[délit	d’hospitalité]’,	as	today	it	is	once	again	being	called	in	French	law,	in	the	spirit	of	the	 decrees	 and	 ordinances	 of	 1938	 and	 1945	 that	would	 punish	 –	 and	 even	 imprison	 –	 anyone	taking	in	a	foreigner	in	an	illegal	situation”	(1999a:71).	
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believe, to consider the implication this might have in the practice of hospitality. 
Considering the ethical responsibility to the Other as bearing heavily on the political is 
paramount for the way in which hospitality may function and hospitality practices be 
implemented. Accepting a Levinasian ethical responsibility towards the Other and the 
third as described in the previous chapter, i.e., an unconditional opening to the call of 
Otherness, tips the balance of the undecidable towards a more open, more responsible 
hospitality. 
 
The eternally returning question of how the moral exigency of such more open or 
unconditional hospitality relates to the juridical world order, indeed remains 
unanswered, at least in full. “The reference to Kant is at once indispensable and 
insufficient. A cosmopolitical right (Weltbürgerrecht) that would regulate what Kant 
called “universal hospitality” would already today constitute the perspective of an 
immense progress if our international agencies wanted to put it into effect” (Derrida, 
2005a:133); however, this does not need to be the case. Nor is it the case that Kant 
with Weltbürgerrecht has resolved the hospitality ethics conundrum: closely 
delineating the conditions of such a right so that it belongs only to citizens with rights 
of visitation and not invitation or residence for a limited period of time, he most 
substantially fails to do so. Partial solutions such as the cities of refuge 190 fail as well in 
their limited scope. “[T]his riddle seems insoluble. But a task whose solution is by the 
same token the object of a knowledge, a task which a simple recognition would render 
accessible, would this still be a task?” (ibid.) Reflection and examination in the 
deconstructive vein should “question and refound [current axioms and principles], 
endlessly refine them and universalise them, without becoming discouraged by the 
aporias such work must necessarily encounter” (Derrida, 2003:114). There seems to be 
no other option than to insist on this task, work on these aporias, question and re-
found them, since the alternative in the form of an ethics of immigration or even 
hospitality understood in the traditional IR and neo-Kantian way is “instituted, 
politically deliberated, juridically constructed”, inevitably and indefinitely retaining 
“within it a trace of the violent nature with which it is supposed to break, the nature it 
is supposed to interrupt, interdict or repress” (1999a:89).  
 
The violent exclusions and pure violence at work in these traditional approaches are 
                                                        190	See	fn	96	earlier.	
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not, as I have argued earlier in this work, accidental but constitutive. Rooted mostly in 
a Western philosophical tradition of hierarchical relationality, IR approaches relate to 
hospitality as they do to other foundational ethical and political concepts: by claiming 
their permanent nature, that hospitality is what it has always been and that the ways 
to account for it are rather specific. Derrida calls this “fabulous retroactivity”, i.e., the 
way in which laws, constitutions (he specifically refers to the American Declaration of 
Independence) but also practices “use performative utterance in order to found their 
legitimacy on the existence of conditions that only come into existence through the 
utterance itself” (Esterhammer, 2001:17). In our case, this could be explained as 
traditional IR approaches that not only take current conceptualisations and practices 
of hospitality for granted but also present them as the inevitable consequence of 
human affairs and development. Derrida’s text “Plato’s Pharmacy”, briefly touched on 
earlier, along with Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas and “A Word of Welcome”, as well as 
other works, have shown us “that what is ultimately feared in effecting these 
exclusions is death, resulting in a turn towards that which provides security, that is, a 
privileging of the home, the authentic, the true, reason, the proper, and/or the 
subject” (De Ville, 2010:20–1). The raising of intransigent boundaries, be they actual 
or metaphorical, limiting the openness of hospitality or tying it to considerations of 
quotas and other legal instruments, serve, therefore, as an antidote to fear and the 
unforeseeable event. Derrida’s conceptualisation of hospitality, on the contrary, 
accentuates this fear, by emphasising the need for an openness to this unpredictable 
to-come. One has to be careful, however, so that autoimmunity does not suffer from 
this “fabulous retroactivity”, this time of the scientific type. As shown above, 
autoimmunity can and must instruct us towards more open borders and a more eager 
embrace of our responsibility towards the Others. We have seen in this chapter that 
such an opening to the future may not be wholly optimistic but may also account for 
the worst. This atemporal suspension, the restlessness of the undecidable at the heart 
of hospitality, the urgent need to continuously engage with it, is the only way to 
challenge and overcome the stable categories engendering violence: 
 
awaiting without horizon of the wait, awaiting what one does not expect yet or 
any longer, hospitality without reserve, welcoming salutation accorded in 
advance to the absolute surprise of the arrivant from whom or from which one 
will not ask anything in return and who or which will not be asked to commit to 
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the domestic contracts of any welcoming power (family, State, nation territory, 
native soil or blood, language, culture in general, even humanity). (Derrida, 
1994:81–2).  
 
Autoimmunity informs the undecidable in an affirmative responsible way and 
undermines the possibility for the worst.   
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 DETENTION/CAMP FOR STRANGERS: FROM 5 /
IMMUNITY TO AN AUTOIMMUNITARY TOPOS  
 
 
Introduction   
In the midst of the worst economic crisis in the state’s history, Greek authorities 
announced in 2012 that they planned to open 30 detention camps to house 30,000 
“illegal” immigrants by 2014. These facilities – officially named “closed hospitality 
centres” – were to be created at unused military sites under a €250-million programme 
funded by the European Union (AP, March 2012). The detained immigrants would 
outnumber Greece’s prison population, then estimated at 12,500. In line with the idea 
of “Fortress Europe”,191 Frontex (the EU’s controversial border control agency which 
was established in 2004 and has acquired increased powers and funding over the 
years),192 and given similar facilities in Calais, southern Malta, the Italian island of 
Lampedusa and elsewhere, the camp appears to have made a forceful comeback in 
European national and international politics as an important instrument of border and 
movement management. Under the current security context, it has acquired 
                                                        191	Used	since	the	mid-1990s	to	describe	the	increased	sealing	off	of	the	EU’s	borders,	the	term	was	actually	coined	during	the	Second	World	War	as	a	propaganda	term	(Festung	Europa)	to	mean	the	fortification	of	Nazi-occupied	territories	in	the	continent	as	a	defence	against	operations	launched	mainly	 from	Britain	and	Allied	 territory	 in	general.	 “Hitler	himself	 coined	 the	 term,”	according	 to	Luftwaffe	commander	Adolf	Galland	(cited	in	Keeney,	2012:30).	Interestingly,	the	same	name	was	given	 by	 the	 British	 Air	 Force	 and	 Allied	 powers	 to	 the	 operations	 from	 the	 UK	 targeting	 Axis-occupied	parts	from	1940	to	1944.		This	 semantic	 difference	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 current	 use	 of	 the	 term	 “Fortress	 Europe”:	 its	derogatory	 use	 is	 invoked	 in	 critiques	 by	 human	 rights	 organisations	 and	 others	 in	 order	 to	condemn	unfair	EU	 immigration	 and	 trade	policies,	 and	especially	 the	 cost	 in	human	 lives	of	 the	former;	whereas	it	is	at	the	same	time	promoted	in	a	positive	light	at	a	national	political	level,	as	in	the	 case	of	Austria’s	 far-right	 Freedom	Party,	where	Festung	Europa	was	 actually	 a	 slogan	 in	 the	recent	European	elections,	 and	was	presented	as	a	project	 that	 should	be	pursued	 further	 (Tava,	2014).	192	Following	 the	signing	of	 the	Schengen	Convention	 for	EU	 internal	 free	movement	 in	1990	and	the	 Amsterdam	 treaty	 in	 1999,	 the	 European	 Council	 on	 Justice	 and	 Home	 Affairs	 created	 the	External	 Border	 Practitioners	 Common	 Unit	 –	 a	 group	 composed	 of	 members	 of	 the	 Strategic	Committee	 on	 Immigration,	 Frontiers	 and	 Asylum	 (SCIFA)	 and	 heads	 of	 national	 border	 control	services	–	in	a	persistent	effort	to	strengthen	the	cooperation	between	EU	members	in	the	area	of	migration,	asylum	and	security.	In	turn,	the	unit	coordinated	six	ad-hoc	centres	on	border	control	at	national	 level:	 a	 Risk	 Analysis	 Centre	 (Helsinki,	 Finland);	 Centre	 for	 Land	 Borders	 (Berlin,	Germany);	Air	Borders	Centre	(Rome,	Italy);	Western	Sea	Borders	Centre	(Madrid,	Spain);	Ad-hoc	Training	Centre	for	Training	(Traiskirchen,	Austria);	Centre	of	Excellence	(Dover,	United	Kingdom);	Eastern	 Sea	 Borders	 Centre	 (Piraeus,	 Greece).	 To	 improve	 the	workings	 of	 the	 unit,	 a	 few	 years	later	 the	 European	 Council	 created	 Frontex	 (the	 European	 Agency	 for	 the	 Management	 of	Operational	Cooperation	at	the	External	Borders	of	the	Member	States	of	the	European	Union)	with	the	 Council	 Regulation	 (EC)	 2007/2004,	 which	 may	 be	 found	 here:	http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/frontex_regulation_en.pdf	 (last	 visited	 on	 5	December	2011).	
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exclusionary dimensions, which set it apart from its traditional relief and 
humanitarian aid role, as observed in the like of camps for refugees, internally 
displaced people, etc. 
 
This new security context is defined by the revolution in surveillance techniques and 
technologies, their fusion with military and police practices and the emergence of a 
discourse that connects flows of population with global threats like terrorism or 
pandemics of contagious viruses. The great increase in the number of forcefully 
displaced persons affected by armed conflicts and other violent situations,193 the 
recurring revelations of the existence of modern slave labour camps, 194  the 
controversies over the legality of detention camps and their practices in the context of 
the war on terror, the substantiation of what the ICRC calls the “hidden global 
internment network” in order to describe CIA extraordinary renditions and the 
relevant “‘black sites” “in European states are among the main practices that reflect 
how states” have gradually altered their commitments to formally agreed hospitality 
conventions.195  The new emerging image seems to be defined by “a widespread 
employment in Western democracies of clauses of exception to the writ of habeas 
corpus” (Hogan and Marín-Dòmine, 2007:2). While the camp is not at the heart of all 
these practices, it does distinguish itself as a basic characteristic of the break from this 
central axis of the rule of law (MSF UK, 2016) with its function being to enclose people, 
particularly foreigners who usually have not been found guilty of any crime other than 
being irregular and undocumented, i.e., having either no identification papers or not 
the correct kind, eroding basic rights such as the right of freedom of movement, with 
countries imposing varying limits of detention without persecution (Spain up to 40 
days, Italy 60 days, etc.). With the EU Returns Directive of 2008,196 which allowed for 
the detention period to be increased to up to 18 months, along with a 5-year ban on 
re-entry for those previously forcibly returned, the camp becomes the central site of 
                                                        193	Malik,	 S.	 “UNHCR	 report	 says	 refugee	 numbers	 at	 15-year	 high,”	 Guardian,	 20	 June	 2011	available	 at:	 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/20/unhcr-report-refugee-numbers-15-year-high	(last	visited	on	25	November	2011).	194	The	Sonapur	labour	camp	in	Dubai,	re-education	labour	camps	in	China	but	also	similar	camps	in	Europe	(in	Italy’s	Puglia	region	in	2006,	near	Krakow	in	the	same	year,	in	Britain	in	2011).		195	See	 for	 instance:	 UNHCR’s	 condemnation	 of	 Austria,	 Slovenia	 and	 FYROM	 for	 their	 restrictive	practices	imposed	on	refugees	(TRT	World,	2016);	UNHCR’s	concerns	regarding	the	legality	of	the	EU/Turkey	plan	(UNHCR,	2016),	etc.		196	Council	Directive	2008/115/EC	is	available	here:		http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010737%202008%20INIT.		
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detention practices and the main impediment for strangers to move freely and to 
access their full range of rights during asylum application procedures.197 
 
This chapter argues that among these camps, there is a type that I will tentatively be 
calling the camp for strangers, in order to define the makeshift or temporary camps for 
undocumented, irregular or uncategorisable migrants. Such initially self-made camps 
may at a later stage often come under the administrative control of nation states and 
international organisations198 and be turned into sorting centres or end up being 
evacuated.199 No matter the way they evolve, camps for strangers are in their first 
instantiation the spaces where the autoimmunitary ethics of hospitality I presented in 
the previous chapter can be further explored. My main contention is that these are the 
topoi where immunisation of borders fails, negative understandings of autoimmunity 
are breached and ethical responsibility is best enacted by the host-Selves. My 
argument is based on a double ambivalence: on the one hand, contrary to the official 
narrative that sees the camp as a “space of protection”,200 detention camps are allowed 
to exist as an essential instrument for turning away strangers, either by deportation 
and/or discouragement against future attempts at border crossing.201 Deportation in 
                                                        197	See	the	discussion	on	Moria	camp	later	on.		198	Or	potentially	by	private	security	companies,	even	though	this	has	not	been	the	case	so	far.		199	The	 best	 known	 case	 is	 the	 camp	 of	 Idomeni	 at	 the	 Greek	 borders	with	 FYROM.	 See	 also	 the	cases	of	 the	Hara	 camp	 in	Northern	Greece	and	Kara	Tepe	 camp	and	 the	Village	of	Altogether	 in	Lesvos,	among	others.	An	exhaustive	list	of	these	and	other	camps	in	Northern	Greece,	with	maps,	reports	 and	 live	 updates	 can	 be	 found	 at	 the	 independent	 reseaech	 page	 http://moving-europe.org/	200	The	2014	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Refugee	and	Forced	Migration	Studies	fails	to	properly	refer	to	camps	at	all.	 In	a	short	chapter	of	10	pages,	 it	makes	reference	 instead	to	encampment	(the	term	“camp”	 is	 indexed	 under	 encampment,	 as	 a	 synonym)	 and	 self-settlement	 as	 “a	 policy	 which	requires	refugees	to	live	in	a	designated	area	set	aside	for	the	exclusive	use	of	refugees,	unless	they	have	 gained	 specific	 permission	 to	 live	 elsewhere”.	 Reading	 as	 a	 policy	 manual,	 the	 camp	 is	considered	a	“space	of	protection”	where	“the	host	state	is	obliged	to	ensure	that	the	human	rights	of	the	refugees	are	upheld”.	The	creation	of	such	spaces	of	protection	is	informed	mainly	by	three	concerns:	Firstly,	the	concern	about	how	large	numbers	of	refugees	can	be	incorporated	within	the	society	 of	 a	 country;	 secondly,	 the	 concern	 addressing	 the	 practicalities	 of	 providing	 for	 the	immediate	basic	needs	of	the	refugee	population;	and	thirdly,	the	concern	about	the	state’s	security,	“often	the	most	pressing”	one	of	all	(Bakewell,	2014:128–9).	There	is	no	critical	engagement	with	either	other	aspects	of	encampment	or	with	addressing	these	concerns.		201	Greece	 has	 been	 repeatedly	 condemned	 for	 degrading	 detention	 conditions	 by	 the	 European	Court	of	Human	Rights	and	for	using	these	spaces	in	order	to	push	back	before	asylum	applications	are	properly	 considered	 (for	 instance,	 in	 the	 recent	Case	of	MD	vs.	Greece,	 2015).	The	European	Committee	 for	 the	 Prevention	 of	 Torture	 and	 Inhuman	 or	 Degrading	 Treatment	 or	 Punishment	(CPT),	 created	 by	 the	 European	 Council	 convention	 of	 the	 same	 name,	 has	 highlighted	 some	 of	these	problems,	 in	 a	public	 statement	 concerning	Greece:	 “The	 reports	 on	 the	2005,	 2007,	 2008,	and	2009	visits	all	paint	a	similar	picture	of	irregular	migrants	being	held	in	very	poor	conditions	in	police	stations	and	other	 ill-adapted	premises,	often	disused	warehouses,	 for	periods	of	up	 to	six	months,	 and	 even	 longer,	with	 no	 access	 to	 outdoor	 exercise,	 no	 other	 activities	 and	 inadequate	
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this context is no longer seen as a policy option but instead “as what has come to 
stand as the apparently singular and presumably natural or proper retribution on the 
part of state powers” to the problem of irregular immigration (Peutz and De Genova, 
2010:1); this can be reasonably deduced both by the low recognition rates of asylum 
claims (Neumayer, 2005:44) and the excessive spending on (often privatised) border 
management technologies (an excess at odds with the current climate of financial 
crisis). Detention camps of immigrants, which in their 21st-century emergence 
embodies various elements of previous camp forms, therefore define this first 
ambivalence: the tension between the proclaimed obligations of states to protect 
strangers who arrive at the border and the essential role of the camps in the 
punishment / banishment of strangers in reality. As such, they are a quintessential 
symbol of a state’s effort for immunisation.  
 
However, at the same time, there are a series of camps of strangers that, makeshift and 
self-organised, seek to address the basic needs of immigrant Others, provide first-aid  
and respond in the best possible way to their call to embrace the responsibility of the 
Self. These camps attract a lot of attention and despite their usual remote locations, 
they become the epicentre of actions of assistance, solidarity and voluntary work of an 
individual and networked character beyond traditional charity structures.202 The vast 
number of examples of people abandoning their everyday lives (and often their 
countries)203 to address the needs of migrants arriving at the border are indicative of 
occurrences where the embracing of an unconditional ethical responsibility takes 
                                                                                                                                                                  health-care	 provision.	 Recommendations	 to	 improve	 the	 situation	 nevertheless	 continued	 to	 be	ignored.	Despite	significant	numbers	of	irregular	migrants	entering	Greece	via	its	eastern	land	and	sea	borders	over	a	period	of	years,	no	steps	were	taken	to	put	in	place	a	coordinated	and	acceptable	approach	as	regards	their	detention	and	treatment”	(CPT,	2011).		202	Traditional	charity	definitions	talk	of	a	distance	between	giving	and	actively	participating	in	the	causes	 one	 gives	 to,	 implying	 a	 vertical	 structure	 from	 the	 donor/sponsor	 to	 the	 object	 of	donation/in	need.	The	choice	of	the	word	“object”	is	indicative	here	(Bekkers	and	Wiepking,	2011).	Research	also	points	to	the	negative	association	between	charity	and	volunteering	(Hill,	2012:2–3).	203	For	example	Rayann	Haries,	the	Malaysian	cook	who	arrived	alone	in	Lesvos	to	set	up	an	open-air	kitchen	for	the	migrants	arriving	at	the	shore	to	the	group	of	Spanish	lifeguards	(Dean,	2015),	or	the	 Kempsons,	 a	 British	 family	 living	 on	 Eftalou	 beach	 who	 initially	 opened	 their	 door	 to	 the	migrants	 arriving	 on	 the	 beach	 near	 their	 house,	 only	 then	 to	 become	 full-time	 volunteers	 and	organisers	 of	 assistance	 to	 all	 arrivals.	 These	 are	 a	 drop	 in	 the	 vast	 sea	 of	 individuals	 selflessly	assisting	the	tidal	wave	of	migrants	from	the	Middle	East	and	Africa,	and	who	often	do	not	belong	to	NGO	 networks	 or	 other	 centrally-organised	 efforts	 (Koukoumakas,	 2015).	 In	 March	 2016	 there	were	more	than	80	aid	organisations	helping	migrants	in	Lesvos,	with	UNCHR	and	the	International	Rescue	 Committee	 among	 them.	 However,	 “the	 majority	 are	 small	 and	 staffed	 by	 self-organised	volunteers;	many	were	set	up	in	response	to	the	current	crisis”	(Garen,	2016)	before	the	arrival	of	larger	INGOs	“organ[ised]	informally	out	of	necessity”	(Nianias,	2016).		
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place. The relations ensuing may be asymmetrical (migrants depending on the 
assistance of the hosts-volunteers) but they are also relations of fraternity and 
responsibility, which enrich the lives and perceptions of Otherness in a mutual 
manner.204 And this autoimmunitary example is all the more remarkable, since it 
occurs in the context of rising xenophobia and far-right rhetoric, along with the 
escalation of anti-immigration policies in Europe and in times of acute economic 
crisis, especially in the case of Greece, where the camps I have referred to are mainly 
located. This constitutes the second ambivalence.  
 
Seen in this way, this chapter considers the camp for strangers as an interesting locus 
for both ethics and politics and a challenging concept, which tests the way 
International Relations understands the responsibility towards strangers and the 
ethics of hospitality. Through my conceptualisation of an autoimmunitary hospitality, 
I will argue that the camps for strangers, the makeshift encampments where irregular 
and undocumented migrants are kept, function against the initial immunising purpose 
of camps in general: they constitute spaces where the individual ethical responsibility 
towards the third is materialised in a spirit of spontaneity and solidarity, often to the 
point of self-sacrifice.    
 
I will proceed with my argument in the following manner: in the first part, I embark on 
a general descriptive definition of the camp, before looking in more detail at the 
contemporary research on the camp, which manifests the strict security narrative 
permeating the detention camps run by central authorities. From there, I attempt in 
5.3 to superimpose this securitisation aspect on Didier Bigo’s reading of the 
“banopticon” dispositif in order to inquire into one of the main influences on said 
research: biopolitics. In 5.4 I explore further the biopolitical aspect of an ethics of 
hospitality, with a focus on its Agambenian vein (5.4.1), and then the relation between 
the camp for strangers with the autoimmunitary ethics of hospitality I examined in 
chapter four (5.4.2) 
 
 
                                                        204	There	 is	 an	 abundance	 of	 stories	 concerning	 hosts-selves,	 volunteers	 and	 others	 who	 are	involved	 in	 assisting	migrants,	who	 later	 follow	 from	afar	 the	progress	 of	 the	migrants’	 trip	 to	 a	final	destination,	being	personally	invested	in	the	trip	and	its	safety.	See	here	for	example	the	story	of	 Italian	photographer	Massimo	Sestini,	who	set	up	the	website	“Where	are	you?”	 in	an	effort	 to	locate	migrants	he	had	photographed	and	was	acquainted	with	over	the	years	(Stefani,	2015).		
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5.1 Definition  
The word camp derives from a 15th-century loanword from the Italian campo, meaning 
arable land, and appears in similar forms in other, Latin-based languages. This root is 
only challenged by the German Lager,205 which is found in the origin of the Russian 
word for camp, Gulag. Its association with the Second World War and the 
complementary word “‘concentration’ renders it a mot malade, an ‘ill word’”, as French 
scholars would have it (Kotek and Rigoulot, 2000; Bernardot, 2008).206 The camp could 
be defined as an arbitrary and imposed roundup of persons beyond the realm of the 
penitentiary system, for an indeterminate amount of time, with an aim to restrain, re-
educate or oblige these persons to work (Bernardot, 2008:12). Regarding the aim of 
camps, David Rousset, whose 1945 testimony of the Nazi camps was perhaps the first 
to emerge, argues that they were not simple economic organisms, as is often 
maintained, but were above all instruments of penal, social and political punishment, 
dominated by the idea of absolute repression (Rousset, 1965). 
 
Often the camp is situated in an ad hoc or pre-existing site serving military, policing, 
economic and social purposes. Sofsky, in his study of Nazi camps (1993), mentions 
that earlier camps were situated in old, dilapidated factories (the case of Dachau), 
empty breweries (such as Oranienburg), old prisons, disused monasteries even old 
ships (the camp in Bremen). Later camps tended to “have no past”: sites were cleared 
especially for the erection of the camp, which was built according to strict designs. 
Power would occupy space and transform it completely. In addition, the last or 
“modern” (according to Sofsky) camps were zoned, i.e., divided into regions where 
activities were functionally separated (Sofsky, 1993:122). Such organisation is much 
scarcer in current camps. Camps for undocumented immigrants in general are usually 
located outside cities, on the periphery of ports, in the suburbs or rural environs. 
Diken argues that this is part of a contemporary strategy to keep migrants and asylum 
                                                        205	The	place	of	lying	down,	such	as	a	bed,	lair,	camp,	storehouse.	206	Perhaps	it	would	be	useful	here	to	note	that	there	is	a	whole	debate	around	the	use	of	the	word	camp	 among	 activists,	 relevant	NGOs,	 assistance	 and	 support	 networks	 involved	with	 non-status	migrants	and	strangers.	The	term	“informal	camp”	is	used	for	informal	settlements	while	migration	experts,	 scholars	and	 international	organizations	such	as	Migreurop	(a	network	of	approximately	42	 associations,	 activists	 and	 researchers	 from	 several	 European	 Union	 member	 states,	 Sub-Saharan,	Maghreb	and	Middle	East	countries)	claim	to	use	the	term	to	refer	not	only	to	a	specific	enclosed	space	but	“the	collection	of	mechanisms	that	constitute	points	of	forced	interruption	along	migratory	 routes”	 (2009:3),	 such	as	waiting	 zones	at	 airports,	 for	 instance.	Migreurop	calls	 them	invariably	camps	d’étrangers,	camps	for	foreigners/strangers.	
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seekers dispersed and “isolated from the amenities and cultural facilities concentrated 
in cities”. Given that migrants are not able to afford transport, it is in this way most 
likely that they will spend their time confined to the camps (Diken and Lautsen, 
2005:87)207 – depending of course on whether they are allowed to exit the camps in the 
first place or whether the camps in question are self-made, where migrants squat 
under the distant observation of the authorities.  
 
With regards to the frequent parallels drawn between the prison and the camp, the 
obvious difference remains the judicial context of the former, with the prison 
functioning as an administrative and penal detention centre. According to some 
scholars (Wormser-Migot, 1973; Kotek and Rigoulot, 2000), the early but also later 
concentrationary systems functioned as a supplement and in parallel to the official 
and legal repression apparatus, with the camp used by society in order to exclude the 
persons who are not officially guilty of any crime and therefore cannot be referred to 
the judicial apparatus. The camp has not, therefore, “the mission to sanction errors or 
real crimes but to rid us of those whom a regime invested with rights and powers 
considers as harmful or dangerous for itself” (Kotek and Rigoulot, 2000:13). Despite 
this obvious trait, the absence of judicial procedure is not always pertinent: one may 
end up in a camp after a trial. It is perhaps the material and topographic element 
which makes the difference. In prison there is a tendency towards individualisation: 
cells are indispensable, isolation is often used as punishment. In a camp, cells are rare, 
isolation an exception: one sleeps, works and defecates in front of everyone. Prisons 
are always enclosed and surrounded by barbed wire while in the case of the camp this 
is not an absolute. In some Russian gulags there was not even barbed wire, given that 
there was nowhere to go in the icy expanses surrounding, them while in other types of 
camps the nearby towns could often hide great dangers.  
 
The form of camps may vary between more “open” spaces (such as accommodation 
centres or reception centres) to “closed”, prison-like structures like detention and 
waiting centres. Today in Europe the camps range from prisons, as in Germany and 
                                                        207	To	comply	with	Greek	law,	immigrants	in	remote	camps	in	Lesvos	needed	to	walk	50	kilometres	to	a	state-run	detention	centre	where	they	could	be	registered	and	follow	a	 further	6.5-kilometre	walk	to	reach	the	central	port.	 It	was	 illegal	 for	 locals	 to	give	them	a	ride	and	for	public	buses	to	allow	 them	 to	board,	 since	 according	 to	 the	 law	 that	was	overturned	only	 in	 July	2015,	 assisting	migrants	was	equivalent	to	people-smuggling.	Anyone	breaching	the	law	was	fined	€100	and	there	were	at	least	two	arrests	(Kingsley,	2015).		
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Ireland, to detention centres, or “hotspots” as they are now euphemistically called, in 
the Greek islands and on the borders with Turkey, which latter were often not planned 
in advance and so are located in makeshift buildings.208 Camps are also the answer to 
the high risk of shipwrecks and boats capsizing while transporting migrants across the 
Adriatic, from the Italian Centri di permanenza temporanea e assistenzato, French zones 
d’attente/waiting zones and centres de rétention, Belgian closed centres for asylum 
seekers, to buffer camps which mark the actual border of the European Union: 
Morocco, Spain (Ceuta, Melilla, Canary islands), Algeria, Ukraine, Malta or Lampedusa. 
 
In his attempt to form an inventory of camp types (and not a typology), Michel Agier 
considers “the four major types of gathering spaces, as these are seen by UN, 
humanitarian, and policing agencies: “cross-border points” in the UNHCR’s official 
terminology; “transit centres”; “refugee camps” or “refugee settlements”; and camps 
for “internally displaced persons”” (Agier, 2011b:39). Reflecting on these differences, 
he further enriches them by making a broader distinction, again in four parts, 
“according to the function that they occupy in a wider mechanism of survival, control 
and distancing”. These are: a. self-organised refuges (“cross-border points”, informal 
camp-grounds, “jungles”, “ghettos”, “grey zones”, “squats”); b. sorting centres 
(transit centres, “way stations”, “holding centres”, camps for foreigners, waiting 
zones); c. spaces of confinement (refugee camps, UNHCR rural settlements) and d. 
unprotected reserves (camps for internally displaced persons). The camp for strangers  
on which I am focusing corresponds mainly to the first type. Self-organised refuges, 
which are characterised by “extreme material precariousness” but usually good 
organisation, they can remain largely invisible and unclassifiable for national and 
international organisations and, according to Agier, sometimes become sites of urban 
stabilisation. Occupants usually remain out of sight of the local population while 
tending to form communities without identity. Such examples can be seen in Lesvos, 
Idomeni and other places near borders. As mentioned before, these spaces may turn 
into centrally (as in UNHCR or state) governed centres or hotspots. Before they do, 
they can be “open” or “closed”, and unidentified waiting periods for their residents are 
very common (Agier, 2011b:39–59). 
                                                        208	See	 for	 instance	 the	 Moria	 hotspot	 in	 Lesvos.	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 that	 Doctors	 Without	Borders	and	Oxfam	suspended	activities	there	in	March	2016	to	avoid	being	complicit	in	an	“unfair	and	inhumane”	treatment	(EurActiv.com,	2016).		
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In contemporary scholarship there is the understanding that the camp has become 
“banal”, common, and its existence is to be expected to grow in numbers (Agier, 2011b 
and 2014; Bernardot, 2008; Hogan and Marín-Dòmine, 2007 among others). While the 
use of the camp is becoming commonplace and is multiplied, it also seems to evolve 
depending on its geographical position. It is argued that whereas in the non-western 
world it has retained its character of accepting refugees or serving purposes of 
humanitarian relief (for instance, the refugee camps described above by Agier), in the 
western, democratic world it takes the form of a repressive space where immigration is 
connected to the threat of terrorism or a general fear of undermining state stability 
(Bernardot, 2008:214). This geographical differentiation between democratic and non-
democratic milieus, between the camp’s repressive and humanitarian relief character, 
is difficult to ascertain from the hard facts. It becomes further complicated when one 
looks at camps that combine both, such as the ones at the borders of India and 
Pakistan; or when one considers the recent self-made camps of displaced persons 
along the borders of Libya following the Arab spring or the commonality of security 
and exclusionary mechanisms used in all type of camps despite their geographical 
location or type. Despite these complications, there seems to be a grain of truth in the 
perception: 83% of the camps under the authority of the UNHCR, the traditional 
provider of humanitarian relief, are located in Africa (Smawfield, 2015). At the same 
time, little is officially said about the camps located near or at the European borders, 
where self-organised refuges are often brought under the control of the authority 
delegated to nation-states or specific European power instruments, such as Frontex; 
and what little is said often revolves around a narrative of security, state stability and 
the threats that are made against it.  
 
 
5.2 Contemporary research on the camp: an attempt to define 
the elusive 
Despite the ever-wider use of the camp as a space of exclusion and forced enclosure 
during the First and Second World Wars, it took some time before the camp became 
the subject of in-depth scholarly research (Wachsmann, 2006; Bernardot, 2008). While 
the first testimonies of Nazi camp survivors already appeared in the late 1940s (David 
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Rousset’s L’Univers Concentrationnaire and Eugen Kogon’s Der SS-Staat in 1946, Primo 
Levi’s Se questo è un uomo and Robert Antelme’s L’Espèce humaine shortly after and 
others from lesser-known camp survivors) and with the exception of Hannah Arendt’s 
work, no relevant, systematic historical or philosophical work was undertaken until a 
few decades later: apart from a few exceptions – studies on individual camps or 
aspects of the camp system published the 1960s and 1970s (Billig, 1967; Pingel, 1978) 
which remained largely unnoticed – methodical research was only undertaken for the 
first time in the 1980s and 1990s (see, for example, Sofsky, 1993; Herbert et al., 1998) 
(Wachsmann, 2006:248). Whether that was due to the aversion caused by the 
extraordinary atrocities of the Nazi extermination and concentration camps and of the 
gulags can only be surmised.209 Irrespective of the reason, as a result of this relative 
silence the camp had come to be viewed either as an evil of the past (a place of horror 
and death, mainly located in Europe for the general imaginary) or a space celebrating 
life through its humanitarian incarnations, especially in the global south or other 
areas ravaged by crises. Apart from some sporadic appearances of relative works and 
testimonies, the study of camps became more systematic in the 1980s, focusing 
however mainly on the Shoah in the Nazi concentration and extermination camps. A 
little later, studies appeared on the earlier colonial examples, which still failed, 
however, to see the camp as a social and political space fully belonging to modern 
civilisation. Sociologists like Zygmunt Bauman were among the first to be interested in 
the camp in parallel with the condition of strangerhood (1991, 1995) whereas 
anthropologists and geographers have sought to explore the social, spatial and 
environmental repercussions of the camps. Debating the camp along with 
extraterritoriality and citizenship or as a parallel concept to the polis (Agamben, 1998; 
Agier, 2014), the concept of the camp has made a forceful theoretical comeback, which 
one could say mirrors in part its increasing use in politics (See for instance Rygiel, 
2011 and 2012; Bulley, 2014 among others). 
 
In the detention camps, which I consider to be a reincarnation emblematic of how 
contemporary exclusionary politics remain uninformed by the ethics of hospitality 
considered in this thesis (contrary to the camps for strangers), the main aim appears to 
be the political, social and sociological exclusion through spatial distancing and a 
                                                        209	Wachsmann	suggests	that	“it	was	less	a	case	of	survivors	unable	to	speak,	but	of	an	audience	–	in	Germany	and	elsewhere	–	unwilling	to	listen”	(Ibid.).	
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semasiological vacuum. Camps in this respect could be seen as Augé’s “non-places” 
(non-lieux): they do not integrate other places, meanings, traditions and sacrificial 
ritual moments but remain, due to a lack of characterisation, non-symbolised and 
abstract spaces (Augé, 1995:82, also cited in Diken, 2005:86). Agier also calls them 
out-places or off-places (hors-lieux), places of great ambivalence regarding the reasons 
for which they are set up, their aims and results, their role as new social milieus for the 
internees. This extraterritoriality can also be seen in practical terms, when exploring 
how camps are absent from official cartographies: this is particularly true for the 
waiting zones and detention spaces at airports or elsewhere, which are often kept from 
public knowledge.210 Bauman sees such extraterritoriality as a major characteristic of 
globalisation (Bauman, 1997); in the case of camps, these are extraterritorial spaces of 
refuse for the “supernumerary” and the abject Other. As such, detention camps often 
exist in a state of exception with regards to the rule of law, as tested by the frequent 
condemnatory ECHR rulings regarding unlawful detention, detention conditions and 
exertion of violence, etc.211  
  
As mentioned earlier, detention is not just an initial stage of the asylum or other 
status-assigning procedures, nor is deportation their derivative. In detention camps 
(or in the cases where a camp for strangers falls under the administration of 
authorities) detention in degrading conditions and threats of deportation appear often 
be a conspicuous aim.212 Despite the international legal principle of non-refoulement, 
deportation defines a post-September 11 environment, preoccupied with border 
security, where they have 
 
achieved a remarkable and renewed prominence as a paramount technique for 
refortifying political, racial, and class-based boundaries and purportedly 
                                                        210	Agier	here	gives	the	example	of	the	Daddab	camps	in	Kenya,	which	despite	being	three	times	the	size	 of	 Garissa,	 the	 administrative	 county	 where	 they	 are	 situated,	 do	 not	 appear	 in	 any	 of	 the	county	maps	(Agier,	2014:20).	Set	up	more	than	20	years	ago,	the	Dadaab	camps	are	the	biggest	in	the	world.		211 	A	 list	 of	 ECHR’s	 rulings	 on	 migrant	 detention	 can	 be	 found	 here:	http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Migrants_detention_ENG.pdf.	Rulings	are	also	recorded	in	the	weekly	bulletins	of	 the	European	Council	 for	Refugees	and	Exiles	(ECRE),	which	are	available	here:	http://www.ecre.org/media/news/weekly-bulletin.html	212	See	the	British	Labour	MP	for	Birmingham	Shabana	Mahmood’s	description	of	such	conditions	in	her	New	Statesman	article	of	15	October	2015.	Official	figures	for	decisions	on	deportations	are	not	 published.	 However,	 discouragement	 and	 delays	 in	 registering	 migrants	 and	 their	 asylum	claims	along	with	the	issue	of	the	returns	following	the	EU/Turkey	deal	have	repeatedly	provoked	general	outcry	(Mahmood,	2015;	EuraActiv.com,	2016	and	others)	
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allaying (while in fact further inciting) socioeconomic insecurities “at home”, 
“within the “domestic” spaces of nation-states. (Peutz and De Genova, 2010:4) 
 
Although this is not and cannot be an officially stated aim, inhumane detention 
conditions as well as a covert tendency for unlawful returns and pushbacks suggest 
that degradation and exclusion of strangers is among the “unwanted” results of the 
camp. Looking at current developments, it is no secret that dismal reception 
conditions of migrants have been partly used as repellent techniques to deter future 
migrants and undermine any potential “pull-factors”.213  
 
In its European expressions at least, the centrally-run camps214 seem often to hold a 
dehumanising vision for their detainees/internees, starting with depersonalisation 
techniques, since, usually for practical reasons, detainees are not identified by their 
name but by numbers or by group of belonging (nationality, language, age, etc.) and 
their division in two broad categories: asylum seekers and irregular migrants. The 
addition of strict and close surveillance leads to another main characteristic, the 
violation of fundamental rights (Intrand and Perrouty, 2005:8) such as the freedom of 
movement, the right to private and family life, the right not to suffer inhuman or 
degrading treatment or rights specific to minors. In continuation, there is a tendency 
on the one hand to increase reception capacities (the cases of Italy, France, Belgium 
and Greece) (UNHCR, 2009; AIDA, 2013) and, on the other, to increase the use of 
private companies for either everyday management or security and surveillance or 
both (Fotiadis and Ciobanu, 2013b; Agier, 2014). The novelty which thus defines 
detention camps today is that they gather a series of characteristics revolving around 
increasing policing and military control. Agier observes a “functional [and contextual] 
solidarity (…) between the humanitarian world and the police and military ordering” 
(2011:5), a connection which proves every policy of assistance (by international 
governmental or non-governmental organisations towards displaced persons or non-
status strangers) to be simultaneously an instrument of control over its beneficiaries. 
                                                        
213 This	has	been	recently	publicly	discussed	in	the	context	of	the	sea	rescues	of	immigrants	and	the	EU’s	 and	 Britain’s	 unwillingness	 to	 continue	 to	 invest	 in	 them.	 It	 is,	 however,	 nothing	 new:	 “the	analysis	of	20	OECD	countries	for	the	period	1985-1999	further	shows	that	some	of	the	most	high	profile	 public	 policy	measures	 –	 safe	 third	 country	 provisions,	 dispersal	 and	 voucher	 schemes	 –	aimed,	at	least	in	part,	at	deterring	unwanted	migration”	(Thielemann,	2006:442).	 214	By	 "centrally-run"	 camps	 I	 refer	 specifically	 to	 those	 camps	 that	 are	 run	 by	 states	 of	 other	administrative	bodies,	rather	than	by	the	camp	inhabitants	themselves'.	
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He finds that this connection, this proximity, is accompanied by “even more frequent 
and commonplace ‘slippages’ in the exercise of power over the lives” of non-status 
strangers, which “relegate the stateless to the very limits of life” (2011:12). This 
relegation derives not only from a de-politicisation of subjects, which is to be expected 
for persons in places of which they hold no citizenship, but also from a targeted 
dehumanisation: this is accomplished, according to Agier, “[b]y speaking only of 
circulation and flows, the management of entrants or the control of encumbrances” 
(2011:17). This is further aided by the fact that individuals in the camps are 
linguistically and practically unidentifiable: they are “entrants”, stateless, displaced, 
“supernumeraries” (according to Mike Davis), “human refuse” (according to Zygmunt 
Bauman), “bare life” (for Giorgio Agamben) or “pariahs” (for Eleni Varikas and Loïc 
Wacquant),215 and the expelled: in a nutshell, they are undesirable and superfluous 
individuals, who are “disconnected from any political system able to offer them a place 
and protect them” (Caloz-Tschopp, 2000:24) at a time when the rejection rate of 
asylum applications in Europe has risen above 90% (Agier, 2011b:24). For theorists like 
Edkins and Pin-Fat, who look at the camp as the normalising locus of the state of 
exception, there are “certain, albeit, limited parallels [that] can be drawn between 
detention camps and the concentration camps, if only in the sense that both can be 
identified as examples of modes of being where there are no power relations and 
resistance is impossible” (2005:17). Finally, detention camps, especially in Europe, 
show similar “common characteristics in terms of (in)effectiveness, of stated and real 
goals” (Intrand and Perrouty, 2005:9). While overall detailed statistics are hard to 
come by (if nonexistent), existing figures tend to suggest almost a zero rate for asylum 
provision (ibid.; also, Valluy, 2005). 
 
To recapitulate, it is this security narrative and the resulting militarisation of the 
treatment of strangers, accompanied by the exclusionary character of the detention 
camps and hotspots, which I consider to be the differentiating characteristic indicative 
of immunisation. This immunising emphasis on security and exclusion is translated 
into lack of collective identity for occupants and their construction as dangerous, the 
militarisation of procedures – which usually tends to reorient or stop migratory flows 
                                                        215	In	 the	 books:	Planet	 of	 Slums	 (2006),	Wasted	Lives	 (2003),	Homo	Sacer	 (1998),	 Les	Rebuts	 du	
Monde	 (2007)	 and	Urban	Outcasts	 (2007)	 respectively,	mentioned	 by	 Agier	 (2011b:18)	 and	 also	mentioned	in	my	introduction.	
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instead of resolving the status of occupants – and finally, “slippages” of power towards 
illegality and violence during these procedures, which remain unaccountable. The 
efforts focusing on “diversion of flows”, stopping or reorienting them as mentioned 
above, could perhaps be seen in the European attempts to “externalise” detention 
camps either in the countries of provenance or in countries outside the EU’s borders, 
seen as buffer zones – “Regional Protection Areas” (RPAs) or “Transit Processing 
Centres” (TPCs) respectively, according to the British cabinet and Home Office paper 
“A New Vision for Refugees”, published in early 2003 and taken up by the European 
Commission and the UNHCR in the same year. This externalisation is apparent in 
attempts to keep strangers in Libya for example (Italian–Libyan Friendship Treaty), 
which is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention, or in eastern European 
countries such as Ukraine, Belarus or Moldova (Readmission Agreements with Eastern 
European Countries), through the European Neighbourhood Policy programme (Le 
Cour Grandmaison, 2007:133–4). The more recent case is the EU/Turkey joint plan to 
“address the migration crisis” (Council of Europe, 2016),216 which led to the creation of 
more detention centres but this time on Turkish soil (Kern, 2016). Following the 
construction of the stranger as a threat in the public imaginary, European Commission 
and UNHCR initiatives are inscribed, according to Jérôme Valluy, “in a context of 
increasing pressures from the part of national governments and successive 
presidencies of the European Union” (2005). Efforts aiming to intern strangers in 
                                                        216	The	EU/Turkey	Joint	Plan,	signed	on	18	March	2016)	foresees	that:		1)	All	new	irregular	migrants	crossing	from	Turkey	to	the	Greek	islands	as	of	20	March	2016	will	be	returned	to	Turkey;	2)	 For	 every	 Syrian	 being	 returned	 to	 Turkey	 from	 the	 Greek	 islands,	 another	 Syrian	 will	 be	resettled	to	the	EU;	3)	 Turkey	 will	 take	 any	 necessary	 measures	 to	 prevent	 new	 sea	 or	 land	 routes	 for	 irregular	migration	opening	from	Turkey	to	the	EU;	4)	 Once	 irregular	 crossings	 between	 Turkey	 and	 the	 EU	 are	 ending	 or	 have	 been	 substantially	reduced,	a	Voluntary	Humanitarian	Admission	Scheme	will	be	activated;	5)	The	fulfilment	of	the	visa	liberalisation	roadmap	will	be	accelerated	with	a	view	to	lifting	the	visa	requirements	 for	 Turkish	 citizens	 at	 the	 latest	 by	 the	 end	 of	 June	 2016.	 Turkey	will	 take	 all	 the	necessary	steps	to	fulfil	the	remaining	requirements;	6)	The	EU	will,	in	close	cooperation	with	Turkey,	further	speed	up	the	disbursement	of	the	initially	allocated	€3	billion	under	the	Facility	for	Refugees	in	Turkey.	Once	these	resources	are	about	to	be	used	in	full,	the	EU	will	mobilise	additional	funding	for	the	Facility	up	to	an	additional	€3	billion	to	the	end	of	2018;	7)	The	EU	and	Turkey	welcomed	the	ongoing	work	on	the	upgrading	of	the	Customs	Union.	8)	 The	 accession	 process	 will	 be	 re-energised,	 with	 Chapter	 33	 to	 be	 opened	 during	 the	 Dutch	Presidency	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 the	 European	Union	 and	 preparatory	work	 on	 the	 opening	 of	 other	chapters	to	continue	at	an	accelerated	pace;	9)	The	EU	and	Turkey	will	work	to	improve	humanitarian	conditions	inside	Syria.		
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camps, which are either located within the borders of the countries that migrants want 
to abandon or in third-party countries, resulting in all cases in keeping strangers away 
from destination countries under the pretext of sorting and in deterrence, constitute 
part of a reality of repression and of an essential ban on immigrants, and are integral 
characteristics of the modern detention camps or hotspots.  
 
This ambivalence and tension regarding scholarly readings of the camp reflects a more 
general and fundamental bifurcation in the camp scholarship. The approach of IR and 
IPT to the camp is mainly constructed around Giorgio Agamben’s work, either in 
agreement or in dissenting terms. These approaches see camps and other hospitality 
practices either in the Agambenian way, i.e., in exceptionalist terms, as located in 
abject spaces bereft of meaning, where human beings are trapped at the eternal 
threshold between inside and outside, devoid of agency and subjectivity; or attempt to 
refute the Agambenian approach for reasons of de-politicisation and de-
subjectification, emphasising the variability and potential of abject spaces as bearing 
meaning and provoking acts of sociality, solidarity and resistance. The latter is usually, 
but not exclusively, identified with the autonomy of migration. Either way, camp 
scholarship, as well as the debates around most current hospitality practices, share to 
a certain extent the biopolitical framework to which I briefly referred in section 1.3.3 
and in the latter part of 3.1. I will now return to it in order to see how it can, if at all, 
enlighten an understanding of the ethics of hospitality. 
 
 
5.3 The biopolitics of the camp: the detention camp as the 
banopticon 
Following on the securitisation and militarisation of the border management 
narratives as symbolised in the case of the camp, it is no wonder that the panopticon, 
in its Foucauldian understanding as a metaphor for the modern “disciplinary” society 
and its tendency to observe and normalise in a “movement that stretches from the 
enclosed disciplines, a sort of social ‘quarantine’, to an indefinitely generalizable 
mechanism of ‘panopticism’” (Foucault, 1977a:216), is often mentioned in scholarly 
discussions about the camp and immigration management in general (Engbersen, 
2001; Mizroeff, 2005; Lyon, 2006; Walters, 2008). Recognising both the oppressive 
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omnipresence of the concept for immigration, security, surveillance studies and other 
relevant disciplines and its conceptual shortcomings, there have been different 
attempts to modify it. Josef Ansorge’s use of the political metaphor of Cuntz’s Tower is 
a case in point (2011): Cuntz’s proposal to store all Germans’ data is used as a 
supplement to the panopticon in order to add the digital dimension to the surveillance 
and management of the Other, which would now acquire a more sophisticated power 
of identification and sorting. Suggestions for modifications notwithstanding, the 
panopticon as a metaphor for the camp can still stand for the “understanding for the 
modern period as a series of linked endeavours to control and discipline people into 
what [Foucault] called docile bodies” (Mizroeff, 2005:124). 
 
In the same biopolitical reading, the camp can be seen as an apparatus, the 
Foucauldian “dispositif”, made up of a “thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting 
of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions” (Foucault, 1980:194). Agier sees it similarly when he looks at the 
interactions among UN and humanitarian organisations and their personnel, activists 
and NGOs, doctors and others who travel from camps in Africa to Sangatte in northern 
France or to detention camps elsewhere and at an established, specialised camp 
economy, where often private companies produce not only survival kits for internees, 
building materials, water pipelines, sanitary provisions, etc., but also institutional 
knowledge and camp savoir faire. Their interaction creates “a consensus 
simultaneously compassionate and technical”, which, sometimes inadvertently, assists 
the sovereign Self, the European Union and other developed countries in the West in 
avoiding the scandal of an official “humanitarian crisis” by accommodating the control 
and often the rejection of the Other, in the face of undesirable strangers (Agier, 
2014:22–23). In this light, detention camps can indeed be seen as the Foucaudian 
dispositif217 par excellence: 
 
a sort of – shall we say – formation which has as its major function at a given 
historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has 
                                                        217	Foucault	talks	of	the	dispositif	in	his	1977	interview	“The	Confession	of	the	Flesh”	(1980:	194–228),	which	was	 going	 to	 be	 the	 title	 of	 his	 fourth	 volume	 of	 the	History	of	Sexuality,	which	was	prevented	 by	 his	 death.	 Dispositif	 is	 translated	 in	 many	 ways,	 sometimes	 in	 the	 same	 text	 as	“apparatus”,	“construction”,	“device”,	“machinery”,	“deployment”.	
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a dominant strategic function. This may have been, for example, the 
assimilation of a floating population found to be burdensome for an essentially 
mercantilist economy: there was a strategic imperative acting here as the 
matrix for an apparatus which gradually undertook the control. (Foucault, 
1980:195) 
 
Didier Bigo combines both concepts to talk of the banopticon, or a “Ban-opticon 
dispositif” as he calls it (2006:6), which, in addressing a general feeling of insecurity 
and unease that was exacerbated globally post-9/11, is “a form of governmentality (…) 
characterized by three criteria: practices of exceptionalism, acts of profiling and 
containing foreigners, and a normative imperative of mobility” (ibid.). Bigo opts for 
ban instead of pan because the surveillance and the impediment of free movement is 
not imposed on entire populations (as pan, meaning whole, would have it) but is kept 
especially for specific “unwelcome” categories, namely irregular migrants, general 
foreigners and strangers, which sovereign states would like to have banned. Borrowing 
the term “ban” from Nancy’s discussion of the abandoned being (Nancy, 1983) and 
Agamben’s treatment of it, i.e., linking it to the old Germanic term designating both 
exclusion from the community and the command and insignia of the sovereign, Bigo 
presents the banopticon as the key to understanding how the detention and 
surveillance of “a small number of people, who are trapped into the imperative of 
mobility while the majority is normalised, is definitely the main tendency of the 
policing of the global age” (Bigo, 2006:35). That is how a clear-cut relation between 
the Self and Other, a Self who is normalised and an Other whose movement, 
localisation, life and death is defined through a strictly hierarchical order, is 
established.218 Understood in this way, the banopticon dispositif allows us to analyse 
and see how discourses on immigration presenting the Other as a threat, institutions 
(such as INGOs, public agencies, governments, etc.), structures (detention centres, 
waiting zones, etc.), relevant laws and administrative measures (on immigration, 
repatriation, EU Return Directives, etc.) (Bigo, 2006:34–5) come together and are all 
symbolised in the figure of the camp.  
 
 
                                                        218	See	my	discussion	in	1.3.3	and	the	latter	part	of	3.1	on	Agamben	and	the	biopolitical	reading	of	the	Other’s	subjectivity.		
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5.4 Ethics in the camp for strangers: from the biopolitical to 
the autoimmunitary 
5.4.1 Ethics and biopolitics 
But how do these discussions shed light on contemporary society’s relationship with 
the stranger? Is there an ethics of hospitality to be found in the camps? Can there be 
an ethics of the camp that addresses the distinction between inside and outside? If the 
other is the homo sacer, how are we to relate with her, how are we to relate with a 
figure with whom we share nothing but her fundamental nakedness? Diken and 
Laustsen ask this same question in order to argue that “a truly universal ethics is one 
which testifies to the nakedness of homo sacer, a nakedness that is shared by all” 
(2005:177) and they turn to Agamben’s reflections on testimony, the remnant and 
shame in order to articulate such ethics. The former is juxtaposed with the sovereign 
exception as the ambivalence of bearing testimony to something, which is impossible 
to bear testimony to, be it the Holocaust concentration camps or bare life in general. 
In this sense, testimony, with its aporetic nature, rises against the unspeakable 
sovereign violence and exclusion. Similarly, the remnant is equally aporetic, existing 
between the human and homo sacer, a residue that cannot be destroyed, “the real 
political subject” (De la Durantaye, 2009:229), a “redemptive machine” that permits 
the salvation of the whole from which it emerges as the signification of division and 
loss (Agamben, 1999:162), opening a way towards a non-statal and non-juridical 
politics and human life, towards a possible escape from state violence. However, for 
Agamben, the ethics of the camp is really based on the idea of shame. Shame derives 
from the nakedness of the subject, from the act of one’s testimony, from one’s 
witnessing her own desubjectification, her own becoming homo sacer. It is the “shame 
that drowned us after the selection, and every time we had to watch, or submit to, 
some outrage” within the limits of the camp, as Levi writes at the beginning of The 
Reawakening (Agamben, 2002:82, Ojakangas, 2011:699). Witnessing and shame, being 
non-juridical concepts, contrary to responsibility, are the real ethical concepts par 
excellence, Agamben argues. “Ethics is the sphere that recognizes neither guilt nor 
responsibility; it is, as Spinoza knew, the doctrine of happy life,” which is why every 
ethical doctrine that claims to be founded on these two notions, even if “interiorized 
and moved outside law”, is necessarily “insufficient and opaque” (Agamben, 2002:22–
24).
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This understanding of the ethics of the camp is in deep contrast with what I consider 
in this project to be a desirable ethics of hospitality, inspired by an unconditional 
responsibility towards the Other, which I take to be embedded a priori in all human 
relations, as posited by Levinas and the affirmative acceptance of the autoimmunitary 
by Derrida. The doctrine of the happy life, being the aim of Agambenian ethics, has no 
place for a responsibility understood in these terms (Agamben, 2002:24). Instead, 
Agamben bases his understanding (and subsequent rejection) of responsibility on its 
juridical origins in the Latin verb spondeo and its meaning of “becoming a guarantor of 
something for someone with respect to someone”. Understanding responsibility as the 
quality of being essentially a sponsor, he reaches the conclusion that the gesture of 
responsibility is thus genuinely juridical and not ethical (Agamben, 2002:21–24). As 
such, responsibility is an obligation, similar to that of a guarantor of a bond or of a 
freed prisoner, and has nothing noble or ethical about it. In this sense, responsibility is 
for him intertwined with culpa, liability or the attribution of damage, what he 
considers to be guilt. These two, responsibility and guilt, have been the two aspects of 
legal imputability, which were only moved outside the legal framework by ethical 
philosophers later and “wrongly”, as one can surmise from Agamben’s writings. 
Responsibility and guilt are insufficient and opaque concepts (2002:22), two 
characteristics that always stand out when the distinction between ethics and law is 
brought to the fore. For this reason, and for the fact that they cannot have 
corresponding legal consequences, responsibility and guilt should not be used as 
ethical categories, according to Agamben. 
 
As Catherine Mills rightly observes, though (2003), Agamben fails to acknowledge that 
responsibility can also be traced to the Latin verb responso, i.e., to answer, to reply or 
respond to the other. It is exactly this capacity for response forming the core of 
Levinasian ethics, explored earlier, that addresses the Other in the camp and may 
potentially protect her from harm. Following up on Levinas’ contemplation of 
hospitality, which avoids the subordination of ethics to knowledge and the 
categorisation of the stranger Other, for instance with respect to refugees who deserve 
protection and irregular migrants who do not, Derrida also argues instead that “there 
is a structure of responsibility built into human relations that precedes other forms of 
relating such as knowing or perceiving” (Barnett, 2003:5). Suggesting that our ethical 
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responsibility towards the stranger Other, the irregular immigrant, etc., supersedes 
our attachment to a place, Derrida theorises ethics, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
as a constant return to the responsibility towards the Other. Hospitality thus is not a 
mere region of ethics, but “ethicity itself, the very principle of ethics in its entirety” 
(Derrida, 1999:94). As we saw, for Levinas the responsibility towards the Other is 
absolute and inviolable; one is exposed to the Other in a face-to-face relationship, but 
this is not a reciprocal or a symmetrical relation. One is always and already responsible 
to and for the Other, prior to any calculation or reflection by a self-conscious subject. 
The subject is, as he puts it, always one-for-the-Other (Levinas 1981, 135–140). 
 
As expected, Agamben is critical of the Levinasian ethical understanding of 
responsibility, finding it to be a complex rendition of the juridical category of the 
sponsor seen earlier. The happy life at which his ethics aims has nothing to do with the 
Other; “there is no ‘one’ Other – there is only the self and the positive action to create 
a new reality” (Fiorovanti, 2010:9). As we have seen, Agamben, under the influence of 
Deleuze, considers that the Self would ideally be singular and devoid of identity in a 
post-statal end of historic time. Therefore, first the Other’s nakedness in bare life, and 
later the singularity of the Self that knows no Other, undermines the possibility of 
biopolitically considering an ethics of hospitality.  
 
5.4.2 Ethics and the autoimmunitary 
Speaking of the camp, Agier identifies another ambivalence, to which I referred very 
briefly earlier: on the one hand, the camp is fundamentally characterised as a 
precarious, banal, indifferent hors-lieu, an off-place, which, despite the variety and 
diversity of camp types, is still in essence a place beyond which normal life takes place, 
outside of the law and an “outside” of life in general; on the other, the camp has a 
potentially vibrant nature, when it becomes a place where actual life takes place, 
through resocialisation of strangers, as a possible locus of community, resistance and 
solidarity, of political tensions and agitations, acquiring a meaning for itself and for its 
internees (Agier, 2014:16–17). A similar tension or ambivalence is noted by Kim Rygiel 
in her discussion of the Calais “Jungle”: the “first image of the camp as a place of 
illegality and abjection is juxtaposed by a second image of “the jungle” as a makeshift 
community, where migrants reveal their resourcefulness in navigating increasingly 
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difficult border restrictions” (Rygiel, 2011:10). Bulley underlines the importance of 
such communities in granting greater agency and meaning to the displaced in refugee 
camps as well as in countering the instrumentalisation foreseen by the camp (Bulley, 
2014:66–8).  
 
Some camps in Greece, a central point of entry of the migrant fluxes towards Europe in 
the last decade,219 can be seen as archetypes of the camp for strangers. Makeshift and 
open-space camps that appeared in late 1990s, transitory points located near ports 
(such as the ports of Patras and Igoumenitsa, where ferries left for Italy) or land 
borders, are defined by the “vibrant nature” and resocialisation that Agier observes. 
Such camps, like the Pikpa camp in Lesvos, the Idomeni and Hara camps in the north 
of Greece and others, are created as a reaction to the hospitality vacuum created by the 
official, state-run detention camps. The island of Lesvos is central in the migration 
flows to Europe, as it “offers an invaluable case study in the promises, pitfalls, and 
progress in the West’s humanitarian response to the ongoing refugee crisis. From 
landing beaches staffed mainly by volunteers to the registration centers and transit 
camps run by professional aid organizations” (Hernandez, 2016), I think Lesvos gives a 
significant picture of the distinction between immunity and autoimmunity in the form 
of camps. I will therefore be focusing on two camps located there: the detention camp 
of Moria and the Pikpa camp for strangers.   
 
In the case of Lesvos (as with other islands), the only way for immigrants to leave the 
island and continue their trip is to first be registered. However, registration, a lengthy, 
complicated procedure in itself, is only possible if the people in transit are arrested 
and detained in a detention facility away from the port, reconstructed in 2013. 
Officially described as a “first reception centre” and later called a “hotspot”, the Moria 
detention camp, the largest registration point in the east Mediterranean, is a properly 
closed camp, fenced off with barbed wire. Living conditions are lamentable due 
partially to the fact that it was built to provide about 600 places for long-term 
detention, a number that was very fast surpassed.220 Regardless of numbers, the Moria 
camp has fast deteriorated and is now characterised by dire conditions: understaffed, 
with severe shortages in food and medicine provisions, queues to use necessary 
                                                        219	At	least	until	the	EU	/	Turkey	Join	Plan,	as	agreed	on	in	March	2016.	See	relevant	footnote	216.	220	It	enclosed	approximately	4,000	migrants	in	April	2016	(Squires,	2016).	
 245 
services,221 unhygienic sanitary facilities (Mahmood, 2015; Squires, 2016) and, what is 
worse, a division of the camp into a part for those who are expected to meet asylum 
granting criteria, i.e. Syrians, and into a part for all others (in spite of being also 
eligible), creating tension among groups of immigrants themselves. As is to be 
expected, immigrants’ hunger strikes and riots are common and the camp is 
permanently guarded by riot police. Police, assisted by the European agency Frontex, 
is also appointed to identify migrants and bring them into the camp. Accusations that 
identification is also followed by interrogations in order to obtain information 
concerning migration patterns have been made, but there is no official evidence to 
back them up (W2EU, 2013). Conditions in Moria and its role in pushing back potential 
refugees following the EU/Turkey Joint Plan led the International Rescue Committee 
(IRC) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) operating in Lesvos to join Doctors 
without Borders and the UNHCR in voicing concerns and scaling back activity in the 
camp (EurActiv.com, 2016; see also fn 208). 
 
Based in the south of the island along with traditional aid organisations such as the 
International Rescue Committee, the hotspot of Moria had failed repeatedly to address 
the needs of incoming migrants and asylum seekers, the vast majority of whom land 
on the northern shores of the island. Its failure, however, did not lie merely with its 
geographical position, but mainly with the extensive focus on detention and control, 
overriding the obligation genuinely to address the needs of the immigrants arriving on 
the island. As a symbol of the immunising tendency of the Greek state and the 
European Union to secure and safeguard their borders, the Moria detention camp 
failed both the laws of hospitality, i.e., to respect and meet the international legal 
standards of human conditions and asylum granting procedures and the law of 
hospitality, the unconditional welcome of the Other in need.      
 
At least until December 2015, migrants arriving in the north of the island were 
welcomed and taken care of by local residents and volunteers on an ad hoc basis, which 
steadily crystallised into a successful, concentrated effort to address the primary 
                                                        221	Mahmood	reports	in	October	2015	a	more	than	11-hour	wait	for	a	migrant	to	register	with	the	authorities	of	 the	 camp	 (Mahmood,	2015).	Registrations	and	asylum	applications	 lodged	 through	skype,	 implemented	 from	the	spring	of	2016,	have	 failed	 to	address	 the	problem	effectively,	with	immigrants	 waiting	 for	 more	 than	 20	 days	 to	 connect	 and	 be	 allocated	 a	 timeslot	 for	 their	application	(Boltje,	2016).	
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subsistence needs of the immigrants arriving by boats from Turkey. The surge in 
migrant arrivals in summer 2015 was met by a surge in volunteers, who were now 
coming from places outside Greece, individually and in groups (see fn 203). Informed 
by social media, moved and determined to respond to the call of strange Others in 
need, they assisted in sea rescues; in the provision of water, food and other goods; 
addressed medical needs; offered transport – thus breaching the law (see fn 207) – and 
basic guidance to the boatload of immigrants arriving daily; and liaised with people 
back home to fundraise and recruit more volunteers, among a variety of other services 
(Hernandez, 2016).222  
 
In the vacuum created by the insistence on immunising the borders in the form of 
ineffective, hospitality-cancelling detention camps, camps for strangers like the Pikpa 
camp (also called the Village of all together) were created. On what had previously 
been a summer camping site for children, latterly fallen into disuse, a group of Greek 
volunteers set up in 2012 a base for refugees arriving in Lesvos. In one of their press 
releases, they present themselves in the following way: 
 
“Village of all together” was born in Lesvos in 2012 from the need to create a 
solidarity network as an answer to the consequences of the economic crisis but 
even more as an organized action to ensure that the local population will not 
become a victim of the Golden Dawn’s propaganda. Unlike other non-
governmental organizations, the “Village of all together” is not a legal entity 
but a network of citizens, collectives, groups and other organisations in Lesvos 
with a common goal to act altogether. (…) [T]he “Village of all together” 
defends the right of the refugees to a fair treatment and simultaneously, it 
promotes the creation of open hospitality centres in support of local 
community. PIKPA is a self-managed-autonomous space and has no access to 
any state or European funds. This self-managed space has hosted during this 
time [in the first three years of its existence] more than 6.000 refugees, some 
for a few days and others for up to a year. The refugees include asylum and 
                                                        222	A	series	of	small	organisations	were	born	from	the	initial	presence	of	these	individuals.	See	the	Starfish	 Foundation,	 the	Dutch	 Stichting	 Bootvluchteling	 (the	 Boat	 Refugee	 Foundation),	 and	 the	ProActiva	 OpenArms,	 a	 nonprofit	 extension	 of	 a	 Barcelona-based	 lifeguard	 company	 after	 its	owner’s	 mobilisation	 following	 the	 international	 outcry	 caused	 by	 the	 photo	 of	 Alan	 Kurdi,	 the	three-year-old	Syrian	boy	whose	body	washed	ashore	(Hernandez,	2016).		
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family unification applicants and/or vulnerable groups of newly arrived 
refugees e.g. people with disabilities, sick, pregnant etc. There, we offer food, 
clothes, medicines, hygiene, legal counseling, and medical help as well as we 
organise activities (sic) for children and classes of Greek and English and 
occasionally, we provide them with transport expenses and social support. (…) 
Our main objective is to stand in solidarity with the refugees and fight against 
the illegal arrests and any practice of humiliation or atrocities conducted in the 
sea or at the borders.223 (…) Our dream is to create proper reception and 
hospitality centres for every refugee as well any Greek national who has been a 
victim of the economic crisis, the racism and any xenophobic propaganda.  
(Latsoudi, 2015) 
 
The “Village of all together” is no more ambitious than the other camps for strangers 
functioning in Lesvos and elsewhere on the Greek territory. Instigators, volunteers, 
temporary and long-term camp facilitators – in a nutshell, host-Selves – fulfil the 
demands both of the law and the laws of hospitality. With personal cost and in danger 
of being persecuted, they embrace an open ethics of hospitality in a spirit of 
Levinasian fraternity and against deep-rooted, philosophically sustained fears of the 
Other and of the “autoaggressive immune behaviour” a less conditional opening to the 
Other may entail.  
 
 
Conclusion 
While for Derrida the moment of ethical fulfilment is the arrival of the Other in a 
disjointed messianic time, in the future-to-come, “the very relationship with the 
Other [being] the relationship with the future” (Levinas, 1999), with her welcome 
always to be negotiated, the fulfilment of the Agambenian biopolitical project, which 
informs and influences poststructuralist debates on hospitality, consists of the 
creation of a new conception of life, of a ““happy life” (…) that has reached the 
                                                        
223 In	June	2015,	in	an	effort	to	challenge	the	law	that	forbade	the	transport	of	immigrants	(see	fn	207),	 the	 Village	 of	 all	 together	 organised	 a	 convoy	with	 over	 forty	 cars	 that	 travelled	 from	 the	north	part	of	 the	 island,	where	 immigrants	have	 landed,	 to	 the	port	of	 the	 island.	 In	addition,	 the	Village	has	participated	in	legal	procedures	in	support	of	citizens	being	tried	for	having	transported	immigrants	against	the	law. 	
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perfection of its own power and its own communicability – a life over which 
sovereignty and right no longer have any hold” (2000:113–14). Such a life foresees a 
possible coexistence between bios and zoe while life will find its unity in a pure 
immanence to itself, in “the perfection of its own power”. Communicability (that is, 
language) (2000:95) is dealt with in greater detail in Agamben’s The Coming 
Community, where the notion of quodlibet, “whatever singularities”, is developed. 
Language is the nexus of an envisaged future community, consisting of “whatever 
singularities”, where common identity and commonality are not the community’s 
prerequisites. Within this perspective, Agamben’s conception of “whatever 
singularity” indicates a form of being that rejects any manifestation of identity or 
belonging and wholly appropriates being to itself, that is, in its own “being-in-
language” (Mills, 2003). Until the advent of this community, though, how can these 
singularities treat their inclusionary exclusion from sovereign power and their 
nakedness in life? Agamben, in advance of such a liberating, non-statal future, seems 
to suggest a bleak present: trapped in their condition of bare life, singularities are 
unable to react. Being singular, they also lack agency, political or communal, and the 
ability to escape their situation. In this sense, the Agambenian paradigm of homo sacer 
has nothing to contribute to a possible rethinking of hospitality ethics, where the 
subject has to be defined as a host or guest in order subsequently to overcome this 
identity and to become an openness to the Other, a welcome of the Other. Host-Selves 
and immigrant strangers are trapped in a dialectical economy of a Self/Other-as-object 
relationship. 
 
Despite these criticisms, however, Agamben’s analysis of biopower and theorisation of 
bare life might offer us certain useful elements to critically asses the ethics of 
hospitality and a valuable basis on which to develop a critique of the 
liberal/humanitarian discourses of citizenship. This basis is mostly found in the way 
Agamben traces and specifies explicitly the problematic in the priority given to 
national security and citizenship over the ethical obligation to the Other 
(Papastergiadis, 2006), an obligation theorised in such a way as to overlook the reality 
of an abject Other. Derridean ethics of hospitality, with their aversion to the dualism 
of “us” and “them” and insistence on an undecidable threshold,224 often overlooks the 
                                                        224	The	undecidable,	often	found	in	translations	that	Derrida	himself	has	overseen	as	undecideable	or	indecideable,	is	essential	for	understanding	Derrida’s	thought	–	for	the	needs	of	this	thesis,	the	
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existing mechanisms expressly deployed to create such dualisms. Such mechanisms 
treat abject Others, such as strangers and undocumented migrants, ambivalently: 
sometimes the impact of their presence at the threshold is exaggerated, at other times 
it is trivialised, but the right to exert violence on them is almost always justified. While 
the ethics of hospitality does call for a new international law of hospitality and for a 
new politics (Derrida, 1999:101), it fails to account in a satisfying manner for the 
violence and marginalisation to which the Other is exposed. 
 
Informing Derridean ethics of hospitality with an autoimmunitary aspect acts in this 
respect as a corrective move. It leads us to ask questions about the Self and address de 
profundis our ethical responsibility towards the Others. Against the fear of an 
autoimmunitary harm, the ethics of autoimmunitary hospitality overcome self-
protection and exit the threshold of undecidability towards the unknown of opening 
up to it. 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  terms	 undecidable	 and	 undecidability	 have	 been	 used	 all	 the	 way	 through,	 altering	 where	necessary	the	spelling	of	citations.		
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Mare mortum and the hospitality landscape 
In a recent article, Roland Bleiker, David Campbell and others (2013) discuss how the 
figure of the asylum seeker is often represented in the (Australian) media. Rarely 
alone, but in medium or large groups with a focus on boats, and without recognisable 
facial features, her representation is made to connote threats to security and 
sovereignty, rather than the humanitarian challenge her plight normally entails. 
“These dehumanising visual patterns directly feed into the politics of fear” and 
“establish the conditions of possibility for political discussions” (Bleiker, Campbell, 
Hutchison, & Nicholson, 2013:399, 414). Dehumanisation and depersonalisation of 
the Other, be she a refugee or an undocumented immigrant, reduces her to an abject 
and liminal Other, whose “plight, dire as it is, nevertheless does not generate a 
compassionate political response” (Bleiker, Campbell, Hutchison, & Nicholson, 
2013:398). Taking Bleiker et al.’s argument to its logical conclusion, a humanising 
visualisation of an asylum seeker’s plight may lead to compassion, empathetic 
political discussions and eventually a compassionate ethical response. The well-
documented case of the death of Alan Kurdi could be a case in point: the dead body of 
a three-year old Syrian that was washed ashore in Turkey in September 2015 was 
immortalised in a picture that travelled rapidly around the world, making global 
headlines. The response was swift: the French President publicly stated the following 
day that this death “must be a reminder of the world's responsibility for refugees”, 
calling for a common EU refugee policy (Daily Sabah, 2015.), while other heads of 
states commented that the photo was shocking, moving and indicative of what the 
refugee crisis really is – a “human catastrophe” (Hand, 2015). The incident even 
became central to the electoral debate during the Canadian federal election (Austen, 
2015), while it caused a great surge in donations, the creation of at least one related 
NGO (See fn222), the mobilisation of volunteers, and even a temporary volte-face on 
the part of one of the most anti-immigrant organs of the British national press, with 
the Daily Mail reporting on “the horrific human cost of the global migrant crisis” (Hall, 
2015).  
 
However, the ensuing compassionate political response that Bleiker et al. expected 
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was not to be. In a counterintuitive manner, the “common refugee policy” that 
Hollande asked for ended in an EU deal with Turkey that has attracted widespread 
criticisms regarding its legality (Human Rights Watch, 2016b) and which, in the first 
three months after being implemented, has been proven to put people in transit in 
grave danger (Michels, 2016). Concurrently, the number of unaccompanied and 
missing refugee children has steeply risen (Jenkins, 2016) and many of the policies 
outlined in the opening sentences of the introduction continue to be implemented 
unhindered.  
 
The reason for this, I have consistently argued in this thesis, is that political 
considerations and decisions do not occur in response to calls for responsibility or for 
the engendering of compassion. On the contrary, compassion and debates on 
responsibility towards others in need, as in the case of refugees, shatter against state-
centric notions of responsibility, primacy of sovereignty, and security fears, which in 
turn are sustained by a state-centric, security-fixated theory. International Relations 
and International Political Theory, in their mainstream and hegemonic strands at 
least, inform responsibility narratives through a hierarchical Self/Other dialectic in 
which the Self, by which I mean the individual self but also the territorially-bound 
community and the state, always comes first. The subjects of compassion, ethical 
responsibility, empathy and their channeling into action are inconspicuously put aside 
by mainstream theory, silently implying that they belong to the sphere of 
impracticality and utopia and not the needs of “the real world”. Ethical issues of this 
kind are considered to be in essence unanswerable (Brown, 1992) since the weight of 
the decision to act compassionately and to take up ethical responsibility lies in essence 
with the community (2.1). The strands of theory that seek to challenge this outlook 
(i.e., both human rights approaches and neo-Kantianism) refer to the centrality of the 
law (rights of free movement and exit), and so do practices of distributive justice and 
inclusion through membership, respectively; but they discount the fact that when it 
comes to refugee plights and mobility, the law is consistently flouted, while practices 
of redistribution of privilege and inclusion via membership are underlined by a 
decisionism in which authority is assigned once again to the state and the community.  
 
Considering this, the question needs to be asked: is what we have in front of us a 
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“refugee” or a “migrant” crisis, or is it indeed a failure of theory and action? I argue it 
is the latter. As Elisabeth Schmidt-Hieber and Lilana Keith, respectively the 
communications officer and Interim Programmes Director of the Platform for 
International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), argue in a recent 
press release:  
what we see is neither a “refugee crisis” nor a “migrant crisis”. The situation 
which is unfolding has not been caused by refugees and migrants over the past 
months, but a result of years of political measures which have focused on 
sealing the EU’s borders, including through agreements with non-EU countries 
to prevent migrants and refugees from coming to Europe, and steadfastly 
avoided taking progressive steps towards a holistic, pragmatic and just policy 
framework to regulate modern human mobility. The significant humanitarian 
challenges to accommodate the number of people currently arriving reflect a 
crisis of political will. (Schmidt-Hieber and Keith, 2015) 
What we see is not a “refugee crisis”; but nor however is it solely “a crisis of political 
will”. As I have argued in the first part of this thesis, it is essentially a failure of ethics 
– and thus also of that part of IR theory that deals with ethics – to address such crises 
in an effective manner. The dehumanisation and depersonalisation of the Other is not 
an issue of visual politics, as Bleiker et al. suggest; instead, it may actually lie within 
our own theoretical “home”. For that reason, I have sought to explore the history of 
hospitality, the mainstream approaches to migration, the definition of the stranger 
Other, and the poststructuralist ethics as a an alternative and corrective to them. 
Exploring the use poststructuralist ethics make of Levinas’ considerations of 
subjectivity and responsibility and Derrida’s conceptualisation of hospitality, I then 
sought to address what I have found to be lacking in order to address the failure 
remarked above. To succeed in doing so, I have argued for the need to reconsider the 
expansion of the Levinasian ethical responsibility to all Others through his concept of 
fraternity and for enriching Derrida’s understanding of autoimmunity through an 
affirmative move tipping the undecidable towards the opening up to the Other. I have 
explored this affirmative autoimmunitary ethics of hospitality in the makeshift, self-
managed camps for strangers, arguing that the selfless, ethical embrace of the Others 
that is taking place there is an indication of what form this autoimmunitary ethics of 
hospitality may take when connected to the political.  
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The history of a concept  
The history of the concept of hospitality in the first chapter suggests neither a 
triumphalist progress to more open hospitality practices, nor an opposite regressive 
course. The consideration and implementation of hospitality have ebbed and flowed 
over time: traditionally linked to religion and religious-influenced obligations to 
neighbours and others, hospitality usually entailed the provision of welcome and 
sanctuary to the foreigner and the persecuted. After the attempts at a legal definition 
by natural law scholars, who tried to embed hospitality in property and 
communication, the notion and practice of hospitality was placed at the discretion of 
the state or other central authorities, leading Enlightenment scholars to lament what 
they perceive to be the loss of hospitality’s humanitarian character. The brief 
universalist respite of the French revolutionary episode emphasises a triumphant 
liberal evolution towards an unconditional opening to the Other – though this 
opening occurs solely in theory. In practice, it is amalgamated in an oxymoron where 
the proclamation of universal friendship and hospitality goes hand in hand with the 
exclusion of foreigners, nobles and other figures who are judged undesirable by the 
revolutionary milieu. As is to be expected, the consolidation of clearly territorially-
demarcated entities, initiated in the Middle Ages and continuing till the 18th century, 
not only undermined the religious influence on hospitality perceptions and practices, 
but also gave birth to an increasingly exclusionary treatment of Otherness.  
 
Kant’s attempt to supplement the individual authority of these entities with a 
republican federation of states partly based on a law of world citizenship – a law 
limited to conditions of universal hospitality (the first direct use of the term in modern 
times) – fails to overcome this exclusionary treatment, despite Kant’s advocacy for the 
idea that a right of hospitality was universal. Such a right proves in reality to be a right 
mainly of visitation: an expectation for anything more than a temporary sojourn 
renders the visitor and foreigner Other an enemy to the Self and the host community. 
This treatment acquires in the 20th century biopolitical traits. The better bureaucratic 
organisation of the state, the proliferation of technology and the need for stronger 
safeguarding of the state led to the upholding of “paper walls” through the obligatory 
registration and documentation of individuals and the increasing embedding of human 
life within institutions and apparatuses of control, such as surveillance, productivity, 
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health metrics but also citizenship and migration controls that were destined to 
exclude western and non-western foreigners alike. These developments are to a 
certain extent related to the horrific violence that results when modern states clash: 
Arendt’s rendering of the tragedy of the Second World War is closely related to a lack 
of hospitality, where, once again, the exclusionary envisioning of Others led many of 
these Others to their deaths, and subsequently condemned many more to permanent 
statelessness.   
From the tolerant universalist humanism of the Enlightenment philosophes that is 
externally constituted by its contrast against the figure of the noble savage to Arendt’s 
stateless subject, it is possible to observe again and again the constitution of a Self and 
community identity through the excluded existence of a stranger Other: the stateless, 
the migrant, the colonial subject, the refugee. This recognition impelled me to clarify 
the figure that I am interested in: to address the who of the autoimmunitary ethics of 
hospitality I am arguing for.  
 
Was Walter Benjamin a refugee or a migrant?225 
Which one would Benjamin be considered to be today? On the move since 1927, living 
a precarious life, dependent on a series of small jobs and having had “28 changes of 
address” (Leslie, 2015) in seven years in different parts of Europe, Benjamin found it 
increasingly impossible to survive in Germany, especially after 1933 and Hitler’s 
assumption of power, ending up fleeing Paris a day before the Germans entered it and 
crossing over to Spain, where he was threatened with deportation back to France. 
Fearing that he would eventually be returned to Nazi Germany, where he would most 
probably be in extreme peril (his own brother later died at a concentration camp in 
1942), he committed suicide in September 1940.   
 
Walter Benjamin was a migrant. One could obviously remark that the conventions 
relevant to the definition of his status (namely, the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 
Protocol, the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention and other legal texts) were not then in 
force, and that it was indeed such cases of statelessness, or situations in which 
citizenship of a specific state could be harmful to an individual, that these conventions 
                                                        225	Title	inspired	by	Esther	Leslie’s	blogpost	with	the	same	title	(Leslie,	2015).	
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were created to address. However, his case, I believe, still convincingly identifies the 
risks of distinguishing between “refugee” and “migrants”, therefore between “legal” 
and “illegal”, “deserving” and “undeserving” people on the move. Benjamin’s 
economic difficulties, which made him initially an economic migrant, were aggravated 
over time by the danger of violence and delegitimation (Leslie, 2015), exacerbated by 
the increasingly perilous circumstances of the time.  
Similarly, migrants may move in search of better living conditions for themselves and 
their families.  
This is often erroneously understood as a “voluntary” move to benefit from job 
opportunities and living standards in the country of destination (…) reasons for 
migration are manifold, multiple and complex. They often include the aim to 
leave situations of violence, insecurity, discrimination and/or systemic poverty 
in order to survive. People leaving situations of war are also frequently facing 
poverty. This complexity is not accounted for in the international protection 
system. Many of those welcomed as “refugees” today will likely be tomorrow’s 
undocumented migrants. Many will not meet the legal definition of a “refugee” 
as it is strictly applied by many European governments, or manage to be 
recognised as such. (Schmidt-Hieber and Keith, 2015)  
While in chapter two I do not insist on this point per se,226 I do argue that strict 
categorisations entail violence, create confusion about the actual realities and needs 
of people on the move and about the practical implications of the use of such terms. I 
have argued that these categories are often slippery and overlapping, permeable to the 
extent that they enable violent practices of control. They do not always act in favour of 
the Other who needs protection and assistance, and this is something that an ethics of 
hospitality should inquire into, researching the use of terms, asking why others do not 
                                                        
226 There	are	arguments	for	abandoning	the	use	of	the	term	migrant:	“There	is	no	"migrant"	crisis	in	the	 Mediterranean.	 There	 is	 a	 very	 large	 number	 of	 refugees	 fleeing	 unimaginable	 misery	 and	danger	 and	 a	 smaller	 number	 of	 people	 trying	 to	 escape	 the	 sort	 of	 poverty	 that	 drives	 some	 to	desperation.”	(Malone,	2015).	“For	reasons	of	accuracy,	the	director	of	news	at	Al	Jazeera	English,	Salah	 Negm,	 has	 decided	 that	 we	 will	 no	 longer	 use	 the	 word	 migrant	 in	 this	 context.	 We	 will	instead,	where	appropriate,	say	refugee.	At	this	network,	we	try	hard	through	our	journalism	to	be	the	 voice	 of	 those	 people	 in	 our	 world	 who,	 for	 whatever	 reason,	 find	 themselves	 without	 one.	Migrant	is	a	word	that	strips	suffering	people	of	voice.	Substituting	refugee	for	it	is	–	in	the	smallest	way	–	an	attempt	to	give	some	back”	(ibid). 
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exist, and making its own, new categories. Noting the recurrence in IR theory of 
various attempts to name the abject liminal Others that existing categories do not 
seem to encompass, I argue for the need to form a new and broader category for the 
abject liminal person, while at the same time, in the body of the thesis, I clarify the 
reference to the figure of the irregular and undocumented immigrant, preventing the 
figures of the Other and the stranger and the foreigner from being swallowed up in 
abstraction. 
 
 
The Ethical in IR 
I argued above that the failure of IR to address effectively hospitality crises and the 
dehumanisation of the Other may lie with the theory itself. In the second chapter I 
have argued in greater length that despite the so-called “ethical turn” in International 
Relations, issues related to the abject liminal figures in society go mostly unnoticed 
and substantially unchallenged. The failure properly to consider the ethics of 
hospitality – and to draw it into the discussion of the responsibility towards such 
liminal figures of society – is at the root of this problem; and I argue further that if the 
debate around ethics needs urgently to answer one question, then this should probably 
be the issue of hospitality. Considering the discourse of rights, the neo-Kantian 
debates on distributive justice and membership and the ethics of migration, I found 
that their seemingly neutral and inclusive legal and ethical categories and 
representations were instead partial and exclusive. Examining the rights of movement 
and exit, I have tried to show the limitations regarding the inability to enforce the one 
(freedom of exit) without the other (freedom of movement). I have equally been 
critical of the other neo-Kantian approaches, as seen on page 258. In the same 
context, I have claimed that the Rawlsian influence on mainstream Anglo-Saxon IR 
constitutes part of the latter’s problematic relation with, and its essential failure to 
address the needs of, strangers. I expanded further on this claim in chapter three, 
when I addressed the issue of consensus in contrast to Levinas’ theorisation of 
responsibility.  I have argued these approaches were part of this failure; and I argued 
that poststructuralism may be the only strand in ethical thinking that can avoid 
discounting the subjectivity and needs of liminal Others. 
In the last part of chapter two, I have shown that despite the common accusations of 
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relativism, nihilism and even amorality (Sokal and Bricmont, 1997; for a rebuttal see 
Der Derian 1997:57–8), poststructuralist IR recognises ethics and the ethical relation 
as central concerns (e.g. Campbell 1998a; 1998b; Walker 1993; 2003). I explored in 
detail poststructuralist ethics, especially its rendering of subjectivity-formation and 
the importance of responsibility towards the Other, and finally, the appearance in its 
narrative of hospitality. Recognising the importance of this work for my own project, I 
took issue with the remit of hospitality as a concept (whether it can be used in 
interventions or whether it can satisfactorily stand when the Self in the Self/Other 
relation is a state), suggesting that hospitality in my understanding is better applicable 
to the calls of individual Others, or in relation to such practices of Othering as occur 
during border crossings. There were also two other important issues with the 
poststructuralist approach that my thesis has tried to overcome: namely, its 
problematic relation with Levinas’ conceptualisation of the third and the insistence 
that without a sturdy border, the ethics of hospitality cannot exist. Regarding the first 
issue, I have argued that the advent of the third should not make us give up on 
Levinas’ importance for an embrace of the liminal Other, suggesting that Derrida’s 
influence on poststructuralist readings of Levinas may be one of the reasons why this 
abandonment happens. As for the second, I have briefly proposed that an 
autoimmunitary aspect of hospitality ethics can undermine this insistence. 
 
 
Otherwise than being 
“Putting a human face to suffering is seen as a key factor in gaining viewers’ attention 
which is, in turn, essential to trigger not only some form of empathetic affective 
response but also a willingness to act” argue Bleiker, et al. (2013:408), perhaps also 
referring to Levinas’ emphasis on the face of the Other (even if only implicitly). The 
empathetic response Bleiker et al. hope for is concomitant with Levinas’ 
understanding of the face as a symbol of immediate ethical process: the face’s signal 
uprightness, poverty and defencelessness. It is this immediate approach of the Other 
who calls us to respond and act that I have explored in chapter three.  
 
I have argued for the need to make use of Levinas’ relational ethics in order to think 
about and promote efforts to link with Otherness and to undermine the latter’s 
exclusion and dehumanisation in politics and in ethical theory; and I have inquired 
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into its usefulness for the ethics of hospitality. Inspired by his work, I have attempted 
to stress the point that we are all “intrinsically bound together in an ethic of 
responsibility, without ontological detachment clauses” (George 1995: 210) Therefore, 
“it is impossible to free myself by saying, ‘it is not my concern’. There is no choice, for 
it is always and inescapably my concern” (Campbell, 1994:460, quoted in George 1995: 
210).  
 
To do so I have first explored how Hegelian and Kojèvian scholarship has influenced 
the conception of the Self/Other relation in International Poltiical Theory, finding that 
these too have been constituted by hierarchy and power and a master/slave binary 
depicting a constant struggle for survival. I have then essayed to challenge this binary 
by exploring Levinas’ rendering of the human relation and his ethics of responsibility 
through the face-to-face relationship mentioned just above. I have finally indicated 
the way that could, in my opinion, overcome the difficulties encountered by 
poststructuralist ethics regarding the arrival of the third and the difficult passage from 
the ethical to the political for Levinas’ thought (namely, that one can hold an 
unconditional responsibility both towards the Other and the Others).  
 
I have tried to debunk this commonly held belief by arguing that an intertwinement of 
the ethical with the political is possible in Levinas’ thought through his earlier concept 
of fraternity. The way fraternity is introduced in Totality and Infinity is twofold: on the 
one hand, it expresses the uniqueness of the elected self, and on the other hand, the 
equality between the “brothers”, “conveying the encounter of the Self with the Other 
but also with a multiplicity of Others simultaneously” (Rat, 2013:110). Given that 
Levinas rarely speaks of hospitality per se, fraternity, I have argued, is his implicit 
reference to it; and it acts as the bridge between the ethical and the political and as a 
tentative solution to the tensions created during the move from the one-for-the-Οther 
to one-for-the-others and to the attribution of justice. Despite its patriarchical 
connotations, I argue that fraternity is essential in enabling us enact our responsibility 
towards undocumented immigrants, who are thus no longer deprioritised in the 
economy of assistance because of their inherent Otherness, lack of categorisation or 
distance to the Self. I argue that fraternity can accomplish this without affecting or 
attenuating the limits of my responsibility to the Other’s singularity and alterity.  
As I will discuss in the conclusion, the prioritisation of my responsibility will take 
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place in an autoimmunitary fashion in my effort to spare her from suffering, violence 
and death in spite of any qualitative caveats. 
 
 
The naked experience of autoimmunity 
This transcendence of the ethical relation with the Other permeates politics, which 
remains always open to question and problematising. Levinas sees this move from 
responsibility to questioning as the passage from ethics to politics (1991:84). This “is 
not a passage of time, but rather a doubling of discourse”, i.e., the response to the 
singularity of the Other’s face and at the same time to the community, where the 
essence of society does not derive from a “struggle of egoisms” but from the 
inegalitarian moment of the ethical relation (Critchley, 1992:226). Derrida is critical of 
this doubling of discourse and the passage to the political.  
 
He attempts his own passage by contemplating the threshold between hospitality and 
no hospitality, conditional hospitality and unconditional hospitality, its laws and the 
law of hospitality and essentially the threshold of life and death, always in peril 
because of the worst violence. Derrida ponders extensively and in a multi-layered way 
the concept of the threshold, considering it as an aporia indicative of the issue of 
hospitality, defining a limen between the inside and outside, a beginning of infinite 
possibilities and responsibilities, but also a topos that needs to be transgressed. His 
lingering on the threshold means that his reflection on borders, and on the need to 
respond to the dilemmas they pose, is not related to any understanding of those 
borders as solid and secure, as defined and given – as traditional ethical approaches 
would have them be – but instead keeps them in question, in line with the essential 
gesture of deconstructive thinking. Considering the impossibility of unconditional 
hospitality I have explored the “transgressive step” this entails: the offering of 
hospitality beyond motivation and predictability and within a vacuum of incentives.  
 
Hospitality in this sense is defined by undecidability, Derrida has made clear, and it is 
this undecidability of his that constitutes the main takeaway for poststructuralist 
ethics. I analyse this to the best of my ability, suggesting however that Derrida’s 
exploration of autoimmunity can inform undecidability in an affirmative way. More 
concretely, I argue that his rendering of autoimmunity can be explored further and 
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beyond the suicidal character of democracies to which it has often alluded. I have 
argued that autoimmunity need not emphasise only the threat of the worst but that it 
can instead make the case for an opening – albeit dangerous – to the unknown, to the 
coming of Otherness beyond pre-established recognition of identity characteristics 
and commonalities of the Other with the host organism. In this case hospitality can be 
considered as a form of autoimmunity in itself.  
 
To assign to the autonomous Self the ability to define in an immunising way her own 
boundaries, in the belief that this is a natural, supposedly scientifically-proven 
characteristic, is, I have argued from the beginning of this project, highly problematic. 
In the context of hospitality, this translates into the supposedly immunising function 
of borders that are always, I argue, porous, always permeable by the presence of the 
Other. Influenced by the most recent work on radical immunology, which suggests 
that immunisation is illusory and that autoimmunity is erroneously conceived as an 
attack upon the Self, I have argued that we need to enrich Derrida’s approach with the 
possibility that autoimmunity may bring productive and fertile transformations to the 
Self when the latter opens up to an affirmative, more open, responsible welcome of the 
growing numbers of stranger Others at the border.  
 
I have suggested that this experience of opening up, this understanding of 
autoimmunity that tips the scales towards a more open border and hospitality, exists 
within a recourse to experience itself” and what is most irreducible within experience: 
“the passage and departure towards the Other” (Derida, 1999:103). It is in this “naked 
experience” (Derrida, 2001:83) that the Self experiences first-hand the struggle 
involved in ethically addressing the responsibility towards the Others that I have tried 
to locate in my exploration of the camp for strangers.  
 
 
The camp: from immunity to autoimmunity 
The camp for strangers, I have argued, consists of self-made, makeshift encampments 
for yet uncateforised immingrants. They are sustained by the presences of indivivuals 
volunteering, by a series of host-Selves that have embraced their ethical responsibility 
towards the Others and have responsed to their call. The wooden pallets, cartons, 
plastic sheets, pieces of used carpet, tarpaulins stolen from building sites – these 
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materials, appearing in the descriptions of makeshift, self-organised camps are all 
used in the attempt to compensate for the lack of proper flooring in the provisional 
housing in the camps for strangers, places of hospitality par excellence. Researchers 
and anthropologists visiting these camps for strangers seem inadvertently to focus on 
these efforts to build shelters, which usually remain standing longer than intended, 
allured perhaps by the desperate resourcefulness behind their construction (Agier and 
Prestianni, 2011:68, 70–75). The threshold of such precarious constructions becomes a 
symbol of setting foot in a non-owned area, where one is not expected, does not 
belong and is not necessarily welcome.  
 
Equally symbolic is the threshold of different points of entrance to the European 
Union: either because such points can be located far away from European borders, as 
in the “Regional Protection Areas” buffer zones or because the threshold may often 
appear to be “mobile” according to varying legal interpretations serving different 
needs: this is the threshold of the Spanish border at cities like Ceuta and Melilla, 
where for a Spanish judge, national territory starts at the outside fence of the border, 
whereas for the Spanish government, it starts rather further in, as it corresponds with 
the line of police officers inside the fence, making all summary returns in this way 
conveniently legal (ECRE, 31 October 2014). The threshold is again here the 
fundamental concept for the ethics of hospitality seen earlier, since it stands as a 
symbolic figure defining the precarious distinction between inside and outside, among 
subject categories, between Self and the Other, hospitality and persecution.  
 
The threshold of detention camps is somewhat different. Patrick Hayden finds that 
spaces like detention camps may be part of a “strategy of inclusive exclusion” as he 
calls it; it “may also be viewed as an attempt to exploit racist and xenophobic 
tendencies in order to shape perceptions about stateless persons as undesirable 
“others” seeking to squander the resources of the state and exploit the good will of the 
nation, thereby corrupting the health and welfare of the nation-state” (Hayden, 
2008:262). Whereas detention camps define the ambvibalence where the proclaimed 
obligations of states to protect strangers at the border hurtle against the 
dehumanising and punishing role of said camps, the camps for strangers embody a 
different one: namely the ambivalence of host-Selves selflessly embracing their 
responsibility towards stranger Others amidst a rise in xenophobia, anti-immigration 
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sentiments and a serious economic crisis.  
 
Looking at the biopolitical readings of the camp, I settle for the ethical 
autoimmunitary embodiment of hospitality in the camps for strangers as seen in the 
example of the Pikpa camp in Lesvos. I have argued that the camp for strangers 
appeared as a response to the ethical vacuum created by the immunisation of borders, 
hospitality-failing camps and the general dehumanising treatment of the stranger 
Other. It also embodies the possibility of implementing an autoimmunitary ethics of 
hospitality into practice.   
 
 
For an autoimmunitary ethics of hospitality 
The twenty-first century will be the century of the migrant, argues Thomas Nail in a 
recent book (2015). The twentieth century was considered to be the century of the 
refugee. In regards to the status of Walter Benjamin, Bertolt Brecht calls him 
“Flüchtling” in the poem he wrote in his memory, “On the Suicide of the Refugee 
W.B.” (Wizisla, 2009:184), which he composed upon hearing the news of his suicide on 
the border of Spain and France. The German equivalent word for refugee, “Flüchtling” 
underlines the notion of moving, more the act of flight and less the act of reaching a 
place of refuge.  
The act of moving, the act of reaching a place, the act of enduring dehumanisation 
before you are accepted, given shelter, food, assistance – this constitutes the threshold 
that the autoimmunitary ethics of hospitality transgress. There, a responsibility, which 
is not actively chosen or consciously accepted, is instead assumed in response to the 
approach of the Other. Is this utopian or impossible? I argue that it is not. Seeds of this 
autoimmunitary hospitality can be seen not only in the camps for strangers, but also in 
the solidarity convoys to Calais, in the soup-kitchens of large cities where people that 
have never been interested in charity or even felt comfortable around foreigners now 
feel the need to be present and address the call of the Other to responsibility.227 With 
                                                        227	In	an	informal	interview	I	had	with	a	70-year	old	woman	assisting	in	a	soup-kitchen	in	Athens	in	January	2016,	it	was	particulary	difficult	to	join	the	dots	between	her	selfless	giving	with	her	raw	admission	that	she	always	carries	an	extra	pair	of	gloves	for	fear	of	catching	something	contagious	“from	these	people	who	come	from	so	far	away”.	
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polls showing high percentages of empathy and solidarity felt by the public for the 
plight of migrants228  amidst adverse conditions of anti-immigration rhetoric and 
economic and political crisis and the provision of assistance to the stranger Other 
growing stronger can only attest to that. 
 
 The embrace of responsibility does not do away with the asymmetry of the ethical 
relation, but it nevertheless helps us to see eye-to-eye, in the mutually enriching co-
presence of Self and Other. Doing away with the need for decisionality and the need to 
base decisions on certainty and calculation, autoimmunitary ethics of hospitality has 
rendered us ready for the transgressive step over the threshold where we were called to 
linger on in the face of uncertainty. The immunisation of borders fails, negative 
understandings of autoimmunity are breached and the ethical responsibility is 
affirmatively enacted by the host-Selves.  
 
Ce qui arrive, arrive 
 
                                                        228	In	February	of	2016,	in	the	sixth	winter	of	economic	crisis,	a	third	consecutive	poll	showed	that	at	 least	 84%	 of	 the	 Greek	 population	 are	 empathetic	 towards	 to	migrants	 arriving	 and	 consider	ways	to	assist	them	(Public	Issue	Poll,	2016).	
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